Lactos Fresh Pty Ltd v Finishing Services Pty Ltd

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Lactos Fresh Pty Ltd v Finishing Services Pty Ltd [2006] FCA 219

CONTRACT – whether notice given by landlord containing new rental assessment valid – whether notice unequivocal and did not leave reasonable recipient in doubt as to meaning – whether reasonable recipient credited with knowledge of terms of lease – whether subjective reaction of recipient of notice relevant – whether landlord’s assessment required to be reasonable and not excessive – whether an implied duty of good faith

TRADE PRACTICES – misleading or deceptive conduct – provision of assessment of proper rent – whether provision of assessment caused applicant’s loss – unconscionable conduct – whether individual under a “special disadvantage”

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – amendment to pleadings – whether claim adequately pleaded – whether amendment should be allowed after conclusion of evidence – relevance of strength of case

Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) ss 51AA, 52 and 82

Alcatel Australia Ltd v Scarcella (1998) 44 NSWLR 349 referred to
Amalgamated Estates Ltd v Joystretch Manufacturing Ltd (1980) 257 EG 489 discussed
Australasian Performing Right Association Ltd v Metro on George Pty Ltd (2004) 210 ALR 244 cited
Australian Steel Company (Operations) Pty Ltd v Lewis (2001) 109 FCR 33 referred to
Beneficial Finance Corporation v Commissioner of Australian Federal Police (1991) 31 FCR 523 referred to
Burnham v City of Mordialloc [1956] VLR 239 cited
Byrne v Australian Airlines Limited (1995) 185 CLR 410 cited
Carradine Properties Ltd v Aslam [1976] 1 WLR 442 referred to
Catley v Watson (1983) V ConvR ¶54-003 applied
Central Pacific (Campus) Pty Ltd v Staged Developments Australia Pty Ltd (1998) V ConvR ¶54-575 discussed
Davstone (Holdings) Ltd v Al-Rifai (1976) 32 P&CR 18 cited
EFM Pty Ltd v New Zealand Steel (Aust) Pty Ltd [2000] VSC 290 cited
Etlis v New Age Constructions (NSW) Pty Ltd [2005] NSWCA 165 cited
Fox & Widley v Guran [1998] 3 EG 142 discussed
GHD Pty Ltd v Wayne [2001] QSC 73 discussed
Gibbins Thomson Pty Ltd v Council of the City of Liverpool [2004] NSWSC 1172 cited
GR Mailman & Associates Pty Ltd v Wormald (Aust) Pty Ltd (1991) 24 NSWLR 80 discussed
Haynes v Top Slice Deli Pty Limited (1995) ATPR (Digest) ¶46-147 discussed
Heaps v Addison Wesley Longman [1999] NSWSC 1093 cited
Henville v Walker (2001) 206 CLR 459 referred to
Janssen-Cilag Pty Limited v Pfizer Pty Limited (1992) 37 FCR 526 discussed
Lancecrest Limited v Asiwaju [2005] EWCA Civ 117 referred to
Leotta v Public Transport Commission (NSW) (1976) 9 ALR 437 cited
Lewis v Sydney Flour Pty Ltd (1956) 56 SR (NSW) 189 cited
MannaiInvestment Co Ltd v Eagle Star Life Assurance Co Ltd [1997] AC 749 applied
McCarthy v McIntyre [1999] FCA 784 discussed
McCarthy v McIntyre [2000] FCA 1250 discussed
McIntyre v Marshall [2004] NSWSC 412 cited
Mercantile Mutual Insurance (Australia) Ltd v Farrington (1996) 44 NSWLR 634 cited
MLW Technology Pty Ltd v May [2004] VSCA 29 cited
National Australia Bank Ltd v Nobile (1988)…

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Details
Case
[2006] FCA 219
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the Supreme Court of Victoria, Lactos Fresh Pty Ltd (the applicant) brought proceedings against Finishing Services Pty Ltd (the first respondent) and another party (the second respondent). The applicant, a company involved in the cutting and wrapping of cheese, leased premises from the first respondent. The dispute centres on a rental increase notice issued by the first respondent, which the applicant claims was invalid and caused loss or damage. The applicant also claims that the second respondent engaged in misleading or deceptive conduct under section 52 of the Trade Practices Act, which is considered an alternative to the primary claim against the first respondent.

The legal issues before the court included whether the rental increase notice was valid and whether the second respondent engaged in misleading or deceptive conduct. The court examined the validity of the notice based on the terms of the lease and whether a reasonable recipient would have understood the notice. The court also considered the applicant's claims of unconscionable conduct and breach of good faith, as well as the assessment of the "proper rent" for the premises.

The court found that the rental increase notice was valid, as a reasonable recipient would have understood the meaning of the notice based on the lease terms and surrounding circumstances. The court declined to amend the statement of claim regarding the proper construction of the lease clause, as the applicant had not demonstrated a compelling case. The court also dismissed the applicant's claims against the second respondent, finding that the evidence did not support the applicant's version of events regarding a conversation with the first respondent.

