Joyce v Christofferson

[1990] FCA 381

Re: JOHN DANIEL JOYCE; JAMES O'DONNELL; BRUCE WILLIAM SLOMAN; FERNANDO LOUIS
PEREZ; RONALD DOUGLAS NORUP; JAMES FRITZ OELLING; BRIAN DENNIS GERHARDT;
ROBERT DOWNIE; SYLVIA MAY LOWE; KENNETH HARVEY EDMUNDS; TERRENCE JAMES FEGAN;
MARK CARL DOWLING; KIMBERLEY GEORGE WILLIAMS; PETER JOHN MALLER; GERASSIMOS
EXARHOS; ERIC THOMAS GROUNDWATER; COSTAS CAMBETIS; RAYMOND KENNETH GRAHAM;
BRADLEY ROY COLEMAN; WILLIAM EDWARD GARRARD; DOUGLAS BERNARD HENDRICKS; THOMAS
GORDON PAYNE; HENRY JAMES LOWE; FRANCISCO PANA GENEROSA; KEVIN JAMES CARLSON;
WILFRED JULIUS THUN; WILLIAM ERNEST SMYTH; JOHN McCULLOUGH; MILES JOHN MASON;
RICHARD DAVID MACDONALD; PERCY ROBERT SALTMER; RAYMOND JAMES LIDDELL; RICKY
DOUGLAS GARRETT; HARRY HENRY BIONDI; IAN FRANCIS RICHARDSON; RONALD WILLIAM
SHUTE; BEVAN SPENCER REAUBEN ALEXANDER; MERVYN DOUGLAS RADECKER; WILLIAM JAMES
CALVERT; JAMES ANTHONY SWIFT; MERVYN JAMES RYDER; KENNETH LAURIE BELTON;
PATRICK CHRISTOPHER McALLISTER; MIROLJUB MIHALJLOVIC; ANDREW CHARLES O'BRIEN;
KENNETH JAMES WEAL; THOMAS PATRICK WHELAN; ROBERT RENNIE and BARRY ALEXANDER
MORRISON< And: BRIAN REUBEN CHRISTOFFERSEN; MICHAEL JAMES WILKINSON; LESLIE
THOMAS HAUFF; BERNARD FRANCIS SMITH and PETER IAN WISEMAN
No. Q 6 of 1988
FED No. 381
Industrial Law
26 FCR 261

COURT

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY
INDUSTRIAL DIVISION
Gray J.(1)

CATCHWORDS

Industrial Law - registered organisation - rules - performance and observance - purge of members by executive of branch on ground of cessation of eligibility - whether all reasonable steps taken before proceeding - rights of appeal under rules - change of legislation - whether eligibility a question for branch executive or a jurisdictional question - whether members continued to be eligible - employment as "storemen/storewomen" - whether engaged in clerical capacity - primary functions of employees - whether decision vitiated by bias - whether bona fide exercise of power - whether ulterior motive - whether decision based on improper considerations - whether decision unreasonable - whether right to a hearing - nature of hearing - whether branch executive misconceived its function under rules - whether defects cured by exercise of right of appeal - whether order should be made - nature of order.

Words and phrases - "engaged in a clerical capacity".

Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904 s. 139, s.141, s.140.

Industrial Relations Act 1988 s.196, s.209.

Industrial Relations (Consequential Provisions) Act 1988 s.5, s.52.

Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1961-1987 (Qld).

Industrial Commercial Practices Act 1984 (Qld).

Mount Isa Mines Limited Award

HEARING

MELBOURNE

#DATE 20:7:1990

Counsel for the applicants: Mr M. Amarena and Mr A. Stone

Solicitors for the applicants: Callaghan and Reidy

Counsel for the respondents: Mr R.R.S. Tracey and Mr P. Applegarth

Solicitors for the respondents: Mullins and Mullins

ORDER

The court orders that the respondents and each of them perform and observe the rules of the Federated Clerks Union of Australia by treating as null and void the resolution of the branch executive of the North Queensland Branch of the Federated Clerks Union of Australia made on 20th September 1988 as follows:

