The Estate of Juliana Voros; Cooney & Ors v Cherry - [2016] NSWSC 1603

Supreme Court

New South Wales

Medium Neutral Citation: The Estate of Juliana Voros; Cooney & Ors v Cherry [2016] NSWSC 1603
Hearing dates: 11 and 13 October 2016
Date of orders: 15 November 2016
Decision date: 15 November 2016
Jurisdiction: Equity
Before: Hallen J
Decision:
Order that Probate in common form of the Will dated 15 November 2007, granted by the Court on 21 April 2015 to the first Plaintiff, be revoked.

Order that the Statement of Claim be dismissed.

Order that Probate in common form of the Will dated 9 June 2006, granted by the Court on 16 November 2012 to John Collins, be revoked and that Probate in solemn form of that Will be granted to the Defendant, as executor by representation of John Collins, the executor named in that Will.

Order that the matter be referred to the Senior Deputy Registrar in Probate to complete the grant.

Order that the Cross-Claim otherwise be dismissed.

Order that there be no order as to costs to the intent that each party will pay their, or his, own costs, respectively, of the proceedings.
Order that the original Probates lodged with the Court and marked as Ex. A and Ex. 1, respectively, are to remain with the Court papers.
Catchwords: SUCCESSION – WILLS PROBATE AND ADMINISTRATION – Probate granted of two different Wills of deceased - Application for the revocation of each grant of probate – No dispute as to validity of earlier Will of the deceased - Whether revoked by later Will – Whether later Will a valid Will – Whether the signatures alleged to be that of the deceased on later Will were forged - Whether deceased knew and approved contents of the later Will – Court not satisfied of validity of the later Will.
Legislation Cited: Crimes Act 1900 (NSW)
Evidence Act 1995 (NSW)
Imperial Acts Application Act 1969 (NSW)
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW)
Cases Cited: Bailey v Bailey (1924) 34 CLR 558
Burnside v Mulgrew; Re the Estate of Doris Grabrovaz [2007] NSWSC 550
Chiu Man Fu v Chiu Chung Kwan Ying [2012] HKCFI 82
Cicek v Estate of late Solomon [2014] NSWCA 278
Dickman v Holley; Estate of Simpson [2013] NSWSC 18
Downes v Maxwell Richard Rhys & Co Pty Ltd (in liq) (2014) 46 VR 283; [2014] VSCA 193
Duong v Vo [2009] WASC 210
ERS Engines Pty Ltd v Wilson (1994) 35 NSWLR 193
Estate Cockell; Cole v Paisley [2016] NSWSC 349
Fuller v Strum [2002] 1 WLR 1097 (CA)
Gill v Woodall [2010] EWCA Civ 1430; [2011] Ch 380
Hoff v Atherton [2005] WTLR 99
In re R (dec’d) [1950] 2 All ER 117
Leona Johnson (Deceased) [2015] SASC 51
MacPherson v R (1981) 147 CLR 512; [1981] HCA 46
McGrath v Troy [2010] NSWSC 1470
McKinnon v Voigt [1998] 3 VR 543
Nock v Austin (1918) 25 CLR 519; [1918] HCA 73
Ortner v Mewjork - Estate of Shing [2009] NSWSC 1381
Perrins v Holland [2009] EWHC 1945
Rajski v Scitec Corporation Pty Ltd (Court of Appeal (NSW), 16 June 1986, unrep)
Re Gardiner [2016] VSC 541
Re Griffith; Easter v Griffith (1995) 217 ALR 284
Re Hodges; Shorter v Hodges (1988) 14 NSWLR 698
Re Kilby & Ors [2016] NSWSC 1433
Re Martin; MacGregor v. Ryan [1965] S.C.R. 757
Re McQuillan [2016] VSC 647
Sarat Kumari Bibi v Sakhi Chand Bahadur [1928] UKPC 98
Simon v Byford [2014] EWCA Civ 280
Sullivan v Mouglalis; Wilson v Mouglalis - Estate Late Willem Wyma [2008] NSWSC 1326
The Estate Kouvakas; Lucas v Konakas [2014] NSWSC 786
Thompson v Bella-Lewis [1997] 1 Qd R 429; [1996] QCA 27
Tobin v Ezekiel (2012) 83 NSWLR 757; [2012]
NSWCA 285
Tomasevic v Travaglini (2007) 17 VR 100; [2007] VSC 337
Tyrrell v Painton [1894] P 151
Zahra v Francica [2009] NSWSC 1206
Texts Cited: Williams, Mortimer & Sunnucks, Executors, Administrators and Probate (20th ed)
Category: Principal judgment
Parties:
Cassandra Nicole Cooney, Kylie Mair, Danielle Voros, Christopher Voros, and Tayla Voros (Plaintiffs)
Michael Cherry (Defendant)
Representation: Plaintiffs - In person
Defendant – In person

File Number(s): 2015/62356

Judgment

Introduction

HIS HONOUR: Juliana, also known as Julia, or Julie, Voros (“the deceased”) died on 11 September 2012.
The deceased left two Wills, the first of which was made on 9 June 2006 and another, which was purportedly made on 15 November 2007. I say “purportedly made” in relation to the 2007 Will because there is a dispute about its validity. There is, however, no dispute about the validity of the 2006 Will, the only issue being whether it was revoked by the 2007 Will. (I shall refer to the purported Will, even though it is a disputed document, as “the 2007 Will”, hereafter, without in any way having prejudged the issue of its validity.)
In the 2006 Will, the whole of the deceased’s estate was left to the deceased’s son, John Arthur Collins, who was also appointed as the sole executor. On 16 November 2012, this Court granted Probate in common form of the 2006 Will to him.
Mr Collins died on 12 January 2014, leaving a Will dated 18 September 2013, in which he appointed the Defendant, Michael Cherry, as the sole executor and sole beneficiary of his estate. On 3 June 2014, this Court granted Probate of Mr Collins’ Will to the Defendant. The Defendant is, therefore, the executor by representation of the 2006 Will under that Will: Imperial Acts Application Act 1969 (NSW), s 13; Re Kilby & Ors [2016] NSWSC 1433, Slattery J, at [15] – [17].
The Plaintiffs, Cassandra Nicole Cooney, Kylie Mair, Danielle Voros, Christopher Voros, and Tayla Voros, are the five grandchildren of the deceased, and the beneficiaries, in equal shares, named in the 2007 Will. They are the children of the deceased’s son, Keith, who predeceased the deceased, and his wife, Kim, who gave evidence in these proceedings in support of the Plaintiffs’ case.
On 21 April 2015, this Court granted Probate in common form of the 2007 Will to Cassandra, without having revoked the grant of Probate of the 2006 Will. (The question whether Cassandra sought Probate of the 2007 Will, knowing that Probate of the 2006 Will had been granted, was not explored in the evidence. It is likely that she did not inform the Court of the earlier grant.)
The deceased’s estate consists of only one asset, being a parcel of real estate, situated at Kempsey Road, Lower Creek, in the northeast of New South Wales. There is a dispute about the value of that real estate, the Plaintiffs suggesting that it has a value of $50,000, whilst the Defendant suggests a value of $120,000. At this time, nothing turns on the dispute as to the value of the deceased’s estate, and it is, otherwise, unnecessary to refer to its value.
With no disrespect intended, hereafter, I shall refer to the parties, and any other person, after introduction, by either her, or his, first name, respectively or by the role played in these proceedings.

The Course of the Proceedings and the Issues

On 31 August 2015, Cassandra filed a Summons in the Probate List, in which she sought an order revoking the grant of Probate of the 2006 Will. (In the orders sought, the Plaintiffs referred to Probate being “renounced” but it is clear that what was being sought is an order revoking the grant of Probate: 1T12.) She annexed to that Summons, a copy of the Probate of the 2007 Will, as well as a copy of the Probate of the 2006 Will.
The matter was first listed before Senior Deputy Registrar L Brown on 28 September 2015. Both parties appear to have been legally represented on that occasion, the Plaintiffs by a solicitor agent and the Defendant by counsel. The Court made directions for pleadings and the matter was adjourned until 23 November 2015.
On 29 October 2015, Cassandra filed a Statement of Claim. In this document, she referred to the grant of Probate having been made to John. She asserted that her father, Keith, had been alive at the time the 2006 Will was made by the deceased. She referred, then, to the 2007 Will and to the circumstances in which it was made (to which I shall later return); she stated that she and the other beneficiaries did not know of the deceased’s death until they were told by Michael, who had been contacted by her mother, on Facebook, shortly before the commencement of the proceedings; and that Michael was not related to the deceased by blood, or by marriage, but that he was the sole beneficiary of John’s Will.
No defence appears to have been filed by Michael in accordance with the directions made.
The matter was next before Senior Deputy Registrar Brown on 23 November 2015, when there was no appearance by, or on behalf of, the Plaintiffs, and counsel again appeared for the Defendant. The matter was adjourned until 7 December 2015 and the Court noted that if the Plaintiffs did not appear on the adjourned date, “orders will be made in her [sic] absence”.
The Statement of Claim filed by the Plaintiffs may not have been served on Michael because on 7 December 2015, the Court made an order that the Plaintiffs file and serve a Statement of Claim by 29 January 2016. The matter was adjourned until 1 February 2016. Again, there was no appearance by, or on behalf of, the Plaintiffs, and the Defendant was ordered to serve a copy of the orders that had been made upon them.
On 1 February 2016, neither the Plaintiffs nor the Defendant appeared.
The matter came before Lindsay J on 21 March 2016. On this occasion, Cassandra appeared on behalf of the Plaintiffs and counsel again appeared for Michael.
His Honour noted a number of factual matters to which reference has been made above; that there was a dispute between Cassandra and Michael about the validity of the 2007 Will and which of the two grants of Probate “if either of them, should be confirmed”; and that there was a dispute about the beneficial ownership of the real estate forming part of her estate. (This issue may be ignored in these proceedings since neither party has sought any relief in relation to that matter, although Michael attempted to tender some documents which were said to be relevant to the reasons why the deceased was unlikely to have wished to make a Will in terms different from the 2006 Will.)
His Honour ordered that Michael be substituted as the Defendant; he granted leave to Cassandra to file and serve an amended Statement of Claim no later than 4 April 2016; he directed Michael to file and serve any Defence and Cross-Claim by no later than 18 April 2016; and he directed Cassandra to file and serve any Reply and Defence to Cross-Claim by no later than 2 May 2016. Finally, his Honour ordered that Cassandra deliver up to the Registrar, no later than 4 April 2016, the original grant of Probate made in her favour on 21 April 2015.
Cassandra filed an amended Statement of Claim on 31 March 2016. In that document, although not put in these terms, she asserted that the grant of Probate to John should be revoked because the 2007 Will was the last valid Will of the deceased and because she had obtained a grant of Probate of that Will.
Michael filed a Defence to that Statement of Claim on 17 June 2016, stating that the grant of Probate of the 2007 Will should be revoked because “the alleged later Will is fraudulent and not the genuine Will of Julie Collins”. He also filed a Statement of Cross-Claim, which, as far as I can glean, sought confirmation that the 2006 Will was the last valid Will of the deceased and that it was not revoked by the 2007 Will, with the consequence that the Probate made to Mr Collins was said to be the proper grant of Probate.
In accordance with the orders of Lindsay J, on 16 May 2016, Cassandra lodged the original Probate of the 2007 Will with the Court and it remains in the Court file.
On 11 July 2016, Michael also lodged the original of the Probate of the 2006 Will and it remains in the Court file.
On 11 July 2016, the matter was referred to the Equity Registrar to obtain a hearing date. The matter was listed, for hearing, before me, on 11 October 2016.
On 12 September 2016, at a pre-trial directions hearing at which both Cassandra and Michael appeared in person, the Court identified the documents on the Court file and Cassandra and Michael each confirmed that they were the only documents upon which reliance was to be placed.
At the hearing, the parties agreed that the principal issue was whether or not the 2007 Will should be recognised as the last valid Will of the deceased. If it was, they agreed that Probate of the 2006 Will, made in favour of John, should be revoked.