The final orders of the court included dismissing the application against the second respondent with costs and directing the parties to propose minutes of orders reflecting the findings. The matter was to be listed for further hearing to address the form of final orders and the issue of costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

2. As against the second respondent, the application be dismissed, with costs.

THE COURT DIRECTS THAT:

3. The parties file and serve proposed minutes of orders that reflect the findings made in these reasons for judgment on or before 5 April 2006.

4. The matter be listed for further hearing in relation to the form of final orders to be made, and the issue of costs, on a date to be fixed.

Background

Background to the litigation

The second respondent provided certain information to the first respondent as to the market rate of rental that, in its opinion, was applicable to the Mulgrave premises. This information, in the form of a letter from the second respondent to the first respondent (“the Colliers letter”), was incorporated in the rental increase notice as an attachment. As against the second respondent, the applicant claims that it engaged in misleading or deceptive conduct under s 52 of the Trade Practices Act, causing loss or damage to the applicant. The claim against the second respondent is, in effect, pleaded as an alternative to the primary claim against the first respondent, that the rental increase notice was invalid. If the challenge to the validity of that notice succeeds, the applicant does not press any claim against the second respondent.BACKGROUND The first respondent leased the Mulgrave premises to the applicant in 1999. At that time, the applicant was called Nobi Holdings Pty Ltd. Prior to this, the Mulgrave premises had been leased by the first respondent to New Zealand Milk (Ausapac) Pty Ltd (“New Zealand Milk”), a company associated with the New Zealand Government. The applicant’s business involves the cutting and wrapping of cheese. This process is conducted out of the Mulgrave premises. The applicant’s parent company is Lactos Pty Ltd. It conducts research and development, marketing and operations activities, and is based in Burnie, Tasmania. Lactos Pty Ltd’s parent company is a French company called Bongrain SA. Mr Claude Bertrand, a French national, is the General Manager of the applicant. The first respondent owns a number of industrial properties, including the Mulgrave premises. Its directors are John Allen, and his son Matthew. All references in these reasons for judgment to Mr Allen are to Mr John Allen, unless otherwise indicated. Mr Allen also is the principal of Allen & Allen solicitors who operate out of Finishing Services’ premises in Moorabbin. It appears that Allen & Allen only do work for companies associated with Mr Allen. The lease for the Mulgrave premises is dated 1 September 1999, and is for a term of seven years, with the option of a further term (“the lease”). The annual rental at the time of the signing of the lease was $244,152. Clause 3.2.2 of the lease provides for a “market rental review”. The clause is prolix, to say the least. It relevantly provides as follows:“MARKET RENTAL REVIEWUpon any day being not more than six months prior to 1 March 2003 and (if the Lessee exercises its option to renew) not more than 6 months prior to 1 September 2006 and 1 March 2010. The Lessor or the Managing Agent may give written notice to the Lessee stating the sum which the Lessor assesses to be the proper rent for the premises for the ensuing period such rent being the market rental value for the premises on the assumption that the premises are tenanted and with all fixtures and fittings and partitions, plant machinery utensils shelving safes and other articles and materials as set out in schedule 2 installed by either the Lessor or the Lessee and having regard to the rents being obtained for comparable premises within the same municipality and the rent shall be varied accordingly, such variation to take effect on and from the day immediately following the date to which such notice shall relate and if the party receiving the notice does not object in writing to the proposed market rent within 30 days it becomes the rent for the review period PROVIDED that the Lessee may by notice in writing (delivered to the Lessor or the Managing Agent within 30 days following receipt of the Lessor’s or the Managing Agent’s notice of assessment) state that he disputes the Lessor’s assessment in which case sub-clause (a) hereof will apply AND in all respects time shall be of the essence in the delivery of the said notice within the time so stipulated.” (emphasis added)

