Legal Practitioners Complaints Committee v Camp [No 2]

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JURISDICTION     :   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

TITLE OF COURT :   FULL BENCH

CITATION:   LEGAL PRACTITIONERS COMPLAINTS COMMITTEE -v- CAMP [No 2] [2010] WASC 207

CORAM:   EM HEENAN J

BLAXELL J
BEECH J

HEARD:   28 JULY 2010

DELIVERED          :   28 JULY 2010

PUBLISHED           :  10 AUGUST 2010

FILE NO/S:   LPD 1 of 2007

MATTER                :In the matter of the Legal Practitioners Act 1893 (WA), the Legal Practice Act 2003 (WA) and the Legal Profession Act 2008 (WA), s 438(1) and s 444

and

In the matter of a Practitioner of this Honourable Court

and

In the matter of a report dated 15 February 2007 by the State Administrative Tribunal to the Full Bench of this Honourable Court under the Legal Practitioners Act 1893 (WA), s 29A(2)(a), s 30 and the Legal Practice Act 2003 (WA), s 185(2)(a) and s 194 and the Legal Profession Act 2008 (WA), s 438(a) and s 444

BETWEEN:   LEGAL PRACTITIONERS COMPLAINTS COMMITTEE

Applicant

AND

ALAN JAMES CAMP
Respondent

Catchwords:

Application to defer delivery of judgment - Proposed application for leave to make supplementary submissions - Gross delay - Alternative remedies - Alleged jurisdictional error - Public interest in concluding litigation - No likelihood of success for proposed submissions - Application to defer judgment to make supplementary submissions refused

Legislation:

Legal Practice Act 2003 (WA), s 194
Legal Profession Act 2008 (WA), s 444
State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA), s 77(2), s 105

Result:

Application dismissed

Category:    B

Representation:

Counsel:

Applicant:     Ms G L Roberts

Respondent:     In person

Solicitors:

Applicant:     Legal Practitioners Complaints Committee

Respondent:     In person

Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):

AK v The State of Western Australia [2008] HCA 8; (2008) 232 CLR 438

Aon Risk Services Australia Ltd v Australian National University [2009] HCA 27; (2009) 239 CLR 175

Camp v Legal Practitioners Complaints Committee [2008] WASCA 253

Carr v Finance Corporation of Australia Ltd (No 1) [1981] HCA 20; (1981) 147 CLR 246

CDJ v VAJ (No 1) [1998] HCA 67; (1998) 197 CLR 172

Crampton v The Queen [2000] HCA 60; (2000) 206 CLR 161

Fingleton v The Queen [2005] HCA 34; (2005) 227 CLR 166

Gipp v The Queen [1998] HCA 21; (1998) 194 CLR 106

Jackson v Goldsmith [1950] HCA 22; (1950) 81 CLR 446

Kirk v Industrial Relations Commission of New South Wales; Kirk Group Holdings Pty Ltd v WorkCover Authority of New South Wales (Inspector Childs) [2010] HCA 1 [100]; (2010) 239 CLR 531

Mobil Oil Canada Ltd v Canada‑Newfoundland Offshore Petroleum Board [1994] 1 SCR 202; (1994) 111 DLR (4th) 1

MZXOT v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2008] HCA 28; (2008) 233 CLR 601

O'Neill v O'Connell [1946] HCA 59; (1946) 72 CLR 101

R v Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration; Ex parte Ozone Theatres [1949] HCA 33; (1949) 78 CLR 389

Re McBain; Ex parte Australian Catholic Bishops Conference [2002] HCA 16; (2002) 209 CLR 372

State Rail…

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Details
Case
[2010] WASC 207
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Legal Practitioners Complaints Committee v Camp [No 2], the Legal Practitioners Complaints Committee sought to defer the delivery of judgment in disciplinary proceedings against Mr Camp, a legal practitioner. Mr Camp applied to make supplementary submissions in response to new matters raised by the Committee during the hearing. The Supreme Court of Western Australia was tasked with determining whether it was appropriate to defer the judgment to allow Mr Camp to make these supplementary submissions.

