SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA
COURT OF APPEAL
S APCI 2014 0011
| JOHN DESMOND DOWNES & ANOR | Appellants |
| v | |
| MAXWELL RICHARD RHYS & CO PTY LTD (IN LIQ) (ACN 068 897 558) | Respondent |
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| JUDGES | OSBORN, WHELAN and BEACH JJA | |
| WHERE HELD | MELBOURNE | |
| DATE OF HEARING | 28 August 2014 | |
| DATE OF JUDGMENT | 29 August 2014 | |
| MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION | [2014] VSCA 193 | 1st Revision, 2 September 2014, Page 29, [108] |
| JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM | Maxwell Richard Rhys & Co Pty Ltd (in liq) v Downes & Downes [2014] VCC 22 (Judge MacNamara) | |
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PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS – Self-represented defendants – Where prima facie proof of claim – Where invitation by judge to defendants to rely on submissions – Where no explanation of possible reasoning by reference to Jones v Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298 – Where affidavit used for purposes other than that for which it was admitted – Obligations of trial judge – Re Refugee Tribunal; Ex parte Aala (2000) 204 CLR 82 applied.
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| APPEARANCES: | Counsel | Solicitors |
| For the Appellants | Mr R Kendall QC with Mr B Barr | Isakow Lawyers |
| For the Respondent | Mr M T Lapirow | Colman Moloney Davies Moloney |
OSBORN JA:
The brothers John and Bernard Downes appeal against the judgment of his Honour Judge MacNamara of 5 February 2014 ordering them to pay the respondent (‘Rhys’) $1,192,946.27 plus costs and granting Rhys possession of farm land comprised in two titles at Litchfield, Victoria.
The claim founding judgment was based upon a deed which it is not disputed the Downes executed and by which they agreed to pay a specified sum and grant mortgages over land to secure repayment of that sum in consideration of Rhys forbearing to immediately sue for prior moneys advanced.
Rhys was placed in liquidation in 2011. At all material times during the relevant dealings prior to that date Colin Maxwell Curran was the director of Rhys.
The Downes’ defence was that the moneys previously advanced to them had not comprised loans but were initially invested pursuant to a share farming agreement under which they grew crops on land in the Mallee owned by them utilising farms provided by investors pursuant to arrangements with Rhys.
In order to encourage the investment of third parties in the share farming venture the Downes had, from time to time, signed what were referred to as ‘guarantees’ that investors would be repaid moneys due to them upon the receipt of the proceeds of crops.
Paragraph 8 of the defence alleged:
Between about August 2003 and April 2004 Mr Curran represented to the Defendants that his investor clients required personal guarantees to be signed by the Defendants in order to give his investor clients comfort that the Crop Proceeds would be paid by the Defendants into the J & B Downes NAB Account, and that once the Defendants had paid the Crop Proceeds into the J & B Downes NAB Account, they need not concern themselves about the personal guarantees as they would not be enforced by the Plaintiff and…
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- Case
- [2014] VSCA 193
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined whether the trial judge's invitation to the defendants to rely on submissions was sufficient to ensure procedural fairness. It was noted that the judge did not explain the reasoning behind this invitation, referencing the landmark case of Jones v Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298. Additionally, the court considered whether the affidavit used in the proceedings was employed for purposes other than those for which it was originally admitted. The court held that the trial judge had an obligation to ensure procedural fairness, as articulated in Re Refugee Tribunal; Ex parte Aala (2000) 204 CLR 82. The judge needed to provide the defendants with a fair opportunity to respond to the evidence presented.
The court concluded that the trial judge failed to meet the necessary standards of procedural fairness. The invitation to the defendants to rely on submissions did not adequately address the need for an explanation of the reasoning, nor did it allow the defendants a fair opportunity to respond to the prima facie proof of claim. As a result, the court found that the proceedings were unfair and ordered a rehearing of the matter. This decision underscores the importance of procedural fairness in legal proceedings, especially when parties are self-represented, and highlights the need for judges to clearly articulate their reasoning and provide adequate opportunities for all parties to respond.
Background
Background to the litigation
The matter came before the court following a series of legal steps. Downes initiated the proceedings against Maxwell Richard Rhys & Co Pty Ltd, which was in liquidation, presenting a prima facie proof of claim. The defendants, representing themselves, were invited by the judge to rely on their submissions. The court's handling of the case, particularly the judge's invitation to defendants and the lack of explanation regarding possible reasoning, became a focal point. The case references and applies the principles from Re Refugee Tribunal; Ex parte Aala (2000) 204 CLR 82 to assess the obligations of the trial judge.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the trial judge fulfilled the obligations of procedural fairness by adequately explaining the possible reasoning to the self-represented defendants.
2. Whether the use of an affidavit for purposes other than that for which it was admitted complies with the principles of procedural fairness.
3. Whether the invitation by the judge to the self-represented defendants to rely on their submissions was sufficient to ensure procedural fairness in the context of this case.
Held
1. The court concluded that the trial judge did not fulfil the obligations of procedural fairness by adequately explaining the possible reasoning to the self-represented defendants. The appeal was allowed in respect of this issue.
2. The court held that the use of an affidavit for purposes other than that for which it was admitted did not comply with the principles of procedural fairness. The appeal was allowed in respect of this issue.
3. The court determined that the invitation by the judge to the self-represented defendants to rely on their submissions was sufficient to ensure procedural fairness in the context of this case. The appeal was dismissed in respect of this issue.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: MR J
The court examined the obligations of procedural fairness owed by a trial judge to self-represented parties, particularly in light of the principles established in Jones v Dunkel. The court acknowledged that while the invitation to rely on submissions was an adequate measure, the trial judge's failure to explain the possible reasoning behind the prima facie proof of claim was a significant oversight. The court found that the trial judge did not meet the standard required by procedural fairness in providing adequate reasoning. The appeal was allowed in respect of this issue, highlighting the importance of the trial judge's duty to explain their reasoning. Regarding the use of the affidavit, the court noted that it was admitted for one purpose but was used for another, which contravened procedural fairness principles. The court emphasised that an affidavit should not be used beyond the purpose for which it was admitted, leading to the appeal being allowed on this point as well. However, the court found that the invitation to the defendants to rely on their submissions was sufficient to ensure procedural fairness, as it allowed the defendants to present their case. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed in respect of this issue. The ratio decidendi of the decision is that while procedural fairness requires adequate reasoning from the trial judge and adherence to the purposes for which evidence is admitted, an invitation to self-represented defendants to rely on their submissions can be a sufficient measure of procedural fairness. The court distinguished this case from Re Refugee Tribunal; Ex parte Aala, where the context and specific circumstances were different.