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

In any event, I would decline the application for leave to amend in part on the basis that the applicant’s submission regarding the proper construction of clause 3.2.2 is by no means compelling (though it is plainly arguable). It is clear that the strength of the applicant’s case, in relation to the proposed amendment, is a relevant consideration when determining whether to grant leave to amend. Had the applicant demonstrated a stronger case, regarding this issue, I may have been minded to allow the applicant to reopen its case, and the respondents to adduce further evidence in response. When all that can be said is that there is an arguable case, the balance of convenience weighs against adopting that course. THE CONTROVERSIAL EVIDENCE There are a number of issues where the evidence of the applicant and the respondents was in conflict. They include whether Mr Bertrand and Mr Allen had a conversation on or about 20 December 2002, and if so, what the substance of that conversation was, and how to treat the expert valuation evidence given before me. These evidential issues go to the applicant’s claims of unconscionable conduct, breach of good faith and whether the “proper rent” was stated in the notice. Ultimately, as will become apparent in my conclusions, it is unnecessary to come to a final conclusion regarding these matters. It is sufficient, for present purposes, to say that had this case turned entirely upon whether Mr Bertrand’s account of the alleged telephone conversation with Mr Allen, on or about 20 December 2002, should be accepted, or whether Mr Allen’s firm denial of any such conversation should be preferred, I would not have found in favour of the applicant. In other words, I would not have found, on the balance of probabilities, that Mr Bertrand’s evidence should be accepted in preference to that of Mr Allen. That does not mean, of course, that I positively disbelieved Mr Bertrand. It reflects nothing more than an inability to be satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that his version was correct. It is also unnecessary to resolve what fixtures and fittings Mr Allen took into account when making his rental assessment, given my ruling in relation to the amendment of the statement of claim.CONCLUSIONSWAS THE FORM OF THE NOTICE VALID? The test to be applied to determine the validity of the notice is whether a reasonable recipient, who is credited with knowledge of the terms of the lease, and taking into account the surrounding circumstances, would have doubt as to the meaning of the notice or have regarded it as equivocal. If so, the notice will be found to be invalid. Since Mannai, that test has been repeatedly applied in English courts. See, for example, the recent decision of the Court of Appeal in Lancecrest Limited v Asiwaju [2005] EWCA Civ 117 (“Lancecrest”). The test has been applied in this Court in Australasian Performing Right Association Ltd v Metro on George Pty Ltd (2004) 210 ALR 244 per Bennett J (in the context of a notice of termination). It has also been applied by the Victorian Court of Appeal in MLW Technology Pty Ltd v May [2005] VSCA 29 (in the context of a notice seeking enforcement of a term of a contract), by the New South Wales Court of Appeal in Etlis v New Age Constructions (NSW) Pty Ltd [2005] NSWCA 165 (in the context of a notice triggering an extension of time in relation to building work), and in the Supreme Court of New South Wales in McIntyre v Marshall [2004] NSWSC 412 (a vendor’s notice to complete), Gibbins Thomson Pty Ltd v Council of the City of Liverpool [2004] NSWSC 1172 (a notice of failure to meet obligations under the contract), and Heaps v Addison Wesley Longman [1999] NSWSC 1093 (a notice from a tenant requesting the appointment of a second valuer in relation to a rent review).

Decision

Reasons for decision

WEINBERG J
It is also unnecessary to resolve what fixtures and fittings Mr Allen took into account when making his rental assessment, given my ruling in relation to the amendment of the statement of claim.CONCLUSIONSWAS THE FORM OF THE NOTICE VALID? The test to be applied to determine the validity of the notice is whether a reasonable recipient, who is credited with knowledge of the terms of the lease, and taking into account the surrounding circumstances, would have doubt as to the meaning of the notice or have regarded it as equivocal. If so, the notice will be found to be invalid. Since Mannai, that test has been repeatedly applied in English courts. See, for example, the recent decision of the Court of Appeal in Lancecrest Limited v Asiwaju [2005] EWCA Civ 117 (“Lancecrest”). The test has been applied in this Court in Australasian Performing Right Association Ltd v Metro on George Pty Ltd (2004) 210 ALR 244 per Bennett J (in the context of a notice of termination). It has also been applied by the Victorian Court of Appeal in MLW Technology Pty Ltd v May [2005] VSCA 29 (in the context of a notice seeking enforcement of a term of a contract), by the New South Wales Court of Appeal in Etlis v New Age Constructions (NSW) Pty Ltd [2005] NSWCA 165 (in the context of a notice triggering an extension of time in relation to building work), and in the Supreme Court of New South Wales in McIntyre v Marshall [2004] NSWSC 412 (a vendor’s notice to complete), Gibbins Thomson Pty Ltd v Council of the City of Liverpool [2004] NSWSC 1172 (a notice of failure to meet obligations under the contract), and Heaps v Addison Wesley Longman [1999] NSWSC 1093 (a notice from a tenant requesting the appointment of a second valuer in relation to a rent review). The authorities recognise that the application of this test can be a question of impression. It can also turn upon the facts of the individual case and the terms of the specific clause under which the notice is issued. The test laid down in Mannai is consistent with approaches taken to the validity of notices, or analogous documents, outside of contract law. For instance, in Beneficial Finance Corporation v Commissioner of Australian Federal Police (1991) 31 FCR 523, Burchett J warned, at 533, against adopting an “overly technical view” in considering the validity of search warrants. He stated, at 544, that in relation to the search warrants at issue in that case, “[t]he language may be infelicitous”, however the nature of the offences specified in the search warrants was clear, and the search warrants were therefore valid. His Honour cited, at 543, New Zealand authority which adopted the test of what a “reasonable reader” would “gather” from the search warrants to determine whether they sufficiently indicated the offence involved: see Rural Timber Ltd v Hughes [1989] 3 NZLR 178. I note that bankruptcy notices arguably constitute an exception to this approach. In Australian Steel Company (Operations) Pty Ltd v Lewis (2001) 109 FCR 33, the majority in a specially constituted court of five (Black CJ, Heerey and Sundberg JJ, Lee and Gyles JJ dissenting) held that the misstatement in a bankruptcy notice of the statutory provision under which interest was being claimed served to invalidate the notice. This was so even though the correct sum of interest was claimed. The majority found that it was irrelevant whether a debtor might be misled or not. Their Honours came to this view on the basis that the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) made the requirement to specify the relevant legislative provision essential. In my view, such an approach is not relevant to these proceedings. In any event, it would only make it more difficult for the first respondent to establish the validity of the notice.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: WEINBERG J

Full text does not contain this section.