Meng v Havacom Pty Ltd Trading as Quest Mandurah

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

MENG v HAVACOM PTY LTD TRADING AS QUEST MANDURAH [2020] FCCA 3034
Catchwords:
INDUSTRIAL LAW – Claimed underpayments pursuant to the Hospitality Industry (General) Award 2010 (Cth) – whether the respondent is a “hotel” or a “resort” – whether the applicant was only entitled to an overnight stay allowance – whether evidence of contractual obligations – respondent is not a hotel or resort – applicant did not work an “overnight shift” – no evidence of contractual terms as per the applicant’s submissions – application dismissed.

Legislation:

Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth), Pt.2-2, ss.45, 535, 570

Public Health Act 2016 (WA), s.202G

Cases cited:

Aon Risk Services Australia Limited v The Australian National University [2009] HCA 27

Davies v Punthill Apartment Hotels Pty Ltd [2014] FCCA 1158
Fair Work Ombudsman v Kensington Management Services Pty Ltd [2012] FMCA 225
Johnson v Monti-Haitsma Enterprises Pty Ltd [2014] FCCA 259
Kramer v Punthill Apartment Hotels Pty Ltd [2020] FCCA 1617
Pryde v Warramunda Village [2000] FCA 1374
Warramunda Village Inc v Pryde [2002] FCAFC 58
WorkPac Pty Ltd v Skene (2018) 264 FCR 536

Applicant: YIQIN MENG
Respondent: HAVACOM PTY LTD TRADING AS QUEST MANDURAH
File Number: PEG 501 of 2018
Judgment of: Judge Kendall
Hearing date: 30 September 2020 – 2 October 2020 and 19 October 2020
Date of Last Submission: 19 October 2020
Delivered at: Perth
Delivered on: 12 November 2020

REPRESENTATION

Counsel for the Applicant: Mr T Petherick
Solicitors for the Applicant: Petherick Cottrell Lawyers
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr R Millar
Solicitors for the Respondent: HMB Employment Lawyers Pty Ltd

ORDERS

  1. The application be dismissed.

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT
OF AUSTRALIA
AT PERTH

PEG 501 of 2018

YIQIN MENG

Applicant

And

HAVACOM PTY LTD TRADING AS QUEST MANDURAH

Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Introduction

  1. On 25 September 2018, the applicant, Yiqin Meng, filed an application in this Court alleging that the respondent, Havacom Pty Ltd., had breached ss.45 and 535 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (the “Act”). The respondent denies that it has contravened the Act and states that the applicant has been paid any entitlements owed to her.

Background

  1. The respondent company is a “management rights business” located in Mandurah.  It offers accommodation services to the general public. At the relevant time, the respondent was a franchisee of Quest Apartment Hotels operating as “Quest Mandurah” in Mandurah, Western Australia (“Quest”).

  2. Quest is situated within a larger complex which contains other privately owned apartments (the “Complex”). Those apartments are individually owned and are managed by the owners of Apollo Quay Strata Plan 38186 Company (the “Strata”). Owners may live in their apartment, rent the apartment themselves privately or use the respondent’s services.  If the latter occurs, the respondent manages the apartments (and rents them) pursuant to a Letting Services Agreement.

  3. David and Deanna Rushworth (the “Rushworths”) co-owned and managed Quest from 2002 until 2019. They are also directors of the respondent.

  4. The applicant started working with the respondent as a casual housekeeper in…

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Details
Case
[2020] FCCA 3034
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The applicant, Yiqin Meng, commenced proceedings in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia against the respondent, Havacom Pty Ltd trading as Quest Mandurah, alleging underpayments pursuant to the Hospitality Industry (General) Award 2010 (Cth). The applicant claimed she had been employed as a full-time or part-time hotel manager and had been paid only an overnight stay allowance, rather than the appropriate rate for overnight shifts. The respondent denied these claims, asserting that the applicant had been paid all entitlements owed to her.

The central legal issues before the Court were whether the respondent's premises constituted a "hotel" or "resort" for the purposes of the Award, and consequently, whether the applicant's role and remuneration aligned with the Award's classifications. Specifically, the Court had to determine if the applicant was entitled to payment for overnight shifts as a manager, or if her entitlement was limited to an overnight stay allowance as paid by the respondent. The Court also considered whether the applicant's employment contract contained implied terms that had not been met.

