Martinez v The State of Western Australia

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JURISDICTION     :   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

TITLE OF COURT  :   THE COURT OF APPEAL (WA)

CITATION:   MARTINEZ -v- THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA [2007] WASCA 143

CORAM:   MARTIN CJ

STEYTLER P
MILLER JA

HEARD:   5-8 JUNE 2007

DELIVERED          :   6 JULY 2007

FILE NO/S:   CACR 94 of 2006

BETWEEN:   JOSE FELIX MARTINEZ

Appellant

AND

THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Respondent

FILE NO/S              :CACR 95 of 2006

BETWEEN              :SALVATORE FAZZARI

Appellant

AND

THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Respondent

FILE NO/S              :CACR 96 of 2006

BETWEEN              :CARLOS PEREIRAS

Appellant

AND

THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Respondent

ON APPEAL FROM:

Jurisdiction              :  SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

Coram  :EM HEENAN J

File No  :INS 150 of 2004

Catchwords:

Criminal law - Appeal - Appeal against conviction - Whether unreasonable or could not be supported by the evidence - Criminal Appeals Act 2004 (WA) s 30(3)(a)

Criminal law - Appeal - Lies - Edwards v The Queen (1993) 178 CLR 193 - General principles - Standard of proof - Whether capable of amounting to implied admissions of guilt - "Intractably neutral" - Misdirection by trial Judge

Criminal law - Appeal - Directions to jury - Circumstantial evidence - Whether failure to identify indispensable links required to be established beyond reasonable doubt - Whether direction on meaning of probable consequence required - Whether directions on complicity and common purpose inadequate - Whether direction to scrutinise appellants' evidence undermined presumption of innocence - Whether failure to direct as to meaning of "esoteric knowledge" - Whether factual misdirections - Whether trial Judge correct to conclude that no identification warning required - Whether any reversal of onus of proof - Whether trial Judge invited jury to speculate

Criminal law - Appeal - Whether trial Judge erred in allowing prosecution to depart from its case as opened - Whether trial Judge erred in relation to hostility of a witness - Whether trial Judge erred in ruling inadmissible an out of court confession and refusing cross­examination

Criminal law - Appeal - Procedural fairness - Communication from juror to trial Judge - Failure to disclose letters to counsel - Discharge of juror - Reasonable apprehension of bias test

Criminal law - Appeal - Evidence - Application to adduce additional evidence - Whether fresh or new - Admissibility of expert medical evidence - Applicable principles

Legislation:

Criminal Appeals Act 2004 (WA), s 30(3)(a), s 30(4), s 40
Criminal Code (WA), s 7, s 8

Result:

Appeals allowed
Convictions quashed
Verdicts of acquittal directed

Category:    A

Representation:

CACR 94 of 2006

Counsel:

Appellant:     Mr D Grace QC & Mr S B Watters

Respondent:     Mr B Fiannaca SC & Mr S F Rafferty

Solicitors:

Appellant:     Thames Legal

Respondent:     State Director of Public Prosecutions

CACR 95 of 2006

Counsel:

Appellant:     Mr M J McCusker QC, Mr P G Priest QC &

Mr A J Robson

Respondent:     Mr B Fiannaca SC & Mr S F Rafferty

Solicitors:

Appellant:     Legal Aid WA

Respondent:     State Director of Public Prosecutions

CACR 96…

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Details
Case
[2007] WASCA 143
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Martinez v The State of Western Australia involved the appellant, Martinez, appealing against his convictions and sentences imposed by the Supreme Court of Western Australia. The primary ground of appeal was that the verdicts of guilty were unreasonable or could not be supported by the evidence. The appeal also raised issues regarding the adequacy of jury directions, the trial judge's handling of the evidence, and procedural fairness in the trial. The Court of Appeal was tasked with determining whether the verdicts should be set aside due to being unreasonable or incapable of being supported by the evidence, and if there were any errors in the trial process that warranted a reversal of the conviction.

