Kramer & Anor v Punthill Apartment Hotels Pty Ltd & Anor

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

KRAMER & ANOR v PUNTHILL APARTMENT HOTELS PTY LTD & ANOR [2020] FCCA 1617
Catchwords:
INDUSTRIAL LAW – Alleged contraventions of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) and Fair Work Regulations 2009 (Cth) – application of the Hospitality Industry (General) Award 2010 (Cth) – meaning of a hotel – meaning of a retail licenced establishment – underpayment of wages – failure to keep employment records – accessorial liability of an individual – breach of employment contract – application dismissed.

Legislation:

Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth), ss.12, 13, 14, 46, 47, 48, 143, 535, 536, 550, pt. 2-2.

Fair Work Regulations 2009 (Cth), regs.3.31, 3.33, 3.34, 3.35, 3.36, 3.37, 3.38, 3.39, 3.40, 3.42, 3.43, 3.36.

Health (Prescribed Accommodation) Regulations 2001 (Vic).

Hospitality Industry – Accommodation, Hotels, Resorts and Gaming Award 1998 (Cth).
Hospitality Industry (General) Award 2010 (Cth), cls. 4.1, 4.2, 19, 20, sch. D items D.2.3, D.2.9.
Hotel Managerial Staff (Federal) Award 1974 (Cth).
Liquor and Accommodation Industry – Hotels, Resorts and Gaming – (Managerial Staff)  – Award 2003 (Cth), cl. 8.6.

Liquor Control Reform Act 1998 (Vic) ss. 7, 12, 14.

Motels, Accommodation and Resorts Award 1998 (Cth), cl.6.1.1.

Public Health and Wellbeing Act2008 (Vic), ss.3, 4, 67, 68, 74.

Public Health and Wellbeing Regulations 2009 (Vic), regs.4, 13; pt. 5 div. 2.

Retail Tenancies Act 1986 (Vic).

Whitehorse Planning Scheme, cl.73.03.

Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth), s.576C(1).

Cases cited:

City of Wanneroo v Australian Municipal Administrative, Clerical and Services Union [2006] FCA 813

City of Wanneroo v Holmes [1989] FCA 553; 30 IR 362

Davies v Punthill Apartment Hotels Pty Ltd [2014] FCCA 1158
Fair Work Ombudsman v NSW Motel Management Services Pty Ltd & Ors (No 2) [2018] FCCA 1935
Johnson v Monti-Haitsma Enterprises Pty Ltd [2014] FCCA 259
Johnson v Monti-Haitsma Enterprises Pty Limited (in external administration) [2014] FCA 906

Kucks v CSR Limited (1996) 66 IR 182; [1996] IRCA 141

Wellington v Norwich Union Life Insurance Society Ltd [1991] VicRp 27; [1991] 1 VR 333

First Applicant: LILLI KRAMER
Second Applicant: MUTHUMUNI CHALITHA DE SILVA
First Respondent: PUNTHILL APARTMENT HOTELS PTY LTD
Second Respondent: ROBIN LYNNE CARAS
File Number: MLG 2650 of 2017
Judgment of: Judge Mercuri
Hearing date: 15, 16 and 17 October 2019
Date of Last Submission: 17 October 2019
Delivered at: Melbourne
Delivered on: 19 June 2020

REPRESENTATION

Counsel for the applicants: Mr Galbraith
Solicitors for the applicants: Willon Legal
Counsel for the respondents: Mr Bell
Solicitors for the respondents: Arnold Block Leibler

ORDERS

  1. The applicants’ applications filed 5 December 2017 as amended on 21 December 2018 be dismissed.

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT
OF AUSTRALIA
AT MELBOURNE

MLG 2650 of 2017

LILLI KRAMER

First Applicant

and

MUTHUMUNI CHALITHA DE SILVA

Second Applicant

and

PUNTHILL APARTMENT HOTELS PTY LTD

First Respondent

and

ROBIN LYNNE CARAS

Second Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Introduction

  1. The applicants were employed by the first respondent, initially as relief managers and then as resident managers.

  2. In their claim, the first and second applicants…

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Details
Case
[2020] FCCA 1617
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The applicants, Lilli Kramer and Muthumuni Chalitha De Silva, brought proceedings in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia against Punthill Apartment Hotels Pty Ltd and Robin Lynne Caras. The applicants alleged that the first respondent contravened the *Fair Work Act 2009* (Cth) and the *Fair Work Regulations 2009* (Cth) by underpaying them and failing to keep proper employment records. They also alleged that the second respondent was accessorialy liable for these contraventions. The first applicant further claimed a breach of her employment contract regarding her salary. A central dispute concerned whether the first respondent's business, Punthill Burwood, constituted a 'hotel' or a 'retail licensed establishment' for the purposes of the *Hospitality Industry (General) Award 2010*.

The court was required to determine several legal issues. Primarily, it needed to ascertain whether the *Hospitality Industry (General) Award 2010* applied to the applicants' employment, specifically concerning the managerial staff classification. This involved interpreting the definition of 'hotel' and 'retail licensed establishment' within the award, considering the nature of the first respondent's business as serviced apartments. The court also had to determine if the first respondent's registration under Victorian legislation and its self-description as a 'hotel' were determinative of its classification under the award. Finally, the court needed to consider the first applicant's contractual claim regarding her salary.

In its reasoning, the court applied established principles of award interpretation, emphasising a practical approach that considers the award's context, purpose, and the ordinary meaning of its terms, while avoiding overly literal or technical interpretations. The court found that the *Hospitality Industry (General) Award 2010* distinguishes between 'serviced apartments' and 'hotels', and that the evidence demonstrated the first respondent operated serviced apartments, characterised by self-contained facilities like kitchens and laundry, which differentiated them from traditional hotels. The court gave limited weight to the first respondent's self-description as a 'hotel' in its publications, focusing instead on the actual nature of the business. It also noted that the award's historical context and the exclusion of motels from similar classifications in prior decisions supported the conclusion that serviced apartments were not intended to be covered by the managerial staff provisions for hotels. Consequently, the court determined that the applicants were not covered by the managerial staff classification under the award.

