Lion Nathan Australia Pty Ltd v Coopers Brewery Ltd

Link copied
Case Copied 82 min read

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Lion Nathan Australia Pty Ltd v Coopers Brewery Ltd [2006] FCAFC 144

CORPORATIONS – construction of company’s articles of association – whether articles require compliance with pre-emptive rights regime for share buy-back – relevant circumstances at time of buy-back - whether regard may be had to extrinsic materials in interpreting articles

Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth), s 12CA, s 12DA
Companies Code (Cth), s 133BC, s 133DA
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), Div 2 of Pt 2J.1, s 124, s 125, s 129, s 140(1), s1041H
Corporations Law (Cth), s 206CA, s 206DA, s 615, s 633(c)

Angostura Bitters (Dr JGB Siegert and Sons), Limitedv Kerr [1933] AC 550 cited

Australian Broadcasting Commission v Australasian Performing Right Association Ltd (1973) 129 CLR 99 referred to
Australian Securities Commission v Marlborough Gold MinesLtd (1993) 112 ALR 627 referred to
Bailey v New South Wales Medical Defence Union Ltd (1995) 184 CLR 399 cited
Bowler v Hilda Pty Ltd (2001) 112 FCR 59 referred to
BP Refinery (Westernport) Pty Ltd v Shire of Hastings (1977) 180 CLR 26 referred to

Bratton Seymour Service Co Ltd v Oxborough [1992] BCLC 693 cited
Buche v Box Pty Ltd (1993) 31 NSWLR 368 cited
CIC Insurance Limited v Bankstown Football Club Limited (1997) 187 CLR 384 referred to
Codelfa Construction Proprietary Litd v State Rail Authority (1982) 149 CLR 337 cited

Coles Myer Ltd v Commissioner of State Revenue [1998] 4 VR 728 cited

Corporate Affairs Commission of New South Wales v Yuill (1991) 172 CLR 319 cited

Cotman v Brougham [1918] AC 514 cited

Egyptian Salt and Soda Company, Limited v Port Said Salt Association, Limited [1931] AC 667 referred to

Equitable Life Assurance Society v Hyman [2002] 1 AC 408 referred to

Equuscorp Pty Ltd v HGT Investments Pty Ltd (2004) 218 CLR 471 referred to
Genossenschaftsbank v Burnhope [1995] 1 WLR 1580 cited

Greenhalgh v Arderne Cinemas, Ltd [1946] 1 All ER 512 cited

Holmes v Keyes [1959] Ch 199 cited
Industrial Equity Limited v Blackburn (1977) 137 CLR 567 cited

Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd v West Bromwich Building Society [1998] 1 WLR 896 cited

Lion Nathan Australia Pty Ltd v Coopers Brewery Limited (2005) 223 ALR 560 affirmed
LondonFinancial Association v Kelk (1884) 26 Ch D 107 referred to

McNeil v McNeil’s Sheepfarming Co Ltd [1955] NZLR 15 cited

National Roads and Motorists’ Association Ltd v Parkin (2004) 60 NSWLR 224 referred to

Norths Ltd v McCaughan Dyson Capel Cure Ltd (1988) 12 ACLR 739 referred to

Oakbank Oil Company v Crum (1882) 8 App Cas 65 cited
Pacific Carriers Ltd v BNP Paribas (2004) 218 CLR 451 applied

Pilmer v Duke Group Ltd (in liquidation) (2001) 207 CLR 165 cited

Prenn v Simmonds [1971] 1 WLR 1381 cited

Rayfield v Hands [1960] 1 Ch 1 cited
Re Blue Arrow plc [1987] BCLC 585 referred to
Re Exchange Banking Company; Flitcroft’s Case [1882] 21 Ch D 519 cited
Re GIGA Investments Pty…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Lion Nathan Australia Pty Ltd v Coopers Brewery Ltd and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2006] FCAFC 144
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Lion Nathan Australia Pty Ltd v Coopers Brewery Ltd, the dispute centered on the interpretation of Coopers' corporate constitution, specifically Articles 38 and 39, and their application during a share buy-back. The case was heard by the court of appeal where Lion Nathan sought to enforce certain obligations under the Coopers Share Agreement, contingent on the proper interpretation of these articles. The appeal arose from the decision of Lander J in the Supreme Court of New South Wales, which was affirmed by Giles JA in the Court of Appeal.

