COURT: SUPREME COURT OF TASMANIA (COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEAL)
CITATION: Neill-Fraser v Tasmania [2012] TASCCA 2
PARTIES: NEILL-FRASER, Susan Blyth v STATE OF TASMANIA
FILE NO/S: 929/2010 DELIVERED ON: 6 March 2012 DELIVERED AT: Hobart HEARING DATE: 11 August 2011 JUDGMENT OF: Crawford CJ, Tennent and Porter JJ
CATCHWORDS:
Criminal Law – Evidence – Matters relating to proof – Standard of proof – Circumstantial evidence – Motive – Whether facts establishing a motive are indispensable to the drawing of an inference of guilt – Whether those facts must be proved beyond reasonable doubt – Direction to jury.
Criminal Law – Evidence – Matters relating to proof – Standard of proof – Circumstantial evidence – Reasonable hypothesis consistent with innocence – Directions to jury - Adequacy – Whether a need for a direction that intermediate facts must be proved beyond reasonable doubt.
Criminal Law – Evidence – Corroboration – What constitutes corroboration – Admissions and conduct of accused – Lies, denials etc – Post-offence conduct – Allegations of laying of a false trial – Whether relied on by Crown as probative of guilt or going to credit – Direction to jury.
Criminal Law – Sentence – Relevant factors – Response to charges – Co-operation with police or assistance to authorities – Generally – Post-offence conduct – Inconvenience and expense of investigation caused by accused’s actions – Whether an aggravating factor.
Counsel: Appellant: M J Croucher, K Cuthbertson Respondent: T J Ellis SC, J Shapiro Solicitors: Appellant: Mackie Crompton Respondent: Director of Public Prosecutions
Judgment Number: [2012] TASCCA 2 Number of paragraphs: 253
Serial No 2/2012 File No CCA 929/2010
SUSAN…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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AGLC
Neill-Fraser v Tasmania [2012] TASCCA 2
Case
[2012] TASCCA 2
Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The appellant, Neill-Fraser, was convicted of the murder of her partner, Bob Chappell. She appealed against her conviction and sentence to the Full Court of the Supreme Court of Tasmania, presided over by Crawford CJ, Tennent and Porter JJ. The dispute centred on the sufficiency and direction of evidence presented to the jury, particularly concerning circumstantial evidence, motive, and the appellant's post-offence conduct.
The legal issues before the Full Court included whether facts establishing motive are indispensable to inferring guilt and must be proved beyond reasonable doubt, and whether a direction to the jury that intermediate facts must be proved beyond reasonable doubt is necessary when relying on circumstantial evidence. The Court also considered whether the appellant's alleged lies and post-offence conduct, including the laying of a false trial, were relied upon by the Crown as probative of guilt or merely going to credit, and whether the jury was adequately directed on this distinction. Finally, the Court examined whether the inconvenience and expense caused by the appellant's actions during the investigation constituted an aggravating factor for sentencing purposes.
The Full Court held that it is not necessary for facts establishing motive to be proved beyond reasonable doubt, nor are they indispensable to the drawing of an inference of guilt. The Court affirmed that the ultimate question for the jury is whether the evidence, taken as a whole, proves guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Regarding the direction on circumstantial evidence, the Court found no error in the trial judge's directions, concluding that a specific direction that intermediate facts must be proved beyond reasonable doubt is not a requirement. The Court also determined that the trial judge's directions concerning the appellant's conduct were adequate, distinguishing between conduct relied upon as evidence of guilt and that going only to credit. The Court granted leave to appeal against conviction but dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the conviction. However, the appeal against sentence was allowed.
The Full Court quashed the original sentence and, in lieu, sentenced the appellant to imprisonment for 23 years, commencing from 20 August 2009, with a non-parole period of 13 years.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Insofar as leave to appeal against conviction is required, leave is granted.
2. Appeal against conviction dismissed.
3. Appeal against sentence allowed.
4. Sentence quashed and in lieu the appellant is sentenced to imprisonment for 23 years from 20 August 2009 and it is ordered that she is not to be eligible for parole until she has served 13 years of the imprisonment.