The court had to decide whether it was in the public interest to allow Mr Camp to make supplementary submissions after the cause had been heard. The Legal Practitioners Complaints Committee argued that the application was grossly delayed, and that Mr Camp had not demonstrated a likelihood of success in his proposed supplementary submissions. They contended that the application would cause further delay and waste of judicial resources.

The court found that once a cause has been heard, there is no right for any party to make supplementary submissions without leave. This principle is grounded in the need to promote the just resolution of litigation and the efficient use of judicial resources. The court emphasised that it is in the public interest to conclude litigation and manage matters efficiently. The court noted that Mr Camp's application was grossly delayed and that there was no likelihood of success for the proposed supplementary submissions. Consequently, the application to defer judgment to make supplementary submissions was refused.

The court's decision underscores the importance of adhering to procedural rules and the need to manage litigation efficiently. The refusal of the application to defer judgment ensures that the disciplinary proceedings against Mr Camp are concluded without unnecessary delay, upholding the public interest in the efficient administration of justice.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

BLAXELL J

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: BLAXELL J

Once a cause has been heard, there is no right for any party to make any further supplementary submissions without leave because it is at the hearing itself that the parties are expected to make a complete statement of their case and position - Carr v Finance Corporation of Australia Ltd (No 1) [1981] HCA 20; (1981) 147 CLR 246, 258 (Mason J). This is only one facet of the wider principles that it is in the public interest that there should be an end to litigation and that actions, causes and matters in the court should be managed and determined with a view to promoting the just resolution of litigation, disposing efficiently of the business of the court, and maximising the efficient use of available judicial and administrative resources and the associated principles enshrined in O 1 r 4A and r 4B of the Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA). For the proposition that it is in the public interest that there should be an end to litigation see Jackson v Goldsmith [1950] HCA 22; (1950) 81 CLR 446, 466 (Fullagar J); CDJ v VAJ (No 1) [1998] HCA 67 [185]; (1998) 197 CLR 172 (Kirby J); and State Rail Authority of New South Wales v Codelfa Construction Pty Ltd (No 2) [1982] HCA 51 [16]; (1982) 150 CLR 29 (Mason J). With regard to the need for the court to manage litigation efficiently and with a view to despatch and without unnecessary use of resources, see Aon Risk Services Australia Ltd v Australian National University [2009] HCA 27; (2009) 239 CLR 175 where, with regard to an application to make a late amendment to a pleading, French CJ said at [35]:It might be said that the adjournment effected by the primary judge’s decision to entertain the amendment application and to allow written submissions to be filed and evidence to be put on, and the subsequent delay in his decision, rendered academic any concern about further waste of court resources or inefficiencies flowing from the amendment ultimately being allowed. It might be said that, in those circumstances, to refuse the amendment would be punitive. It is true that a punitive response to the substance of a late amendment application is not appropriate. But neither is a party to be rewarded by weighing in its favour the disruptive consequences of its own application. In any event the granting of the amendment in this case, at the time it was granted, meant that there would still be further delay while interlocutory processes flowing from the new claims were put in place … These considerations were also addressed in the joint reasons of Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ at [73] ‑ [83]. The passages emphasise that whenever an application is made for some procedural relief which is made late, or well out of time, or which is likely to cause further delay to the determination of proceedings, the matter should be dealt with on its merits but bearing in mind the disruptive consequences which may follow if an indulgence being sought is granted. The first sign of any such proposed application in this case was contained in a letter dated 30 April 2010, addressed to the presiding Judge, from the solicitors for the respondent which informed the court that:We are about to file an application for leave to file a Supplementary Submission responding to matters:•raised by the letter dated 19 April 2010 which was read out in Court by the Applicant but which the Respondent had not previously seen,•foreshadowed in paragraph 5(f) of the Respondent's Outline of Argument that was before the Court at the hearing of 20 April 2010…