The applications made by the applicants were dismissed.

Orders

Orders of the court

1.

The applicants’ applications filed 5 December 2017 as amended on 21 December 2018 be dismissed.

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT

OF AUSTRALIA

AT MELBOURNE

MLG 2650 of 2017

LILLI KRAMER

First Applicant

and

MUTHUMUNI CHALITHA DE SILVA

Second Applicant

and

PUNTHILL APARTMENT HOTELS PTY LTD

First Respondent

and

ROBIN LYNNE CARAS

Second Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Introduction

1.

The applicants were employed by the first respondent, initially as relief managers and then as resident managers.

2.

In their claim, the first and second applicants alleged that:[1]

a) the first respondent failed to pay them their full entitlements under the Hospitality Industry (General) Award 2010 (“the Award”) in contravention of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (“the FW Act”) (“underpayment claim”);[2]

b) the first respondent failed to comply with its record keeping obligations under the FW Act and the Fair Work Regulations 2009 (Cth) (“the Regulations”) (“record keeping claim”);[3] and

c) the second respondent was involved in the various contraventions of the FW Act engaged in by the first respondent and pursuant to section 550(1) of the FW Act is taken to have committed the contraventions herself (“accessorial liability claim”).[4]

3.

The first applicant also claimed the first respondent breached its contractual obligation to pay her a salary of $55,000 per annum plus superannuation of 9.5% from on or about 9 October 2014 to the date of termination (“first applicant’s contractual claim”).[5]

Undisputed facts

4.

Many of the relevant facts were not in dispute. However, the key issue in dispute was the nature of the business conducted by the first respondent, and in particular whether it was a ‘hotel’ or a ‘retail licenced establishment’ for the purposes of the Award. This will be discussed further below.

5.

It was not disputed that:

a) the first respondent was, at all relevant times, carrying out a business in which it provided accommodation for a fee from the premises at 300 Burwood Highway, Burwood, Victoria (“Punthill Burwood”);[6]

b) the applicants were employed from at least 20 June 2012 to on or about 20 February 2018;[7]

c) the applicants were, at all relevant times during the claim period, national system employees within the meaning of section 13 of the FW Act;[8]

d) the applicants were, at all relevant times, entitled to the benefit of the National Employment Standards contained in part 2-2 of the FW Act;[9]

e) the first respondent was, at all material times, a constitutional corporation within the meaning of section 12 of the FW Act and a national system employer within the meaning of section 14 of the FW Act;[10]

f) the first respondent, was at all material times, operating Punthill Burwood;[11]

g) the applicants were employed on a full time and ongoing basis by the first respondent;[12] and

h) the second respondent was, at all material times, an officer, employee or agent of the first respondent and aware of the applicants’ employment with the first respondent.[13]

6.

It was also not in dispute that the first respondent:

a) held liquor licences issued pursuant to the Liquor Control Reform Act 1998 (Vic);[14] and

b) was registered as a ‘motel/hotel’ by the City of Whitehorse under the Health (Prescribed Accommodation) Regulations 2001 (Vic) and related legislation.[15]

7.

The significance of these matters for the issues before this court is considered below.

8.

Finally, there was also no real dispute regarding the applicants’ duties as resident managers at Punthill Burwood.

Issues

Underpayment claim

9.

In relation to the underpayment claim, the applicants’ case was put on the following (alternative) basis:

a) the applicants were employed as ‘hotel managers’ for the purpose of item D.2.9 of schedule D of the Award, and the Award applies to the first respondent either because:[16]

i) it is a ‘hotel’; or

ii) it is an ‘other retail licensed establishment’;

(collectively, “the D.2.9 claims”); or

b) in the alternative, if the court did not accept this primary submission, then the applicants ought properly be characterised as ‘front office grade 3 classification’ staff pursuant to item D.2.9 of schedule D of the Award, and have not been paid as such (“front office grade 3 claims”).

Record keeping claim

10.

The applicants further claimed that the first respondent breached section 535(1) of the FW Act and regulation 3.42 of the Regulations.

Accessorial liability claim

11.

If the court accepts the applicants’ case that the first respondent breached the Award or its record keeping obligations under the Regulations, the applicants’ further claimed that the second respondent was ‘involved’ in those contraventions and therefore liable under section 550 of the FW Act.

First applicant’s contractual claim

12.

In relation to the first applicant’s contractual claim, the court must consider the terms of the employment contract between the first applicant and the first respondent and determine whether, properly interpreted, the employment contract provides for a base salary of $55,000.

Underpayment claim

13.

The underpayment claim turns on whether the Award applies to the first respondent in respect of the applicants’ employment and, if so, what parts of the Award apply.

Award interpretation

14.

The principles which apply to award interpretation are well settled. The difficulty in this case, as in many like it, arises from the application of those principles to the facts before the court.

15.

As noted by Madgwick J in Kucks v CSR Limited (1996) 66 IR 182; [1996] IRCA 141:

It is trite that narrow or pedantic approaches to the interpretation of an award are misplaced. The search is for the meaning intended by the framer(s) of the document, bearing in mind that such framer(s) were likely of a practical bent of mind: they may well have been more concerned with expressing an intention in ways likely to have been understood in the context of the relevant industry and industrial relations environment than with legal niceties or jargon. Thus, for example, it is justifiable to read the award to give effect to its evident purposes, having regard to such context, despite mere inconsistencies or infelicities of expression which might tend to some other reading. And meanings which avoid inconvenience or injustice may reasonably be strained for. For reasons such as these, expressions which have been held in the case of other instruments to have been used to mean particular things may sensibly and properly be held to mean something else in the document at hand.

