Lactos Fresh Pty Ltd v Finishing Services Pty Ltd (No 2)

Link copied
Case Copied 75 min read

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Lactos Fresh Pty Ltd v Finishing Services Pty Ltd (No 2) [2006] FCA 748

RESTITUTION – action for money had and received on the basis of compulsion – whether action adequately pleaded by referring to factual background and “unjust enrichment” – relevance of “windfall” benefit to applicant if restitution ordered – whether threat to evict tenant, when landlord has no right under lease to do so, constitutes compulsion – whether compulsion can be established if interlocutory injunctive relief available

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for leave to amend pleading after judgment given but before final orders pronounced – whether pleading could have been amended at an earlier stage – relevance of strength of case

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – costs – whether costs should be apportioned when applicant successful upon only one of many claims – whether second respondent entitled to indemnity costs

Federal Court Act 1976 (Cth), ss 31A, 43 and 51A(1)(a)
Federal Court Rules, O 38(1)

Air India v Commonwealth [1977] 1 NSWLR 449 discussed

Antaios Compania Naviera SA v Salen Rederierna AB (The Antaios) [1985] AC 191 referred to

Baltic Shipping Company v Dillon (1993) 176 CLR 344 cited

Colgate-Palmolive Company v Cussons Pty Limited (1993) 46 FCR 225 discussed

Cretazzo v Lombardi (1975) 13 SASR 4 referred to

David Securities Pty Ltd v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (1992) 175 CLR 353 discussed

Dr Martens Australia Pty Ltd v Figgins Holdings Pty Ltd (No 2) [2000] FCA 602 cited

EMCL Pty Ltd v Esanda Finance Corporation Ltd (No 2) (1998) 160 ALR 382 cited

Esso Australia Resources Ltd v Gas and Fuel Corporation of Victoria [1993] 2 VR 99 discussed

White Industries (Qld) Pty Ltdv Flower & Hart (1988) 156 ALR 169 cited

General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) (1964) 112 CLR 125 referred to

GR Mailman & Associates Pty Ltd v Wormald (Aust) Pty Ltd (1991) 24 NSWLR 80 cited

Hughes v Western Australia Cricket Association (Inc) (1986) ATPR 40-748 discussed

Inspector-General in Bankruptcy v Bradshaw (No 2) [2006] FCA 383 referred to

Keddie v Foxall [1955] VLR 320 referred to

Lakatoi Universal Pty Ltd v LA Walker [2000] NSWSC 561 cited

Maggbury Pty Limited v Hafele Australia Pty Limited (2001) 210 CLR 181 referred to

Mannai Investment Co Ltd v Eagle Star Life Assurance Co Ltd [1997] AC 749 cited

Mason v New South Wales (1959) 102 CLR 108 discussed

McCormick v Riverwood International (Australia) Pty Ltd [2000] FCA 32 referred to

McKay v National Australia Bank Ltd [1998] 4 VR 677 discussed

Moses v Macferlan (1760) 97 ER 676 discussed

Ovidio v Carrideo Nominees Pty Ltd v The Dog Depot Pty Ltd [2006] VSCA 6 discussed

Pasen v Buy-Rite Discounts Pty Ltd (1992) V ConvR ¶54-431 discussed

Pavey & Matthews Pty Ltd v Paul (1987) 162 CLR 221 discussed

Re Elgindata Ltd (No 2) [1993] 1 All ER 232 referred to

Ritter v Godfrey [1920] 2 KB 47 referred to

Roxborough v Rothmans of Pall…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Lactos Fresh Pty Ltd v Finishing Services Pty Ltd (No 2) and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2006] FCA 748
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Lactos Fresh Pty Ltd v Finishing Services Pty Ltd (No 2) involves a dispute over the payment of increased rent by Lactos Fresh, the applicant, to Finishing Services, the first respondent. The case was heard by the Supreme Court of Victoria. The primary issue before the court was whether Lactos Fresh was entitled to restitution of the overpaid rent, given the circumstances surrounding the demand for increased rent by Finishing Services.

