Inspector-General in Bankruptcy v Bradshaw (No 2)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Inspector‑General in Bankruptcy v Bradshaw  (No 2) [2006] FCA 383

COSTS – indemnity basis – whether successful party not entitled to costs in respect of those issues on which the party failed – whether circumstances justified awarding indemnity costs – effect of Calderbank letter

Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), s 155
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 43

Inspector General in Bankruptcy v Bradshaw [2005] FCA 424 discussed
Inspector General in Bankruptcy v Bradshaw [2006] FCA 22 discussed
Re Smith; ex parte Inspector-General in Bankruptcy [1996] FCA 1076 referred to
Calderbank v Calderbank [1975] 3 All E R 333 referred to
Oshlack v Richmond River Council (1998) 193 CLR 72 referred to
Ruddock v Vadarlis (No 2) (2001) 115 FCR 229 referred to
Latoudis v Casey (1990) 170 CLR 534 referred to
Dr Martens Pty Ltd v Figgins Holdings Pty Ltd (No 2) [2000] FCA 602 referred to
Re Elgindata Ltd (No 2) [1993] All ER 232 referred to
Hayle Holdings Pty Ltd v Australian Technology Group Ltd (No 2) [2000] FCA 1699 cited
Dodds Family Investments Pty Ltd v Lane Industries Pty Ltd (1993) 26 IPR 261 cited
Mok v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (No 2) (1993) 47 FCR 81 cited
Hughes v Western Australia Cricket Association (Inc) (1986) ATPR 40 –748 cited
Cretazzo v Lombardi (1975) 13 SASR 4 cited
Re Wilcox; Ex parte Venture Industries Pty Ltd (No 2) (1996) 72 FCR 151 referred to
Colgate-Palmolive Company v CussonsPty Ltd (1993) 46 FCR 225 referred to
Port Kembla Coal Terminal Ltd v Braverus Maritime Inc (No 2) (2004) 212 ALR 281 referred to

INSPECTOR‑GENERAL IN BANKRUPTCY AND THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA v DAVID ANTHONY BRADSHAW AND ACE INSURANCE LIMITED (FORMERLY KNOWN AS CIGNA INSURANCE AUSTRALIA LIMITED)

VID 972 OF 2004

KENNY J
7 APRIL 2006
MELBOURNE


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

VID 972 OF 2004

BETWEEN:

INSPECTOR-GENERAL IN BANKRUPTCY
FIRST APPLICANT

THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
SECOND APPLICANT

AND:

DAVID ANTHONY BRADSHAW
FIRST RESPONDENT

ACE INSURANCE LIMITED (FORMERLY KNOWN AS CIGNA INSURANCE AUSTRALIA LIMITED)
SECOND RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

KENNY J

DATE OF ORDER:

7 APRIL 2006

WHERE MADE:

MELBOURNE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

  1. Up to 15 April 2005, the applicant pay the respondents’ costs of the proceeding on a party and party basis.
  2. After 15 April 2005, the applicant pay the respondents’ costs of the proceeding on an indemnity basis, the indemnity costs to include all costs, including reserved costs, incurred by the respondents except in so far as they are of an unreasonable amount or have been unreasonably incurred, so that subject to these exceptions, the respondents are completely indemnified by the applicant.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

VID 972 OF 2004

BETWEEN:

INSPECTOR-GENERAL IN BANKRUPTCY
FIRST APPLICANT

THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
SECOND APPLICANT

AND:

DAVID ANTHONY BRADSHAW
FIRST RESPONDENT

ACE INSURANCE LIMITED…

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Details
Case
[2006] FCA 383
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Inspector-General in Bankruptcy v Bradshaw (No 2) involved the Inspector-General in Bankruptcy, acting as the plaintiff, and various respondents, including individuals and companies, as the defendants. The primary dispute centred around claims made by the Inspector-General regarding breaches of conditions on certain bonds and subsequent claims for indemnity costs. The matter was heard in the Federal Court of Australia.

The legal issues before the court were primarily concerned with the entitlement of the respondents to indemnity costs following a specific juncture in the litigation. On 28 June 2005, the applicants had rejected a settlement offer made by the first respondent for $23,248, which was proposed as a full and final settlement of all claims, excluding costs. The first respondent argued, based on the principles established in Calderbank v Calderbank, that he should be awarded indemnity costs from this date onward due to the applicants' rejection of the settlement offer. The court had to determine whether the respondents were indeed entitled to such costs and if so, from which date they should apply.

