Martires v Endura Paint Pty Ltd (No 1)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Martires v Endura Paint Pty Ltd (No 1) [2021] FCA 178

Appeal from: Martires v Endura Paints Pty Ltd (No 2) [2020] FCCA 717
File number: WAD 125 of 2020
Judgment of: JACKSON J
Date of judgment: 9 March 2021
Catchwords: APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - appeal from decision of Federal Circuit Court of Australia - appellant self-represented - procedural fairness - duty of judge to apprise appellant of rules of evidence and procedure - appellant presented with new evidence going only to credibility while being cross-examined at trial - appellant not told of right to object or ask for adjournment - possibility that outcome could have been different - appellant denied procedural fairness - appropriateness of ordering new trial - appeal allowed
Legislation:

Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) ss 102, 103, 106, 570

Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) ss 340, 341, 343, 344

Federal Circuit Court of Australia Act 1999 (Cth) s 28

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules (NSW) r 51.53(1)

Cases cited:

AMF15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 68; (2016) 241 FCR 30

Australian and Overseas Telecommunications Corporation Ltd v McAuslan (1993) 47 FCR 492

Balenzuela v De Gail (1959) 101 CLR 226

Blenkinsop v Wilson [2019] WASC 77

Board of Bendigo Regional Institute of Technical and Further Education v Barclay [2012] HCA 32; (2012) 248 CLR 500

Canturi Corporation Pty Ltd v Gagner Pty Ltd [2008] NSWDC 151; (2008) 8 DCLR (NSW) 17

Conway v The Queen [2002] HCA 2; (2002) 209 CLR 203

Dietrichv The Queen (1992) 177 CLR 292

Ebner v The Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2000] HCA 63; (2000) 205 CLR 337

Gambaro v Mobycom [2019] FCAFC 144; (2019) 271 FCR 530

Government Insurance Office (NSW) v Bailey (1992) 27 NSWLR 304

HT v The Queen [2019] HCA 40; (2019) 374 ALR 216

John v Rees [1970] Ch 345

Jorgensen v Fair Work Ombudsman [2019] FCAFC 113; (2019) 271 FCR 461

Kioa v West (1985) 159 CLR 550

Martires v Endura Paints Pty Ltd (Judicial Review) [2021] FCA 179

Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Teoh (1995) 183 CLR 273

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, Re; Ex parte Miah [2001] HCA 22; (2001) 206 CLR 57

Nobarani v Mariconte [2018] HCA 36; (2018) 265 CLR 236

Orr v Holmes (1948) 76 CLR 632

Rajski v Scitec Corporation Pty Ltd (Unreported, New South Wales Court of Appeal, 16 June 1986)

Re F (Litigants in Person Guidelines) [2001] FamCA 348; (2001) 27 Fam LR 517

Seltsam Pty Ltd v Ghaleb [2005] NSWCA 208; (2005) 3 DDCR 1

Stead v State Government Insurance Commission (1986) 161 CLR 141

Stokes v The Queen (1960) 105 CLR 279

Stone v Braun [2015] WASCA 103; (2015) 13 ASTLR 444

SZRUR v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2013] FCAFC 146; (2013) 216 FCR 445

Tomasevic v Travaglini [2007] VSC 337; (2007) 17 VR 100

Whall v…

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Details
Case
[2021] FCA 178
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In this case, the appellant, Mr Martires, self-represented, brought proceedings against Endura Paint Pty Ltd in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia seeking orders under the Fair Work Act 2009. The primary judge dismissed the proceedings, finding that Endura Paint had not breached the Act. Mr Martires appealed, and the appeal was heard in the Federal Court of Australia. The appeal court found that the appellant was not accorded procedural fairness during the proceedings, leading to a denial of procedural fairness. The court held that it was necessary to order a new trial and that it was neither necessary nor appropriate to determine the challenges to the primary judge's factual findings. The appeal was allowed, the decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia was set aside, and the proceedings were remitted to that court for a new trial by a different judge.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal is allowed.