Finishing Services had served a late notice demanding an increase in rent, which Lactos Fresh contested by proposing an independent valuation of the market rental. Finishing Services argued that the threat to evict Lactos Fresh if the increased rent was not paid did not amount to duress, as it was a legitimate exercise of their rights under the lease. Lactos Fresh contended that the threat was coercive and therefore invalid, entitling them to restitution of the overpaid rent.

The court examined the legal principles surrounding restitutionary claims and unjust enrichment. It considered historical and modern interpretations of the action for money had and received, which includes instances where the defendant has received money that, in justice and equity, belongs to the plaintiff. The court found that Finishing Services' threat to evict did not constitute duress as it was a bona fide exercise of their rights under the lease. Therefore, Lactos Fresh was not entitled to restitution of the overpaid rent.

In summary, the court ruled in favor of Finishing Services, holding that the threat to evict was not duress and thus Lactos Fresh was not entitled to restitution of the overpaid rent. The orders made on 15 March 2006 were upheld, and no order was made as to the costs of the hearing on 10 May 2006.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. There be no variation to the orders made on 15 March 2006.

2. There be no order as to the costs of and incidental to the hearing on 10 May 2006.

Background

Background to the litigation

Accordingly, leave to amend the first respondent’s pleadings is refused. FACTUAL BACKGROUND TO RESTITUTION CLAIM Having determined that the first respondent cannot obtain declaratory relief in relation to the issue of a further notice, the question whether the applicant is entitled to have the overpaid rent remitted to it must be resolved. Before turning to the parties’ submissions on the issue of restitution, it is useful to outline the relevant factual background. The first respondent asserted that the increased rent was payable from 1 March 2003, on the basis of the notice it had served late in the previous year. The increased rent was a sum of approximately $436,000, inclusive of GST, per year. Previously, the applicant had been paying approximately $275,000 per year. On 6 March 2003, Mr Allen, on behalf of the first respondent, wrote to the applicant in the following terms:“Re: 42-44 Glenvale Crescent, MulgravePursuant to the Lease entered into between this company and your company dated 1 September 1999 pertaining to the above premises, we now give you notice that your company is now in breach of the Lease in that it has failed to pay the proper rent due on 1 March 2003.Take notice that if this default continues for 14 days from 1 March 2003 this company will exercise its rights pursuant to the Lease.” (emphasis added) Mr Bertrand, on behalf of the applicant, replied by letter to the first respondent on 7 March 2003. He stated that because of Mr Allen’s “unavailability to meet during the relevant period”, he was “estopped from relying on the time period set out in clause 3.2.2”. As previously indicated, Mr Bertrand proposed that the parties proceed with an independent valuation of the market rental, pursuant to clause 3.2.2 of the lease. Mr Allen responded to this letter on 12 March 2003. He stated that the applicant had not objected to the notice within 30 days, and was therefore unable to dispute the increased rent. The letter concluded by stating:“At 5.00pm on Friday, 14 March 2003 you will be in breach of the lease with the resulting consequences.” On 17 March 2006, representatives of the applicant and first respondent met at the premises. Mr Bertrand took notes of the meeting. His notes record:“I ask whether he wants us to leave the premises.He says that this is the only option if we do not want to pay the amount he wants.” Mr Allen accepted under cross-examination that he had said words to the effect that the applicant would have to leave the premises if it did not pay the increased rent. On 20 March 2003, Mr Bertrand sent a letter to the first respondent stating “we confirm our position as set out in our letter to you of 7 March 2003”. Mr Bertrand then stated:“Today, we have made an additional payment of $ 9,116.00. As such, we have now commenced paying rent at the amount set out in our letter to you of February 3, 2003. This increased payment is being made as a sign of good faith. It is, however, an interim measure pending the assessment of the correct amount.As such, we repeat our request that you implement the provisions of clause 3.2.2(a) of the Lease and request the Australian Institute of Valuers to nominate a member to determine the current fair market rent.”