Judge Kendall determined that the respondent's business was not a "hotel" or "resort" as defined by the Award, noting that the term "hotel" did not extend to serviced apartments, a point clarified by recent case law. The Court found that the applicant did not work an "overnight shift" in the sense contemplated by the Award, but rather was compensated with an overnight stay allowance for her on-call availability. Furthermore, the Court found no evidence to support the applicant's submissions regarding contractual terms or entitlements beyond those already paid. The Court also refused an adjournment sought by the applicant, finding that the respondent's defence had not fundamentally changed and that the applicant could adequately present her case.

The application was dismissed.

Orders

Orders of the court

1.

The application be dismissed.

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT

OF AUSTRALIA

AT PERTH

PEG 501 of 2018

YIQIN MENG

Applicant

And

HAVACOM PTY LTD TRADING AS QUEST MANDURAH

Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Introduction

1.

On 25 September 2018, the applicant, Yiqin Meng, filed an application in this Court alleging that the respondent, Havacom Pty Ltd., had breached ss.45 and 535 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (the “Act”). The respondent denies that it has contravened the Act and states that the applicant has been paid any entitlements owed to her.

Background

2.

The respondent company is a “management rights business” located in Mandurah. It offers accommodation services to the general public. At the relevant time, the respondent was a franchisee of Quest Apartment Hotels operating as “Quest Mandurah” in Mandurah, Western Australia (“Quest”).

3.

Quest is situated within a larger complex which contains other privately owned apartments (the “Complex”). Those apartments are individually owned and are managed by the owners of Apollo Quay Strata Plan 38186 Company (the “Strata”). Owners may live in their apartment, rent the apartment themselves privately or use the respondent’s services. If the latter occurs, the respondent manages the apartments (and rents them) pursuant to a Letting Services Agreement.

4.

David and Deanna Rushworth (the “Rushworths”) co-owned and managed Quest from 2002 until 2019. They are also directors of the respondent.

5.

The applicant started working with the respondent as a casual housekeeper in 2013.

6.

In December 2013, the applicant was offered and accepted the position of “onsite caretaker”.

7.

The applicant was given a document which she says outlined the “Package” she would receive from the respondent for working as the onsite caretaker. That document, in evidence before the Court, provides:

Onsite care taker

• Free rent, power & phone in apartment 73

$500.00 per fortnight.

• Responsibilities would Involve the security of the complex (noise etc)

• Any afterhours requests from guests (locked out of room or toilet)

• Late check In’s or departures before reception opens (collect keys or night safe)

Package value : Rent $15,600.00

Pay $13,000.00

Power $2800.00

Phone $1200.00

Total $45,600.00

(Without alteration)

8.

The applicant’s duties are the subject of some debate, as is the effect of the “Package” outlined above.

9.

It is agreed between the parties that the applicant’s duties included “checking in guests”, “resolving enquiries”, “responding to complaints” (eg. noise or smoking) and “checking the Complex at least once during the evening”.

10.

So that the applicant could respond to complaints or enquiries and communicate after-hours, her mobile telephone number was given to guests. After reception closed, the applicant was the only onsite staff member until the reception reopened the following morning.

11.

On 13 February 2018, the applicant resigned.

12.

Shortly after tendering her resignation, the applicant advised the respondent that she believed she had been underpaid. Following an audit, the applicant was paid an additional $8,685.36. This payment was included in the applicant’s final pay on 9 March 2018.

Issues

13.

It is not in dispute that the applicant’s employment was covered by the Hospitality Industry (General) Award 2010 (Cth) (the “Award”).

14.

The applicant claims that she was underpaid. She claims that during the course of her employment she was employed in one of the following capacities:

a) as a full-time hotel manager; or

b) as a part-time hotel manager.

15.

The applicant also claims that her pay fell below what these classifications require. She was paid only the overnight stay allowance. She says she ought to have been paid for overnight shifts.

16.

Alternatively, although not entirely clear (a concern that will be addressed further below), the applicant seems to claim that she has been underpaid pursuant to a partly written and partly oral employment contract. She says that her contract contains implied terms consistent with the (then current) National Employment Standards set out in Part 2-2 of the Act and that entitlements arising from these implied terms have not been paid.

17.

