FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Martires v Endura Paint Pty Ltd (No 1) [2021] FCA 178
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read Martires v Endura Paint Pty Ltd (No 1) and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2021] FCA 178
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal is allowed.
2. The decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia made on 20 April 2020 is set aside.
3. The proceedings are remitted to the Federal Circuit Court of Australia for a new trial by a different judge.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Ground 2 is vague and harder to understand, but under its rubric Mr Martires appears to wish to advance various challenges to the primary judge's factual findings. Since it will not be necessary for me to determine those challenges, it is not necessary to describe them further.Consideration - procedural fairness and the Email Chain In Jorgensen v Fair Work Ombudsman [2019] FCAFC 113; (2019) 271 FCR 461 at [93] the Full Court said that where 'an appeal involves grounds involving allegations of apprehended bias or denial of procedural fairness along with other substantive or discrete grounds, the appeal court should first deal with the issues of bias or procedural fairness': see also Gambaro v Mobycom [2019] FCAFC 144; (2019) 271 FCR 530 at [48]. I will take that approach here. The primary judge was obviously correct to say that the AHRC Email was concocted by someone other than any person from the AHRC. Mr Martires does not suggest otherwise. His complaint of error arises out of his Honour's observations as to authorship of the email. It includes a complaint that he was denied a reasonable opportunity to prove that he was not the person who fabricated the AHRC Email. In oral submissions in the appeal, Mr Martires said he was not given 'a fair amount of time to investigate'. He also said that the email was 'not supposed to be included' but it nevertheless 'became on evidence', and that the primary judge 'included [the Email Chain] in the judgment, when it's not supposed to be'. I take him by this to be alluding to an impression which the primary judge arguably gave that his Honour was not going to have regard to the AHRC Email for the purposes of his decision on liability (as distinct from costs), which I will address further below. As I have set out, his Honour then nevertheless took the Email Chain into account in his decision. Mr Martires submitted, in effect, that taking the Email Chain into account caused the primary judge to take an adverse view of his credibility, causing his Honour to 'judge me as a liar, as a gold digger, everything'. He complained that the primary judge did not grant the 'chance to prove myself with that email', and that this was unfair. It is a fundamental principle of our system of justice that all courts, whether superior or inferior, are obliged to accord procedural fairness to parties to a proceeding: HT v The Queen [2019] HCA 40; (2019) 374 ALR 216 at [17] (Kiefel CJ, Bell and Keane JJ). An obligation to afford procedural fairness to the parties who are the subject of the exercise of the judicial power of the Commonwealth is an incident of that power. Mr Martires was entitled to a hearing that afforded him procedural fairness: SZRUR v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2013] FCAFC 146; (2013) 216 FCR 445 at [55]. The particular content of the rules of procedural fairness depend upon the nature of the power being exercised, and the factual circumstances in which the power is to be exercised: Kioa v West (1985) 159 CLR 550 at 584‑585 (Mason J), 612‑614 (Brennan J). In HT v The Queen at [18], Kiefel CJ, Bell and Keane JJ said:Whilst stated as principles or rules deriving from the more general principle of procedural fairness, these rules do not have immutably fixed content. The content of procedural fairness may vary according to the circumstances of particular cases. Procedural fairness is not an abstract concept; rather, it is essentially practical. The concern of the law is the avoidance of practical injustice. It is that consideration which guides a court in deciding whether its procedures should be adapted to meet difficulties which may arise.