"That Branch Executive hereby directs the Branch Secretary to immediately remove from the registry of members the names of those members listed on the membership schedule dated 20th September 1988 marked "A" as such members are no longer eligible for membership of the Union and that each such member be notified accordingly."

so far as such resolution relates to the following applicants:

John Daniel Joyce

James O'Donnell

Bruce William Sloman

Fernando Louis Perez

Ronald Douglas Norup

James Fritz Oelling

Brian Dennis Gerhardt

Robert Downie

Sylvia May Lowe

Kenneth Harvey Edmunds

Mark Carl Dowling

Eric Thomas Groundwater

Raymond Kenneth Graham

Bradley Roy Coleman

Douglas Bernard Hendricks

Thomas Gordon Payne

Henry James Lowe

Franciso Pana Generosa

Kevin James Carlson

Percy Robert Saltmer

Harry Henry Biondi

Ronald William Shute

Bevan Spencer Reauben Alexander Kenneth Laurie Belton

Patrick Christopher McAllister Miroljub Mihajlovic

Andrew Charles O'Brien

Robert Rennie

Barry Alexander Morrison

Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with by O.36 of the Federal Court Rules.

JUDGE1

The Federated Clerks Union of Australia ("the Union") was an organisation of employees, registered pursuant to the Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904 ("the C. and A. Act"). Since the repeal of the C. and A. Act, and its replacement by the Industrial Relations Act 1988 ("the Act"), the Union has continued to be an organisation of employees, registered under the Act; see s.5(1) of the Industrial Relations (Consequential Provisions) Act 1988. One of the branches of the Union covers the area of North Queensland, including the city of Mt. Isa, and is known as the North Queensland branch ("the branch").

1. The respondents in this proceeding constitute the branch executive of the branch. The respondent Christoffersen is the branch president, the respondent Wilkinson is vice president and branch organiser of the branch, and the respondent Hauff is the branch secretary of the branch. The other two respondents, Mr Smith and Mr Wiseman, are members of the branch executive.

2. On 2nd September 1988, the branch executive met at the office of the branch at Townsville. Mr Hauff gave a lengthy report concerning the membership of the Union by persons employed in the classification "storemen/storewomen" or "storeman/storewoman" by Mount Isa Mines Limited at Mt. Isa. At the conclusion of the report, Mr Hauff moved in the following terms:
   

"That Branch Executive, after considering the present employment of members classified as storemen/storewomen whose names are listed on the membership schedule dated 2/9/88 and who are employed under the Mt. Isa Mines Limited Award, instructs the Branch Secretary to send to each such member a notice advising that the Branch Executive intends to direct the Branch Secretary to remove that member's name from the register of members in accordance with rule 11(a)(i) at the Branch Executive meeting to be held at the Union Office, 485 Flinders Street, Townsville on 20/9/88 commencing at 5.00 p.m.".

This motion was seconded and carried. The membership schedule referred to contains the names of and other information about some sixty persons who were, or were treated as, members of the Union in the branch at that time. In the execution of the resolution, letters dated 5th September 1988 were sent by post to all of the persons whose names appeared in the membership schedule.

1. At a further meeting of the Branch Executive of the branch on 20th September 1988, following events which will be described in more detail later in these reasons for judgment, Mr Hauff moved:
   

"That Branch Executive hereby directs the Branch Secretary to immediately remove from the registry of members the names of those members listed on the membership schedule dated 20th September 1988 marked "A" as such members are no longer eligible for membership of the Union and that each such member be notified accordingly."

That motion was seconded and carried. The schedule referred to contained the names of and other information concerning fifty-six persons who were, or had been treated as, members of the Union in the branch. The names of all those persons had been on the schedule considered on 2nd September.

1. On 21st October 1988, a rule to show cause was granted on the application of a number of persons. Changes have since been made to the list of applicants in the proceeding. Orders are sought that the respondents perform and observe the rules of the Union and of the branch by treating as null and void the decision to remove the names of the applicants, treating as null and void the meeting of 20th September 1988, directing the branch secretary to reinstate the applicants' names in the register of members of the branch and treating the applicants in all respects as if they had been members, notwithstanding the removal of their names from the register of members. The orders were sought pursuant to s.141 of the C and A Act. Upon the repeal of the C and A Act, the application is required to be dealt with as if it had been made under s. 209 of the Act; see s.52 of the Industrial Relations (Consequential Provisions) Act 1988.