The central legal issue before the court was the extent to which extrinsic evidence and the factual matrix should be considered in interpreting corporate constitutions. Lion Nathan argued that the traditional approach to interpretation, which strictly limited the consideration of external circumstances, should govern, while Coopers contended for a broader approach that allows for the use of surrounding circumstances even if the contractual language is not ambiguous. The court had to decide whether the principles set out by the High Court in Pacific Carriers and subsequent cases should apply to the interpretation of corporate constitutions.

The court determined that the High Court's approach to contract interpretation, which permits the consideration of surrounding circumstances even in the absence of ambiguity, was applicable to the interpretation of corporate constitutions. This approach aligns with the common law principles articulated by Lord Hoffmann in West Bromwich, emphasizing that the interpretation should reflect the meaning that the document would convey to a reasonable person with all the background knowledge reasonably available to the parties at the time of the contract. The court held that Finn J's interpretation of the principles governing the interpretation of commercial contracts was correct, and that the controversy regarding the use of surrounding circumstances in contract interpretation had been largely resolved by recent High Court cases.

The court ultimately dismissed the appeal, affirming the decision of the primary judge. The appeal was dismissed with costs, except for those attributable to the notice of contention, which were to be paid by Lion Nathan. This decision underscores the importance of considering the factual matrix when interpreting corporate constitutions, in line with the broader approach to contract interpretation adopted by the High Court.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The time within which the first respondent be at liberty to file and serve a notice of contention be extended to 24 April 2006.

2. Leave be given to the first respondent to rely on a copy letter from the appellant to the third respondent dated 14 July 2005, being exhibit “C” admitted at the hearing before the learned trial judge.

3. The appeal be dismissed.

4. Save for any costs attributable to the notice of contention, the appellant pay the respondents’ costs of the appeal.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Indeed, Lion Nathan went further and noted that Ipp JA had also referred specifically to Bratton, Santos and Simon, stating that those cases should be followed. Lion Nathan submitted that this showed that Finn J’s conclusion that Pacific Carriers governed the interpretation of corporate constitutions was simply wrong. Far from the traditional approach having been eroded by later authority, that approach was alive and well.CONCLUSIONS I am satisfied that Finn J’s statement of the principles that now govern the interpretation of commercial contracts, having regard to Pacific Carriers, was correct. I am also satisfied that the controversy engendered by the passage from the judgment of Mason J in Codelfa, to which to which Finn J referred, has now been largely resolved by recent High Court cases dealing with the use of surrounding circumstances when construing contracts. I refer, in particular, to Pacific Carriers, Equuscorp Pty Ltd v HGT Investments Pty Ltd (2004) 218 CLR 471, and Toll (FGCT) Pty Limited v Alphapharm Pty Limited (2004) 219 CLR 165 (“Toll”). In effect the High Court has determined that, at least when construing commercial contracts, the “surrounding circumstances” or “factual matrix” may be taken into account. This is so in all cases, even if the words at issue are not ambiguous, or susceptible of more than one meaning. See generally E Peden and JW Carter, “Taking Stock: the High Court and Contract Construction” (2005) 21 Journal of Contract Law 172 at 178-80. Coopers submitted that the position now taken by the High Court in relation to the construction of contracts is, in substance, the same as that taken by the House of Lords in Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd v West Bromwich Building Society [1998] 1 WLR 896 (“West Bromwich”). In that case, Lord Hoffmann said (at 912): “My Lords, I will say at once that I prefer the approach of the learned judge. But I think I should preface my explanation of my reasons with some general remarks about the principles by which contractual documents are nowadays construed. I do not think that the fundamental change which has overtaken this branch of the law, particularly as a result of the speeches of Lord Wilberforce in Prenn v. Simmonds [1971] 1 W.L.R. 1381, 1384-1386 and Reardon Smith Line Ltd. v. Yngvar Hansen-Tangen [1976] 1 W.L.R. 989, is always sufficiently appreciated. The result has been, subject to one important exception, to assimilate the way in which such documents are interpreted by judges to the common sense principles by which any serious utterance would be interpreted in ordinary life. Almost all the old intellectual baggage of “legal” interpretation has been discarded. The principles may be summarised as follows.(1) Interpretation is the ascertainment of the meaning which the document would convey to a reasonable person having all the background knowledge which would reasonably have been available to the parties in the situation in which they were at the time of the contract. (2) The background was famously referred to by Lord Wilberforce as the “matrix of fact,” but this phrase is, if anything, an understated description of what the background may include. Subject to the requirement that it should have been reasonably available to the parties and to the exception to be mentioned next, it includes absolutely anything which would have affected the way in which the language of the document would have been understood by a reasonable man. (3) The law excludes from the admissible background the previous negotiations of the parties and their declarations of subjective intent. They are admissible only in an action for rectification. The law makes this distinction for reasons of practical policy and, in this respect only, legal interpretation differs from the way we would interpret utterances in ordinary life. The boundaries of this exception are in some respects unclear. But this is not the occasion on which to explore them. (4) The meaning which a document (or any other utterance) would convey to a reasonable man is not the same thing as the meaning of its words. The meaning of words is a matter of dictionaries and grammars; the meaning of the document is what the parties using those words against the relevant background would reasonably have been understood to mean. The background may not merely enable the reasonable man to choose between the possible meanings of words which are ambiguous but even (as occasionally happens in ordinary life) to conclude that the parties must, for whatever reason, have used the wrong words or syntax: see Mannai Investments Co. Ltd. v. Eagle Star Life Assurance Co. Ltd. [1997] A.C. 749. (5) The “rule” that words should be given their “natural and ordinary meaning” reflects the common sense proposition that we do not easily accept that people have made linguistic mistakes, particularly in formal documents. On the other hand, if one would nevertheless conclude from the background that something must have gone wrong with the language, the law does not require judges to attribute to the parties an intention which they plainly could not have had.”