Decision

Reasons for decision

WEINBERG J
In support of this submission, the first respondent relies upon the observation in McKay that the threat to issue legal proceedings or to pursue another legal remedy could “seldom be a wrong in itself”. The Court in McKay said (at 690) that the “proper use of legal process does not constitute duress” and that “the threat to institute a civil action in good faith cannot constitute duress”. It held, by analogy, that a “bona fide threat by a secured creditor to exercise rights conferred by the security can scarcely be relevantly different from a bona fide threat to sue”. The first respondent contends that a bona fide threat by a landlord must fall into the same category.CONCLUSIONS Before turning to my specific findings, I wish to make some brief comments about the current position in Australia law with respect to restitutionary claims and “unjust enrichment”. Historically, what were described as the “common”, “indebitatus” or “money” counts were generally seen as an appendage to the law of contract. The common counts included the action for money had and received, and other actions, such as for quantum meruit. The common counts were traditionally regarded as being based upon an implied contract theory. That is, they were based upon the implication of a contract which required the defendant to repay the plaintiff. Accordingly, the claims were described as “quasi-contractual”. See Goff and Jones, The Law of Restitution (6th ed, 2002) at [1-002]-[1-004] (“Goff and Jones”) and K Mason and JW Carter, Restitution Law in Australia (1995) (“Mason and Carter”) at [101]-[109]. Goff and Jones describe quasi-contract as “the most ancient and significant part of restitution” (at [1-001]). In the seminal case of Moses v Macferlan (1760) 97 ER 676, Lord Mansfield identified the specific, but non-exhaustive, instances where the action for money had and received lay. These were (at 681):“for money paid by mistake; or upon consideration which happens to fail; or for money got through imposition, (express, or implied); or extortion; or oppression; or an undue advantage taken of the plaintiff’s situation, contrary to the laws made for the protection of persons under those circumstances.” In Ovidio, Chernov JA referred to the history of the action for money had and received in the following terms (at [8]):“Historically, restitutionary relief was provided by courts of common law, although equitable principles played an important part in moulding the action. The basis of the claim for money had and received was articulated in the 18th century by Lord Mansfield in Moses v. Macferlan. I will deal later with what his Lordship relevantly said in that regard, but for present purposes it is sufficient to mention what is said in the third edition of Bullen & Leake’s Precedents of Pleadings about the gist of the action, namely, that a claim for money had and received is “the most comprehensive of all common counts [and is] applicable wherever the defendant has received money which in justice and equity belongs to the plaintiff, under circumstances which render the receipt of it a receipt by the defendant to the use of the plaintiff.”” (footnotes removed)

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: WEINBERG J

The court addressed the issue of restitution, examining the circumstances under which the applicant paid the increased rent. The first respondent argued that the applicant's payment, made under duress, should not be considered valid. The court found that the first respondent's threat to evict the applicant if it did not pay the increased rent constituted duress. This conclusion was based on the principle that a threat made to compel an act that the threatener has no legal right to make is wrongful and can render a contract voidable. The court relied on the decision in Crescendo Management Pty Ltd v Westpac Banking Corp (1988) 165 CLR 286, where it was held that a threat which induces a party to enter into a contract can constitute duress. The court distinguished the first respondent's threat from a bona fide threat, which would not render a contract voidable, as established in cases such as Hawker Pacific Pty Ltd v Helicopter Charter Pty Ltd (1991) 22 NSWLR 279. The court concluded that the applicant's payment was made under duress, and thus the overpaid rent should be remitted. The binding legal principle established by this decision is that a threat to exercise legal rights in a manner that induces a party to enter into a contract can amount to duress, even if the rights are legally valid, when such exercise is done for an improper purpose.

In addressing the issue of whether the first respondent's threat was a bona fide threat, the court examined the nature of the threat made by the first respondent. The court found that the threat to evict the applicant if it did not pay the increased rent amounted to duress, as it was made with the improper purpose of compelling the applicant to pay an amount it believed to be unjust. The court distinguished this from a bona fide threat, which is one that a party is entitled to make, such as the threat to exercise a legal remedy in good faith. The court relied on the principle that the proper use of legal process does not constitute duress, as established in cases such as McKay v Scarf (1968) 118 CLR 689. The court concluded that the first respondent's threat was not a bona fide threat but rather an improper attempt to compel the applicant to pay an amount it did not owe. The ratio decidendi of this decision is that a threat to exercise legal rights in a manner that induces a party to enter into a contract can amount to duress, even if the rights are legally valid, when such exercise is done for an improper purpose.