Keays v J P Morgan Administrative Services Australia Limited

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Keays v J P Morgan Administrative Services Australia Limited [2011] FCA 358

Citation: Keays v J P Morgan Administrative Services Australia Limited [2011] FCA 358
Parties: COLIN KEAYS v J P MORGAN ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES AUSTRALIA LIMITED
File number: NSD 1375 of 2008
Judge: BUCHANAN J
Date of judgment: 13 April 2011
Catchwords:

CONTRACTS – employment contract – repudiation – breach of contract – implied terms

TRADE PRACTICES – whether representations made in connection with an employment contract contravened ss 52 and 53B of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth)

Legislation: Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) ss 48, 60, 136
Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) ss 51A, 52, 53B
Cases cited:

Adelaide Corporation v Jennings Industries Ltd (1985) 156 CLR 274
B.P. Refinery (Westernport) Pty Ltd v Shire of Hastings (1977) 180 CLR 266
Butcher v Lachlan Elder Realty Pty Limited (2004) 218 CLR 592
Byrne v Australian Airlines Ltd (1995) 185 CLR 410
Campbell v Backoffice Investments Pty Ltd (2009) 238 CLR 304
Codelfa Construction Pty Ltd v State Rail Authority of New South Wales (1982) 149 CLR 337
Goldman Sachs JPWere Services Pty Limited V Nikolich [2007] FCAFC 120
McGrath v Australian Naturalcare Products Pty Ltd (2008) 165 FCR 230
Moneywood v Salamon Nominees Pty Ltd (2001) 202 CLR 351
Secured Income Real Estate (Australia) Limited v St Martins Investments Pty Ltd (1979) 144 CLR 596
Toll (FGCT) Pty Limited v Alphapharm Pty Limited (2004) 219 CLR 165

Date of hearing: 25, 26, 27, 28 October 2010; 13, 14 December 2010; and 21 February 2011
Place: Sydney
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 91
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr M J Cranitch SC with Ms K E Day
Solicitor for the Applicant: Gillis Delaney Lawyers
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr J J E Fernon SC
Solicitor for the Respondent: Freehills

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 1375 of 2008

BETWEEN:

COLIN KEAYS
Applicant

AND:

J P MORGAN ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES AUSTRALIA LIMITED
Respondent

JUDGE:

BUCHANAN J

DATE OF ORDER:

13 APRIL 2011

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application be dismissed.

THE COURT DIRECTS THAT:

1.Any application for costs be made in written submissions filed together with evidence in support within 14 days.

2.If the respondent opposes an application for costs it must do so by written submission together with any further evidence upon which it relies within 14 days of service of the applicant’s written submissions.

3.Any submissions or evidence in reply should be filed within a further seven days.

4.If no party seeks an oral hearing the question of costs will be dealt with on the basis of material filed in compliance with directions 1, 2 and 3 above.

Note:Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
The text of entered orders can be located using Federal Law Search on the Court’s website.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL…

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Details
Case
[2011] FCA 358
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In Keays v J P Morgan Administrative Services Australia Limited, the primary issue was whether JPM had breached the terms of Mr Keays' employment contract or contravened sections 52 and 53B of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth). Mr Keays claimed that JPM's representations regarding his employment were misleading, which led him to forfeit his previous employment and stock entitlements without a fair understanding of the true nature of his role with JPM. His claims were predicated on the assertion that his position was supposed to be on the public side of JPM’s operations, whereas he was later moved to the private side. This shift, he argued, constituted a breach of contract and was misleading under the Trade Practices Act. The court had to determine if there was a breach of contract and whether JPM’s conduct was misleading or deceptive under the Trade Practices Act.

The court examined the evidence and found that JPM had not breached the contract. It held that there was no evidence of a repudiation of contract or any breach by JPM. Regarding the Trade Practices Act claims, the court noted that JPM had provided sufficient evidence to counter the statutory presumption that their representations lacked reasonable grounds. It found that Mr Keays had not established that JPM’s representations were misleading or deceptive. Specifically, the court held that while Mr Keays had been assured of certain terms in his job description, the onus was on him to prove that JPM did not have reasonable grounds for those representations. Since he failed to do so, his claims under the Trade Practices Act were dismissed.

The court dismissed the application and directed that any application for costs be made within a specified timeframe, with responses and replies to be filed accordingly. The decision underscored that JPM's conduct did not breach the contract or contravene the Trade Practices Act.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application be dismissed.

THE COURT DIRECTS THAT:

1. Any application for costs be made in written submissions filed together with evidence in support within 14 days.

2. If the respondent opposes an application for costs it must do so by written submission together with any further evidence upon which it relies within 14 days of service of the applicant’s written submissions.

3. Any submissions or evidence in reply should be filed within a further seven days.

4. If no party seeks an oral hearing the question of costs will be dealt with on the basis of material filed in compliance with directions 1, 2 and 3 above.

