Moneywood Pty Ltd v Salamon Nominees Pty Ltd

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HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

GLEESON CJ,
McHUGH, GUMMOW, KIRBY AND CALLINAN JJ

MONEYWOOD PTY LTD   APPELLANT

AND

SALAMON NOMINEES PTY LTD  RESPONDENT

Moneywood Pty Ltd v Salamon Nominees Pty Ltd [2001] HCA 2
8 February 2001
B22/2000

ORDER

1.   Appeal allowed with costs.

2.   Orders of the Court of Appeal of Queensland made on 22 December 1998 set aside.  In lieu thereof, order that the appeal to that Court be dismissed with costs.

On appeal from the Supreme Court of Queensland

Representation:

W Sofronoff QC with K Buxton for the appellant (instructed by Russell and Company)

P A Keane QC with L D Bowden for the respondent (instructed by Brown & Fowler)

Notice:  This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.

CATCHWORDS

Moneywood Pty Ltd v Salamon Nominees Pty Ltd

Principal and agent – Commission – Action for recovery of commission by agent – Sale of property – Whether agent was effective cause of sale – Whether engagement or appointment of agent complied with s 76(1)(c) of the Auctioneers and Agents Act 1971 (Q).

Contract – Written agreement to engage agent and oral agreement to pay commission – Terms of the contract – Whether commission payable in respect of sale of part only of the property – Whether appointment of agent complied with s 76(1)(c) of the Auctioneers and Agents Act 1971 (Q).

Words and phrases – "effective cause" – "implied terms" – "evidenced in writing".

Auctioneers and Agents Act 1971 (Q), s 76(1)(c).

  1. GLEESON CJ.   The issues in this appeal concern a real estate agent's disputed claim to commission.  The appellant was engaged as agent by the respondent, and found a purchaser, BMD Constructions Pty Ltd ("BMD"), which entered into a contract to purchase land from the respondent.  The contract identified the appellant as the vendor's agent.  That contract was never completed, and there was no commission payable in relation to it.  By a later contract, which was completed, and which made no reference to the appellant, BMD agreed to purchase, for a lesser sum, part of the land which was the subject of the first contract.  The dispute is as to whether the appellant was entitled to commission on the sale price under the second contract.

  2. The detailed facts and circumstances surrounding the appointment of the appellant as agent, and the dealings between the respondent and BMD, are set out in the reasons for judgment of Gummow J.  At first instance, in the District Court of Queensland, Botting DCJ found in favour of the appellant[1].  By majority (de Jersey CJ and Chesterman J; McPherson JA dissenting), that decision was reversed in the Court of Appeal[2].

    [1]Moneywood Pty Ltd v Salamon Nominees Pty Ltd unreported, District Court of Queensland, 1 May 1998.

    [2]Salamon Nominees Pty Ltd v Moneywood Pty Ltd (1998) Q Conv R ¶54-525.

  3. The issue upon which the Court of Appeal found against the appellant was whether there had been satisfaction of…

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Details
Case
[2001] HCA 2
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia heard an appeal from the Court of Appeal of Queensland concerning a dispute over real estate agent commission. Moneywood Pty Ltd (the agent) sought to recover commission from Salamon Nominees Pty Ltd (the vendor) for the sale of land. The core of the dispute revolved around whether the agent had been effectively engaged in writing as required by section 76(1)(c) of the *Auctioneers and Agents Act 1971* (Qld) and whether the agent was the effective cause of the sale, particularly given that the sale ultimately comprised only a portion of the originally contemplated property.

The legal issues before the High Court were whether the agent's engagement or appointment complied with the written requirement of section 76(1)(c) of the *Auctioneers and Agents Act 1971* (Qld), and whether the agent was the effective cause of the sale of the land, notwithstanding that the final transaction involved a sale of part of the land rather than the whole parcel initially discussed. The Court was required to determine the scope of the written engagement and its connection to the eventual sale transaction.

The High Court reasoned that the standard condition 30 within the initial contract for sale, which confirmed the appointment of the vendor's agent to introduce a buyer, constituted sufficient written evidence of the agency in respect of the transaction. The Court held that this written confirmation was not limited to the specific buyer named in that contract but extended to any buyer introduced by the agent, and importantly, was "in respect of such transaction" as contemplated by section 76(1)(c). The Court found that the agent's introduction of a developer interested in the land was the effective cause of the subsequent sale, even though the final sale involved a reduced area and a different contract. The Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the orders of the Court of Appeal and dismissing the appeal to that Court with costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Appeal allowed with costs.