The respondent, in turn, argues that the applicant was paid all that was owed to her during the course of her employment. Importantly, the respondent says, the applicant received an “overnight stay allowance” as per the Award. The respondent argues that the applicant is now claiming that she worked extra hours (hours which were not claimed when she was employed) and that this claim should be rejected.

Hearing

Digital Hearing

18.

This matter was heard over three days. The parties agreed to proceeding via Microsoft Teams. The Court is satisfied that this did not hinder the provision of a fair hearing.

Adjournment Request

19.

The evening prior to the hearing of this matter, the applicant’s solicitor sent an email to the Court (Exhibit 1) which provided:

We refer to the above matter and the submissions filed and served on behalf of the Respondent on 23 September 2020, signed by their counsel, Mr Rohan Millar (Submissions).

In particular, we refer to paragraphs 9 through to 12 of the Submissions, wherein the Respondent raises a new defence for the first time; namely that the Respondent’s complex was not a “Hotel” for the purposes of the Hospitality Industry (General) Award 2010 (“the Award”). This defence has never been pleaded.

The Respondent requires the leave of the Court to amend its pleadings (Federal Circuit Rules 2001 (Cth), Rule 7.01(1)). The Applicant notes that there is has no such application and the trial is scheduled to begin tomorrow. If the Respondent is allowed to amend its pleadings, the effect of its argument if successful, is that the Applicant if found to be a manager as pleaded is not covered by the Award. This would necessitate the Applicant amending its pleadings. Moreover, the Applicant has not had a fair or adequate opportunity to consider and respond to the further defence now advanced.

The Respondent has accepted that the Applicant is covered by the Award. However, the Submissions now argue effectively that the complex is not a Hotel. This should have been pleaded earlier as the Applicant’s entire case is that she is a Hotel Manager under the Award. This pleaded from the outset in both the Applicant’s Statement of Claim filed on 25 September 2018, and Amended Statement of Claim and Particulars of Claim file 7 May 2020. We note the Submissions were filed within 7 days of the trial in this matter, inclusive of the public holiday in Western Australia on 28 September 2020.

It is inappropriate of the Respondent to raise a novel defence now some two years after it was first alerted to the Applicant’s claim and on the eve of the trial of this matter. The appropriate course would have been for the Respondent to raise this defence at the very latest in its Amended Defence filed 27 May 2020.

To lead a defence at this time embedded in Submissions is in our view inconsistent with the fair administration of justice and is an attempt to circumvent the correct processes of the Court. If the Respondent intended to lead this defence it should have sought leave of the Court to do so. We note again that the Respondent has had ample time to do so.

Further, the Submissions propose a defence central to the Applicant’s claim and at complete variance from the Respondent’s filed pleadings. Per Aon Risk Services Australia Ltd v National University [2009] HCA 27, [113] parties have choices as to what claims are to be made and how they are to be framed. As parties have sufficient opportunities to therefore identify the issues they seek to agitate, limits will be placed upon a party’s ability to effect changes to pleadings particularly where litigation is advanced.

The Applicant faces substantial prejudice as the period of time that has lapsed since their Amended Defence and their Submissions is considerable, further costs have been incurred in having to deal with these amendments less than a week before trial and as the Applicant has already filed an outline of submissions dealing with the grounds already established. This would amount to an injustice ‘which could not be compensated for’ if the Submissions are allowed to stand in place of amended pleadings by the Respondent and if a right of reply is not granted by the Court to the Applicant (noting matters set out by Lucev J at [23] and [25] in CEJ15 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2019] FCCA 1038 in relation to the Court permitting late amendments of pleadings; Medich v Bentley-Smythe Pty Ltd [2010] FCA 484, [8]).

The lateness of the Respondent in promulgating this defence is unexplained and on face value is not made in good faith.

Respectfully, in our view the appropriate course is:

1. that the trial to be adjourned and relisted as soon as practicable;

2. the Respondent apply for leave to amend its pleadings; and

3. the Applicant to be granted leave to respond if required;

4. Costs in favour of the Applicant are awarded;

…

20.

The respondent then sent Chambers an email in response (Exhibit 2), which provided:

…

There is no substance in the matters relied upon in seeking the adjournment. We note:

(a) It is not in dispute that the Respondent is and was at all times within the coverage of the Award. Clause 4.2 of the Award specifically refers to ‘serviced apartments’ being within the ‘hospitality industry’ and therefore within the coverage of the Award. The Respondent has been clear that the Applicant has been paid in accordance with the Award – as a housekeeper receiving the overnight stay allowance. The Respondent has followed the Award in its payment arrangements for the Applicant.