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Coopers contended that Lion Nathan was seeking to “leap frog” the rights of the first and second tier pre-emptive right holders. In relation to Lion Nathan’s contention that it should be permitted to purchase the buy-back shares, Coopers argued that the participating members had not been, and must be, heard. Also in this connection, Coopers contended that participating members might have been willing to sell into a buy-back for taxation or other reasons applicable to the buy-back, but might not be willing to transfer their shares to Lion Nathan. CONSIDERATION Lion Nathan seeks to enforce Coopers’ contractual obligations to it under the Coopers Share Agreement. As Lander J and the primary judge explain, the scope of these obligations depends on the proper interpretation of Coopers’ Articles, especially Arts 38 and 39. At the time of the share buy-back, Arts 38 and 39 relevantly read as follows:“38.Notwithstanding the provisions of any other Article including Article 54, the Directors must register any transfer of shares which requires registration and which is expressly permitted by Articles 40-53 or which is made in compliance with such Articles. No member may make any transfer of shares and the Directors must not register any transfers of shares without complying with Articles 40-53.39.In Articles 38-53, ‘transfer’ includes:-(a)sell, assign, offer, dispose of, transfer or deal in any way with any right, title or interest in any share (whether legal or beneficial and whether for valuable consideration or not); and(b)to agree to sell, assign, offer, dispose of, transfer or deal in any way with any right, title or interest in any share (whether legal or beneficial and whether for valuable consideration or not); and (c)create, declare or allow to be created any trust over any share.”Lander J and the primary judge have described in some detail the pre-emptive rights regime created by Arts 40 to 53. For my purposes, the regime is sufficiently described below. Coopers’ power to conduct the buy-back derived from Pt 2J.1 of Ch 2J of the Corporations Act and, in particular, s 257A. This provision enables a company to buy back its own shares if the buy-back does not materially prejudice the company’s ability to pay its creditors and it follows the statutory procedure. All rights in buy-back shares are suspended once the company enters into a buy-back agreement and it cannot deal in those shares: see s 257H(1) and (2). Shares bought back are cancelled immediately after the registration of the relevant transfers to the company: see s 257H(3). Coopers’ Articles did not make express reference to buy-backs, although, as we have seen, they did make provision for the sale and other disposition of shares in certain circumstances. Whether the conduct of the buy-back in 2003 was controlled by this pre-emptive rights regime depends upon the proper construction of Coopers’ Articles. Generally speaking, the principles for interpreting corporate constitutions are well established, although differences of opinion may sometimes arise as to the extent to which it is permissible to take into account matters extrinsic to the language of the constitutive documents.