2. Many issues of fact and law arose in the proceeding. It is convenient to deal with those issues under separate headings.
   APPLICATION FOR ADJOURNMENT.

3. Section 209 of the Act contains the following provisions:
   

"(3) The Court may refuse to deal with an application for an order under this section unless it is satisfied that the applicant has taken all reasonable steps to try to have the matter the subject of the application resolved within the organisation.

(4) At any time after the making of an application for an order under this section, the Court may make such interim orders as it considers appropriate, and, in particular, orders intended to further the resolution within the organisation concerned of the matter the subject of the application."

Section 141 of the C and A Act did not contain any provision resembling sub-s.(3). Nor was there specific mention in s.141(2), which empowered the Court to make interim orders, of orders intended to further the resolution within the organisation concerned of the matter the subject of the application.

1. In the course of the trial, a question arose whether the Court should receive evidence as to the work actually performed by the persons whose names were removed from the register of members, or whether it was confined to examining the evidence which was before the branch executive. That question is dealt with later in these reasons for judgment. In the course of argument, it was pointed out that the branch executive had not had the benefit of the material which the applicants sought to place before the Court. Mr Tracey of counsel, who with Mr Applegarth of counsel appeared for the respondents, applied for an adjournment, on the basis that the applicants had not taken all reasonable steps to try to have the question of their eligibility for membership of the Union resolved within the Union. It was suggested that the Court could exercise its power under sub-s.(4), and make interim orders, directing the respondents to reconsider the matter on the basis of the material which it was proposed to canvass during the trial. Mr Amarena of counsel, who with Mr Stone of counsel appeared for all of the applicants who appeared at the trial, opposed the adjournment.

2. Mr Tracey drew attention to rule 11(g) and (h) of the rules of the branch ("the branch rules"), which gave to all of those whose names have been removed from the register of members the right to appeal from the decision of the branch executive to the branch council, and from there to the national council or national executive of the Union. Only two of the applicants exercised any of those rights. John Joyce and James O'Donnell appealed to the branch council, which upheld the decision of the branch executive. They did not seek to appeal further. The question arose whether it would have been reasonable for them to do so, or whether it would have been reasonable for any of the others purged to exercise any of their rights of appeal, so as to have taken "all reasonable steps" within the meaning of s.209(3).

3. It must be remembered that the application was made under s.141 of the C. and A. Act, which remained in force until 1st March 1989, when the Act came into operation. The Act was assented to on 8th November 1988, at which stage it was not known when it would come into operation. On 6th February 1989, it was proclaimed to come into effect on 1st March. By rule 13(c) of the branch rules, anyone desiring to appeal from a decision of the branch executive to the branch council was required to do so within six weeks of the date of the decision appealed from. Accordingly, a person desiring to appeal from the decision of the branch executive made on 20th September would have had to lodge his or her appeal no later than 1st November, a week before the Act was passed. It would not be reasonable to treat the lodging of an internal appeal as a reasonable step, and therefore the failure to take it as some sort of bar to relief under s.209 of the Act, when no statutory obligation to take reasonable steps existed or could have been in contemplation, at the time when the right to appeal expired.

