DPP v Korybutiak - [2004] VSCA 29

SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA

COURT OF APPEAL

No. 7356 of 2003

DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS

(On behalf of Mark Higgins, Informant)

Applicant

ADRIAN JOHN KORYBUTIAK

Respondent

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JUDGES:	WINNEKE, P., CHERNOV, J.A. and BONGIORNO, A.J.A.
WHERE HELD:	MELBOURNE
DATE OF HEARING:	27 February 2004
DATE OF JUDGMENT:	27 February 2004
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION	[2004] VSCA 29	First Revision – 16 March 2004

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Traffic infringement notices – Requirement for notice to state address to which notice of objection may be sent – Whether requirement satisfied – Construction of Notice – Road Safety Act 1986, ss.88, 89A – Road Safety Act (General) Regulations 1999, reg. 603.

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APPEARANCES:	Counsel	Solicitors
For the Applicant	Mr J. McArdle, QC	Ms. K. Robertson, Solicitor for OPP
For the Respondent	Mr S.P. Hardy	Law Offices of Barry Field

CHERNOV, J.A.:

This is a return of a summons filed by the Director of Public Prosecutions on behalf of the informant, Mark Higgins, by which leave is sought, pursuant to s.17A(3A)(b) of the Supreme Court Act 1986, to appeal against the decision of a judge of the Supreme Court who upheld the dismissal by a Magistrate of a charge that the respondent drove a vehicle whilst his authorisation to do so was suspended. His Honour concluded that the respondent had not lost the authority to drive a motor vehicle because the traffic infringement notice, which purportedly suspended his licence, was invalid since it did not set out certain information, contrary to statutory requirements. Consequently, said the primary judge, the Magistrate did not err as the Director contended. The Director seeks leave to appeal the decision on the basis that his Honour erred in law. Given the urgency of the case, and its relatively short compass, the Court indicated to the parties earlier this week that it would hear argument as if the hearing were an appeal and decide if leave to appeal should be granted and, if that were the case, would proceed to determine the appeal. The parties accommodated the short timetable so that we heard full argument on the issues from the counsel for the Director, and counsel for the respondent who also appeared in that capacity at the hearings below.

The events giving rise to the charge and the progress of the proceedings were these. On 1 March 2003 the respondent was intercepted by police in Frankston while driving his motor vehicle. When the police conducted a licence check it revealed that the respondent had received a traffic infringement notice on 10 October 2002 in respect of his alleged driving at an excessive speed which informed him that, after 28 days from its issue, his licence would be suspended for six months unless he contested the matter by lodging a notice of objection. The respondent did not lodge an objection, but paid the fine of $430 that was shown on the notice of infringement. Thus, as will be seen shortly, the suspension became effective, or so it was thought by the police, at…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading DPP v Korybutiak

Details

AGLC: Director of Public Prosecutions v Korybutiak [2004] VSCA 29
Case: [2004] VSCA 29
Decision Date: 27 February 2004

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of the Director of Public Prosecutions versus Korybutiak, the High Court of Australia was called upon to determine the validity of traffic infringement notices issued under the Road Safety Act 1986. The primary issue before the Court was whether the requirement for a traffic infringement notice to state the address to which a notice of objection may be sent was satisfied. This requirement was stipulated in section 88 of the Road Safety Act 1986 and further elaborated upon in regulation 603 of the Road Safety Act (General) Regulations 1999. The Court was required to construe these statutory provisions to ascertain the legislative intent and its application to the facts of the case.

The Court considered the language of section 88 and regulation 603, noting that section 88 required a notice to be in writing and to contain prescribed particulars. Regulation 603 stipulated that one of these particulars must be the address to which a notice of objection may be sent. The Court examined whether the notices in question, which did not explicitly state this address, complied with the statutory requirements. The Court also took into account the purpose of the legislative scheme, which was to provide clear and accessible information to the recipient of the notice to enable them to exercise their right to object.

In reaching its decision, the Court held that the notices were invalid because they did not specify the address to which a notice of objection could be sent. The Court emphasised that the statutory provisions were mandatory and required strict compliance. While the Court acknowledged the inconvenience and potential hardship caused by the invalidation of the notices, it found that the legislative intent was clear and must be adhered to. The Court's interpretation ensured that the statutory rights of the recipients were upheld, reinforcing the importance of precision in the drafting of statutory requirements.

The final orders of the Court declared the traffic infringement notices invalid due to the omission of the required address for notices of objection. The Court's decision underscored the necessity for compliance with statutory provisions to ensure that the rights of individuals are protected and that the legislative framework is properly enforced.

Orders