2. Orders of the Court of Appeal of Queensland made on 22 December 1998 set aside. In lieu thereof, order that the appeal to that Court be dismissed with costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

In my opinion, each of these issues should be answered in favour of the agent. The appeal should therefore be allowed, and the judgment of the District Court in favour of the agent restored. The material facts In February 1994, Mr Phillip Murphy, an employee of the agent, informed the vendor that he had a developer who was interested in purchasing land owned by the vendor in the Redland Shire in Queensland. The trial judge found that the vendor agreed to pay the agent a commission "at the rate of 2 per cent of the purchase price upon Mr Murphy's introducing a purchaser who actually completed a purchase, or, as Mr Murphy put it, 'he would pay me on the receipt of moneys, 2 per cent commission.'" On 31 March 1994, the purchaser signed a contract for the purchase of the land, the area of which was 47.5372 hectares. The land was zoned "Rural Non-Urban". The Council had given approval to the rezoning of part of the land, subject to certain conditions which had not been satisfied at the date of the contract. The purchase price was $6,825,000, and a deposit of $270,000 was payable. The contract described the agent as the Vendor's Agent. Clause 30 provided:"In the absence of any specific appointment the Vendor by executing this Contract hereby confirms the appointment of the Vendor's Agent … as the agent of the Vendor to introduce a buyer." The contract was to be completed on or before 31 October 1994. The learned trial judge found that the contract was "unusually favourable" to the vendor in respect of eight matters. The contract also required the vendor to continue with its existing application for rezoning and to lodge and pursue an application for rezoning the balance of the land. The vendor lodged the further application in April 1994. The contract contained a special condition that completion was conditional upon the vendor receiving from the local council "written advice ... as to the conditions of approval for rezoning of the whole of the land which would be required by that Council upon giving such approval". This condition gave the vendor the right to vary the time for completion in certain circumstances. Another special condition required the purchaser to accept the land in its "unrezoned state". By September 1994, not only had the Council failed to issue the conditions for rezoning but it had informed the vendor that it might acquire part of the land, apparently because of public concern that a "koala corridor" within the land was needed. In June 1995, the vendor agreed to sell 16.06 hectares of the land to the Council. The next day, the vendor and the purchaser entered into a contract for the sale of 31.338 hectares of the land for $4,260,000. The agent was not identified as the Vendor's Agent in either of the June contracts.The effect of the agency agreement The express agreement between the vendor and the agent was a simple one: upon introducing a purchaser who bought the 47.5372 hectares, the vendor would pay the agent two percent of the purchase price. That agreement, simple though it was, contained a number of additional terms that are implied by law or necessity in contracts between vendors and real estate agents.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

GLEESON CJ (dissent) HUGH J (dissent) GUMMOW J (dissent) CALLINAN J (dissent)
The submission (which reflects what was held by the majority in the Court of Appeal[88]) that standard condition 30 is in some sense "transaction specific" should be rejected. When incorporated into a contract such as the first contract, standard condition 30 provides written evidence of the agency of the agent listed in the contract in respect of the property identified in that contract. This agency includes the transaction of sale to the buyer listed in the contract but it is not limited to it. It will also, for example, include subsequent transactions of sale, under different contracts, in respect of the same buyer specified in the signed contract. This follows from the general words used in standard condition 30. These refer to "a buyer" introduced by the agent, whereas elsewhere the standard conditions refer to "the Buyer", being the party listed on the standard form contract. The agent is confirmed, in writing, as the agent in respect of any such party introduced as a "buyer". [88](1999) Q ConvR ¶54-525 at 60,222, 60,234.Conclusion Two textual considerations support my preferred approach to s 76(1)(c) of the Act. The first is the repeated reference both in the opening words of s 76(1), and in par (c) itself, to the word "transaction". As has been pointed out, this represented a change from the New Zealand legislative source where the more specific word "sale" had been used. It was a change which the legislature of Queensland introduced into the provision in that State in 1922[152] and continued when the present Act was adopted in 1971. Secondly, there is the repeated reference, both in the language of s 76(1) and in par (c), to the words of connection "in respect of". Crucially, in the present case, it is enough to show that the "engagement or appointment to act as ... real estate agent" that must be "in writing", signed as required, is "in respect of such transaction", being the transaction for which the agent is suing to recover the commission in question. The width of the words "in respect of" has been the subject of many judicial observations[153]. There is no reason in the present context to cut down that width.[152]Auctioneers and Commission Agents Act 1922 (Q), s 15.[153]See eg State Government Insurance Office (Qld) v Crittenden (1966) 117 CLR 412 at 416. It follows that it is not necessary that the writing required should be contained in a particular written instrument of sale or even within the particular instrument evidencing the transaction giving rise to the claim[154]. It is enough that the "engagement or appointment to act" propounded by the agent should be "in respect of such transaction"[155]. The "writing" relied upon may therefore appear in private correspondence which comes to light and, by its terms, adequately evidences the engagement or appointment that is in question. These considerations sufficiently answer the propositions which found favour with the majority in the Court of Appeal.[154]Bradley v Adams [1989] 1 Qd R 256 at 260.[155]The Act, s 76(1)(c).