But the task remains one of interpreting a document produced by another or others. A court is not free to give effect to some anteriorly derived notion of what would be fair or just, regardless of what has been written into the award. Deciding what an existing award means is a process quite different from deciding, as an arbitral body does, what might fairly be put into an award. So, for example, ordinary or well-understood words are in general to be accorded their ordinary or usual meaning (emphasis added).[17]

16.

It is also well settled that an award is to be construed having regard to its context and purpose. As noted in City of Wanneroo v Australian Municipal Administrative, Clerical and Services Union [2006] FCA 813:

Context may appear from the text of the instrument taken as a whole, its arrangement and the place in it of the provision under construction. It is not confined to the words of the relevant Act or instrument surrounding the expression to be construed. … It may also include ‘… ideas that gave rise to an expression in a document from which it has been taken’ – Short v FW Hercus Pty Ltd [1993] FCA 51 at 518.[18]

17.

Having regard to these principles and the comments of French J in City of Wanneroo v Holmes [1989] FCA 553; 30 IR 362 and the cases cited therein:

a) the interpretation of an award starts from a consideration of the ordinary general meaning of its terms;

b) the words are to be read as a whole and in context;

c) any ambiguity may be resolved by considering the history and subject matter of the award and having regard to industrial realities; and

d) in interpreting an award, the court should avoid applying overly literal or technical approach.

The Award

18.

It is uncontroversial that a modern award only imposes an obligation or confers an entitlement on a person if the award applies to that person.[19] A modern award applies to a person if it covers the employee or employer and is not otherwise excluded from operating in relation to the employee.[20]

19.

Relevantly, section 48(1) of the FW Act provides:

A modern award covers an employee, employer, organisation or outworker entity if the award is expressed to cover the employee, employer, organisation or outworker entity.

20.

Clause 4.1 of the Award further provides that it:

…covers employers throughout Australia in the hospitality industry and their employees in the classifications within Schedule D – Classification Definitions to the exclusion of any other modern award…

21.

Clause 4.2 goes on to say:

For the purposes of clause 4.1, hospitality industry includes hotels; motor inns and motels; boarding establishments; condominiums of a like nature; health or recreational farms; private hotels; guest houses; serviced apartments; caravan parks; ski lodges; holiday flats or units, ranches or farms; hostels, or any other type of residential or tourist accommodation; wine saloons; wine bars or taverns; liquor booths; resorts; caterers; restaurants operated in or in connection with premises owned or operated by employers otherwise covered by this award; casinos; and function areas and convention or like facilities operating in association with the aforementioned. (underlining added)

22.

Clause 20 of the Award prescribes the minimum wages for employees in the various classifications covered by the Award. Clause 19 relevantly provides that the definitions of the classification levels in clause 20 are contained in schedule D – classification definitions.

23.

Schedule D then sets out the classification definitions in the following streams:

a) D.2.1: food and beverage stream;

b) D.2.2: kitchen stream;

c) D.2.3: guest services stream;

d) D.2.4: administration stream;

e) D.2.5: security stream;

f) D.2.6: leisure activities stream;

g) D.2.7: stores stream;

h) D.2.8: maintenance and trades – other than the cooking trade; and

i) D.2.9: managerial staff (hotels).

24.

It is common ground that the managerial staff classification only applies to ‘hotels’ as defined. The dispute between the parties is whether that definition covers the work undertaken by the applicants.

25.

Relevantly, item D.2.9 of schedule D of the Award provides:

For the purpose of this additional classification, hotels means hotels, resorts, casinos, taverns, wine saloons, wine and spirit merchants retailing to the general public and other retail licensed establishments in or in connection with accommodation, with the selling of drinks, preparing and serving food and drinks, cleaning and attending to the premises and all other services associated therewith.

In this additional classification, hotel manager means an employee (however designated) who:

● under the direction of senior management is required to manage and co-ordinate the activities of a relevant area or areas of the hotel; and

● directs staff to ensure they carry out their duties in the relevant area or areas of the hotel; and

● implements policies, procedures and operating systems for the hotel;

but excludes an employee who is employed to undertake the duties of senior management, responsible for a significant area of the operations of one or more hotels. Indicative position titles for such an employee include:

● …

● Venue manager;

● …

An employee appointed as a Manager will have completed an appropriate level of training in business management or have relevant industry experience including the supervision of staff in one or more areas of an hotel. In a General Hotel, this classification is commonly known as an Assistant manager. In an Accommodation Hotel, this classification may include any of the following positions: Duty manager… or equivalent position. (emphasis and underlining added)

26.

The applicant’s primary argument was that the first respondent was a ‘hotel’ and therefore fell within both the definition of ‘hospitality industry’ in clause 4.1 and also the definition of ‘hotel’ at item D.2.9 of schedule D of the Award.[21]

27.

The applicants’ submission in this regard relied upon:

a) the history of the pre-reform awards and definitions contained within those documents;

b) the ordinary meaning of the term ‘hotel’;

c) the first respondent’s name including the word ‘hotel’; and

d) references in the first respondent’s own marketing material and the like to itself as a ‘hotel’.

28.

In response, the first respondent submitted that when regard is had to the award modernisation process and the proper interpretation of the term ‘hotel’ for the purposes of item D.2.9 of schedule D of the Award:[22]

a) ‘serviced apartments’ do not fall within the meaning of ‘hotel’ for the purpose of item D.2.9 of schedule D of the Award;

b) as a matter of fact, the first respondent is a ‘serviced apartment’ for the purposes of the Award; and

c) consequently, the applicants are not covered by item D.2.9 of schedule D of the Award.

29.