2. The decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia made on 20 April 2020 is set aside.

3. The proceedings are remitted to the Federal Circuit Court of Australia for a new trial by a different judge.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

I have concluded for the following reasons that Mr Martires was not accorded procedural fairness. As a result it is necessary to order a new trial. This means it is neither necessary nor appropriate to determine Mr Martires's challenges to the primary judge's factual findings.Background Endura Paint is in the business of manufacturing and supplying paint and protective coatings. It is a wholly owned subsidiary of a Canadian company. Mr Martires commenced employment as a Production Assistant with Endura Paint on 18 September 2017. There was a written contract of employment. His role involved assisting in the manufacture of paint, installation of infrastructure within Endura Paint's manufacturing facility, packing, delivering, collecting and purchasing goods and other works as directed from time to time. On 11 April 2018 Aaron Soos, a director of Endura Paint, gave Mr Martires a 'Performance Improvement Plan' (PIP) letter referring to a meeting between the two men which took place on 9 April 2018. According to the letter, serious breaches by Mr Martires of company policy and occupational health and safety requirements were discussed, as well as concerns about Mr Martires's performance. Mr Martires signed the PIP, and so committed to achieving certain improvement goals and acknowledged that dismissal was one possible outcome if he failed to do so. On 2 May 2018 there was an incident in which another director at Endura Paint, Michelle Cleary, alleged to Mr Soos that Mr Martires was working in the factory at a time when water from a hose was being discharged onto the factory floor, and at the same time electrical work was going on. On 3 May 2018 Mr Martires and another employee were sent to a client's property to perform some work on a pool. At one point while there, Mr Martires took his shoes off and took a nap on the client's outdoor furniture. These basic facts are common ground, although Mr Martires denies that they constitute any wrongdoing on his part. On 4 May 2018 Mr Martires sent text messages to Mr Soos which Mr Soos says were unsolicited. The messages proposed wording which Mr Soos could use in relation to another claim from another former employee of Endura Paint. The suggested wording would have accused the former employee of bullying Mr Martires to such an extent as to cause Mr Martires to suffer mental health issues and to require him to see a psychiatrist. While Mr Martires gave evidence to the effect that those things were at least partially true, he accepted that he had not in fact been referred for psychiatric help. On 4 May 2018 Mr Martires gave Mr Soos what purported to be a report about the incident on 2 May 2018 which alleged that it was Ms Cleary who had violated safety rules. On 7 May 2018 Mr Soos gave Mr Martires a letter terminating his employment with Endura Paint with one week's pay in lieu of notice. The letter gave reasons for the termination. In summary the reasons were the water incident in the factory of 2 May 2018, Mr Martires's unwillingness to follow directions from Ms Cleary, the nap on 3 May 2018 and the text messages of 4 May 2018.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Mr Martires commenced proceedings in the Perth registry of the Federal Circuit Court on 5 July 2018. The primary judge, who was based in the Melbourne registry of that court, heard it on 25 March 2020. Both Mr Martires and the solicitor for Endura Paint appeared by telephone from what appears to have been different locations in Perth.The primary judge's decision Mr Martires's originating application sought orders pursuant to s 340, s 343 and s 344 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (FWA). But it became clear that there was no evidence capable of supporting any claim under s 343 (coercion to exercise or not exercise a workplace right) or s 344 (undue influence or pressure to make or not make certain agreements). The issue was whether Endura Paint had breached s 340 which, broadly speaking, prohibits adverse action against a person because the person has a workplace right or has (or has not) exercised a workplace right or proposes to (or proposes not to) exercise a workplace right. There was no issue that the termination of Mr Martires's employment was adverse action; the issue was why the adverse action had been taken. In relation to the incident on 2 May 2018 involving the discharge of water, Mr Martires claimed that the water was 'gushing', not 'flooding' as Endura Paint claimed, saying that there was 'a big difference'. He claimed that it was Ms Cleary who had violated safety policies by entering the production area without safety shoes. As to the nap he took on 3 May 2018, Mr Martires justified this by saying that he was entitled to a work break after six hours of continuous work and was entitled to stagger his work break as mandated by the Manufacturing and Associated Industries and Occupations Award 2010. Mr Martires claimed he was terminated for reasons