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by:

It follows that, subject to the final issue, that concerning the operation of s 76 of the Act, Moneywood was entitled to its commission.The operation of the Act Section 76 of the Act has a relatively long pedigree[62]. It can be traced back to s 13 of the Land Agents Act 1912 (NZ) ("the 1912 Act"). That section was headed "Disability of unlicensed agent" and provided:"A land agent shall not be entitled to sue for or recover any commission, reward, or remuneration for or in respect of the sale or other disposition of land, or of any interest in land, made or effected after the coming into operation of this Act, unless–(a)He is the holder of a license under this Act; and(b)His engagement or appointment to act as agent in respect of such sale or disposition is in writing signed by the person to be charged with such commission, reward, or remuneration."[62]Section 76 was previously numbered as s 70. It was renumbered in Reprint No 3 of 21 December 1995, apparently pursuant to the Reprints Act 1992 (Q). The 1912 Act has been repealed and replaced by a succession of statutes. Although the wording of the relevant provisions of each statute differed slightly, sections approximating the effect of s 13 of the 1912 Act all utilised terms referring to evidence of the contract of agency[63]. [63]Section 30 of the Land Agents Act 1921 (NZ), s 25 of the Land Agents Act 1953 (NZ) and s 79 of the Real Estate Agents Act 1963 (NZ) were headed "Evidence of contracts of agency", while s 62 of the current Act, the Real Estate Agents Act 1976 (NZ), is headed "Real estate agent to have written contract of agency". As Macnaughton J noted in Roach v Hough[64] and McPherson JA remarked in this case[65], the provisions of the 1912 Act were reproduced in substantially the same form in s 23(1)(b) of the Auctioneers and Commission Agents Act 1922 (Q) ("the 1922 Act"). This section provided:"A real estate agent, debt collector or motor dealer shall not be entitled to sue for or recover or retain any fees, charges, commission, reward, or other remuneration for or in respect of any transaction, unless–…(b)His engagement or appointment to act as real estate agent, debt collector or motor dealer in respect of such transaction is in writing signed by the person to be charged with such fees, charges, commission, reward, or remuneration, or his agent or representative".[64][1926] St R Qd 24 at 28.[65](1999) Q ConvR ¶54-525 at 60,228. The 1922 Act was repealed and replaced by the present statute with effect from 28 February 1972. Both s 23(1) of the 1922 Act and s 76 of the Act have at all times been headed "Restriction on remedy for commission". The heading is not part of the Act[66] but may be considered to confirm the ordinary meaning of s 76[67].[66]Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Q), s 14(2).[67]Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Q), s 14B(1)(c), s 14B(3). An apparent difference between the terms of s 13 of the 1912 Act and s 76 of the Act is that the former speaks of "the sale or other disposition of land, or of any interest in land" whereas the latter speaks of "any transaction as … a real estate agent". It was not until the Land Agents Act 1921 (NZ) that the New Zealand legislation was broadened to cover "the sale, lease, exchange, or other disposal of land or any interest in land, or in respect of his services as agent in any other like transaction" (emphasis added).