The central legal issues before the Court of Appeal included whether the trial judge had erred in directing the jury on the meaning of "probable consequence" and whether the directions on complicity and common purpose were adequate. Additionally, the Court examined whether the trial judge's directions undermined the presumption of innocence or failed to clarify certain terms. The appeal also scrutinized whether there were factual misdirections, if the trial judge correctly decided not to give an identification warning, and whether there was any reversal of the onus of proof. The Court also assessed whether the trial judge allowed the prosecution to depart from its original case, mishandled witness hostility, and erred in ruling an out-of-court confession inadmissible while refusing cross-examination.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge's directions to the jury did not contain any significant errors that would render the verdicts unreasonable or unsupported by the evidence. The Court considered the evidence in its entirety and concluded that it was open to the jury to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of the appellant's guilt. The Court held that the trial judge did not misdirect the jury on any material point and that there were no errors in the handling of evidence or procedural fairness that would necessitate setting aside the verdicts. Consequently, the appeal against the conviction was dismissed, and the original convictions and sentences were upheld.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The first ground of appeal is that, having regard to the evidence, the verdicts of guilty were unreasonable or could not be supported. This ground reflects the provisions of s 30(3)(a) of the Criminal Appeals Act 2004 (WA) which provides:"30. Appeal against conviction, decision on(1)This section applies in the case of an appeal against a conviction by an offender.(2)Unless under subsection (3) the Court of Appeal allows the appeal, it must dismiss the appeal.(3)The Court of Appeal must allow the appeal if in its opinion - (a)the verdict of guilty on which the conviction is based should be set aside because, having regard to the evidence, it is unreasonable or cannot be supported … " Section 30(3)(a) of the Criminal Appeals Act 2004 is in almost identical terms to s 6(1) of the Criminal Appeal Act 1912 (NSW), which was under consideration in M v The Queen(1994) 181 CLR 487. As Mason CJ, Deane, Dawson and Toohey JJ pointed out (at 492), there are criminal appeal provisions in common form in Australia which allow a verdict which is unsafe or unsatisfactory to be set aside, notwithstanding that those words do not appear in the legislation. The test which faces a Court of Appeal in considering whether a verdict should be set aside on the ground that it is unreasonable or cannot be supported, having regard to the evidence, is set out in two passages from the judgment of Mason CJ, Deane, Dawson and Toohey JJ (at 492 ‑ 493). They are in the following terms: "The question is one of fact which the court must decide by making its own independent assessment of the evidence [Morris v The Queen (1987) 163 CLR 454] and determining whether, notwithstanding that there is evidence upon which a jury might convict, 'none the less it would be dangerous in all the circumstances to allow the verdict of guilty to stand' [Hayes v The Queen (1973) 47 ALJR 603 at 604]. But a verdict may be unsafe or unsatisfactory for reasons which lie outside the formula requiring that it not be 'unreasonable' or incapable of being 'supported having regard to the evidence'. A verdict which is unsafe or unsatisfactory for any other reason must also constitute a miscarriage of justice requiring the verdict to be set aside.…Where, notwithstanding that as a matter of law there is evidence to sustain a verdict, a court of criminal appeal is asked to conclude that the verdict is unsafe or unsatisfactory, the question which the court must ask itself is whether it thinks that upon the whole of the evidence it was open to the jury to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the accused was guilty [Whitehorn v The Queen (1983) 152 CLR 657 at 686; Chamberlain v The Queen [No 2] (1984) 153 CLR 521 at 532; Knight v The Queen (1992) 175 CLR 495 at 504 ‑ 505, 511]. But in answering that question the court must not disregard or discount either the consideration that the jury is the body entrusted with the primary responsibility of determining guilt or innocence, or the consideration that the jury has had the benefit of having seen and heard the witnesses. On the contrary, the court must pay full regard to those considerations [Chamberlain v The Queen (supra) at 621]."

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established