4. The position of Mr Joyce and Mr O'Donnell is slightly different. They did appeal to the branch council. There is very little evidence as to their appeals. Rule 13(d) of the branch rules obliges the branch council to hear and determine appeals at its first meeting after notice thereof is given. Rule 24(a) requires the branch council to meet quarterly, in the months of March, June, September and December. It may therefore be assumed that the appeals were heard by the branch council no later than the end of December 1988. There was in evidence a letter to Mr Joyce, dated 24th November 1988, in which he was advised that his appeal would be heard on 19th December 1988. Rule 27(9) of the rules of the Union ("the national rules") provided for appeal to the national executive from a decision of a branch. Under sub-rule (f), a three month time limit is imposed. Mr Joyce and Mr O'Donnell would therefore have been obliged to have given notice of appeal by some date in March 1989, probably 19th March, a matter of weeks after the coming into operation of s.209(3). Given that the proceeding was already in train, and that a new obligation to take all reasonable steps arose on 1st March, it is questionable whether, at that stage, a further appeal was a reasonable step. In any event, adjournment of the claims of Mr Joyce and Mr O'Donnell by themselves was not sought, and adjournment of the whole proceeding on the basis that only two of the applicants had open to them some form of right of internal appeal after the coming into operation of the Act would have been unproductive. It should be noted that, even if an applicant had wished to appeal direct from the branch executive to the national executive, by virtue of rule 27(9)(a) of the national rules, the time limit of three months would have expired on 20th December 1988, well before the coming into operation of the Act. The applicants should not therefore suffer from any failure to lodge any internal appeal, in the context of s.209(3).

5. Mr Tracey also suggested that the applicants should have submitted the evidence which they sought to bring to the Court to the branch executive, and requested a reconsideration of the decisions of 2nd September and 20th September 1988. He was unable to point to any provision of the rules which would have obliged, or even enabled, the branch executive to engage in such a reconsideration. It is true that rule 25(b)(xiv) empowered the branch executive to "conduct an enquiry into any matter affecting the Branch or any members". There is no guarantee that the branch executive would have been prepared to regard an application for reconsideration, by a number of persons who were not regarded as members, as a matter affecting the branch. In any event, as was pointed out to Mr Tracey in the course of the trial, if the branch executive wished to examine the evidence produced by the applicants to the Court, and to reconsider its position, it was open to it to do so at any time.

6. For these reasons, the application for an adjournment, and for interim orders, was refused.
   THE FUNCTION OF THE COURT.

7. A submission made by Mr Tracey on behalf of the respondents, both during the trial in objecting to the admission of evidence, and in final argument, was that the Court should approach its task in the present case as if it were reviewing a decision of an administrative tribunal. If this argument were accepted, the Court would only look to see whether the rules of the branch gave to the branch executive jurisdiction to decide whether the name of a member should be removed from the register of members, and whether there was material before the branch executive on 2nd September and 20th September on which it could act to make the decisions it made. The Court would not be entitled to look at further evidence, which was not before the branch executive, to determine for itself whether the persons purged from membership were in truth eligible to continue their membership.

8. No direct authority was cited in support of this argument. Rather, reference was made to a line of cases concerned with expulsion of members of registered organisations for "offences" under the rules of those organisations. In Cleworth v. Barrow (1978) 20 ALR 359, at p 369, the Full Court said:
   

"Further, certain evidence was led at the hearing before the court which appeared to be an attempt to have the charge re-heard by the court. On any hearing by a court of proceedings such as the present the court considers whether reasonable men acting honestly could have come to the decision that the domestic tribunal did (Australian Workers Union v. Bowen (No.2) (1948) 77 CLR 601 at 615). If the domestic tribunal could have so found, then the court will not interfere with the finding of that tribunal unless there has been a denial of natural justice."

The reference to Australian Workers Union v. Bowen (No.2) at p 615 was to the judgment of Latham CJ. Similar statements are to be found in the judgments of Dixon J. at pp 628-630 and Williams J. at p 634. Reference was also made to decisions of the Commonwealth Industrial Court in O'Connor v. Palmer (No. 1) (1959) 1 FLR 397, at p 401 and Cameron v. Davis (1960) 1 FLR 413, at pp 420 and 423, and to a statement of J.B. Sweeney J. in Re Keogh and Federated Clerks Union of Australia; Ex parte Linehan (1979) 40 FLR 445, at p 449. To the same effect is a passage in the judgment of Evatt J. in Cook v. Crawford (1981) 52 FLR 1, at pp 64-65.

