Armstrong v The State of Western Australia

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JURISDICTION     :   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

TITLE OF COURT :   THE COURT OF APPEAL (WA)

CITATION:   ARMSTRONG -v- THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA [2010] WASCA 108

CORAM:   PULLIN JA

BUSS JA
MAZZA J

HEARD:   13 MAY 2010

DELIVERED          :   16 JUNE 2010

FILE NO/S:   CACR 150 of 2009

BETWEEN:   BRYAN McMILLAN ARMSTRONG

Appellant

AND

THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Respondent

ON APPEAL FROM:

Jurisdiction              :  DISTRICT COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

Coram  :YEATS DCJ

File No  :IND 638 of 2009

Catchwords:

Criminal law - Appeal against conviction - Possession of methylamphetamine with intent to sell or supply - Whether the appellant possessed 2 g or more of methylamphetamine - Whether verdict unreasonable, or could not be supported having regard to the evidence - Turns on own facts

Legislation:

Criminal Appeals Act 2004 (WA), s 30(1), (2), (3)(a) and (5)(c)
Misuse of Drugs Act 1981 (WA), s 6(1), s 6(2), s 11(a)
Sentencing Act 1995 (WA), s 39(2)(a)

Result:

Leave to appeal granted
Appeal allowed
Conviction set aside
Appellant guilty of simple possession of methylamphetamine

Category:    B

Representation:

Counsel:

Appellant:     Mr L Levy SC

Respondent:     Mr J McGrath

Solicitors:

Appellant:     Max Crispe

Respondent:     Director of Public Prosecutions (WA)

Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):

Chamberlain v The Queen (No 2) [1984] HCA 7; (1984) 153 CLR 521

Domican v The Queen [1992] HCA 13; (1992) 173 CLR 555

Gerakiteys v The Queen [1984] HCA 8; (1984) 153 CLR 317

M v The Queen [1994] HCA 63; (1994) 181 CLR 487

Martinez v The State of Western Australia [2007] WASCA 143

RPS v The Queen [2000] HCA 3; (2000) 199 CLR 620

Scriva v The State of Western Australia [2010] WASCA 89

Shepherd v The Queen [1990] HCA 56; (1990) 170 CLR 573

The State of Western Australia v Pollock [2009] WASCA 96

  1. PULLIN JA:  I agree with Mazza J. 

  2. BUSS JA:  I agree with Mazza J.

  3. MAZZA J: The appellant was tried before Yeats DCJ and a jury on one count of wilfully destroying evidence and one count of possession of methylamphetamine with intent to sell or supply it to another, contrary to s 6(1) of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1981 (WA). After the close of the State's case, her Honour found that the accused had no case to answer on the charge of wilfully destroying evidence and found him not guilty. On 16 September 2009, the jury convicted him of the charge of possession of methylamphetamine with intent to sell or supply it to another. The learned trial judge later imposed a sentence of 4 years and 6 months' immediate imprisonment and made a parole eligibility order. The appellant appeals to this court against his conviction.

The grounds of the appeal

  1. The grounds of appeal are:

    1.The verdict of guilty should be set aside because it is unreasonable or cannot be supported by the evidence.

    Particulars

    a)The totality of the evidence was incapable of supporting a finding beyond reasonable…

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Details
Case
[2010] WASCA 108
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Armstrong v The State of Western Australia, the appellant, Armstrong, appealed against his conviction for possession of methylamphetamine with intent to sell or supply. The critical issue in the appeal was whether the appellant possessed 2 g or more of methylamphetamine, and whether the verdict was unreasonable or could not be supported by the evidence. The appeal hinged on the application of section 30(3)(a) of the Criminal Appeals Act 2004 (WA), which allows for an appeal against a conviction if the verdict is deemed unreasonable or cannot be supported by the evidence.