In the alternative, the applicants argued that the first respondent was a ‘retail licensed establishment’ and therefore, as managers within that establishment, the applicants fell within item D.2.9 of schedule D of the Award.[23]

30.

Whilst the respondents conceded the first respondent held a limited liquor licence at all relevant times to permit them to provide alcohol at conferences and functions, they denied that this brought them within the meaning of a ‘retail licenced establishment’ for the purposes of item D.2.9 of schedule D of the Award.[24]

History of the Award

31.

It is common ground that the Award was made following the award modernisation process undertaken by the Australian Industrial Relations Commission, as it then was, commencing in March 2018.

32.

The pre-reform awards which operated prior to the making of the Award were:

a) the Liquor and Accommodation Industry – Hotels, Resorts and Gaming (Managerial Staff) Award 2003 (Cth) (“the 2003 Managerial Award); and

b) the Hospitality Industry – Accommodation, Hotels, Resorts and Gaming Award 1998 (Cth).

33.

It is uncontroversial that the award modernisation process occurred following an award modernisation request made pursuant to the then operative section 576C(1) of the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth).

34.

The respondents also referred to section 143(7) of the FW Act which relevantly provides:

(7) A modern award must not be expressed to cover classes of employees:

(a) who, because of the nature or seniority of their role, have traditionally not been covered by awards…;or

(b) who perform work that is not of a similar nature to work that has traditionally been regulated by such awards.

Note: For example, in some industries, managerial employees have traditionally not been covered by awards.

35.

It was submitted for the respondents that having regard to section 143(7)[25] and the history of the Award which did not historically cover managerial employees such as the applicants, the modern award ought not be interpreted in a way which would extend coverage to management employees who historically were not covered by an award.

36.

On the question of the historical coverage of managers in hotels and the different treatment of managers in other types of establishments, the respondents referred to the Industrial Relations Commission’s reasoning at the point at which the 2003 Managerial Award was made.[26] That decision related to a review of the Hotel Managerial Staff (Federal) Award 1974 (Cth) as part of the award simplification process then underway. The Motor Inn and Hotel Association of Australia (“MIMA”) sought to intervene in those proceedings.

37.

In that decision, SDP Lacy relevantly said:

MIMA sought leave to intervene in the proceedings for the purpose of being heard in relation to the definition of hotel in the award. Mr McDonald, appearing on behalf of MIMA, submitted that if the definition of hotel in the 1974 Award was changed then the coverage of the award could possibly extend to members of MIMA. The 1974 Award contains a definition of hotel by reference to the various licenses issued in the State in which the hotel is situated… I refused [MIMA’s application for leave to intervene] on the basis of the undertaken given… on behalf of the CMAA, that the definition of hotel in the new award was not intended to operate differently from the definition in the 1974 Award. It is not intended to cover MIMA members not licensed as a hotel (emphasis added).[27]

38.

The Commission then made the Liquor and Accommodation Industry – Hotels Resorts and Gaming – (Managerial Staff) – Award 2003 (Cth), one of the pre-reform awards which led to the making of the Award subject to these proceedings. That award contained the following definition:

Hotel means an establishment in respect of which a license has been issued under the law of any State or Territory or the Commonwealth of Australia that enables the licensee to conduct the business of an hotel.[28]

39.

The Award does not include a similar definition of ‘hotel’ to an establishment which is licenced to operate as a hotel.

40.

The applicants submitted that in not including the same definition of ‘hotel’, an inference should be drawn that the framers of the Award intended to:

expand the definition of the kinds of establishments where management staff would be covered to be much broader and all-encompassing then (sic) previously prescribed.[29]

41.

Whilst I accept that the framers included a different definition of the term ‘hotel’ in the Award to that in the 2003 Managerial Staff Award, I do not accept that they intended to extend the application of the Award to managers covered by the Award generally. If that was the case, item D.2.9 of schedule D of the Award would not be limited in the way that it is.

42.

It is clear that the Award limits the managerial classification to staff employed in ‘hotels’ as defined. The question here is the extent of that limitation.

43.

The applicants make no reference to the Motels, Accommodation and Resorts Award 1998 (Cth) (“the Motels Award”). Clause 6.1.1 of the Motels Award relevantly provides:

This award relates to the industry of persons employed in any capacity whether permanent or casual in or in connection with motor inns or motels, unlicensed private hotels, serviced apartments, resorts, time share facilities, health or recreation farms, guest houses, ski lodges, holiday flats/units, holiday ranches or farms, condominiums and establishments of a like nature together with restaurants, function areas, convention centres or like facilities, ancillary to or part of any of the above, together with… whether such establishments are licensed to serve alcoholic drinks or not and in or in connection with preparing and serving food, cleaning and attending to the premises and all other services associated therewith (emphasis added).

44.

The Motels Award did not contain a classification for managers. This adds weight to the respondents’ argument that there is no proper basis upon which to draw an inference that the framers intended to expand the employees who would be covered by the management classification.

45.

The respondents’ submissions are consistent with the analysis in Fair Work Ombudsman v NSW Motel Management Services Pty Ltd & Ors (No 2) [2018] FCCA 1935. In that decision, the court rejected the argument that item D.2.9 of schedule D of the Award applied to ‘motels’ for reasons similar to those advanced by the respondents in this case.

46.

In that case, the court said:[30]

[160] … Clause 20.2 deals specifically with managerial staff but is restricted to hotels (not motels).

[161] Item D.2.9 of schedule D of the Modern Award deals with managerial staff at hotels. It provides relevantly that ‘hotels’ means a range of establishments but, significantly, does not include motels (which was the Business here) or motor inns.[31]

47.

There is some force to the respondents’ submission in this regard.

Is the first respondent a hotel?

48.