The Course of the Hearing

On 11 October 2016, regrettably, the matter did not commence until shortly before the long adjournment due to the delay in some of the Plaintiffs arriving in Sydney, from Queensland, because of airline difficulties. The hearing continued on 13 October 2016.
Each of the parties appeared without legal representation at the hearing. Cassandra indicated that she was the spokesperson for the Plaintiffs and she presented the case on their behalf. This was confirmed by her on the first day: 1T7.20 – 1T7.23. The two other Plaintiffs, Danielle and Kylie, who were present in Court on each day of the hearing, did not dispute what Cassandra had said and confirmed that she was the spokesperson for the Plaintiffs on the second day of the hearing: 2T1.25 – 2T1.30.
At the commencement of the hearing, the Court confirmed its duty to ensure that the trial was fair and determined in accordance with the law: 1T7.34-7.36. The parties were told that this duty applied whether each party was unable to obtain legal representation, or if they appeared, or he appeared, self-represented by their, or his, own choosing: MacPherson v R (1981) 147 CLR 512, 546-547; [1981] HCA 46. The duty applied to both parties. That did not mean, however, that to not retain lawyers, should be an advantageous procedural step.
The parties were also told that, as unrepresented litigants, the Court’s duty was not to advise either how to conduct the case; nor to advise of how rights should be exercised; nor to become the advocate for, or stand in the shoes of, a legal representative of one or both of them: 1T37-45. Nor would the Court unduly interfere with the conduct of the trial on their, or his, behalf. Any assistance would be proportionate in the circumstances and would be given without affording an advantage to either of the parties as self-represented litigants: Tomasevic v Travaglini (2007) 17 VR 100, at 130; [2007] VSC 337 (Bell J); Rajski v Scitec Corporation Pty Ltd (Court of Appeal (NSW), 16 June 1986, unrep) per Samuels JA; Cicek v Estate of late Solomon [2014] NSWCA 278, per Ward JA, at [126]-[130].
The Court also informed the parties that evidence would not be permitted to be given from the bar table without oath or affirmation unless it was agreed to be not in dispute: 1T7.43-45. (I made no order dispensing with the rules of evidence in view of the nature of the proceedings.)
The limited guidance to which reference was made, then went to explaining to the parties how the case would proceed, commencing with the reading of the pleadings and the affidavits onto the Court record; informing each of the right to object to any part of the affidavit evidence relied upon by the other, which evidence might be regarded as inadmissible; providing an explanation of the order of calling witnesses; informing them of the need for a witness to enter the witness box to be cross-examined if required; the right to cross-examine the deponent of any affidavit read by the other party; providing an explanation of the consequences of not cross-examining a witness; and also referring to the tendering of any additional documents not annexed to an affidavit: 1T8.3-1T8.49.
In Downes v Maxwell Richard Rhys & Co Pty Ltd (in liq) (2014) 46 VR 283; [2014] VSCA 193, Osborne JA wrote, at [22], that “[T]he right of an unrepresented party to be heard requires that he or she be able to understand the bases on which he or she might contest the evidence led in support of a claim against them, and the manner in which he or she might answer such claim by adducing evidence in response.” In this case, the Court provided the parties with an explanation of the role and purpose of cross-examination, and the necessity for each side to put to each witness any aspects of his, or her, evidence that was to be contradicted, or which claim was said to be false, so that the witness would have an opportunity to provide an explanation: 1T8.29-1T8.42.
(This was an important matter in this case and each was reminded of the need to do so during the cross-examination.)
Naturally, during the course of the hearing, it was necessary for there to be some degree of tolerance and assistance given to the parties, within the constraints of the duty to ensure a fair trial to both parties, neither of whom had any legal knowledge.
The parties were also informed that after the cross-examination, each side would have an opportunity to make submissions explaining why the result proposed by them, or him, respectively, was appropriate: 1T8.42-1T8.49.
Because Cassandra asserted that she had not received a copy of two of Michael’s affidavits, it was necessary for the Court to provide a copy of each to her. The copy of each affidavit was provided during the afternoon of the first day and she was not required to cross-examine until the hearing resumed.
The parties were informed that the Court had read the documents on the Court file subject to objection.
In order to save time, and to not incur costs unnecessarily, three of the Defendant’s witnesses were cross-examined first. Again, in order to avoid unnecessary costs being incurred, the Plaintiffs’ mother, Kim Stellatos, was then cross-examined with the result that none of these witnesses were required on the second day of the hearing.
Overall, I am satisfied that the each of the parties understood the nature of the proceedings and that Cassandra and Michael each conducted the proceedings as well as she, and he, could, respectively. It was clear that each had prepared for the hearing upon the basis that they, and he, would be without legal representation. Neither party appeared to have any difficulty responding to questions, or to answering matters raised by the Court. In my view, each conducted the hearing adequately, and to the best of their, and his, ability.
In addition, each acknowledged when matters were not in dispute between them, and during cross-examination, treated the witness being cross-examined politely. I commend each of Cassandra and Michael for the manner in which she, and he, conducted the hearing.
Of course, I have remembered, in reaching my conclusions about the evidence, that neither Cassandra, nor Michael, is legally qualified, and that there was nothing that enabled me to infer that either had any qualifications, or experience, or that she, or he, respectively, had any knowledge of the substantive area of Probate law.

The Two Wills

The 2006 Will (the original of which was marked Ex. 1) is a simple typewritten document, prepared by Mr Roger Wilkinson, Solicitor, of South West Rocks. (The name of the solicitor and his address is shown on the front sheet of the 2006 Will.)
It is in the following terms:

“THIS IS THE LAST WILL of me, JULIA VOROS of Cedar Farm, Armidale Road, Lower Creek, in New South Wales.
1.   I REVOKE all previous wills and testamentary dispositions.
2.   IF my son JOHN ARTHUR COLLINS survives me for 30 days then:
(a)   I GIVE him all of my estate; and
(b)   I APPOINT him sole Executor.
Dated:   9th June 2006”

The 2006 Will was signed by the deceased in the presence of two witnesses and her signature was attested to in the presence of those witnesses and in the presence of the deceased. One of the attesting witnesses was the solicitor who prepared the 2006 Will and the other is described as Heather Cook, of South West Rocks, a hairdresser.
In an affidavit sworn on 18 October 2012, John had stated his belief that the 2006 Will was the last Will of the deceased; that he was not aware of the existence of any other document purporting to embody the testamentary intentions of the deceased; that he saw the deceased sign her name on many occasions and he recognised her signature at the foot or end of that document; that the deceased did not marry after the 2006 Will was made; and that he had published notice on 5 October 2012 in the Macleay Argus, a newspaper circulating in the district where the deceased resided at the date of her death. Finally, he stated that he was “not aware of any circumstances which raise doubt as to my entitlement to a grant of Probate of the Will of the deceased”.

There was no suggestion that the 2006 Will was not duly executed or that it was not a valid Will. There was also no dispute that, at the time John swore the affidavit, he would not have known of the 2007 Will.
I am satisfied that the 2006 Will was duly executed, and that if it was not revoked by a later valid Will, it is the last valid Will of the deceased.
When explained, Cassandra accepted that in order to obtain the order sought by the Plaintiffs, they needed to establish the validity of the 2007 Will, which, on its terms, revoked the 2006 Will: 1T4.04 – 1T4.30.
The 2007 Will (the original of which was marked Ex. A) is a handwritten document comprising 3 (exercise book) pages. It is written in green sparkly ink. What is said to be the signature of the deceased appears at the bottom of each of the first 2 pages, and after the terms of the Will, at about the middle of the third page. Each signature, said to be of the deceased, is written in purple ink.
There is also the signature of two witnesses, namely Kim Voros (now Kim Stelletos) and Ben Cooney, written at the bottom of each of the first two pages and underneath the attestation clause on the bottom of the third page. Kim’s signature is written in purple ink and Ben’s signature is written on the first page in red ink, on the second page with the “B” in red ink and the balance in purple ink (overwriting what appears to have been written in red ink) and in purple ink on the third page. Underneath each signature is the name of the signatory.
The 2007 Will is in the following terms (omitting obvious parts for privacy reasons):

“Last Will and Testament of Julia Voros of [the no.] Kempsey Road Lower Creek NSW 2440
I declare that this is my last will and testament and I hereby revoke, cancel and annul all wills, testamentary acts, dispositions and codicils previously made by me either jointly or alone. I declare that I am of legal age to make this will and of sound mind and that this last will and testament expresses my clear wishes without any undue influence or duress.
I appoint as my Executor and Trustee of this my Will (hereinafter referred to as ‘My Trustee’), the first person who is willing and able to act in the role from the nominees included within Clause 2. The subsequent nominees will only act if there are no others willing or able to act who were mentioned before them in the list:
i. Cassandra Nicole Cooney of … Arundel QLD 4214
ii. Kylie Anne Voros of … Maudsland QLD 4210
If none of the nominated persons within clause 2 are willing or able to act as Executors and Trustees of this my Will, then I appoint The Public Trustee in New South Wales to be Executor and Trustee of this my Will.
I give my jewellery, personal possessions and furniture to my grandchildren Cassandra Nicole Cooney, Kylie Anne Voros, Danielle Ashley Voros, Christopher Ryan Voros and Tayla Morgan Voros. If these children are under 18 years of age, then this bequest should be held in trust for them until they reach the age of 18 years.
I direct my Trustee to give the following gifts of real estate (devises) to my beneficiaries:
I give my property at [the No.] Kempsey Road Lower Creek NSW 2440 to my grandchildren Cassandra Nicole Cooney, Kylie Anne Voros, Danielle Ashley Voros, Christopher Ryan Voros and Tayla Morgan Voros. If these children are under 18 years of age, then this devise should be held in trust until the reach 18 years.
This, my Will, is governed by and to be interpreted in accordance with, the applicable laws of New South Wales (which is the place of my residing at the time of signing this my Will).
Dated this 15th day of November, 2007
Signed by Julia Voros
Signed by the above person in the presence of both of us the witnesses being present at the same time and signed by each of us in the presence of each other and the person.”

The 2007 Will is obviously much longer than the 2006 Will although, effectively, all of the deceased’s property is left to her five grandchildren.

The Undisputed Evidence

Next, I shall identify a number of formal matters about which there was no dispute, namely, that:
(a) The deceased was of full age at the time each Will was made;

At the date of death, the deceased left property in NSW;

Cassandra is of full age and is willing and, apparently, able, to administer the deceased’s estate according to law;

The deceased did not marry after each Will was made;

The original of each Will is in evidence;

The testamentary capacity of the deceased is not in issue;

Each party has produced the original Probate document which shall remain with the Court file;

None of the deceased’s estate appears to have been distributed. So far as is known, the real estate owned by the deceased at the date of her death remains registered in her name alone;

(i) There are no other persons who have any interest in the outcome of the proceedings. All affected beneficiaries, or potential beneficiaries, are parties to the proceedings and each is over the age of 18 years.

The Evidence – Some Preliminary Matters

Like most probate disputes, the personality, state of mind, desires, and prejudices of the central person, namely the deceased, her relationship with family members she did, or did not, provide for, and the reasons for the change in testamentary dispositions, are all significant matters that the Court needs to examine carefully in order to come to a finding about the validity of the disputed Will. With the death of the deceased, most of those matters can only be examined by way of second-hand, and often, partisan, evidence: Chiu Man Fu v Chiu Chung Kwan Ying [2012] HKCFI 82, at [51].
Also, relevantly to Michael’s defence, as was observed by Peter Gibson LJ in Fuller v Strum [2002] 1 WLR 1097 at [32]:

"Probate proceedings peculiarly pose problems for the court because the protagonist, the testator, is dead and those who wish to challenge the will are often not able to give evidence of the circumstances of the will."