1. In all of the cases referred to, except Keogh's case and Cook v. Crawford, members of organisations had been charged with "misconduct". In Cook v. Crawford, the officers of a branch of an organisation had been charged with "gross misbehaviour". In each case, the Court was concerned to see whether there was before the domestic tribunal of the organisation evidence which would justify a finding by reasonable persons of misconduct or gross misbehaviour. It was not considered to be the task of the Court to interfere with the opinion formed by the domestic tribunal that the conduct disclosed by the evidence before it did amount to misconduct or gross misbehaviour. Keogh's case was not concerned with any charge against any person. The statement by J.B. Sweeney J. purported only to be a summary of the law, and not a complete one.

2. The argument in the present case came down to the question whether the branch executive had "jurisdiction" only where a member had ceased to be eligible to belong to the Union, or whether eligibility for membership was a question for the branch executive to determine within its jurisdiction. In the cases dealing with offences under the rules of organisations, the Courts have recognised clearly that the existence of misconduct or gross misbehaviour was a question to be determined by the domestic tribunal of the organisation within its jurisdiction, and was not a jurisdictional question. Those decisions do not bear directly upon an issue such as arises in the present case. Indeed, they depend upon the content of the rules of the organisation in each case, and upon the notion that a domestic tribunal is best placed to judge whether particular conduct amounts to misconduct or gross misbehaviour. There seems to be no reason why an organisation could not, by casting its rules differently, make the existence of misconduct or gross misbehaviour a jurisdictional fact, and thereby require that there be actual misconduct or gross misbehaviour before the domestic tribunal be entitled to act. The question in the present case is therefore whether the rules of the Union and the branch, upon their proper construction, make the question of entitlement to membership one on which the power of the branch executive to act is dependent, or merely one which is for the branch executive to determine. To resolve this question, it is necessary to examine some of the rules of the Union.

1. Rule 2 of the national rules provides as follows:
   

" 2 - CONSTITUTION The Union shall consist of all persons engaged in any clerical capacity, and/or engaged in the occupation of shorthand writers and typists and/or on calculating, billing, or other machines designed to perform or assist in performing any clerical work whatsoever."

Despite the suggestion in this rule that all of the relevant persons are to be regarded as belonging to the Union, there follow in rule 5 detailed provisions as to how a person is to become a member. Rule 11 of the national rules provides, so far as is relevant, as follows:

" 11 - PURGING THE REGISTER

(1) The National Executive may from time to time direct the removal from the register of members of the name of any member;

(a) who has ceased to be eligible for membership under Rule 2 of these rules;

(b) who has failed for the period of twelve months or more to pay any moneys owing to the Union; or

(c) who does not, within 28 days, disclose his postal address or residential address or place of employment, whichever is requested when required in writing by the National Secretary or the Secretary of the Branch to which he is attached so to do. ...

(6) A Branch may provide by its rules that the Branch Council or Branch Executive may direct the removal from the register of any member attached to that Branch in any of the circumstances set out in sub-rule (1) hereof."

The branch has acted on the power contained in rule 11(6) of the national rules. The branch rules included, as at 2nd and 20th September 1988, rule 11, which, so far as is relevant, was in the following terms:

" 11 - PURGING THE REGISTER

(a) Subject to the Rules of the Union the Branch Executive may direct the Branch Secretary to remove from the Register the name of any member:-

(i) who has ceased to be eligible for membership of the Union, or

(ii) who owes more than one years contributions, or

(iii) who has failed for the period of one year or more to pay any fines, fees, levies, dues or liabilities.

(b) Any person whose name has been so removed from the Register shall thereupon cease to be a member and to have any of the rights or privileges of membership.

(c) Any such person shall be liable to pay all contributions, fines, fees, levies, dues and liabilities due to the Union up to the date of the removal of his name form (sic.) the Register and may be sued without notice for any amount so owing.

(d) Before removing the name of any member from the Register in accordance with this Rule the Branch Executive shall cause to be sent to the member concerned a notice of its intention so to remove his name and such notice shall specify the date, time and place of the hearing of the matter.

(e) Such notice shall specify the ground or grounds upon which such action is to be taken and shall be forwarded by post to the member concerned at his postal address shown on the Register of members at least 14 days before the date notified for the hearing of the matter.

(f) Should such member fail at the time and place specified in such notice to show cause before the Branch Executive why his name should not be removed from the Register the Branch Executive may direct that his name to be so removed without further inquiry."