(b) The Amended Statement of Claim does not allege that the Respondent was operating a ‘hotel’ within the meaning of clause D.2.9 of the Award. The claim is made that the Applicant was working in the capacity of ‘Onsite caretaking/night manager’ (para 1) and as a ‘Permanent caretaker/night manager’, and the Respondent has denied that the Applicant was performing any managerial duties (Amended Defence paragraphs 14(b), 44(a), 46(a), 53(d)).

(c) The references later in the Statement of Claim to ‘managerial staff-hotel’ are not, properly construed, as asserting a claim to be within that classification, but to a form of reverse arithmetic with the starting point of there being ‘no hourly pay rate in the relevant Guide of $50.01 per hour’ (see paragraph 41), and an annualised salary arrangement calculation (see paragraph 44) which is manifestly irrelevant to the claim. In any event, the Respondent’s Defence is clear in stating, at paragraph 41:

…the Applicant was not paid the rate for ‘Managerial staff-hotel’, and had no such entitlement, but was entitled to receive, and did receive, payment of the Overnight Stay Allowance.

(d) If the Applicant sought to challenge that defence she needed to establish her entitlement, including that she was working within a ‘hotel’.

(e) It is only in paragraph 2 of the written submissions of the Applicant that the contention has been clearly advanced that the Applicant was a ‘hotel manager’. The Respondent has countered by stating that the Applicant fulfils neither limb of that term. It is an unsurprising submission, brought into focus by the recent decision of this Court in Kramer v Punthill Apartment Hotels Pty Ltd [2020] FCCA 1617, but is not one which required amendment of the pleadings to facilitate. In any event, even if amendment were required, then it is for the Applicant to plead a contention that the Respondent operates a ‘hotel’, rather than suggesting it is incumbent upon the Respondent to plead to a previously unarticulated contention.

(f) The point is, ultimately, only a subsidiary issue in the proceeding. Irrespective of whether the Respondent operates a ‘hotel’ (which is denied), the Respondent maintains that the Applicant has been paid her due entitlements both as a housekeeper and to the overnight stay allowance, and that is the end of the matter. The Applicant would still have been paid correctly even if the Respondent operated a five-star hotel. Ultimately, she was paid for an overnight ‘stay’ rather than an overnight ‘shift’. If that contention is accepted then it is simply not necessary to deal with any contention that the Applicant was a ‘hotel manager’.

(g) Even if there were substance in any of the concerns voiced by the Applicant, there is no basis for an adjournment. The Applicant’s lawyers have had the Respondent’s submissions for almost a week, and if objection had been taken prior to the night before trial, then the issue could have been addressed in a more orderly manner. In fact, despite regular communications between the parties in preparation for trial (including a conferral between the parties’ respective Counsel after the Respondent’s submissions were filed) this point has never been addressed with the Respondent’s lawyers or Counsel prior to this approach being made directly to the Court. In any event, it is simply a part of conducting trials that issues emerge and evolve – seeking an adjournment causes costs and inconvenience and such an application ought not be lightly granted.

(h) If the Applicant seeks an opportunity to file reply submissions, present further argument, or even requires leave to adduce further evidence on this point, then such an application may be accommodated within the current timetable for the trial, rather than necessitating the adjournment the Applicant now seeks.

It is respectfully submitted that there is no impediment to the trial proceeding tomorrow, and the parties should proceed to hearing in accordance with the current directions.

21.

At the commencement of the hearing, the Court indicated that it would not grant an adjournment. Nor did the Court accept that an amendment of the pleadings was necessary.

22.

The Court’s reasons for these decisions are as follows.

23.

The Court notes the following factors that must be assessed when determining whether an adjournment request should be granted:

a) the evidence in support of the adjournment and the explanation for the adjournment;

b) the parties’ choices in the litigation to date and whether the parties will be able to adequately present their case if an adjournment were not granted such that there is a “just resolution” of the proceeding;

c) any prejudice that cannot be mitigated by costs or other indulgences; and

d) modern principles of case management (including the avoidance of undue delay) and wastage of public resources.

