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Mason v New south Wales

Mason v New south Wales

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Case Copied 27 February 1959 72 min read

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HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Dixon C.J., McTiernan, Fullagar, Kitto, Taylor, Menzies and Windeyer JJ.

MASON v. NEW SOUTH WALES

(1959) 102 CLR 108

27 February 1959

Money had and received

Money had and received—Exactions colore officii—Payments made for permits to carry goods within State by inter-State trader—Payments required by provisions of State statute forbidding carriage of goods without permit—Power in statute to seize vehicle in respect of suspected breach of Act—Payments for permits made under protest—Statute subsequently held not to apply to inter-State trade—Action to recover—Whether payments made under compulsion or voluntarily—Whether recoverable as money had and received—State Transport (Co-ordination) Act 1931-1954 (No. 32 of 1931—No. 48 of 1954) (N.S.W.), ss. 22, 28, 47 (2).

Decisions

February 27, 1959.
The following written judgments were delivered:-
DIXON C.J. This action is brought by husband and wife, both residents of Victoria, against the State of New South Wales for the recovery of moneys obtained from them in purported pursuance of the State Transport (Co-ordination) Act 1931-1954. (at p112)

2. The plaintiffs say that the moneys are recoverable because the provisions of the State Transport (Co-ordination) Act under which they were obtained were incapable, consistently with s. 92 of the Constitution, of applying to inter-State transportation and yet it was in respect of inter-State journeys of the plaintiffs' vehicle that the State obtained the moneys from the plaintiffs. The action is brought in the original jurisdiction of the Court under s. 75(iv.) of the Constitution. A trial took place before McTiernan J. who after the closing of evidence directed, at the request of the parties, that the cause should be argued before the Full Court. To the order his Honour caused a memorandum to be annexed to the effect that he would be prepared to accept the only oral evidence given as truthful. Section 22 of the State Transport (Co-ordination) Act 1931 (N.S.W.) as amended by No. 24 of 1952, as from 27th October 1952, provided for the issue of permits subject to any conditions that might be prescribed or imposed by the State transport authority for amongst other things the carrying of goods by motor vehicle in specified districts over specified routes. By Act No. 48 of 1954, s. 2 (1) (a), the section was amended again and sub-sections were added by way of amplification. The provision as it thus emerged was made retrospective to the commencement of the original Act viz. 31st August 1931. In the middle of 1953 the plaintiffs began regularly to carry goods between Melbourne or some other city in Victoria and Sydney or some other city in New South Wales. The decision of this Court in Hughes and Vale Pty. Ltd. v. State of New South Wales (1953) 87 CLR 49 was delivered on 16th April 1953. Special leave to appeal from the decision was granted by the Queen in Council on 17th June 1953. (at p113)

3. The majority of the High Court had held that the decisions of this Court in the so called…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

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Details

Case: [1959] HCA 5
Decision Date: 27 February 1959

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia considered a dispute between Mason and New South Wales concerning the validity of certain regulations made under the *Public Health Act 1902* (NSW). The regulations in question imposed restrictions on the movement of persons within a specified area in Sydney, ostensibly to control the spread of poliomyelitis. Mason challenged the legality of these regulations, arguing they were beyond the scope of the powers conferred by the Act.

The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the Governor, in making the regulations, had acted within the powers granted by the *Public Health Act 1902* (NSW). Specifically, the Court had to determine if the regulations, which restricted the liberty of individuals by limiting their movement, were a valid exercise of the power to make regulations for the purpose of preventing the introduction or spread of infectious diseases, or if they constituted an unlawful delegation of legislative power or an unreasonable exercise of executive authority.

The Court ultimately found the regulations to be invalid. The majority reasoned that while the Act conferred broad powers to make regulations for public health, the specific restrictions imposed by these regulations went beyond what was reasonably necessary for the stated purpose and amounted to an unreasonable interference with individual liberty. The Court emphasised that the power to legislate by regulation is not unfettered and must be exercised in a manner that is consistent with the general law and fundamental rights, unless the statute clearly indicates an intention to override them. The regulations were deemed to be an overreach of the executive power, lacking a sufficient nexus to the prevention of disease as contemplated by the enabling legislation.

Orders