Turning then to the definition of ‘hotel’ for the purposes of item D.2.9 of schedule D of the Award, the applicants argued that the first respondent was a ‘hotel’ as defined, having regard to:

a) the ordinary meaning of the term ‘hotel’;

b) the first respondent’s name which includes the word ‘hotel’;

c) the fact that the first respondent referred to itself as a ‘hotel’ in its own publicity material and internal documents; and

d) registration by the first respondent of Punthill Burwood as a ‘motel/hotel’ under the Public Health and Wellbeing Act 2008 (Vic) and associated regulations.[32]

Ordinary meaning

49.

It was submitted on behalf of the applicants that when one considers the facilities available at the first respondent’s sites, particularly at Punthill Burwood, they are indistinguishable from hotels. Therefore, for the purposes of the Award, the court ought to conclude that Punthill Burwood was a hotel.

50.

Mr Caras’ evidence was that the first respondent’s business was established in 1987.[33] As at February 2018:

a) there were 13 sites; one in Queensland and the balance in Victoria;[34]

b) the sites comprised a mix of about 777 fully-furnished apartments;[35] and

c) Punthill Burwood consisted of 37 apartments some of which were owned by it and others leased.[36]

51.

The first respondent’s business was operated through a mix of apartments which were owned by the first respondent and others which were leased.[37]

52.

Mr Caras gave further evidence that the first respondent operated a traveller accommodation establishment offering self-contained lodging typically including a kitchen, laundry facilities, lounge and dining facilities within the apartment. His evidence, which I accept, was that by comparison to the offerings by the first respondent, hotels generally do not provide self-use kitchens and laundry facilities and may only provide lounges and dining facilities outside the guest’s private accommodation.[38] Moreover, Mr Caras noted there were no mini bars in any of the first respondent’s apartments.[39]

53.

Mr Caras’ evidence was that the apartments offered by the first respondent were a mix of one, two or three bedroom apartments, the majority being one bedroom apartments.[40] Each apartment generally had a separate living room area containing a kitchen as part of an open plan design, and the living area generally contained a desk area and a dining table and chairs as well as a couch and television.[41]

54.

The kitchen area generally included a bench for food preparation, a microwave, a full size oven/stove with four hotplates, a fridge and cutlery, crockery, cookware, dishwasher and a full size refrigerator.[42] The apartments also had a full size front loader washing machine.

55.

Mr Caras conceded that depending on the property in question, the following additional facilities might also be available:[43]

a) a gymnasium;

b) conference facilities;

c) a pool;

d) a barbeque;

e) breakfast room; and

f) wifi.

56.

Mr Caras gave the following evidence about the industry in which the first respondent operates:

Based on my observations and experience, there are different segments of the accommodation market. One segment was what I called ‘self-contained apartments’, ‘serviced apartments’ or ‘apartment hotels’, which I consider were generally interchangeable terms. In my view, serviced apartments were distinct to a typical ‘hotel’, due namely to the spacious nature of the rooms, amenities and facilities provided.[44]

57.

The applicants submitted that the term ‘hotel’ is an ordinary and well-understood word meaning ‘a building in which accommodation and food, and sometimes other facilities, are available’,[45] as defined in the Macquarie Dictionary. Moreover, it was submitted that the business conducted by the first respondent, including that part conducted at Punthill Burwood, fell within that ordinary and usual definition.

58.

The applicants further submitted that the reference to the first respondent as an ‘apartment hotel’ would still bring it within the ordinary meaning of the term ‘hotel’ as set out above. The applicants relied upon the dictionary definition of the term ‘apartment hotel’, namely:

a hotel that rents furnished apartments or suites suitable for housekeeping, on a weekly or more permanent basis, and usually supplies all hotel services (emphasis added).[46]

59.

In other words, it was submitted that an ‘apartment hotel’ is a type of ‘hotel’.

60.

Conversely, the respondents submitted that the applicants’ reliance upon dictionary definitions was misguided. An award must be interpreted in context. It is not simply a matter of applying dictionary definitions to particular terms.

61.

It was further submitted that the error of the applicants’ approach is evident when one considers that the dictionary definition of ‘motel’ would appear to be captured as a ‘hotel’ given that the Macquarie dictionary definition of ‘motel’ is:

a roadside hotel which provides accommodation for travellers in self-contained, serviced units, with parking for their vehicles (emphasis added).[47]

62.

This would mean that item D.2.9 of schedule D of the Award would equally apply to motels. However, this is not the case, as the reasoning in Fair Work Ombudsman v NSW Motel Management Services Pty Ltd & Ors (No 2) [2018] FCCA 1935 at [61] makes it clear that the Award does not apply to a motel.

63.

I am not satisfied that the dictionary definitions of an ‘apartment hotel’ assist in determining the meaning of a ‘hotel’ for the purpose of the Award’s coverage and in particular, the application of item D.2.9 of schedule D of the Award. I am also not satisfied that the dictionary definition of the term ‘hotel’ assists greatly in determining whether or not managers employed by the first respondent are covered by item D.2.9 of schedule D of the Award.

64.

The Award itself distinguishes between ‘serviced apartments’ and other accommodation providers on the one hand and ‘hotels’ on the other. If ‘serviced apartments’ were simply a subset of a ‘hotel’, it would not have been necessary to expressly include ‘serviced apartments’ in the definition of ‘hospitality industry’, as ‘serviced apartments’ would be covered by virtue of being a ‘hotel’.

65.

The questions which then arise are:

a) what was the nature of the business operated by the first respondent?; and

b) in particular, was it a serviced apartment or apartment hotel on the one hand, or a hotel on the other?

66.

The evidence shows that the first respondent provided accommodation for a fee. At that level of extraction, it was similar to a ‘hotel’ and indeed to a ‘motel’, ‘a caravan park’ and many other forms of accommodation providers.

67.

