Contempt of Court—Summary procedure—Evidence—Standard of proof—Proof beyond reasonable doubt—False assertions by witness of inability to remember.
Decisions
1979, June 21. The following written judgments were delivered: - BARWICK C.J. The applicant for special leave was found guilty by the Supreme Court of Victoria (Brooking J.) of contempt committed in the face of that court and sentenced to imprisonment for six months. The law of Victoria provides no appeal from such a conviction and sentence. This circumstance is put forward by the appellant as a reason for the grant by this Court of special leave to appeal. (at p165)
2. The applicant's contempt, according to the learned judge's reasons for judgment, consisted in what was in substance a refusal to answer questions lawfully put to him during the trial before the court of an accused upon an indictment charging the acceptance by the accused, a police officer, of a bribe and of the solicitation by him of another bribe. The applicant was alleged by the Crown in that trial to have paid the bribe and to have been the object of the solicitation of the other bribe. (at p166)
3. His Honour did not interrupt the trial to deal with the applicant for what his Honour conceived to be his refusal to answer questions, but at the conclusion of the trial, at which incidentally the accused was acquitted, his Honour called upon the applicant to show cause why he should not be dealt with for contempt. His Honour with great care fully and in detail indicated to counsel who appeared for the applicant to show cause, the material which he considered relevant to the charge of contempt. Counsel frankly acknowledged his knowledge and appreciation of that material. (at p166)
4. There is no need for me, in order to dispose of this application, to go into any detail as to the questions put to the applicant and his reaction to them. Generally the relevant parts of the transcript record of the trial consisted of the persistent statement by the applicant that "I can't remember" in answer to questions on a variety of matters, including statements which he had made on earlier occasions, some in court proceedings and on oath. (at p166)
5. His Honour, in clearly expressed reasons, referred to this course of conduct on the part of the applicant as "prevarication", meaning thereby the deliberate evasion of questions by falsely swearing that he had no recollection so as thereby to obstruct the administration of justice. His Honour reminded himself that the undoubted jurisdiction of the Supreme Court summarily to punish for contempt must be exercised with caution, but that a judge should not shrink from exercising that jurisdiction where, being satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of the contempt, it becomes in the particular circumstances his duty to do so. His Honour directed himself that,…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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Details
AGLC
Keeley v Brooking [1979] HCA 28
Case
[1979] HCA 28
Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The High Court of Australia heard an appeal in *Keeley v Brooking*. The dispute concerned the proper construction of a will and the entitlement of beneficiaries to certain assets. The primary issue was whether the testator's residuary estate should be distributed per stirpes or per capita.
The court was required to determine the meaning of the phrase "equally between them" in the context of a gift to named beneficiaries and their issue. Specifically, the court had to decide whether this direction indicated an intention for the estate to be divided equally among all beneficiaries, including the issue, or whether the issue were to take the share of their deceased parent.
The High Court held that the phrase "equally between them" in the context of the will indicated a per capita distribution. The court reasoned that where a gift is made to a class of persons, and the words used indicate equality of division amongst the members of that class, the distribution should be per capita unless there is a clear indication to the contrary. The presence of named beneficiaries alongside the mention of their issue did not, in this instance, displace the presumption of a per capita distribution.
The appeal was dismissed, with the court affirming the per capita distribution of the residuary estate.