Note:

Background

Background to the litigation

Contrary to expectations, Mr Keays’ employment with JPM was relatively short-lived. His services were terminated on 5 June 2008 for the stated reason that his position had been made redundant. Mr Keays’ case is that JPM’s conduct in connection with the formation of his contract of employment contravened s 52 and s 53B of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) (“TP Act”) (i.e. it was misleading or deceptive or likely to be misleading or deceptive, or was liable to mislead Mr Keays about aspects of his employment with JPM) and that JPM breached his contract of employment. Mr Keays has sought damages calculated, generally speaking, on the premise that he should be paid all his expected remuneration until 4 January 2018 (when he would be 60 years of age). The total amount was substantial. It exceeded $6 million.Background In late 2005 Mr Keays was 47 years old and approaching his 48th birthday. In the years since he graduated from the University of Western Australia in 1982 with the degree of Bachelor of Economics, he had worked for Wardley Australia Limited (which was taken over by HSBC), Citigroup and Deutsche. On his evidence, at Wardley Australia/HSBC he was one of the first people to operate in the derivatives market. After working for Wardley Australia/HSBC for about 13 years Mr Keays was approached by Citigroup. His evidence was that he was offered a position in charge of derivatives sales. After he commenced employment on that understanding the position was not made available and he was consigned to a lesser role. This experience contributed to his insistence, when approached in due course on behalf of JPM, on having a written position description as the basis for his employment. Mr Keays took employment with Deutsche in 1996. He commenced in the position of an “associate director” in charge of derivatives sales for New South Wales. He progressed to “director”. His earnings increased (taking into account base salary, bonuses and stock entitlements) from $575,000 in 1998 to $715,000 in 2000 and 2001, fell back to $660,000 in 2002 (without a “stock bonus”), rose again to $843,750 in 2003 and were finally $1,174,500 (a “stellar year”) in 2004. Mr Keays left Deutsche in late 2005 before bonuses for that year were announced and forfeited a number of stock entitlements at the same time. Those matters were addressed in the arrangements made with him by JPM. For the purpose of the present proceedings it is necessary to note a distinction between “public” and “private” side operations of a merchant or investment bank. The term “private side” refers to confidentiality arrangements made within merchant and investment banks, normally under the supervision of a compliance department, whereby “insider knowledge” acquired in the course of developing, proposing and constructing transactions for clients is kept confidential until released generally into the market. By way of example relevant to the present case, someone working on the private side at JPM is taken to know all the information held by JPM (and its related companies globally) and to be restricted accordingly. Those operating on the “public side” are not (nor presumed to be) privy to such information unless they are “wall-crossed” for particular transactions or dealings, when they come under specific restrictions concerning those transactions or dealings. Those on the private side are, subject to some very limited exceptions, always on the private side. Those on the public side, by contrast, only work under private side restrictions when wall-crossed for particular transactions. The separation between private side and public side operations is generally (and was at JPM) reflected by a physical separation of working space and strictly restricted access to private side areas and operations.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

There is no basis to conclude that JPM refused to honour any legal obligation with respect to the vesting or payment of any stock entitlements. Payment in respect of unvested stock was offered to Mr Keays but his refusal to sign a deed of release represented a failure to fulfil a stated condition for such payment. Conclusion on contract claims No repudiation or breach of contract has been established.Sections 52 and 53B of the Trade Practices Act Mr Keays also put a case based on s 52 and s 53B of the TP Act. Section 52 of the TP Act provides (relevantly):52 (1) A corporation shall not, in trade or commerce, engage in conduct that is misleading or deceptive or is likely to mislead or deceive. Section 53B of the TP Act provides:53BA corporation shall not, in relation to employment that is to be, or may be, offered by the corporation or by another person, engage in conduct that is liable to mislead persons seeking the employment as to the availability, nature, terms or conditions of, or any other matter relating to, the employment. As I earlier indicated, s 51A of the TP Act operates in some circumstances to impose a practical onus on a corporation to adduce some evidence that there were reasonable grounds for making a representation, or face a statutory presumption (in the absence of any such evidence) that reasonable grounds for making the representation did not exist and the representation was, accordingly, misleading. Section 51A affects both s 52 and s 53B. In the present case JPM did adduce evidence sufficient to displace the statutory presumption. Accordingly, insofar as the representations about which Mr Keays complained were ones about future matters the onus remained with him to show that there were no reasonable grounds, at the time, for making them. The conduct which Mr Keays asserted was in breach of s 52 and s 53B of the TP Act consisted of the alleged representations which I set out earlier. In the further amended statement of claim those alleged representations were repeated and relied upon in various ways but, at least in the pleaded case, they reflected the following basic premises: Mr Keays was being offered a promotion; he would suffer no financial loss as a result of accepting the JPM role; his position would be ongoing (i.e. permanent until he chose to retire) and; his role and responsibilities would (except with his agreement) remain as set out in the job description (i.e. on the public side with full responsibility for the management of foreign exchange sales business). In the written submissions, Mr Keays’ contentions expanded to include a further proposition. In those submissions, Mr Keays argued that JPM had always intended that his role would be (or become) a private side one. Mr Keays’ argument was that, despite the terms of the job description provided to him in November 2005, which were discussed with him before he accepted employment with JPM on 14 December 2005, JPM and its officers, Mr Priestley and Mr Taylor, always had it in mind that his position would be transferred to the private side and kept that information from him. Mr Keays’ evidence was that he would not have accepted a job on the private side and therefore, so the argument went, he gave up the guarantee of secure continuing employment with Deutsche only to find himself confronted after a short time with a requirement to move to the private side, which requirement gave effect to JPM’s original undisclosed intent.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established