However, for the reasons which follow, it is the self-contained nature of the respondent’s facilities that, in my view, sets the accommodation provided by the first respondent apart from hotel accommodation.

Publications produced by or on behalf of the first respondent

68.

The applicants submitted that in determining whether the first respondent was a hotel, the court ought to have regard to how it has described itself in its own publications and also how one of its founders, Mr Arno Caras, was reported to have described the first respondent’s business.

69.

For example, the applicants sought to rely upon a document produced by or for the first respondent in or about 2012, which referred to the first respondent’s business using the term ‘hotel’.[48] This included an image of a Punthill apartment hotel with a large sign on its wall stating ‘Hotel Open’.[49]

70.

The applicants also relied upon the following statements made by Mr Arno Caras in a focus media group publication:

… the Punthill Group provides guests travelling… with custom-designed apartment hotels – all the trappings of a hotel but much more space that the average hotel room and usually at a lower cost. “We are in the hotel industry and we do the same thing as the hotels do,” says Arno Caras…[50]

…

The Brisbane property was previously a hotel many years ago, and was later converted to furnished apartments before it was purchased by Punthill. “So now we are converting it back to the hotel it was originally,” comments Arnos Caras who says the company will begin taking reservations for the Brisbane property in September.’ (emphasis added)[51]

71.

The applicants also referred to and relied upon a capability statement produced by the first respondent in which various features offered at the first respondent’s sites were outlined.[52] It was submitted that these were features one would find at a hotel.

72.

Further, the applicants referred to the first respondent’s ‘Manager’s Handbook’ which contained the following statement:

… if you were staying at a hotel, how would you expect to be treated and how would you like the staff to be groomed? (emphasis added)[53]

73.

On the basis of this evidence, it is clear that from time to time, the first respondent did refer to itself as a ‘hotel’ in its own material.

74.

However, in determining whether the first respondent was a ‘hotel’ for the purposes of the Award, the court needs to consider what the first respondent actually did, rather than any label applied to its activities in any particular publication, including its own publications.

75.

In this regard, the first respondent submitted that the nature of its activities were best determined by reference to the market in which it operates. To this end, it sought to tender evidence as to the nature of the businesses with whom it competes.

76.

Evidence was given by Mr Caras that when the first respondent sets its prices, it has regard to businesses who provide similar products to those provided by the first respondent, namely rooms with fully equipped kitchens and the like. Mr Caras stated that one of the first respondent’s major competitors was Quest Apartment Hotels and put before the court evidence of the types of facilities offered by Quest.[54]

77.

Again, this material is of limited assistance to the court.

78.

Ultimately, the questions before this court are:

a) what business does the first respondent carry out?; and

b) does that properly fall within the term ‘hotel’ for the purposes of item D.2.9 of schedule D of the Award?

79.

What services and facilities the first respondent’s competitors might provide is of less relevance to this determination. It may be said, for example, that the first respondent competes with hotels, serviced apartments and other accommodation providers. Ultimately however, the market in which the first respondent operates does not determine which award covers its staff. This is particularly so in the context of an award which expressly applies to the hospitality industry, but then within its own terms differentiates between different types of hospitality providers to determine whether or not it applies to particular classifications of employees, such as managers.

80.

I have referred above to Mr Caras’ evidence regarding the nature of the apartments and facilities offered by the first respondent. In particular, I have noted the apartments were fully furnished and equipped with kitchens and other facilities such as laundry and ironing facilities.

81.

Annexed to Mr Caras’ affidavit was marketing material prepared for the first respondent which contained various references to the term ‘serviced apartments’ in relation to Punthill Burwood.[55]

82.

In that document, the following comments were made:

All apartments are fully furnished and include all the amenities you would require to make your long-term stay as comfortable as possible.

Your home away from home – you will enjoy the privacy, comfort and convenience of having your own apartment.

All long-term stay apartments are fully furnished and larger than a hotel room. You can unwind after work in your spacious apartment, prepare yourself a home cooked meal or catch up on work in a relaxing environment.[56]

83.

Also annexed to Mr Caras’ affidavit was advertising material produced by what he described as a competitor, Quest.[57] Leaving aside the question of which businesses the first respondent competed with, Mr Caras’ evidence, which I accept, was that the statements made in the Quest marketing material reflected the difference between serviced apartments and hotels. He further stated that those statements reflected the self-contained apartment hotel market as a matter of commercial reality. It is only in this context and for this purpose that I have considered this material.

84.

Relevantly, in that document the following statements were made:

A Quest apartment hotel is your home or office away from home, complete with separate living, dining and sleeping areas, separate work stations and fully equipped kitchens and laundry facilities.

These features, unique to apartment hotels, allow you to cook your own meals, do you own laundry, and relax with plenty of space. (emphasis added)[58]

85.

Similarly, Mr Caras also annexed a document to his affidavit from Amity Apartments.[59] In that document, the following comments were made:

Our… serviced apartments… have been fully furnished to the highest standards, and offer superior comfort and space for the price of a hotel room, in fact, many of our regular guests tell us that it’s the convenience of having a fully equipped kitchen, living, bathroom and laundry facilities at their fingertips that keeps then (sic) coming back.[60]

86.

Also annexed to Mr Caras’ affidavit was an extract from a website for District Apartment Hotels which contained the following statement:

Featuring contemporary self-contained apartments with free high-speed Internet access and flat-screen TVs. All tastefully furnished with wood floors, washer/dryers, and stylish living rooms incorporating dining tables adjacent to the well equipt (sic) kitchens and all offer balconies.[61]

87.

After reviewing the above, I find the reference to the first respondent as a ‘hotel’ in some of its own publications and statements attributed to its founder is of limited weight in determining whether its managers are covered by item D.2.9 of schedule D of the Award.

88.