The court was required to undertake an independent assessment of the evidence to determine whether it was open to the jury to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant was guilty of the offence. The test established in M v The Queen was applied, which requires the court to consider whether, despite there being evidence to sustain a conviction, it was open to the jury to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the accused was guilty. The court had to take into account the advantage the jury had in seeing and hearing the evidence, but also needed to consider whether the evidence contained discrepancies or lacked probative force to the extent that there was a significant possibility the appellant was wrongfully convicted.

The court found that the evidence presented was sufficient to support the verdict, and that there were no discrepancies or issues with the evidence that would render the verdict unreasonable or incapable of being supported by the evidence. The jury had the benefit of seeing and hearing the witnesses, and the court was not persuaded that there was a significant possibility that the appellant was wrongfully convicted. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, and the original conviction was upheld. The court's reasoning was based on a thorough examination of the evidence and a careful consideration of the principles set out in M v The Queen.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

This ground is formulated to reflect the terms of s 30(3)(a) of the Criminal Appeals Act 2004 (WA) which provide:30.Appeal against conviction, decision on(1)This section applies in the case of an appeal against a conviction by an offender.(2)Unless under subsection (3) the Court of Appeal allows the appeal, it must dismiss the appeal.(3)The Court of Appeal must allow the appeal if in its opinion -(a)the verdict of guilty on which the conviction is based should be set aside because, having regard to the evidence, it is unreasonable or cannot be supported; … The test to be applied where it is alleged that a verdict is unreasonable or cannot be supported by the evidence was formulated by Mason CJ, Deane, Dawson and Toohey JJ in M v The Queen [1994] HCA 63; (1994) 181 CLR 487, 492 ‑ 493 as follows:The question is one of fact which the court must decide by making its own independent assessment of the evidence and determining whether, notwithstanding that there is evidence upon which a jury might convict, 'none the less it would be dangerous in all the circumstances to allow the verdict of guilty to stand'. But a verdict may be unsafe or unsatisfactory for reasons which lie outside the formula requiring that it not be 'unreasonable' or incapable of being 'supported having regard to the evidence'. A verdict which is unsafe or unsatisfactory for any other reason must also constitute a miscarriage of justice requiring the verdict to be set aside.…Where, notwithstanding that as a matter of law there is evidence to sustain a verdict, a court of criminal appeal is asked to conclude that the verdict is unsafe or unsatisfactory, the question which the court must ask itself is whether it thinks that upon the whole of the evidence it was open to the jury to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the accused was guilty. But in answering that question the court must not disregard or discount either the consideration that the jury is the body entrusted with the primary responsibility of determining guilt or innocence, or the consideration that the jury has had the benefit of having seen and heard the witnesses. On the contrary, the court must pay full regard to those considerations. (footnotes omitted)Their Honours went on to say:In most cases a doubt experienced by an appellate court will be a doubt which a jury ought also to have experienced. It is only where a jury's advantage in seeing and hearing the evidence is capable of resolving a doubt experienced by a court of criminal appeal that the court may conclude that no miscarriage of justice occurred. That is to say, where the evidence lacks credibility for reasons which are not explained by the manner in which it was given, a reasonable doubt experienced by the court is a doubt which a reasonable jury ought to have experienced. If the evidence, upon the record itself, contains discrepancies, displays inadequacies, is tainted or otherwise lacks probative force in such a way as to lead the court of criminal appeal to conclude that, even making full allowance for the advantages enjoyed by the jury, there is a significant possibility that an innocent person has been convicted, then the court is bound to act and to set aside a verdict based upon that evidence. In doing so, the court is not substituting trial by a court of appeal for trial by jury, for the ultimate question must always be whether the court thinks that upon the whole of the evidence it was open to the jury to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the accused was guilty. Although the propositions stated in the four preceding sentences have been variously expressed in judgments of members of the court in previous cases, we have put aside those differences in expression in order to provide authoritative guidance to courts of criminal appeal by stating the propositions in the form in which they are set out above. (494 ‑ 495) (footnotes omitted)

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established