1. It is to be noted that rule 11(a)(i) of the branch rules is expressed so as to empower the branch executive to act only in respect of a person who "has ceased" to be eligible for membership. The power of the branch executive to act is not expressed to be dependent upon the formation of any opinion by it as to whether a member has ceased to be eligible. The rule is therefore expressed in terms that are at least consistent with the cessation of eligibility being a jurisdictional fact. It is worth noting that the other grounds on which the branch executive may act are also expressed in similar terms in rule 11(a)(ii) and (iii). It would be difficult to contend that the branch had power to direct the removal from the register of members of the name of any member who did not in fact owe more than one year's contributions or who had not in fact failed for the period of one year or more to pay any fines etc., merely because the branch executive made an incorrect conclusion on those issues, which conclusion was based on some evidence before the branch executive. The provisions of rule 11(1) of the national rules are consistent with this conclusion. The broad terms of rule 2 of the national rules, and the context of the rules as a whole support it. Membership is given as of right, subject only to completing the necessary formalities laid down in rule 5 of the national rules. It would be an odd construction of the rules if such membership could be terminated, where no ground for its termination existed, but where a decision making body arrived at a mistaken decision, based on some evidence which turned out to be incorrect.

2. For these reasons, I held that evidence going to the question of the eligibility for membership of the applicants was admissible, and I further hold that I am bound to take into account such evidence in deciding whether the branch executive acted in accordance with the rules of the Union in making its decision on 20th September 1988 to purge the applicants and others from membership.
   THE ELIGIBILITY FOR MEMBERSHIP OF THE PERSONS PURGED.

3. The question which arises for the Court to determine is whether on 20th September 1988, the persons whose names were removed from the register of members were then eligible to belong to the Union. This question is answered by looking at rule 2, the text of which has already been set out. Not surprisingly, the concentration of argument was on whether they were "persons engaged in any clerical capacity", although it should not be overlooked that the rule includes the phrase "engaged...on...other machines designed to perform or assist in performing any clerical work whatsoever". In either case, the focus must be on the meaning of the word "clerical".

4. The Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd ed., 1989, defines "clerical" relevantly as "of or pertaining to a clerk or penman". The appropriate definition of "clerk" is "one employed in a subordinate position in a public or private office, shop, warehouse, etc., to make written entries, keep accounts, make fair copies of documents, do the mechanical work of correspondence and similar "clerkly" work. Among the definitions of "clerkly" is "of or belonging to an office clerk".

5. There are many authorities dealing with rule 2 of the Union's rules. In a now famous passage, in Re Federated Clerks' Union of Australia, New South Wales Branch, and Australian Workers' Union (1971) 71 AR (N.S.W.) 419, at p 421, Sheldon J. said, in reference to the phrase "clerical capacity":
   

"This phrase, in my view, must be read against the background of the way industry has developed and is now conducted. Clerical work in industry has long since moved from the Dickensian era of the high stool and the quill pen. The voice and the mind are now part of clerical stock-in-trade. So is the acceptance of responsibility and the exercise of discretion. The conception is fluid and progressive and recourse to a dictionary gives only partial help. It is impossible, and in any event it would be undesirable, to attempt to devise a code as to what in the setting of industry today can fairly be regarded as clerical work. But too fine a toothcomb should not be used in solving this question in particular cases. Obviously all employees in an office are not engaged in a clerical capacity. It is clear that professional employees are not nor are those who are truly and basically executive officers. But an employee does not cease to be employed in a clerical capacity merely because his work includes many administrative and non-recording functions. No doubt there are cases near the border which would be difficult to determine but in general, and subject to some special categories, those who are in a subordinate position but are engaged in the ordinary work of office administration are, in my opinion, prima facie covered by this constitution rule. ... But the salient point is that for years clerical work has been regarded for industrial purposes as including more than mere recording and covers work of different kinds which no doubt leads to or results from recording but in fact is part of the general office administration system. That is why I deprecate dividing office functions too strictly by attempting to quantify the recording done by different members of the team and using this as the test."