In reaching its decision, the court examined the discretionary power to award costs under section 43 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth). It noted that while a successful litigant is generally entitled to an award of costs, the exercise of this power is discretionary and must be exercised judicially. The court found that the respondents were successful in their primary claims and that the focus of the litigation had not been heavily contested on the major issues. The applicants had failed to establish significant controversy around the breach of bond conditions and had also failed in their attempt to reopen their case to quantify loss. Given these findings, the court concluded that the applicants should bear the respondents' costs on a party and party basis for the entire proceeding.

The court ordered that up to 15 April 2005, the applicants were to pay the respondents' costs on a party and party basis. From 15 April 2005 onwards, the applicants were to pay the respondents' costs on an indemnity basis, ensuring that the respondents were fully indemnified, except for costs that were unreasonable or incurred unreasonably.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Up to 15 April 2005, the applicant pay the respondents’ costs of the proceeding on a party and party basis.

2. After 15 April 2005, the applicant pay the respondents’ costs of the proceeding on an indemnity basis, the indemnity costs to include all costs, including reserved costs, incurred by the respondents except in so far as they are of an unreasonable amount or have been unreasonably incurred, so that subject to these exceptions, the respondents are completely indemnified by the applicant.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

KENNY J (dissent)

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by:

The first respondent made an alternative claim for indemnity costs for the period following 28 June 2005. On that day, the applicants rejected a settlement offer, made by letter of 21 June 2005, for $23,248 “in full and final settlement of all the Applicants’ claims in this matter (exclusive of costs), being the total sum of all disbursements you have claimed”. Referring to Calderbank v Calderbank [1975] 3 All E R 333, the first respondent submitted that he should receive costs on an indemnity basis after that date.Consideration The power of the Court to make orders for costs derives from s 43 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth). A successful litigant is ordinarily entitled to an award of costs: see, e.g., Oshlack v Richmond River Council (1998) 193 CLR 72 at 97 per McHugh J (dissenting in result) and 120-1 per Kirby J. The power to make orders for costs is, however, discretionary, although it “must be exercised judicially and not against the successful party except for some reason connected with the case”: see Ruddock v Vadarlis (No 2) (2001) 115 FCR 229 (“Ruddock v Vadarlis (No 2)”) at 234 per Black CJ and French JJ. Ordinarily, if a successful party is denied an order for costs in whole or part, it is because the party’s conduct of the proceeding in some respect or respects makes it just or reasonable to do so: see, e.g., Ruddock v Vadarlis (No 2) at 236 and Latoudis v Casey (1990) 170 CLR 534 at 544 per Mason CJ. An unsuccessful party is not automatically entitled to costs in respect of those issues of facts or law on which the successful party failed: see Dr Martens Pty Ltd v Figgins Holdings Pty Ltd (No 2) [2000] FCA 602 at [54] per Goldberg J; also Re Elgindata Ltd (No 2) [1993] All ER 232 at 237 per Nourse LJ, cited with approval in Hayle Holdings Pty Ltd v Australian Technology Group Ltd (No 2) [2000] FCA 1699 at [9] per Hely J; Dodds Family Investments Pty Ltd v Lane Industries Pty Ltd (1993) 26 IPR 261 at 271-2 per Gummow, French and Hill JJ; Mok v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (No 2) (1993) 47 FCR 81 per Keely J at 84; and Toohey J in Hughes v Western Australia Cricket Association (Inc) (1986) ATPR 40 –748 at 48,136, citing Cretazzo v Lombardi (1975) 13 SASR 4 at 16 per Jacobs J. The respondents are the successful parties in this proceeding. I accept that, as the respondents contended, the making of the declarations was not seriously contested and that the focus of the dispute at the first hearing was whether, as the second respondent put it, “the bond was, in effect, a good behaviour bond, forfeitable without proof of loss”. Whilst it is true that the applicants established that the respondents had breached the conditions of their bonds, these were not matters of significant controversy. Moreover, whilst the first respondent failed in his contention that the applicants’ claim was statute–barred and the second respondent failed in its contention that it had revoked its bond, neither issue loomed large in the litigation. Further, the applicants failed at the second hearing to persuade me that they should have leave to reopen their case in order to quantify their loss. The applicants were thus unsuccessful, so it seems to me, with respect to the major issues in this case. Accordingly, at a minimum, the applicants must bear the respondents’ costs on a party and party basis for the entire proceeding.