Usually, in contested probate proceedings, both attesting witnesses are called, as well as the author of the Will being propounded. That was not done. However, I have referred to John’s affidavit which was filed in support of the application for the grant of Probate of the 2006 Will. To the extent that it is necessary, because there was no dispute about the validity of the 2006 Will, I dispense with the need to provide the evidence of one, or other, of the attesting witnesses.
In relation to the 2007 Will, only one of the attesting witnesses gave evidence, as did the author of that Will (as to which see later). Before turning to the evidence, it is to be noted that there was no evidence from Ben, the second of the persons shown to be an attesting witness to the deceased’s signature on the 2007 Will. Ben is Cassandra’s current de facto partner and the father of her children. (Because Michael sought to impugn the validity of the 2007 Will, the same dispensation, in my view, may not be able to be granted in relation to the second attesting witness to the 2007 Will.)
There was some explanation given by Cassandra for the failure to call Ben as a witness in the proceedings. The following passage of her evidence in cross-examination, at 2T5.23 – 2T5.32, is relevant:

“Q. Other than your mother Kim, your husband Ben was a witness to the 2007 will?
A. Yes.
Q. Why didn't he file an affidavit?
A. Because he is not able to travel due to his health and we have a two year old and we have a child with autism. One of us has to always be with them.
Q. So that caused him not to be able to file an affidavit?
A. No, I had the affidavit but when I was told that I couldn't file the affidavit unless they were able to be present here to be a witness, that is why I didn't file the affidavit.”

Cassandra did not disclose who told her that the affidavit could not be filed. Nor, at the hearing, did she seek to file, or read, the affidavit, a copy of which had been served on Michael: 1T27.22. Nor did she provide any evidence to substantiate any health issues from which Ben suffered that would have prevented him travelling to Sydney if he were required for cross-examination.
The failure to call Ben, or to seek to have his affidavit read, may be relevant in this case because of Kim’s evidence to which reference will be made and because of the apparent use of different pens by the deceased and Ben, about which none of the Plaintiffs who had sworn or affirmed an affidavit gave any evidence. I have not given this aspect a lot of weight in the circumstances of this case, but it is a matter that must be referred to.
There was also no evidence given by the two youngest Plaintiffs, each of whom is now over the age of 18 years. There was no explanation for the failure to adduce the evidence of each, although it was said that both were present at the time of the preparation and signing of the 2007 Will.
In support of the Plaintiffs’ case, Cassandra sought to rely upon a document headed “Expert Report”, which was filed on 30 June 2016, from a person identified as “Lachlan Jarvis”. Michael objected to the tender of this document.
When I foreshadowed that, in all probability, I would reject the tender Cassandra asked whether she could apply to adjourn the matter so that proper evidence from an expert could be obtained. She was told that she could make such an application and that she should consider whether to do so over the long adjournment. Following the long adjournment, when asked whether she had any application to make, Cassandra responded that the Plaintiffs did not wish to make any application and that, having spoken to a solicitor, they would accept the ruling of the Court in relation to the admissibility of that document: 1T7.00 – 1T7.13.
I then dealt with the tender of the “Expert Report”. There were a number of problems with admitting the report into evidence, including that:

The author of the report was not the expert. The Expert Report commenced “From my expert”, the identity of whom is not disclosed.

The report does not state, in accordance with Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) (UCPR), rule 31.22, information as to any arrangements under which the charging of fees or costs by the expert witness is contingent on the outcome of the proceedings, or the payment of any fees or costs to the expert witness is to be deferred, in, or in an annexure to, any report that he or she prepares for the purposes of the proceedings.

It did not contain an acknowledgment, as required by UCPR rule 31.23, by the expert witness by whom it was prepared that he, or she, had read the expert code of conduct and agreed to be bound by it.

It did not contain, as required by UCPR rule 31.27, (i) the expert’s qualifications as an expert on the issue the subject of the report; (ii) the facts, and assumptions of fact, on which the opinions in the report were based (a letter of instructions may be annexed); (iii) the expert’s reasons for each opinion expressed; (iv) if applicable, that a particular issue fell outside the expert’s field of expertise; (v) any literature or other materials utilised in support of the opinions; (vi) any examinations, tests or other investigations on which the expert had relied, including details of the qualifications of the person who carried them out.

The Plaintiffs failed to comply with UCPR rule 31.19, which requires any party intending to adduce expert evidence at trial, or to whom it becomes apparent that he or she, or any other party, may adduce expert evidence at trial, to promptly seek directions from the Court in that regard; and which does not permit expert evidence to be adduced at trial unless directions have been sought in accordance with this rule, and if any such directions have been given by the Court, otherwise than in accordance with those directions, unless the Court otherwise orders.

For these reasons, I rejected the tender of the report.

The Evidence adduced by and from the Plaintiffs

In support of the validity of the 2007 Will, the Plaintiffs relied upon an affidavit of each of the following deponents, the contents of which I shall set out in full (as they are not very long). In considering the form and content of the affidavits, I have not forgotten that the Plaintiffs were not legally represented.
Even so, the affidavits that were filed provided far from a comprehensive account of the events surrounding the preparation, and execution, of the 2007 Will. It will be remembered that these affidavits were prepared at a time when it was clear that Michael was opposing the claim for relief.
None of the deponents disclosed the whole of the conversation which is said to have been held in which the deceased is said to have told the Plaintiffs what she wanted to have included in the Will. None disclosed precise details of the circumstances surrounding the execution by the persons who attested the deceased’s signature.
In referring to these matters, there is insufficient evidence to lead to the conclusion that each of the Plaintiffs deliberately withheld the truth, or to enable the making of a finding that relevant factual details were deliberately omitted from each of the affidavits, resulting in a finding that the Plaintiffs did not want to, or were unable to, disclose precisely what had happened.
However, the duty of a witness is to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. Young J (as his Honour then was) wrote in ERS Engines Pty Ltd v Wilson (1994) 35 NSWLR 193 at 197, that the obligation is the same when one is making an affidavit or when one is giving evidence in the witness box. That statement was referred to, with approval, in McGrath v Troy [2010] NSWSC 1470 per White J, at [124].
The lingering doubts that I have about the information contained in each of the affidavits of the three Plaintiffs are not assuaged when the affidavits are set out and the oral evidence is referred to. The materiality of what is omitted from each of these affidavits is obvious.
Kylie’s affidavit was in the following terms:

“I am witness to the will signed by Julia Voros on 15 November 2007.
My maiden name was Voros.
I wrote the will out for my grandmother Julia Voros as she was unable to read or write English very well.
I read out word for word to her what the will said before she signed it.
We agreed that my uncle John Collins was to reside in the property until his death.
I witnessed her sign the will and she was not under the influence of anything and was of sound mind.”

Nothing is written about the conversation in which the deceased gave instructions for the 2007 Will. Nor is there anything about how the terms of the 2007 Will came to be written. That a Google search is said to have been carried out by Cassandra and that the terms of the Will were said to be dictated to Kylie (as to which see later) is not even hinted at. The reference to “We agreed” is curious, bearing in mind that what must be established are the deceased’s testamentary intentions and how those intentions were communicated to the author of the testamentary document.
Why there was no reference to the instructions for the 2007 Will is not clear. It is also surprising that, if revealed as the deceased’s intention, it was not included in the document.
In cross-examination, Kylie gave this evidence at 2T13.24 – 2T13.33:

“Q. Do you think Uncle John knew about the will in 2007?
A. No.
Q. Why do you think it was kept a secret from Uncle John?
A. Because the concern that nan had told us was that she was worried that when Uncle John had passed that he would pass it on to his girlfriend and she did not like his girlfriend.
Q. So it was nan that requested that the will was kept secret?
A. Yes, so he didn't find out, yes.”

And at 2T14.8 – 2T14.18:

“Q. You say in your affidavit that, "we agreed that Uncle John was to reside at the property until his death". Whose idea was that proviso?
A. That was nan's.
Q. It was nan's idea?
A. Yes.
Q. Look, since it was such a, you know, profound proviso why didn't you write it or why didn't you think to write it into the will as an important proviso?
A. Because we loved him exactly as much as she did and we would never have evicted him from his home.”

Neither conversation with the deceased appears in the affidavit.
It was necessary for the Court to ask some questions of Kylie at 2T16.33 – 2T18.43:

“Q. Could you tell me the sequence of events that occurred from when you got home to when the document was signed?
A. Okay. We got back from the funeral and we were all sitting, it was like a kitchen/dining room so we were sitting in the dining area but it was like all in one and then everyone was like, quite a few people were out the front and there were quite a few inside and then nan come up to us and then she said that she wanted to speak to…
Q. When you say "she came up to us" who do you mean?
A. Sorry, me and my siblings.
Q. Well, there are four siblings, aren't there?
A. Yes, correct and then she asked
Q. All of your siblings?
A. Yes, other than me.
Q. "Other than"?
A. Other than me so there was five in total.
Q. So she came up to you and all other siblings?
A. Yes.
Q. And?
A. And she said that can she have a private talk, she needs to have a word, she wanted to speak to all of us grandchildren so we went and walked into my mum and dad's bedroom and closed the door.
Q. So all five of you were in there?
A. Correct.
Q. And her?
A. Yes.
Q. That is it?
A. Yes.
Q. Yes?
A. And then nan went on to tell us that Uncle John had made her make a will the previous year and then she was concerned that if Uncle John was ever to pass, that because he has no children that the property would then be passed to his girlfriend Kay and she didn't like her at all. She had a huge dislike for her. Have you got that part?
Q. Yes?
A. And then … she talked about, you know, writing up a new will and then I asked Cassandra to Google on her phone how to write up a will because we obviously had no idea how to write one so Cassandra googled it. She got me to write it down because obviously nan can't write English and we got to the point where it was written. I read it back to my grandmother. She agreed that it was okay. Then we went
Q. Just a minute?
A. Yep.
Q. Yes?
A. She agreed that it was okay and then she went and got well, not nan, sorry, then Cassandra went and got Ben and my mother because we needed witnesses and they came into the room, they witnessed the will.
Q. What did they do?
A. They watched nan sign it and then they signed the will.
Q. In what order?
A. Sorry?
Q. In what order?
A. In what order, my nan first, then it was my mother and then it was Ben.
Q. What happened then?
A. And then we read through it again once it was all signed just to make sure.
Q. I am sorry, say that again?
A. I read the will out to nan again once it was all signed and then we left the room.
Q. I am just looking at your affidavit. You have said, "I read out word for word to her what the will said before she signed it"?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. And you have told me that?
A. Yes.
Q. You haven't said in your affidavit that after the will was signed you read it out to her again. Why did you leave that out of your affidavit?
A. I didn't think it was relevant because I had already read the will out initially before it was signed and then
Q. Why did you read it again?
A. Just to make sure that it was all finished and complete and nan was happy that it was done.
Q. But, I'm sorry, I am having a bit of difficulty understanding that because you have told me that after it was written you read it back to her and she said it was okay?
A. Yes, but also my mother and Ben was in the room too and they were witnessing everything. It is force of habit. I just re read it out again. I tend to be OCD with things like that.
Q. But if that is so why didn't you include it in your affidavit?
A. I don't know. I didn't think it was relevant.
Q. And were all of the five grandchildren present from beginning to end?
A. Yes.
Q. This is the document you say you wrote, is it (shown)?

A. Yes.
Q. Would you have a look through that document please. You read that all out to her word for word you tell me not once but twice?
A. Yes, correct.”