That passage has been quoted with approval in this Court in Voigtsberger v. Council of the Shire of Pine Rivers (1980) 49 FLR 391, at pp 398-399, Re Application by Prichard; Re Federated Clerks' Union of Australia (S.A. Branch) (1985) 12 FCR 66, at pp 77-78 and Re Federated Clerks Union of Australia; Ex parte Tanner (1986) 70 ALR 79, at p 84. As Sheldon J. indicated, and was recognised in Prichard's case, a person may be engaged in a clerical capacity or performing clerical work, whilst having other functions as well. In Prichard's case, at p 78, the test applied was whether the primary functions of the person concerned were directed to the recording, processing and disseminating of information. In the case of a person exercising clerical and non-clerical functions, the question will always arise as to which of them are the primary functions. A good illustration of this problem is found in The Federated Clerks' Union of Australia Industrial Union of Workers, W.A. Branch v. Cary (1977) WAIG 585. In that case, the question was whether a person employed in a firm of real estate agents to deal with the leasing of premises was a clerk. Her principal duties were to negotiate tenancy agreements, supervise performance by tenants of those agreements, advise landlords as to the termination of tenancies and act on instructions in relation to them. Inevitably, she did a great deal of work that was essentially of a clerical nature. The Industrial Appeals Court held that she was not a clerk. At p 586, Burt CJ. said:

"If in substance the worker's job is to write and the job is done when the writing has been done he is a clerk, but if in substance the writing done by the worker is but a step taken in the doing by him of something extending beyond it then he is not. The "substance" of the work identifies the question as being one of degree and it indicates the answer to it will be, or may be, very much the product of a value judgment."

At p 587, Brinsden J. said:

"There is no doubt, of course, that she was involved in doing a lot of work which was of a clerical nature in relation to the running of the rental department. In addition, it appears that she also at times did clerical work relating to other portions of the respondents' business. It does not appear to me, however, that the work which she did which was not of a clerical nature, was work which could be said to be or form part of general office administration. Indeed that work was the work of a land salesman as understood by the provisions of the Land Agents Act and as such she was required to be, and was in fact, registered as a land salesman under that Act. What one is left with therefore is the necessity to evaluate the evidence to determine whether her duties as a land salesman were so slight as to be outweighed by her duties of a clerical nature, so that in truth and in substance, it should be said that she acted as a clerk."

1. Much of the evidence before the Court in the present case was concerned with the proportion of the time of each employee concerned which was occupied by what might be described as clerical duties. No doubt the time occupied in the performance of such duties is to be taken into account, but the test of whether a person is engaged in a clerical capacity or in performing clerical work is not a quantitative one. Many people are employed in jobs which require them to do a great deal of recording, but which could not be described as clerical jobs. For instance, a doctor in a twenty-four hour medical clinic might spend the majority of his or her time writing detailed histories, records of diagnosis and of prescription, so that other doctors seeing the same patient at the same clinic would have a clear indication of what had gone before. Even though the majority of the doctor's time might be spent in writing such records, it could not be said that the doctor was engaged in a clerical capacity. The primary functions of the doctor's employment would be diagnosis and treatment.

2. The operation of the primary functions test is illustrated by an example discussed in argument. A motor vehicle repair workshop might employ a number of motor mechanics. Each motor mechanic might be required to record on job cards the results of his or her labours. Plainly, the primary function of each motor mechanic would be the repair of motor vehicles, and the recording would be a secondary function. If, however, it were decided that motor mechanics should be relieved of the recording function, and a separate person were to be employed for this purpose, going from mechanic to mechanic and recording details of work done, that person would undoubtedly be engaged in a clerical capacity. His or her primary function would be the recording of work done.

3. The other aspect of the word "clerical" which is raised in the dictionary definition is that of its subordinate nature. This was borne out in Keogh v. Federated Clerks Union of Australia (1979) Industrial Arbitration Service Current Review 589, especially at pp 592-593, where it was held to be an important factor in deciding the eligibility of a trade union organiser to belong to the Union that his work was unsupervised. If, in turn, a person is employed in a supervisory capacity, it is unlikely that his or her employment will be in a clerical capacity.