(Aon Risk Services Australia Limited v The Australian National University [2009] HCA 27).

24.

The reason the applicant sought an adjournment are set out in Exhibit 1. In effect, the applicant believed the respondent raised a defence not previously pleaded. This, it is said, “caught the applicant off guard” such that “more time” to prepare was required.

25.

The respondent’s defence has not changed. The respondent, has at all times, denied that the applicant was covered by item D.2.9 of the Award – that is, the respondent has at all times denied that the applicant was a “hotel manager”. The fact that the respondent never pleaded that the respondent was not a hotel can be attributed to the fact that the applicant never pleaded that the respondent was a hotel.

26.

The respondent’s case has always been that the applicant was entitled to an overnight stay allowance as per the Award and that she was paid accordingly. As Counsel for the respondent confirmed at the hearing, this is the respondent’s primary defence. The respondent has always expressly denied that the applicant met the classification in item D.2.9 and the respondent maintains that position.

27.

Further, the case that the respondent’s rely upon, Kramer v Punthill Apartment Hotels Pty Ltd [2020] FCCA 1617 (“Kramer”) (which appears to be the case that “caught the applicant off guard”) does not reflect a jurisprudential shift.

28.

While Kramer is factually similar to the circumstances in this case, the definition of “hotel” as it appears in item D.2.9 of the Award has been the subject of judicial consideration previously. This case law dates as far back as Johnson v Monti-Haitsma Enterprises Pty Ltd [2014] FCCA 259 (“Johnson”) (albeit in a different context).

29.

Pleading that the respondent was a “hotel” was, in line with Johnson, a material fact which the applicant did not plead. Placing that aside, the respondent denied that the applicant met the classification pleaded and it fell to the applicant to then satisfy all aspects of that classification.

30.

Even if the Court had been of the view that the pleadings needed to be amended, it would have granted leave for the respondent to do so in any event. The nature of the amendment (to argue that the respondent is not a “hotel”) is not futile. While the law has not changed, Kramer makes it clear that the term “hotel” does not apply to serviced apartments – something that is entirely relevant here. For the Court to ignore this issue would, in effect, run contrary to the administration of justice.

31.

As noted further below, an adjournment was, in any event, unnecessary as the Court granted additional time after the hearing for this argument to be addressed by both parties in detail – something both parties did without difficulty.

32.

The Court determined that the applicant could adequately present her case without an adjournment. The Court advised Counsel for both parties that closing submissions could be made in writing and that, to the extent that the applicant felt that further evidence was necessary, this could be addressed in due course. Any concerns the applicant had about inadequate preparation time could be (and was) addressed by the provision of additional time at the end of the hearing.

33.

The Court also bears in mind the principles of case management. The applicant asked for the matter to be re-listed on “the next available date” but “as soon as practicable”. The “next available date” for a three day hearing would have been August 2021. A delay of almost one year is entirely unsatisfactory. Witness recollection might be affected. Proceedings would have been on foot for nearly three years. In a Court whose statutory objective is to act “efficiently” this is completely inappropriate.

34.

In light of the above, the Court refused the adjournment. Even if the applicant was “caught off guard” (a suggestion which the Court rejects), by allowing written submissions to be filed after the hearing the Court ensured that any outstanding issues were well and truly addressed.

Evidence and Credit

35.

The parties presented evidence in chief by way of affidavit. The affidavit evidence comprised of:

a) the applicant’s affidavit affirmed 19 June 2020;

b) the affidavit of Emma Jane Biggs affirmed 24 June 2020;

c) the affidavit of Penelope Daphne Ann Curtis affirmed 22 July 2020;

d) the affidavit of Michaela Jayde Murby affirmed 22 July 2020;

e) the affidavit of Kodie Lee O’Driscoll affirmed 22 July 2020;

f) the affidavit of Desmond Godfrey Michaud sworn 22 July 2020

g) the affidavit of Michael Max Bevilaqua affirmed 31 July 2020;

h) the affidavit of Deanna Raynor Rushworth affirmed 23 July 2020; and

i) the affidavit of David John Rushworth affirmed 22 July 2020.

36.

All witnesses (except Ms Curtis) were cross-examined.

37.