including the complaint he made against Ms Cleary about the events of 2 May 2018. The primary judge recounted the evidence of Mr Soos, which stated that Mr Martires had engaged in a range of unsafe and unacceptable work practices during his employment with Endura Paint, set out other complaints about Mr Martires's productivity and compliance with housekeeping requirements at the factory, and recounted the imposition of the PIP and the events of 2 to 4 May 2018 leading up to Mr Martires's dismissal on 7 May 2018. His Honour noted that Mr Martires denied all allegations regarding his conduct and performance. The primary judge also considered an issue about whether, as Mr Martires claimed, Mr Soos had solicited information to be used against the other former employee, being the information Mr Martires had proffered in the text messages of 4 May 2018. Mr Soos denied that he had and his Honour accepted that evidence. The primary judge also recounted evidence that Ms Cleary gave about unacceptable and unsafe practices she had seen Mr Martires engage in, and his complaint about her on 4 May 2018 and her perception that he was unwilling to follow her directions unless Mr Soos backed them up. The basis of the primary judge's decision was simply that he accepted the evidence adduced on behalf of Endura Paint, in particular Mr Soos's evidence, that Mr Martires had not been terminated because of the exercise of any workplace right, but for the reasons which Mr Soos gave and which were given in the letter notifying of his termination.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Ground 2 is vague and harder to understand, but under its rubric Mr Martires appears to wish to advance various challenges to the primary judge's factual findings. Since it will not be necessary for me to determine those challenges, it is not necessary to describe them further.Consideration - procedural fairness and the Email Chain In Jorgensen v Fair Work Ombudsman [2019] FCAFC 113; (2019) 271 FCR 461 at [93] the Full Court said that where 'an appeal involves grounds involving allegations of apprehended bias or denial of procedural fairness along with other substantive or discrete grounds, the appeal court should first deal with the issues of bias or procedural fairness': see also Gambaro v Mobycom [2019] FCAFC 144; (2019) 271 FCR 530 at [48]. I will take that approach here. The primary judge was obviously correct to say that the AHRC Email was concocted by someone other than any person from the AHRC. Mr Martires does not suggest otherwise. His complaint of error arises out of his Honour's observations as to authorship of the email. It includes a complaint that he was denied a reasonable opportunity to prove that he was not the person who fabricated the AHRC Email. In oral submissions in the appeal, Mr Martires said he was not given 'a fair amount of time to investigate'. He also said that the email was 'not supposed to be included' but it nevertheless 'became on evidence', and that the primary judge 'included [the Email Chain] in the judgment, when it's not supposed to be'. I take him by this to be alluding to an impression which the primary judge arguably gave that his Honour was not going to have regard to the AHRC Email for the purposes of his decision on liability (as distinct from costs), which I will address further below. As I have set out, his Honour then nevertheless took the Email Chain into account in his decision. Mr Martires submitted, in effect, that taking the Email Chain into account caused the primary judge to take an adverse view of his credibility, causing his Honour to 'judge me as a liar, as a gold digger, everything'. He complained that the primary judge did not grant the 'chance to prove myself with that email', and that this was unfair. It is a fundamental principle of our system of justice that all courts, whether superior or inferior, are obliged to accord procedural fairness to parties to a proceeding: HT v The Queen [2019] HCA 40; (2019) 374 ALR 216 at [17] (Kiefel CJ, Bell and Keane JJ). An obligation to afford procedural fairness to the parties who are the subject of the exercise of the judicial power of the Commonwealth is an incident of that power. Mr Martires was entitled to a hearing that afforded him procedural fairness: SZRUR v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2013] FCAFC 146; (2013) 216 FCR 445 at [55]. The particular content of the rules of procedural fairness depend upon the nature of the power being exercised, and the factual circumstances in which the power is to be exercised: Kioa v West (1985) 159 CLR 550 at 584‑585 (Mason J), 612‑614 (Brennan J). In HT v The Queen at [18], Kiefel CJ, Bell and Keane JJ said:Whilst stated as principles or rules deriving from the more general principle of procedural fairness, these rules do not have immutably fixed content. The content of procedural fairness may vary according to the circumstances of particular cases. Procedural fairness is not an abstract concept; rather, it is essentially practical. The concern of the law is the avoidance of practical injustice. It is that consideration which guides a court in deciding whether its procedures should be adapted to meet difficulties which may arise.