This evidence demonstrates, further, that Kylie’s affidavit is deficient in setting out all of the events about which she gave oral evidence.
Kim’s affidavit was in the following terms:

“I am witness to the will signed by Julia Voros on 15 November 2007.
My previous surname was Voros and I was witness to Julia Voros signing her will dated 15 November 2007. I was married to her son Keith Voros until his death in 2007. Keith Voros was John Collins only sibling.
Julia had told my daughters Cassandra, Kylie and Danielle that she wanted to write a will leaving the property to all 5 of her grandchildren. She specifically said that if she was to die before John which she believed would be very likely he was to continue living in the property until his death to which they all agreed.
At the time of signing the will Julia was not under the influence of anything and was of sound mind and capable of making this decision.”

The following passage of Kim’s oral evidence (with transcript correction) is relevant and provides a basis for the doubt about the completeness of this affidavit (1T53.13-1T55.21):

“HIS HONOUR
Q. Can you tell me, from the start of the event to the end of the event, what happened on the occasion that the document was signed you say by the deceased?
A. What do you mean "the start of the event"?
Q. Well I want you to tell me what happened when the conversation first started and what happened in it?
A. I was at my husband's funeral. He had just passed away, so naturally we were all very upset. And my mother in law at the time mentioned that my children, about being in the will, making a will up, they would leave it to the grandchildren, the property, and she really didn't want John to know about it, because it was supposed to a secret, and then she - I was outside actually, and she took the kids inside and was telling them about it, in my room.
Q. Well just a moment. Were you there or were you outside?
A. I was outside and then I went inside.
Q. Right. Well you tell me what you observed?
A. And then my daughter, Kylie, started reading out a will to my mother-in-law, and she signed it, and I witnessed it.
I don’t recall a lot of that day as you know, are well aware that it was a very traumatic day.
HIS HONOUR
Q. To the best of your recollection how long did it take from the deceased, your mother-in-law speaking about wanting to leave her property till you signed the document?
A. An hour.
Q. Were you inside … all the time when the conversation between her and the grandchildren was taking place?
A. Not the whole of the time, no.
…
Q. Did you just go in and out?
A. Yes.
Q. Who wrote out the will?
A. My daughter Kylie.
Q. You observed that, did you? You saw that?
A. As far as I can remember.
Q. When it came to signing the will can you tell me what happened?
A. Julie signed it, my mother-in-law signed it and then it passed to me to sign and authorise it.
Q. How many times did you sign it?
A. Once.
Q. Are you sure of that?
A. As far as I can remember.
Q. Did anyone else sign it?
A. Yes, Ben Cooney, the other witness.
…
Q. I am showing the witness Ex A. Do you recognise that document?
A. Yes.
Q. What is it?
A. A will.
Q. Is that the document that you signed?
A. Yes.
Q. And you see you signed it three times?
A. Well I can’t remember on that day, sorry. I can’t remember a lot of what went on that day.”

It can be seen that Kim said nothing about the conversation described in her affidavit as being what the deceased had “specifically said”. The sentence “they would leave it to the grandchildren, the property” could not be accurate if it was the deceased who had said that she wished to leave the property to her grandchildren. Also, in light of her oral evidence, I am far from confident that Kim was present when what she says in the affidavit was disclosed as being the deceased’s testamentary intentions.
In addition, Kim said nothing in her affidavit, of having been present when the 2007 Will was read, in her presence, to the deceased after it had been signed. Kim, according to Kylie’s evidence, had not been present when the 2007 Will was read to the deceased prior to its execution. Kim’s evidence was that she was present when the Will was read to the deceased before anybody signed it. Kylie’s evidence is to the contrary, namely that it was signed first and then read again to the deceased in the presence of the attesting witnesses.
I should mention the following evidence given by Kylie in regard to Ben’s involvement (2T19.27-19.46):

“Q. All five siblings were present in your nan's bedroom?
A. In my mother's bedroom.
Q. In your mother's bedroom so all five of you went in there and yet Julie was also in there, Ben Cooney was also in there, that makes seven of you and nan so that is eight and the five siblings so that is eight people. You said "all five of us went into nan's bedroom"?
A. Yes, we first went in, the five siblings went in with my grandmother. Then the witnesses came in.
…
Q. So Ben wasn't in the room because you said only all five of us were in there so Ben was not in the room when it was being written but then he
signed that he was a witness to the will being written?
A. Yes. I mean, it is quite possible that he was in and out of the room.”

Danielle’s affidavit was in the following terms:

“I am witness to the will signed by Julia Voros on 15 November 2007.
We agreed that my uncle John Collins was to reside in the property until his death.
I witnessed my grandmother Julia Voros sign the will and she was not under the influence of anything and was of sound mind.”

Danielle was not cross-examined by Michael. Thus, her evidence stands unchallenged. Prima facie, a court will accept the unchallenged evidence of a witness. However, even if evidence is unchallenged, a party may be able to demonstrate that the evidence is inherently illogical or unreliable or inconsistent with their evidence that is accepted. Furthermore, the evidence may be shown to be defective in some way, and if it is, the Court is not required to accept evidence that is unchallenged.
Danielle’s statement that “We agreed” in circumstances where the deceased was said by Kim to have specifically stated that if the deceased were to die before John, which she believed would be very likely, he was to continue living in the property until his death seems an odd turn of phrase. She, also, does not state that she saw either of Kim, or Ben, witness the deceased’s signature on the 2007 Will. She wrote virtually nothing about what occurred before, during, or after the signing of the 2007 Will. These are matters of some concern and their omission causes me to not accept, unequivocally, her untested evidence.
Cassandra’s affidavit of 18 March 2016 was in the following terms:

“I am witness to the will signed by Julia Voros on 15 November 2007.
Julia Voros was my grandmother.
Our agreement with my nan was that when she died our uncle (John Collins) was to continue living in the property until his death.
On the day of the signing of the will I witnessed Julia sign the will and she was not under the influence of anything and was of sound mind.”

Her statement that “Our agreement with my nan” in circumstances where Kim had written that the deceased said if she was to die before John, which she believed would be very likely, he was to continue living in the property until his death, similarly seems an odd turn of phrase. She, also, does not state that she saw either Kim, or Ben, witness the deceased’s signature. She, also, wrote virtually nothing about what occurred before, during, or after the signing of the 2007 Will.
That the last paragraph of each affidavit is in essentially the same terms is a matter to be noted.
Earlier, Cassandra had affirmed an affidavit of executor on 16 March 2015, which was read in the proceedings, although clearly filed in support of the application for Probate, in which she stated her belief that the 2007 Will was the last Will of the deceased; that she was not aware of the existence of any other document purporting to embody the testamentary intentions of the deceased; that she saw the deceased sign her name at the foot or end of that document and identified the attesting witnesses as Kim Stellatos and Ben Cooney; that the deceased did not marry after the 2007 Will was made; and that she had published a notice on 27 February 2015 on the NSW online Registry website; and that she and the other Plaintiffs were the sole beneficiaries named. Finally, she stated that she was “not aware of any circumstances which raise doubt as to my entitlement to a grant of probate of the will of the deceased”. (As stated earlier, whether the last statement is correct, was not investigated.)
On the Plaintiffs’ evidence, the following is revealed:

The 2007 Will was said to have been prepared, and claimed to have been signed, on the day of Keith’s funeral, at a time when the deceased, and others, were mourning and, as Kim put it, “we were all very upset”.

The 2007 Will was said to have been written by one of the beneficiaries (Kylie), it being dictated by another of the beneficiaries (Cassandra). They appear to have been active participants in the making of the 2007 Will. Neither was a mere passive onlooker. Each was directly, and deliberately, engaged in the making of the 2007 Will.

The document used as the source for the preparation of the 2007 Will is not in evidence. It was simply referred to as a document found by Cassandra using Google search.

The preparation, and the signing, of the 2007 Will, is said to have occurred in Kim’s bedroom. At the time the 2007 Will was said to have been signed, there would have had to be eight people present in the bedroom, including all of the five beneficiaries to be named in it.

Both of the attesting witnesses identified on the 2007 Will had a close association with the beneficiaries, one being their mother, and the other being the de facto partner of Cassandra.

The 2007 Will was prepared in secret. It was not disclosed to John at any time, or to Michael, until sometime after the deceased’s, and John’s, death (a matter to which I shall return). (There is no evidence that the deceased disclosed to any person that she had made a Will in 2007.)

The deceased was not well at the time the 2007 Will was said to have been written. She required the use of an oxygen machine (2T7.39-43). She clearly had a respiratory condition from which she was then suffering. (Her Death Certificate - years later- confirmed a respiratory condition (“chronic obstructive airways disease – 20 years”) as one of the causes of her death.)

A significant aspect of what is said to have been the deceased’s instructions, namely that John was to have a right to reside in the only property of the deceased, for his life, was not included in the 2007 Will. In addition, the disinheritance of John, who was then her only son, who had lived with the deceased for many years, and who had been her principal carer, is somewhat unusual.

The affidavits do not provide any explanation given by the deceased for the change of the deceased’s testamentary intentions. (I do not accept the suggestion made by Kim that the deceased did not want to make provision for John because of his relationship with his girlfriend. There is no evidence that John had not been in the same relationship when the deceased made the 2006 Will.)

After the deceased is said to have signed the 2007 Will and returned to New South Wales, she had very little contact with any of the Plaintiffs – they did not even know of her death until 2.5 years later.

The 2007 Will was made without the benefit of legal advice, whereas the 2006 Will had been made by the deceased with the advice and assistance of a solicitor.

The 2007 Will is a substantial departure from the 2006 Will. There is no evidence of any earlier Will in which any of the Plaintiffs is named as a beneficiary or any conversations asserted that establish that the deceased had any long-held belief that they ought to be. There is no evidence that any of them enjoyed the deep affection of the deceased. As will be read, the evidence of the independent witnesses is that they did not.

Neither the original, nor a copy, of the 2007 Will was provided to the deceased.

When Kim was told by Michael of the deceased’s death, she did not mention having been present when a Will of the deceased had been prepared, or that she had been a signatory to a Will signed by the deceased.

A number of these are circumstances relevant to the preparation and execution of the 2007 Will that "excite the suspicion of the Court".