The applicant was cross-examined at length. She was assisted by an interpreter in the Mandarin language. The Court thanks the interpreter for her extraordinary assistance. The interpretation of complex legal documents and witness testimony is difficult at the best of times. Doing so via Microsoft Teams with witnesses who appear remotely and who are “problematic”, however, makes that task even more complex. The patience and expertise shown here by this interpreter was very much appreciated.

38.

The Court has concerns about the reliability of the evidence the applicant gave during the course of cross-examination. The applicant was, at times, “difficult”, bordering on obstructionist. She tended to avoid answering questions or provided extraordinarily lengthy explanations that did little more than obfuscate or confuse issues.

39.

For example, when it was put to the applicant that she had provided her telephone number to Strata residents, she indicated “not from my own initiative”. She then stated that reception and Mrs Rushworth had provided her number. She then stated that she was asked for her number by Strata residents and provided it. She then stated that there was “nothing in her contract” and she was never told she could not provide her number. In effect, the answer was “yes” – even though the applicant maintained that it was not – but getting to “yes” was deliberately difficult and unnecessarily complex.

40.

The Court should not be seen as suggesting that the applicant was “untruthful”. However, the Court is of the view that she intentionally embellished her evidence or avoided responding when she could and should have done so. The Court treats the evidence provided by her with a considerable degree of caution.

41.

Ms Biggs, who appeared as a witness for the applicant, struck the Court as entirely credible. At times, her evidence did not support the applicant’s case. She presented as candid and truthful.

42.

In relation to the respondent’s witnesses, the applicant provided written submissions which sought to discredit a number of the respondent’s witnesses. Those submissions referred to inconsistencies between the witnesses’ evidence (for example, as that evidence related to the number of guests who checked in or in relation to who prepared “a contract” for the applicant).

43.

Background

Background to the litigation

Yiqin Meng commenced proceedings against Havacom Pty Ltd, trading as Quest Mandurah, alleging underpayments pursuant to the Hospitality Industry (General) Award 2010 (Cth). Meng began working for the respondent as a casual housekeeper in 2013, and in December 2013, she was offered and accepted the position of "onsite caretaker." She was provided with a document outlining her responsibilities and entitlements, which included free rent, power, and phone in apartment 73, and a fortnightly payment of $500. Meng's duties involved checking in guests, resolving enquiries, responding to complaints, and checking the complex during the evening. After her resignation on 13 February 2018, Meng alleged that she had been underpaid, and an audit resulted in an additional payment of $8,685.36. The respondent denied any contravention of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) and stated that Meng had been paid all entitlements owed to her.

The case revolved around whether the respondent was a "hotel" or a "resort," and whether Meng was entitled to payment for overnight shifts rather than just an overnight stay allowance. Meng claimed that she worked either as a full-time or part-time hotel manager and that her pay fell below the required classifications. The respondent argued that Meng was paid according to the Award and that she was not a hotel manager. The hearing was conducted over three days via Microsoft Teams, and the Court refused an adjournment request by Meng's solicitor, who argued that the respondent's late defence that the complex was not a hotel had prejudiced Meng.

The Court found that the respondent's defence had not changed, as they had always denied that Meng was a hotel manager and that she was entitled to payment under item D.2.9 of the Award. The Court also noted that the respondent's case was consistent with previous case law and that an adjournment was unnecessary. The Court granted additional time for both parties to address the argument in detail and allowed for written closing submissions. The Court found Meng's evidence during cross-examination to be unreliable, as she appeared to intentionally embellish or avoid answering questions.

The matter came before the Federal Circuit Court of Australia at Perth as an application filed by the applicant, Yiqin Meng, on 25 September 2018. Meng alleged that the respondent, Havacom Pty Ltd trading as Quest Mandurah, had breached sections 45 and 535 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth). The respondent denied the allegations and asserted that Meng had been paid all entitlements owed to her. The case was heard over three days via Microsoft Teams, with the Court ruling that the digital format did not hinder the provision of a fair hearing. The applicant sought an adjournment on the eve of the hearing, arguing that the respondent raised a new defence that its complex was not a "hotel" for the purposes of the Hospitality Industry (General) Award 2010, which had not been previously pleaded. The Court declined to grant an adjournment, finding that the respondent’s defence had not changed and that the applicant could adequately present her case without further delay. The Court also noted the principles of case management and the avoidance of undue delay. The application was dismissed, and the Court provided additional time for both parties to address arguments in detail after the hearing.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Whether the respondent is a “hotel” or a “resort” within the meaning of the Hospitality Industry (General) Award 2010 (Cth).