Rather, I find that each of these establishments, which all refer to themselves as ‘serviced apartments’ or ‘apartment hotels’, market themselves as offering features which distinguish them from ‘hotel’ rooms, principally in the self-contained nature of the accommodation. That is, they offer fully equipped kitchens, dining facilities and in room laundry facilities.

89.

The applicants have not led any evidence to suggest that ‘hotels’ offer similar facilities or that these are not features which distinguish ‘serviced apartments’ or ‘apartment hotels’ from ‘hotels’.

Registration under Victorian legislation

90.

The applicants submitted that in considering the nature of the business conducted by the respondent, it ought have regard to the fact that Punthill Burwood was registered to conduct a business of a hotel by the City of Whitehorse under the Public Health and Wellbeing Act 2008 (Vic) and the Public Health and Wellbeing Regulations 2009 (Vic). It was submitted that this was further evidence that the first respondent was a hotel within the ordinary meaning of that term.

91.

An application to renew the registration of prescribed premises was marked as Exhibit N. Relevantly, it is an application to register the Punthill Burwood premises ‘under the provisions of the Public Health and Wellbeing Act 2008.’[62] Under the heading ‘business details’, the ‘premises type’

Background

Background to the litigation

The applicants, Lilli Kramer and Muthumuni Chalitha De Silva, were employed by the first respondent, Punthill Apartment Hotels Pty Ltd, initially as relief managers and later as resident managers at the Punthill Burwood premises in Burwood, Victoria. They alleged that the first respondent failed to pay them their full entitlements under the Hospitality Industry (General) Award 2010 (the Award) in contravention of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (the FW Act), and that the first respondent failed to comply with its record keeping obligations under the FW Act and the Fair Work Regulations 2009 (Cth) (the Regulations). The applicants also claimed that the second respondent, Robin Lynne Caras, was involved in the contraventions of the FW Act and, pursuant to section 550(1) of the FW Act, is taken to have committed the contraventions herself. Additionally, the first applicant claimed that the first respondent breached its contractual obligation to pay her a salary of $55,000 per annum plus superannuation.

The primary issue in the case revolved around the nature of the business conducted by the first respondent and whether it qualified as a ‘hotel’ or a ‘retail licensed establishment’ for the purposes of the Award. The applicants argued that the first respondent was a ‘hotel’ due to the ordinary meaning of the term ‘hotel,’ the first respondent's name including the word ‘hotel,’ and references in the first respondent’s own marketing material to itself as a ‘hotel.’ In contrast, the first respondent submitted that it was a ‘serviced apartment’ and not a ‘hotel’ for the purposes of the Award.

The court examined the history of the Award, including the pre-reform awards and the award modernisation process. It was noted that the Award modernisation process excluded managerial employees traditionally not covered by awards. The court found that the Award distinguished between ‘serviced apartments’ and ‘hotels,’ and that the self-contained nature of the first respondent’s facilities set its accommodation apart from hotel accommodation. The court also considered the first respondent’s own publications, which occasionally referred to it as a ‘hotel,’ but ultimately found these references of limited assistance. The court concluded that the first respondent was not a ‘hotel’ for the purposes of the Award’s coverage.

The matter came before the Federal Circuit Court of Australia at Melbourne in an application filed by Lilli Kramer and Muthumuni Chalitha De Silva against Punthill Apartment Hotels Pty Ltd and Robin Lynne Caras. The applicants sought to enforce their rights under the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) and the Fair Work Regulations 2009 (Cth), alleging that the respondents contravened their entitlements under the Hospitality Industry (General) Award 2010 (Cth), failed to maintain employment records, and that the second respondent was liable for the contraventions under accessorial liability provisions. The first applicant also claimed a breach of her employment contract. The respondents opposed the applications, and the applicants amended their claims on 21 December 2018. The court dismissed the applicants' applications, finding that the respondents were not liable under the terms asserted by the applicants.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Does the Hospitality Industry (General) Award 2010 apply to the first respondent's business, and if so, which parts of the Award apply?
2. Is the first respondent a 'hotel' within the meaning of item D.2.9 of schedule D of the Award?
3. If the first respondent is not a 'hotel', does it fall within the definition of a 'retail licenced establishment' under item D.2.9 of schedule D of the Award?
4. Were the applicants underpaid in contravention of the Hospitality Industry (General) Award 2010, if the Award applies to the first respondent?
5. Did the first respondent breach its record keeping obligations under the Fair Work Act 2009 and the Fair Work Regulations 2009?
6. Does the second respondent have accessorial liability for the alleged contraventions of the Fair Work Act 2009 and the Fair Work Regulations 2009?
7. Did the first respondent breach the contractual obligation to pay the first applicant a salary of $55,000 per annum plus superannuation of 9.5%?

Held
1. The Hospitality Industry (General) Award 2010 does not apply to the first respondent's business. The court held that the first respondent was not a 'hotel' or a 'retail licenced establishment' within the meaning of the Award.
2. The court found that the first respondent was not a 'hotel' within the meaning of item D.2.9 of schedule D of the Award.
3. The court concluded that the first respondent did not fall within the definition of a 'retail licenced establishment' under item D.2.9 of schedule D of the Award.
4. The applicants were not underpaid in contravention of the Hospitality Industry (General) Award 2010 as the Award did not apply to the first respondent.
5. The first respondent did not breach its record keeping obligations under the Fair Work Act 2009 and the Fair Work Regulations 2009.
6. The second respondent did not have accessorial liability for the alleged contraventions of the Fair Work Act 2009 and the Fair Work Regulations 2009.
7. The first respondent breached the contractual obligation to pay the first applicant a salary of $55,000 per annum plus superannuation of 9.5%.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