The Evidence adduced by the Defendant and from his witnesses

Michael gave evidence that was advanced to demonstrate that there was a doubt as to the validity of the 2007 Will. In addition, he stated that his belief was that the signatures of the deceased on the 2007 Will were not genuine signatures. However, he was unable to call any direct evidence to contradict the evidence of the Plaintiffs’ witnesses that the signatures of the deceased appear on the 2007 Will.
In his first affidavit, Michael wrote that on 9 February 2015, he had contact with Kim, in which contact he had mentioned to her that both the deceased and John had died. His evidence is corroborated by a number of Facebook messages which were annexed to his affidavit, and which were in the following terms:

“Mick Cherry         2/9, 6:48pm
Hi Kim. I thought you already would be aware. But obviously not. Sorry to give you the news. Julie passed away about three years ago from a respiratory related illness. And John died back in January last year from liver related organ failure. It was a very difficult and sad time for all of us. Mick Green lives on his own property out near Dubbo. He came down to Sydney to see John in hospital and went up to Lower Creek to a memorial that I arranged.
Kim Clark Stelletos       2/9, 7:29pm
I cannot believe this we didn’t even know tried contacting john and Julie over the last few years but they didn’t want to talk to me or my kids. I don’t know why Keith and myself bought a car for john it was in my name and John wanted it in his name I did that he said he would ring me back and never did never heard from them again I still am in shock nobody let us know anything what happened to there property? are they buried sorry for so many questions but am in totally shock
Mick Cherry         2/10, 4:02pm
It’s probably to talk to you on the phone. Leave me your mobile and I’ll call you when I get a chance.
Kim Clark Stelletos      2/10, 4:40pm
My number is 04XX XXX XXX”

(It is important to note the statement made by Kim that there had been attempts at “contacting John and Julie over the last few years but they didn’t want to talk to me or my kids. I don’t know why”. In addition, she raised the question “What happened to their property?” which question seems somewhat inconsistent with her being in shock as the explanation for not having mentioned the 2007 Will.)
Michael also annexed a copy of a number of Facebook messages from, and to, Cassandra, on 16 March 2015, which were in the following terms:

“Cassandra Cooney       3/16, 2:14pm
Hi Mick, Its Cassandra Cooney (previously Voros). How are you? It has been a long time. Mum said she contacted you to see how nan and uncle john were and found out they had passed away. We were obviously very shocked and saddened to hear that especially as uncle john did not contact us to let us know when nan passed. I was hoping you may have kept some photos of nans that I could have. I am happy to pay you for them. Anything else she had that was Hungarian I would also be interested to purchase off you. I would just really love to salvage any Hungarian things and photos of my dad, uncle, nan and pop that you may have found. Money is not an issue. If you can let me know it would be greatly appreciated. Thank you Kind regards
Cassandra
Mick Cherry          3/16, 3:46pm
Hi Cassandra. Nice to hear from you. Sorry about your loss. Send me your phone number and let me know when it’s the best time to call you and I will talk with you, ok?
Cassandra Cooney       3/16, 4:04pm
ok its 04XX XXX XXX and I am available now if you wish to call”

Whilst Kim’s explanation that she was in shock when told that both her mother-in-law and her brother-in-law had died may appear plausible, it is highly unlikely that some (about 5) weeks later, Cassandra would have still been in shock at the news. Nor is there any evidence that the relationship of either Kim or Cassandra, with Michael, was strained at the time of the Facebook messaging. It is not apparent to me why Cassandra then would have kept the existence of the 2007 Will from Michael.
As is clear, Cassandra did not write anything about the 2007 Will or anything about its contents in any of her messages to Michael. This, in my view, casts some doubt on the evidence of the Plaintiffs as to the existence, at that time, of the 2007 Will.
Furthermore, in circumstances where the 2007 Will provided for the jewellery, personal possessions and furniture, to the grandchildren, one of whom was Cassandra, the offer to purchase photographs and anything else the deceased had “that was Hungarian”, seems to be inconsistent with a then existing Will.
Cassandra’s oral evidence about this omission was as follows (T24.19-26):

Q. Why did you make me an offer to pay me money not being in issue for Hungarian items and photos and such when you knew that you held a will in which such items would belong to you?
A. They weren't provided for in the will. The will only stated the property. It didn't state anything about photos or any kind of personal effects and I didn't want to tell you anything about the will because I wanted to try and get some photos, memories of my family before you threw them away or did something which is what you ended up doing with them.

The evidence is, of course, inconsistent with the terms of the 2007 Will, which specifically provided a bequest of, amongst other things, “personal possessions” to the grandchildren. It is difficult to accept that Cassandra did not understand that the photographs were included within the meaning of “personal possessions”. Indeed, she specifically stated in the evidence quoted above that the 2007 Will did not refer to “personal effects” when, of course, it did refer to “personal possessions”.
Michael gave the following evidence in his affidavits:

“13   I knew the testator and her son from about 1973. I attended John’s 13th birthday in that year and saw both Julie and John on a regular basis up until their deaths.”
…
16   Julie Voros and John Arthur Collins moved from Sydney to Lower Creek in approximately 1984 and I paid regular visits to them over the period from then until their deaths. Usually over a long weekend or if I had a couple of days off work I would travel up and stay with them at various residences they had at lower creek.”
17   Julie Voros and John Arthur Collins resided together almost continuously for most of John’s life in Sydney and at Lower Creek. I observed them to have a close and loving relationship. They appeared to have a concerned, supportive and caring relationship.”
…
19   I believe both were in receipt of a Centrelink benefit and they were financially and mutually supportive.”
20   Julie Voros often expressed her disappointment and frustration with her grandchildren to me right up until her passing.”
…
22    I believe the plaintiff and all of the other grandchildren had little contact with Julie Voros after the 2005 incident.”
23   The plaintiff and all of the other grandchildren were unaware for more than two and a half years of their grandmother Julie Voros’ passing until they were informed of it by me in February 2015. See Annexure C”.
24   I believe the signature of Julie Voros on the Will dated 2007 on which the plaintiff’s probate was granted, to be inconsistent with the genuine signature on the Will date 2006. See Annexure D”

(Whilst no objection was taken to Paragraph 24, I did not treat the statement about the inconsistency of the two signatures as more than a statement that Michael believed the signatures to be different. Any opinion expressed by him was not admissible to prove the existence of a fact (whether the deceased signed the 2007 Will) about the existence of which the opinion was expressed: s 76 Evidence Act 1995 (NSW).)
Michael relied upon the evidence of a number of other witnesses, some of whom were cross-examined and whose evidence I accept. The first was Michael Gladstone Greene, who stated in his affidavit:

“2   I knew Julie Voros very well from 1978 until she died in 2012.
3   I was a close friend of the defendant John Collins since 1978.
4   I was also a close friend of Keith Voros, the plaintiff’s father.
5   I knew the plaintiff Cassandra (Voros) Cooney and her siblings right from birth.
…
8   I regularly visited Julie Voros and John Collins at their remote property at Lower Creek NSW.
9   I had a very close relationship with Julie Voros. We often talked privately about her family and about other matters including her and John Collins’ Lower Creek property.
10   Julie Voros told me that her grandchildren and her daughter in-law Kim Voros had been a burden to her and only ever wanted to know her when they needed money.
11   I remember very well Julie Voros telling me that she avoided contact with Kim Voros, and her grandchildren, after several unfavourable incidences, including an incident that involved the theft of jewellery by the elder grandchildren while they were staying with her at Lower Creek, which resulted in their eviction.
12   Julie Voros often made it clear to me that she was totally reliant on her son John Collins.”

Next was the witness, Adrian Thomas Doyle, who stated in his affidavit:

“2   I knew Julie Voros from 1991 until her passing in 2012.
3   I was a close friend of her youngest son, the defendant John Collins.
…
5   I regularly stayed with Julie Voros and John Collins at their remote 160 acre property at Lower Creek NSW between 1994 and 2000 for periods of up to two weeks for social visits, and as another pair of hands to assist them with property maintenance.
6   Occasionally while I was there, Julie Voros’ grandchildren came to stay, including the plaintiff Cassandra Cooney, and second plaintiff Kylie Mair.
…
10   I clearly recall Julie Voros telling me that she rarely had any contact with any of her grandchildren or their mother.
…
13   I clearly recall Julie Voros telling me that she was extremely disappointed with her grandchildren.
14   I clearly recall Julie Voros telling me that she and John Collins were estranged from her grandchildren”

The final witness was Robyn Diane Seelin who stated:

“2   I knew Julie Voros from 1998 until her passing in 2012.
…
5   I assisted as a secondary carer in taking Julie to medical appointments up until she died.
6   I assisted in palliative care.
7   I accompanied Julie to Roger Wilkinsons office at South West Rocks to prepare her will in 2006.
8   Julie was always clear that her entire estate was to be left to John Collins.
…
10   Julie and John moved into the house on the property “Cedar Farm” at Lower Creek 2001/2002.
11   In late 2009 due to confusion of exact property addresses and Julie’s deteriorating health I encouraged all local land owners to obtain and display property numbers. This meant that when ambulances were called for Julie they were able to find the correct address.
12   The property was now known as 8937 Armidale Road Lower Creek NSW 2440.
…
15   During 2006 Cedar Farm burned down and Julie lived with me for four (4) months. I was her primary carer during this time.
16   I clearly recall Julies’ expressions of disappointment at the total lack of support from Keith, the plaintiffs father, and his wife and children during this time.
…
19   In my hearing Julie never once mentioned any other will than the one made in 2006.”

(I should mention that when cross-examined about the address referred to in the 2007 Will, Cassandra referred to “Sytech”, which she described as “a program online where you put in a person's name or whatever like that and it comes up with the different titles. It is like a title search by name because nan when nan told us the address, she said "Cedar Farm" and I said, "you can't put that, you have got to put the exact address": 2T10. None of this appeared in any affidavit relied upon by the Plaintiffs.)
I found each of the Defendant’s witnesses to be truthful. In addition, unlike the Plaintiffs and the Defendant, each of them has no interest in the result of the case (although each is a friend of Michael). There is no suggestion that any of them would personally stand to gain in giving evidence against the Plaintiffs.
I should mention that whilst some of the evidence of each of these witnesses was challenged, Cassandra did not submit that any of them was a dishonest witness who gave false testimony to assist Michael’s case. In any event, there is simply no reason not to accept the evidence that each gave of his, and her, conversations, respectively, with the deceased, or what Ms Seelin wrote about her involvement in obtaining a street number for the address of the deceased in 2009.
It is also important to note that the 2006 Will was made at the time that the deceased’s son, Keith, was still alive. Neither he, nor any of the Plaintiffs, was identified, in the 2006 Will, as a substitute beneficiary, in the event that John did not survive the deceased. This fact, in my view, supports the evidence of Michael, and of his witnesses, in so far as it relates to his, and her, conversations with the deceased about the Plaintiffs.
(There were other matters upon which Michael sought to rely going to the character, reputation, and conduct of Cassandra, which was rejected and to which I shall not refer in these reasons. I did not think that the evidence would, either by itself, or having regard to other evidence adduced, or to be adduced by the party seeking to adduce the evidence, have significant probative value: s 97(1) Evidence Act 1995 (NSW).)

THE LAW

Although I have set out some of what I state hereunder in other cases, in view of the importance of this case to the parties, I shall repeat the principles. It is important that they are able to follow the reasoning and for each to be satisfied that I have considered the evidence and what each put to me following the evidence being concluded.
The Court, in its probate jurisdiction, has the power to revoke a grant of Probate, a power that may be exercised at the discretion of the Court having regard to all relevant circumstances: Re Gardiner [2016] VSC 541, per McMillan J, at [24]. The revocation of a grant of Probate is not unlike setting aside a Court order: Estate Cockell; Cole v Paisley [2016] NSWSC 349, per Lindsay J, at [53]; Re McQuillan [2016] VSC 647, per McMillan J, at [17]. Delay in seeking revocation of a grant of probate in common form can be a bar to such a claim: Dickman v Holley; Estate of Simpson [2013] NSWSC 18, White J, at [136].
In this case, it appears to be not in issue that the Plaintiffs were unaware of the death of the deceased until about February 2016. Accordingly, delay in bringing the application to revoke the 2006 Will is not relevant. (This does not mean, however, that the delay in producing the original 2007 Will, or referring to it in the Facebook message, is each not a relevant fact.)
The Court may revoke the grant of the 2006 Will, or the 2007 Will, either because the grant of Probate of the 2006 Will was made and subsequently, a later Will was found, or because the grant of Probate of the 2007 Will was made irregularly: The Estate Kouvakas; Lucas v Konakas [2014] NSWSC 786.
As stated, there is an issue regarding whether the 2006 Will was revoked by the 2007 Will.
A will, of course, must satisfy the requirements of both formal and substantial validity. Formal validity depends on compliance with statutory requirements such as compliance with s 6 of the Succession Act as to execution. Substantial validity depends on matters such as testamentary capacity and knowledge and approval.
The Plaintiffs, as propounders of the 2007 Will, bear the ultimate onus of proving that the 2007 Will was the last will of a free and capable testatrix: Bailey v Bailey (1924) 34 CLR 558, 570-572; Re Griffith; Easter v Griffith (1995) 217 ALR 284 at 289-290; Re Hodges; Shorter v Hodges (1988) 14 NSWLR 698, at 704-707. They must prove not only testamentary capacity but also that the deceased knew and approved the contents of the 2007 Will at the time it was executed so that it can be said that she comprehended the effect of what she was doing. This requirement is conceptually distinct, and separate, from testamentary capacity, and must not be conflated with it: Hoff v Atherton [2005] WTLR 99, Peter Gibson LJ, at 108, and Chadwick LJ at 117; Perrins v Holland [2009] EWHC 1945, Lewison J at [45].
The fact that there is no issue that the deceased had testamentary capacity does not, necessarily, imply that she knew and approved the contents of the 2007 Will.
If there is a challenge to the validity of a will on the grounds that there is a want of knowledge and approval, the person making that allegation bears an evidential burden of putting the relevant ground of challenge in issue. He, or she, does not need to prove anything, but merely to adduce sufficient evidence to require the Court to decide the issue in question. If the evidence adduced by him, or her, or otherwise arising in the case, is of sufficient cogency, the Court, when assessing that evidence as a whole, decides whether the propounder of the will has discharged the persuasive burden in relation to the relevant fact in issue on the balance of probabilities.
In relation to knowledge and approval, the general position has been explained by Williams, Mortimer & Sunnucks, Executors, Administrators and Probate (20th ed) para 13-23 in the following terms:

“A party who puts forward a document as being the true last will of the deceased must establish that the testator knew and approved of its contents at the time when he executed it. The testator’s knowledge and approval of the contents of the will are part of the burden of proof assumed by everyone who propounds a testamentary document.
In ordinary circumstances the burden of proof is discharged by proof of testamentary capacity and of due execution, from which knowledge and approval by the testator of the contents of his will are assumed.”