2. Whether the applicant was employed as a full-time or part-time hotel manager, or an onsite caretaker/night manager.

3. Whether the applicant was entitled to be paid for overnight shifts rather than an overnight stay allowance.

4. Whether there was evidence of contractual obligations between the parties that would entitle the applicant to additional payments.

5. Whether the respondent was entitled to raise the defence that it was not a “hotel” or a “resort” for the first time on the eve of the trial, and if not, whether the trial should have been adjourned to allow the applicant to respond to this new defence.

Held
1. Whether the respondent is a “hotel” or a “resort” within the meaning of the Hospitality Industry (General) Award 2010 (Cth).
The Court concluded that the respondent’s complex was not a “hotel” for the purposes of the Award, and this defence was not futile. The term “hotel” does not apply to serviced apartments, which is relevant in this case.

2. Whether the applicant was employed as a full-time or part-time hotel manager, or an onsite caretaker/night manager.
The Court found that the applicant did not meet the classification of a full-time or part-time hotel manager and was employed as an onsite caretaker/night manager.

3. Whether the applicant was entitled to be paid for overnight shifts rather than an overnight stay allowance.
The Court concluded that the applicant was not entitled to be paid for overnight shifts, as she was paid the overnight stay allowance as per the Award.

4. Whether there was evidence of contractual obligations between the parties that would entitle the applicant to additional payments.
The Court found that there was no evidence of contractual terms as per the applicant’s submissions, and thus no entitlement to additional payments.

5. Whether the respondent was entitled to raise the defence that it was not a “hotel” or a “resort” for the first time on the eve of the trial, and if not, whether the trial should have been adjourned to allow the applicant to respond to this new defence.
The Court held that the respondent was not entitled to raise this defence for the first time on the eve of the trial. However, the Court refused to adjourn the trial, determining that the applicant could adequately present her case without an adjournment and that the principles of case management did not support a delay of almost one year.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Court began by addressing the issue of whether the respondent was a “hotel” or a “resort” within the meaning of the Hospitality Industry (General) Award 2010 (Cth). The Court noted that the respondent had consistently denied that the applicant was employed as a hotel manager, which the applicant had pleaded. The Court found that the respondent’s defence had not changed and that the applicant had failed to plead that the respondent was a hotel, which was a material fact. The Court concluded that the respondent’s argument that it was not a hotel did not require an amendment to the pleadings and was not a new defence.

The Court then turned to the issue of whether the applicant was employed as a full-time or part-time hotel manager, or an onsite caretaker/night manager. The Court found that the applicant’s duties included checking in guests, resolving enquiries, responding to complaints, and checking the complex at least once during the evening. The Court concluded that the applicant’s duties did not amount to managerial duties and that she was employed as an onsite caretaker/night manager.

Next, the Court considered whether the applicant was entitled to be paid for overnight shifts rather than an overnight stay allowance. The Court found that the applicant was paid an overnight stay allowance as per the Award and that she was not entitled to be paid for overnight shifts.

The Court also considered whether there was evidence of contractual obligations between the parties that would entitle the applicant to additional payments. The Court found that the applicant had failed to provide any evidence of contractual obligations and that her claims in this regard were speculative and unsubstantiated.

Finally, the Court considered whether the respondent was entitled to raise the defence that it was not a “hotel” or a “resort” for the first time on the eve of the trial, and if not, whether the trial should have been adjourned to allow the applicant to respond to this new defence. The Court found that the respondent’s defence had not changed and that the applicant had failed to plead that the respondent was a hotel, which was a material fact. The Court concluded that the respondent’s argument that it was not a hotel did not require an amendment to the pleadings and was not a new defence. The Court also noted that the applicant had not been prejudiced by the timing of the respondent’s defence and that an adjournment would have caused undue delay and wastage of public resources.

In light of the above, the Court dismissed the applicant’s application. The ratio decidendi of this case is that where a party fails to plead a material fact, they cannot subsequently rely on that fact as a defence. Additionally, where a party seeks to amend their pleadings to raise a new defence on the eve of trial, this will not be permitted unless it is necessary for a just resolution of the proceeding and there is no undue delay or wastage of public resources.