was marked as ‘motel/hotel’.[63] The applicants submitted this was clear evidence that the first respondent was a hotel.[64]
92.
The respondents submitted that the registration of the premises as a motel/hotel under the Public Health and Wellbeing Act 2008 (Vic) was irrelevant to the issue of the application of item D.2.9 of schedule D of the Award.[65]
93.
The applicants’ argument is of limited assistance. It is not the court’s function to interpret legislation other than in so far as it is relevant to the interpretation of the Award. The registration of the premises under the Public Health and Wellbeing Act 2008 (Vic) does not assist in determining the meaning of ‘hotel’ for the purposes of item D.2.9 of schedule D of the Award.
94.
Accordingly, I am not satisfied that the registration of the premises under the Public Health and Wellbeing Act 2008 (Vic) assists in determining the meaning of a ‘hotel’ for the purposes of item D.2.9 of schedule D of the Award.
Is the first respondent a retail licenced establishment?
95.
The applicants argued in the alternative that if the first respondent was not a ‘hotel’, it was a ‘retail licenced establishment’ for the purposes of item D.2.9 of schedule D of the Award.
96.
The applicants submitted that the first respondent was a ‘retail licenced establishment’ as it held a liquor licence which permitted it to sell alcohol on the premises and also hold functions and conferences where alcohol was served.
97.
The respondents submitted that even if the first respondent was not a ‘hotel’, it was not a ‘retail licenced establishment’ within the meaning of item D.2.9 of schedule D of the Award.
98.
The definition of ‘hotel’ at item D.2.9 of schedule D of the Award includes a number of establishments which sell alcohol to the public, but that definition does not include a ‘retail licenced establishment’.[66]
99.
The definition of a ‘retail licenced establishment’ is not provided in the Award. The applicants did not provide any evidence as to the meaning of a ‘retail licenced establishment’.
100.
In the absence of any evidence as to what constitutes a ‘retail licenced establishment’ for the purposes of item D.2.9 of schedule D of the Award, I am not satisfied that the first respondent was a ‘retail licenced establishment’.
Underpayment claim
101.
Having regard to the above, it follows that neither the first respondent nor the applicants were covered by item D.2.9 of schedule D of the Award. The applicants were not employed as ‘hotel managers’ or as ‘front office grade 3 classification’ staff.
102.
The underpayment claim must therefore be dismissed.
Record keeping claim
103.
The applicants’ record keeping claim was that the first respondent breached section 535(1) of the FW Act and regulation 3.42 of the Regulations.
104.
Section 535(1) of the FW Act provides:
An employer must keep records in respect of employees that contain all the information prescribed by the regulations.
105.
Regulation 3.42 of the Regulations provides:
The records must include all of the following:
a) the employee’s full name;
b) the employee’s address;
c) the employee’s date of birth;
d) the employee’s occupation or position;
e) the employee’s hours of work and any overtime worked;
f) the employee’s ordinary rate of pay; and
g) the employee’s gross wages and superannuation contributions.
106.
The applicants submitted that the first respondent failed to keep employment records in accordance with section 535(1) of the FW Act and regulation 3.42 of the Regulations.
107.
The first respondent submitted that it did keep records in accordance with section 535(1) of the FW Act and regulation 3.42 of the Regulations.
108.
However, given that the underpayment claim has been dismissed, there is no need to determine the record keeping claim. The record keeping claim is accordingly dismissed.
Accessorial liability claim
109.
The applicants further claimed that the second respondent was involved in the various contraventions of the FW Act engaged in by the first respondent and therefore liable under section 550 of the FW Act.
110.
Section 550 of the FW Act provides:
(1) An individual who is involved in the contravention of a provision of this Act or the regulations by an employer is taken to have committed the contravention.
111.
Given that the underpayment claim has been dismissed, there is no need to determine the accessorial liability claim. The accessorial liability claim is accordingly dismissed.
First applicant’s contractual claim
112.
The applicants also claimed that the first respondent breached its contractual obligation to pay the first applicant a salary of $55,000 per annum plus superannuation of 9.5%.
113.
The terms of the employment contract between the first applicant and the first respondent were set out in a written contract of employment.[67]
114.
The applicants submitted that the employment contract provided for a base salary of $55,000 per annum plus superannuation of 9.5%.[68]
115.
The first respondent submitted that the contract of employment did not provide for a base salary of $55,000 per annum plus superannuation of 9.5%.[69]
116.
The first applicant’s contract of employment provided for a base salary of $55,000 per annum plus superannuation of 9.5%. However, the first applicant’s duties as resident manager at Punthill Burwood were significantly different to the duties performed by hotel managers. The first applicant’s duties included:[70]
a) providing support to the general manager in the day to day management of the site;
b) providing direction and assistance to the front office staff;
c) ensuring that the front office and back office are operating in a seamless and efficient manner;
d) undertaking a key role in the preparation of budgets and financial reports;
e) liaising with the general manager and other senior managers in relation to all matters relating to the site;
f) providing support in the preparation and implementation of marketing and promotional activities; and
g) providing support in the preparation and implementation of the quality assurance program.
117.
The first respondent submitted that the first applicant’s duties were not the same as those performed by hotel managers, and therefore she was not entitled to the base salary of $55,000 per annum plus superannuation of 9.5%.
118.
The first applicant’s duties as resident manager at Punthill Burwood were different to the duties performed by hotel managers. The first applicant’s duties were primarily administrative in nature, and the first applicant did not have the same level of responsibility and authority as a hotel manager.
119.
The first applicant’s contract of employment did not provide for a base salary of $55,000 per annum plus superannuation of 9.5%. The first applicant’s duties as resident manager at Punthill Burwood were significantly different to the duties performed by hotel managers. The first applicant’s contractual claim is accordingly dismissed.
Conclusion
120.
Accordingly, the orders of the court are as follows:
a) The applicants’ applications filed 5 December 2017 as amended on 21 December 2018 be dismissed.