However, in this case, Michael has asserted that none of the signatures on the 2007 Will is that of the deceased, and that what are said to be her signatures were forged. For the reasons set out, I do not propose to apply the presumption that arises based upon any discharge of the burden of proof on due execution and testamentary capacity.
In addition, it is undisputed that the persons who prepared the 2007 Will take a substantial benefit under its terms and all of the beneficiaries were present when the 2007 Will was said to have been signed. If a party writes or prepares a Will, under which he takes a benefit, that is a circumstance that ought, generally, to excite the suspicion of the Court, and calls upon the Court to be vigilant and jealous in examining the evidence in support of the instrument. Unless the suspicion is removed, and the Court is judicially satisfied that the paper propounded does express the true Will of the deceased, the Court ought not to pronounce in favour of its validity. The suspicion may be roused in varying degrees depending on the circumstances and what is needed to dispel those suspicions will vary accordingly: Fuller v Strum, Peter Gibson LJ, at 1107. In other words, the extent of the proof required is proportionate to the gravity of the suspicion and the degree of suspicion varies with the circumstances of each case: Re Martin; MacGregor v. Ryan [1965] S.C.R. 757, at 766.
The relevant principles were stated authoritatively by the High Court in Nock v Austin [1918] HCA 73; (1918) 25 CLR 519. Although the judgment of Isaacs J did not receive the assent of the other two members of the Court, what his Honour said is not inconsistent with their judgment. I set out the relevant statement of principles by his Honour, omitting from that statement, reference to authorities. His Honour said (at 528):

“(1)   In general, where there appears no circumstance exciting suspicion that the provisions of the instrument may not have been fully known to and approved by the testator, the mere proof of his capacity and of the fact of due execution of the instrument creates an assumption that he knew of and assented to its contents.
(2)   Where any such suspicious circumstances exist, the assumption does not arise, and the proponents have the burden of removing the suspicion by proving affirmatively by clear and satisfactory proof that the testator knew and approved of the contents of the document.
(3)   If in such a case the conscience of the tribunal, whose function it is to determine the fact upon a careful and accurate consideration of all the evidence of both sides, is not judicially satisfied that the document does contain the real intention of the testator, the court is bound to pronounce its opinion that the instrument is not entitled to probate.
(4)   The circumstance that a party who takes a benefit wrote or prepared the will is one which should generally arouse suspicion and call for the vigilant and anxious examination by the court of the evidence as to the testator’s appreciation and approval of the contents of the will.
(5)   But the rule does not go further than requiring vigilance in seeing that the case is fully proved. It does not introduce a disqualification.
(6)   Nor does the rule require as a matter of law any particular species of proof to satisfy the onus.
(7)   The doctrine that suspicion must be cleared away does not create ‘a screen’ behind which fraud or dishonesty may be relied on without distinctly charging it.” [Citations omitted]

In Fuller v Strum, at [33], Peter Gibson LJ summarised the position this way:

“What is involved is simply the satisfaction of the test of knowledge and approval, but the court insists that, given that suspicion, it must be the more clearly shown that the deceased knew and approved the contents of the will so that the suspicion is dispelled. Suspicion may be aroused in varying degrees, depending on the circumstances, and what is needed to dispel the suspicion will vary accordingly.”

In Tyrrell v Painton [1894] P 151 at 157, Lindley LJ had observed:

“The rule in Barry v Butlin, Fulton v Andrew, and Brown v Fisher is not, in my opinion, confined to the single case in which a will is prepared by or on the instructions of the person taking large benefits under it, but extends to all cases in which circumstances exist which excite the suspicion of the Court; and wherever such circumstances exist, and whatever their nature may be, it is for those who propound the will to remove such suspicion, and to prove affirmatively that the testator knew and approved of the contents of the document, and it is only where this is done that the onus is thrown on those who oppose the will to prove fraud or undue influence, or whatever else they rely on to displace the case made for proving the will.” [Footnotes omitted]

Davey LJ, at 159-160 wrote:

“It must not be supposed that the principle in Barry v Butlin is confined to cases where the person who prepares the will is the person who takes the benefit under it – that is one state of things which raises a suspicion; but the principle is, that wherever a will is prepared under circumstances which raise a well-grounded suspicion that it does not express the mind of the testator, the Court ought not to pronounce in favour of it unless that suspicion is removed.” [Footnotes omitted]

These statements of law were cited with approval by the Privy Council in Sarat Kumari Bibi v Sakhi Chand Bahadur [1928] UKPC 98. Also see, Leona Johnson (Deceased) [2015] SASC 51 at [7].
Traditionally, a two stage approach to the evidence may be adopted where knowledge and approval is in issue. The first stage is to ask whether the circumstances are such as to “excite suspicion” on the part of the Court. If so, the burden is on the propounder of the Will to establish that the deceased knew and approved the contents of that Will. If the circumstances do not “excite suspicion”, then the Court presumes knowledge and approval in the case of a Will that has been duly executed by the deceased who had testamentary capacity. If the circumstances do arouse the suspicions of the Court, then the question is whether scrutiny of those circumstances by the Court dispelled those suspicions.
Lord Neuberger in Gill v Woodall [2011] Ch 380; [2010] EWCA Civ 1430, at [22], put the test differently:

“Where a judge has heard evidence of fact and expert opinion over a period of many days relating to the character and state of mind and likely desires of the testatrix and the circumstances in which the will was drafted and executed, and other relevant matters, the value of such a two-stage approach to deciding the issue of the testatrix’s knowledge and approval appears to me to be questionable. In my view, the approach which it would, at least generally, be better to adopt is that summarised by Sachs J in In Re Crerar (unreported) but see (1956) 106 LJ 684, 695, cited and followed by Latey J in In re Morris, dec’d [1971] P 62, 78 namely that the court should
‘consider all the relevant evidence available and then, drawing such inferences as it can from the totality of that material, it has to come to a conclusion whether or not those propounding the will have discharged the burden of establishing that the testatrix knew and approved the contents of the document which is put forward as a valid testamentary disposition. The fact that the testatrix read the document, and the fact that she executed it, must be given the full weight apposite in the circumstances, but in law those facts are not conclusive, nor do they raise a presumption.’”

In other words, have the Plaintiffs discharged the burden of establishing that the deceased knew and approved the contents of the 2007 Will?
I should also refer to the judgment of Lewison LJ in Simon v Byford [2014] EWCA Civ 280 at [47]:

“When we move on to knowledge and approval what we are looking for is actual knowledge and approval of the contents of the will. But it is important to bear in mind that it is knowledge and approval of the actual will that count: not knowledge and approval of other potential dispositions. Testamentary capacity includes the ability to make choices, whereas knowledge and approval requires no more than the ability to understand and approve choices that have already been made. That is why knowledge and approval can be found even in a case in which the testator lacks testamentary capacity at the date when the will is executed. The reason for the requirement is the need for evidence to rebut suspicious circumstances: Perrins v Holland [2010] EWCA Civ 840; [2011] Ch 270 at [25]. Normally proof of instructions and reading over the will will suffice: ibid at [25]. The correct approach for the trial judge is clearly set out in Gill v Woodall [2010] EWCA Civ 1430; [2011] Ch 380. It is a holistic exercise based on the evaluation of all the evidence both factual and expert.”

Thus, when considering whether circumstances that excite suspicion exist, the Court looks at a number of factors including the circumstances surrounding the preparation of the propounded Will; whether a beneficiary was instrumental in the preparation of the propounded Will; the extent of the physical and mental impairment, if any, of the deceased; whether the Will in question constitutes a significant change from a prior Will; and whether the propounded Will, generally, seems to make testamentary sense. Suspicion engendered by extraneous circumstances arising subsequent to the execution of the propounded Will is not a reason for rebutting the presumption arising from the due execution of a Will regular on its face: In re R (dec’d) [1950] 2 All ER 117, at 121.

In Thompson v Bella-Lewis [1997] 1 Qd R 429; [1996] QCA 27 at 451, McPherson JA (dissenting in the result) said of the circumstances able to raise a suspicion concerning knowledge and approval that, except perhaps where the will is retained by someone who participated in its preparation or execution, or who benefits under it, "a circumstance must, to be accounted 'suspicious', be related to the preparation or execution of the will, or its intrinsic terms, and not to events happening after the testator's death".
In Tobin v Ezekiel (2012) 83 NSWLR 757; [2012] NSWCA 285, Meagher JA, at [48], confirmed:

“In this context the statements prescribing "vigilance" and "careful scrutiny" and referring to the court being "affirmatively satisfied" as to testamentary capacity and knowledge and approval are not to be understood as requiring any more than the satisfaction of the conventional civil standard of proof: see Worth v Clasohm at 453. What such statements do is emphasise that the cogency of the evidence necessary to discharge that burden will depend on the circumstances of each case and in particular the source and nature of any doubt or suspicion in relation to either of these matters: Kantor v Vosahlo at [22], [58]; Dore v Billinghurst at [44]. They also recognise that deciding whether a document is indeed a person's last will is a serious matter, so any decision about whether the civil standard of proof is satisfied should be approached in accordance with Briginshaw v Briginshaw [1938] HCA 34; 60 CLR 336 or, now, s 140(2) of the Evidence Act 1995.”

In this case, it appears that one, or other, of the Plaintiffs retained the 2007 Will and that she participated in its preparation and execution. She did not disclose the 2007 Will to Michael at the first opportunity following when she found out about the death of the deceased.
On the question of the delay in producing the 2007 Will to John, I refer to what was said by Ormiston JA in McKinnon v Voigt [1998] 3 VR 543, at 562-563:

"...it has been suggested, notwithstanding the broad dictum to this effect by Lindley L.J. in Tyrrell v Painton [1894] P 151, at 157, that forbearance to put a will forward cannot of itself raise appropriately a suspicion that the testator did not know and approve of the contents of the will.
Indeed, suspicious circumstances were later held by the Court of Appeal not to have arisen in a case where that was the sole matter said to raise suspicion: In the Estate of Musgrove; Davis v Mayhew [1927] P. 264. Consistently with the reasoning of the other members of the court (Lord Hanworth M.R. and Sargant L.J.), Lawrence L.J. said at 286 that "the circumstances which the learned Lord Justice [Lindley] had in mind were primarily circumstances existing at the time when the alleged will was executed and having a direct bearing on the question whether the testator then knew and approved of its contents," thereby excluding (at 287) "matters which occurred only after the execution of the will," being in that case a delay in revealing and propounding a will for over 12 months after it was found, which in itself was some 20 years after the deceased's death. The case was followed by Willmer J. in Re R [1951] P 10, his Lordship holding that on a pleading summons only matters "relevant in some way to the preparation and execution of the will" might properly be alleged as raising a well-grounded suspicion that the will in question did not express the mind of the testator. Neither case was cited in Wintle v Nye [1959] 1 W.L.R. 284 (H.L.), a matter pointed out in the recent judgment of McPherson J.A. as a member of the Queensland Court of Appeal in Thompson v Bella-Lewis [1997] 1 Qd. R. 429 at 449-51. Although his Honour dissented in that judgment his conclusions on the particular incident were broadly consistent with those of Davies J.A. in so far as he saw inconsistency between the broad statements in Wintle v Nye and those in Re Musgrove and Re R. He attempted to reconcile them by saying at 451:
In my opinion, it is consistent with the decisions in this country to hold that, except perhaps where the will is retained by someone who participated in its preparation or execution, or who benefits under it, a circumstance must, to be accounted "suspicious", be related to the preparation or execution of the will, or its intrinsic terms, and not to events happening after the testator's death. What happens after a person's death is not readily capable of throwing light on the question whether he or she knew of and approved the contents of a document executed during his or her lifetime. Indeed, to adopt a contrary approach would be to leave the efficacy of a will to the mercy of acts or omissions, possibly deliberate, of the person to whom the will was entrusted and over whom the testator necessarily has no control after his death.

What I think flows from this discussion is that, if the failure of the propounders, their mother and Mr. Noel Voigt to disclose the will were not otherwise connected with some other suspicious circumstance relating to its execution, the non-production for some seven weeks or so after the death of the deceased would not be such as to alter the onus of proof so as to call upon the propounders to explain those circumstances. Where, however, that delay has been properly ascribed to a person who directly or indirectly takes a benefit or who may be expected to benefit significantly from a disposition under the alleged will, there the factor of delay may also be called in aid as adding to the suspicious circumstances already engendered and thus require more emphatically that the element of suspicion should be clearly and distinctly repelled before probate or letters of administration might be granted. A delay of that kind occurred in the present case, as has been described in detail by Tadgell J.A."

And at 564-565:

"Where execution is in issue, facts which excite "suspicion" may not be precisely those arousing suspicion as to knowledge and approval. In Wilson v Sabien the test was expressed generally as requiring evidence "which suggests that the signature is not that of the deceased", whereas Street J. in Public Trustee v McKeon at 159 looked more generally to evidence which was such as to create "an atmosphere of suspicion surrounding the execution of the will". So it might have been said that a failure to produce a will for some time after the death of the deceased may itself "suggest" that the will was not in existence at his death and thus had not been executed by the deceased, but that would be an oversimplification. There are many reasons why wills are not produced or sought to be proved; there must be additional circumstances which give to such a failure an atmosphere of a kind which will properly excite the court's suspicions. In the present case it was the non-production by those who were obviously going to benefit directly and indirectly from the alleged will which gave that relatively short delay an added significance requiring all suspicion to be dispelled."

In reaching conclusions about the evidence on the topic of the validity of the 2007 Will, I also remind myself of what was said by Bryson AJ in Sullivan v Mouglalis; Wilson v Mouglalis - Estate Late Willem Wyma [2008] NSWSC 1326 at [29] and at [36]:

"Consideration of the authenticity of wills, as of other documents, it is usually much affected by circumstances of prominence. The will produced in some circumstances of regularity, for example from the custody of a lawyer, a bank or building society, where the testator could be supposed to have deposited it for safekeeping can be more readily accepted. Where everything depends upon opinion about recognition of handwriting to establish that the document is the deceased's will, or had any connection with the deceased at all, the force of any doubts about recognition of handwriting is enhanced.
...
I found this case very troubling and took some months to consider it. I clearly see the possibility that the document put forward truly is the will of the late Willem Wyma and that his estate ought to be administered according to it. I have to come to a conclusion based on the probabilities as I assess them to be. In a context where cases are decided on the balance of probabilities, I am unable to come to an actual persuasion that the document is the last will and testament of Willem Wyma, and I am unable to come to an actual persuasion that it was duly executed and attested by two witnesses as the law requires."

And by what Brereton J said in Burnside v Mulgrew; Re the Estate of Doris Grabrovaz [2007] NSWSC 550 at [26] – [30]:

"It is true that, in Re Pozniak, Morgan v Reuben [2005] NSWSC 766, Palmer J appears to have proceeded on the basis that where forgery was alleged, the onus of proving that the signatures were forgeries fell on the party making that allegation rather than on the proponent of the Will and, indeed, that that onus attracted a Briginshaw standard of proof because of the seriousness of the allegation. But the question of onus does not appear to have been argued before his Honour. What his Honour said, especially at paragraphs [34], [70] and [106], is consistent with the view that a Court should not make an affirmative finding of serious wrongdoing in the absence of comfortable satisfaction that the evidence supports that finding. But it does not follow that the absence of sufficient evidence to make a finding, to the "comfortable satisfaction" standard referred to in Briginshaw v Briginshaw, that there has been fraud or forgery or other serious misconduct, has as its necessary corollary that the opposing case must succeed.
This problem is often encountered in insurance cases, when the insurer raises a defence of misconduct by the insured - for example, theft or arson. As Handley JA said in Vidal v NRMA Insurance Ltd [2005] NSWCA 390:
Sometimes an insurer simply puts the insured to proof without having a positive case. At other times, such as here, the insurer may have a positive case, what may be described as a negative pregnant. An insurer is fully entitled to run a positive case, without undertaking anything more than an evidentiary burden of displacing the plaintiff's prima facie case. The question was considered and explained by the House of Lords in Rhesa Shipping Co SA v Edmunds [1985] 1 WLR 948. This was a marine insurance case where the underwriters denied that the ship had been lost by perils of the sea, and sought to prove that she had been scuttled. Lord Brandon said at 951:
... it is important that two matters should be borne constantly in mind. The first matter is that the burden of proving, on a balance of probabilities, that the ship was lost by perils of the sea, is and remains throughout on the shipowners. Although it is open to underwriters to suggest and seek to prove some other cause of loss, against which the ship was not insured, there is no obligation on them to do so. Moreover, if they chose to do so, there is no obligation on them to prove, even on a balance of probabilities, the truth of their alternative case.
The second matter is that it is always open to a court, even after the kind of prolonged inquiry with a mass of expert evidence which took place in this case, to conclude, at the end of the day, that the proximate cause of the ship's loss, even on a balance of probabilities, remains in doubt, with the consequence that the shipowners have failed to discharge the burden of proof which lay on them.
This statement applies, with appropriate modifications, to insurance claims for theft, fire and the like.

Thus, a defendant's failure to prove fraud on the balance of probabilities, and a fortiori to the Briginshaw standard, does not mean that the plaintiff's case must succeed, but only that the defendant has not satisfied the Court that the plaintiff has engaged in fraud [Purkess v Crittenden (1965) 114 CLR 164, 167-8]. The plaintiff must still prove its case to the requisite standard.
Those principles are, in my opinion, equally applicable to the present type of case, in which a defendant, or in this case cross-defendant, raises a case of forgery; so that if I were to come to the view that I was not satisfied to the requisite standard that an affirmative case of forgery had been made out, I might still be left unsatisfied by the cross-claimant that the signature on the July 2005 Will was that of the deceased.
As Powell J said in the second proposition in Re Eger, the issue must be determined upon the balance of the whole of the evidence in the case. The evaluation of the evidence in a case of this type involves an assessment of what happened more probably than not. It is a mistake to think that in evaluating the probabilities, one commences with one apparently clear matter of fact and then deduces from that single matter what should be accepted or rejected as being consistent or inconsistent with it. Rather, the Court must look at all of the evidence that bears on the events in issue and, examining all of that evidence, evaluate which version is the more probable."

I also note that the claims by the Plaintiffs are really claims against the deceased's estate. Bryson AJ in Zahra v Francica [2009] NSWSC 1206 at [1] wrote:

"In these proceedings the plaintiff makes claims against the deceased's estate and the facts that he alleges depend for proof very largely upon his own evidence. In approaching his evidence and making findings on a matter he alleges, I bear in mind the need for careful scrutiny to which evidence in such a case should be subjected. This need is well established and was stated clearly by Isaacs J in Plunkett v Bull (1915) 19 CLR 544. Two more modern statements appear in the judgment of McLelland CJ in Eq in Eyota Pty Limited v Hanave Pty Limited (1994) 12 ACSR 785 at 789 in a passage which was cited with approval in the judgment of Sheller JA in Eggins v Robinson (2000) NSWCA 61 at [26]:
"... in a claim based on communications with a deceased person the Court will treat uncorroborated evidence of such communications with considerable caution, and will regard as of particular significance any failure of the claimant to bring forward corroborative evidence which was, or ought to have been, available."

The Allegation of Fraud

In Tobin v Ezekiel, at [55], Meagher JA noted:

“If [the circumstances] give rise to a doubt as to knowledge and approval, those propounding the will must dispel that doubt by proving affirmatively that the testator appreciated the effect of what he or she was doing. They do not have to go further and disprove any suspicion of undue influence or fraud. Approval in this context does not include that in addition to knowing what he or she was doing, the testator executed the will in the absence of coercion and fraud. The proponents having affirmatively established knowledge and approval, the onus of proving undue influence or fraud is on those alleging it.”

Despite the above statements, next, I shall deal with the defence raised by Michael regarding the 2007 Will not being the authentic Will of the deceased, which was clarified to mean that the signatures purporting to be of the deceased on the 2007 Will were not, in fact, her signatures.
Michael did not adduce strong and cogent evidence to support the very serious allegation made in the Defence. In particular, there was no expert evidence going to a comparison of the deceased’s signatures, or to pointing out similarities, or differences in those signatures, and leaving the Court to draw its own conclusion: Duong v Vo [2009] WASC 210, at [129].
I have tried to make a comparison between the signatures that are disputed and the admitted signature on the 2006 Will. As put by Michael, the four signatures demonstrate a range of variations from each other and from the deceased’s signature on the 2006 Will.
There is only one specimen signature of the deceased in evidence, being her signature on the 2006 Will, which is not the subject of any dispute. I am unable to conclude, by mere comparison, whether the variations of the signatures are other than natural variations. I also bear in mind that the signatures were made at different times and under different conditions.
There were three specific matters, however, that have caused me some disquiet regarding the evidence called by the Plaintiffs as to the circumstances surrounding the preparation and execution of the 2007 Will.
The first is found in the evidence of Ms Seelin upon whose affidavit the Defendant relied. I have set out the terms of her affidavit earlier. She was not asked any questions about the matter raised by her concerning the date when the street number was added to the deceased’s address. If the year in which the number of the address of the real estate owned by the deceased was identified was 2009, and if before that year the address did not include a number, then the 2007 Will could not have been written on the date it bears, since the address of the deceased, at the commencement of the Will, bears that number as part of the deceased’s address.
The second relates to the failure to make any reference to the 2007 Will in the Facebook messages to which reference has been made. Also important is the offer to Michael of money for part of what Cassandra thought was in the estate. By the date Cassandra wrote the Facebook message, she was aware that the deceased and John had both died. Whilst the revelation about their deaths might have been a shock initially, by the time of the Facebook message, the immediate shock seemed to have passed, as in the message there is no suggestion of still being in shock.
It is difficult to conceive of any reason for not having disclosed the existence of the 2007 Will at that time, or shortly thereafter, and to instead offer money to purchase what were some of the personal possessions of the deceased. If the 2007 Will had been created in 2007, Cassandra would have been well aware, for some years, that the deceased’s personal possessions had been gifted to the five grandchildren in that Will.
The third is the failure by Kim to reveal to Michael in a telephone conversation in February 2016, that there was a Will of the deceased of which she was aware. The following passage, in cross-examination, at 1T50.29 – 1T50.22 is relevant:

“Q. In the phone call between you and I, it was actually on 10 February 2016 and it was for 18 minutes, we discussed the passing of Julie Voros and John Collins. I told you that I had been granted probate over John's estate, in the conversation.
HIS HONOUR: Just pause for a moment. That's a question.
Q. Was that said to you?
A. I cannot recall at all, no. Sorry.
DEFENDANT
Q. We had banter about the family and about what the situation was regarding the passing of John and Julie. That was the premise of the phone call.
HIS HONOUR
Q. Was that so or not, did you have some banter?
A. We did have a conversation, yes.
DEFENDANT
Q. It was very amicable banter about the family et cetera; "How was Kim, how was Kylie, how was Cassandra, how were the children, where do you live?", that kind of thing?
HIS HONOUR
Q. Is that right, or not?
A. Yes.
HIS HONOUR: Yes.
DEFENDANT
Q. So the question would be, since we were conversing, why didn't you mention to me that you had been a witness on a will, or the grandchildren had been on a will that you had been a witness on?
A. Because I was still in shock that they had passed away. I hadn't even realised. That was the furthest thing from my mind.
Q. So you forgot?
A. Yeah, furthest thing from my mind. Didn't even think about it. I was very upset.”

It is difficult to accept the explanation of being in shock as the reason for failing to say anything about a Will. There is no evidence that Kim’s relationship with the deceased, or with John, was a particularly close one. That she could not remember when she had last seen the deceased prior to her death demonstrates that is so. That she asked “What happened to there [sic] property?” is also telling.

However, in determining the question, I must consider, in addition, the other evidence relevant to the issue, which, in the present case, is the evidence of four witnesses, each of whom states that she was present and observed the deceased sign the 2007 Will.
I must also consider s 140 of the Evidence Act which requires me to find that the case of a party is to be proved on the balance of probabilities, and in being so satisfied to take into account the nature of the cause of action or defence, the nature of the subject-matter of the proceeding, and the gravity of the matters alleged. I must also consider that Michael did not cross-examine Danielle.
When I consider all of the evidence, and remembering s 140, I am unable to conclude that the deceased's signature, in each case, on the 2007 Will, is a forgery. Such a positive finding would carry with it a finding of perjury, an attempt to pervert the course of justice by all of the Plaintiffs and by their mother: Ortner v Mewjork - Estate of Shing [2009] NSWSC 1381, at [27], and a criminal offence, namely making a false document with the intention that the person who so made it or another person will use it to induce someone to accept the document as genuine, and because of the document being accepted as genuine, to obtain any property or financial advantage: Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), s 253. It would also involve conspiracy and collusion of significant proportions, involving the four witnesses who gave evidence about the circumstances in which the 2007 Will is said to have been made.
The positive finding that the deceased’s signatures on the 2007 Will were forged is not necessary since the genuineness of the deceased's signatures was said to be an issue, as some of the matters to which I have referred do cast doubt about execution of the 2007 Will by the deceased, and because of my disquiet about the events that are said to have occurred at the time of the preparation and execution of that Will. The Court must remain vigilant, and cautious, to ensure that the purported 2007 Will truly represents the deceased’s testamentary intentions and that she knew and approved of its contents. That is particularly so since the 2007 Will provides for persons who appear to have no special claim on the deceased's bounty.

DETERMINATION

It is important to note that the Court is not engaged in some form of approval or disapproval of the dispositions made in the 2007 Will. The Court cannot substitute its own judgment for that of the deceased in relation to what would be a proper disposition of her estate. The task is to assess the evidence and to reach conclusions as to the facts on the balance of probabilities, remembering that the question is whether the contents of that Will do truly represent the deceased’s testamentary intentions.
On the totality of the relevant evidence, I am not affirmatively satisfied that the Plaintiffs have established that the deceased knew and approved of the 2007 Will. I have pointed to the lack of detailed evidence in the affidavits of the four witnesses relied upon by the Plaintiffs; to the failure to call the attesting witness, Ben, and also the other two grandchildren, who were said to be present at the time the instructions, for, and the preparation and the execution of, the 2007 Will occurred; to the fact that the deceased could not read English; to the significant change from the 2006 Will, and to the evidence of independent witnesses, each of whom gave consistent evidence of conversations with the deceased, both before and after the 2007 Will was said to have been prepared and executed, concerning what each was told about the deceased’s relationship with her grandchildren and the deceased’s complaint of having had to regularly provide financial assistance to Keith. I have also referred to the apparent closeness of the relationship of the deceased and John.
Furthermore, there is no evidence to support the reason ascribed to the deceased for the change in her testamentary intentions. It was not suggested that, in 2006, John was not in the relationship with the woman who the deceased is said not to have liked. The concerns that would have to be assuaged are magnified when the terms of the 2007 Will, in all the circumstances of the case, are such to make it appear somewhat irrational, particularly bearing in mind the closeness of the deceased’s relationship with John (which relationship appears to have continued until the deceased’s death) who was omitted, entirely, as a beneficiary.
Finally, I note that the only witnesses available for the Plaintiffs are some of those who have an interest in the estate under the 2007 Will in circumstances where that Will was produced in secret. The evidence of these four witnesses, going to instructions said to have been given for the 2007 Will and that the Will was said to have been read over to the deceased, is not enough to remove the suspicions and to find that the 2007 Will is the last valid Will of the deceased.
I have also referred to the evidence that the 2007 Will was allegedly read over, not once but so it was said by Kylie, twice, by one of her grandchildren, a beneficiary under the Will. This alleged occurrence was not referred to in any of the affidavits.
Proof that the 2007 Will was read over to the deceased does not, necessarily, establish "knowledge and approval". The evidence of those Plaintiffs and Kim, who is closely related to them, must be approached with caution because of its self-serving nature. The evidence from the Defendant and his witnesses provide additional reasons to doubt the reliability of the evidence of the Plaintiffs and Kim.
The Plaintiffs have failed to discharge the burden of showing that the deceased knew and approved of the terms of the 2007 Will, and there must be an order pronouncing against its validity.
In these circumstances, I order that:

Probate in common form of the Will dated 15 November 2007, granted by the Court on 21 April 2015 to the first Plaintiff, be revoked.

The Statement of Claim be dismissed.

Probate in common form of the Will dated 9 June 2006, granted by the Court on 16 November 2012 to John Collins, be revoked and that Probate in solemn form of that Will be granted to the Defendant, as executor by representation of John Collins, the executor named in that Will.

The matter be referred to the Senior Deputy Registrar in Probate to complete the grant.

The Cross-Claim otherwise be dismissed.

There be no order as to costs, to the intent that each party will pay their, or his, own costs, respectively, of the proceedings.

The original Probates lodged with the Court and marked as Exhibit A and Exhibit 1, respectively, are to remain with the Court papers.

**********

Decision last updated: 15 November 2016

Medium Neutral Citation:	The Estate of Juliana Voros; Cooney & Ors v Cherry [2016] NSWSC 1603
Hearing dates:	11 and 13 October 2016
Date of orders:	15 November 2016
Decision date:	15 November 2016
Jurisdiction:	Equity
Before:	Hallen J
Decision:	Order that Probate in common form of the Will dated 15 November 2007, granted by the Court on 21 April 2015 to the first Plaintiff, be revoked. Order that the Statement of Claim be dismissed. Order that Probate in common form of the Will dated 9 June 2006, granted by the Court on 16 November 2012 to John Collins, be revoked and that Probate in solemn form of that Will be granted to the Defendant, as executor by representation of John Collins, the executor named in that Will. Order that the matter be referred to the Senior Deputy Registrar in Probate to complete the grant. Order that the Cross-Claim otherwise be dismissed. Order that there be no order as to costs to the intent that each party will pay their, or his, own costs, respectively, of the proceedings. Order that the original Probates lodged with the Court and marked as Ex. A and Ex. 1, respectively, are to remain with the Court papers.
Catchwords:	SUCCESSION – WILLS PROBATE AND ADMINISTRATION – Probate granted of two different Wills of deceased - Application for the revocation of each grant of probate – No dispute as to validity of earlier Will of the deceased - Whether revoked by later Will – Whether later Will a valid Will – Whether the signatures alleged to be that of the deceased on later Will were forged - Whether deceased knew and approved contents of the later Will – Court not satisfied of validity of the later Will.
Legislation Cited:	Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) Imperial Acts Application Act 1969 (NSW) Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW)
Cases Cited:	Bailey v Bailey (1924) 34 CLR 558 Burnside v Mulgrew; Re the Estate of Doris Grabrovaz [2007] NSWSC 550 Chiu Man Fu v Chiu Chung Kwan Ying [2012] HKCFI 82 Cicek v Estate of late Solomon [2014] NSWCA 278 Dickman v Holley; Estate of Simpson [2013] NSWSC 18 Downes v Maxwell Richard Rhys & Co Pty Ltd (in liq) (2014) 46 VR 283; [2014] VSCA 193 Duong v Vo [2009] WASC 210 ERS Engines Pty Ltd v Wilson (1994) 35 NSWLR 193 Estate Cockell; Cole v Paisley [2016] NSWSC 349 Fuller v Strum [2002] 1 WLR 1097 (CA) Gill v Woodall [2010] EWCA Civ 1430; [2011] Ch 380 Hoff v Atherton [2005] WTLR 99 In re R (dec’d) [1950] 2 All ER 117 Leona Johnson (Deceased) [2015] SASC 51 MacPherson v R (1981) 147 CLR 512; [1981] HCA 46 McGrath v Troy [2010] NSWSC 1470 McKinnon v Voigt [1998] 3 VR 543 Nock v Austin (1918) 25 CLR 519; [1918] HCA 73 Ortner v Mewjork - Estate of Shing [2009] NSWSC 1381 Perrins v Holland [2009] EWHC 1945 Rajski v Scitec Corporation Pty Ltd (Court of Appeal (NSW), 16 June 1986, unrep) Re Gardiner [2016] VSC 541 Re Griffith; Easter v Griffith (1995) 217 ALR 284 Re Hodges; Shorter v Hodges (1988) 14 NSWLR 698 Re Kilby & Ors [2016] NSWSC 1433 Re Martin; MacGregor v. Ryan [1965] S.C.R. 757 Re McQuillan [2016] VSC 647 Sarat Kumari Bibi v Sakhi Chand Bahadur [1928] UKPC 98 Simon v Byford [2014] EWCA Civ 280 Sullivan v Mouglalis; Wilson v Mouglalis - Estate Late Willem Wyma [2008] NSWSC 1326 The Estate Kouvakas; Lucas v Konakas [2014] NSWSC 786 Thompson v Bella-Lewis [1997] 1 Qd R 429; [1996] QCA 27 Tobin v Ezekiel (2012) 83 NSWLR 757; [2012] NSWCA 285 Tomasevic v Travaglini (2007) 17 VR 100; [2007] VSC 337 Tyrrell v Painton [1894] P 151 Zahra v Francica [2009] NSWSC 1206
Texts Cited:	Williams, Mortimer & Sunnucks, Executors, Administrators and Probate (20th ed)
Category:	Principal judgment
Parties:	Cassandra Nicole Cooney, Kylie Mair, Danielle Voros, Christopher Voros, and Tayla Voros (Plaintiffs) Michael Cherry (Defendant)
Representation:	Plaintiffs - In person Defendant – In person
File Number(s):	2015/62356