4. Each of the persons purged from membership of the Union on 20th September 1988 was employed in the classification "storeman/storewoman" in the Mount Isa Mines Limited Award, an award made by the Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Commission of Queensland, pursuant to the Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1961-1987 (Qld.). Scattered throughout the mining lease occupied by Mount Isa Mines Limited were various areas, known as stores, used for the storage of goods of various kinds for use in mining operations. The stores were called by various names, and the kinds of articles stored in them depended upon the purpose for which each store was established. As would be expected, articles would be delivered to a store, and their receipt would be recorded. They would then be placed into storage, the kind of storage depending upon their size and quantity, and the length of time for which they were likely to be stored. Goods would also be despatched from each store, either to another store, or to persons who would use them in the operation of the mine, or, in one case, outside. Again, it would be necessary to record the despatch. Records of the articles stored in each store were kept, so that more could be ordered if stocks ran low.

5. In almost all cases, records were kept by means of a computer data base, to which access could be had through visual display unit terminals and keyboards in the store concerned. There were two computer systems in use. A system known as "Mapper" was used to a small extent. By September 1988, it was overshadowed by a system known as "Mincom", which had been introduced in August 1986. Most of the persons classified as storeman/storewoman were required to operate the computers as part of their normal employment.

6. Typically, the work of a person classified as a storeman/storewoman would involve the selection and despatch of goods pursuant to instructions contained in a document called a picking slip. The picking slip would be generated by someone outside the store concerned, by means of the computer system, and would often be printed out in the store concerned. In effect, the picking slip was an order for one or more articles normally stored in that store. The storeman/storewoman would take the picking slip and ascertain what was required. If necessary, the existence of stock of the required articles, and the location within the store of that stock could be ascertained by reference to the computer. The storeman/storewoman would then remove the article or articles required from storage, check the selection against the picking slip to ascertain its correctness, and prepare the article or articles for despatch. The storeman/storewoman would then acquit the picking slip, by writing some annotation on it, and use the computer to confirm that the particular picking slip had been satisfied. In the case of a request for an article not held in the store, the appropriate entry would be made in the computer system. The use of the computer enabled continuous stock control and ordering in advance, so as to maintain supplies of articles that were needed. Although the operation just described was common to most of the persons purged from membership of the Union, there were differences between their duties, depending upon the nature of the various stores in which they were employed.

7. In respect of the operations of many of the stores, John Lucassen, an employee of Mount Isa Mines Limited, had prepared flow charts to describe the various operations required by the Mincom system. These flow charts were in evidence, and were relied upon by the applicants as evidence of the duties which they were required to perform.

8. In examining the work of particular employees, it is convenient to go first to the main warehouse, receiving section. In September 1988, James Oelling, Richard MacDonald, Francisco Generosa, Raymond Liddell, Kevin Carlson, Bruce Sloman and Thomas Payne were all employed there. All of these men are applicants in the proceeding, but Mr Liddell is one of a group of applicants for whom counsel did not appear at the trial. As its name suggests, the receiving section was concerned with receiving goods delivered from outside. Mr Liddell was the leading hand, with his own desk and telephones. One area with three desks, three computer terminals and two printers was used by Messrs. MacDonald, Generosa, Carlson and Oelling. This area dealt with goods from three sources, known as road, rail and local. The employees were rotated amongst these three divisions every six to eight months. In September 1988, Mr MacDonald was in charge of road, Mr Generosa of rail and Mr Oelling of local. Mr Oelling was most at home with the computers and assisted the others when they needed help. In respect of the receipt of goods described as "local", it was necessary for a storeman to sign and stamp each delivery docket with the date and time of delivery. Road and rail deliveries were marked off on manifests. The goods were put onto trolleys or pallets. A goods received note would be generated in the computer system, to indicate that the particular goods had arrived and had been checked. Sometimes extra paperwork was needed, when there was a discrepancy between an order and the goods delivered, in which case a discrepancy note, or a "TBA" (to be advised) note was generated. The goods were then moved to an appropriate place of storage. Usually, this was done by the storeman receiving them, although the assistance of a forklift was available for heavy items. No labourer was employed in the receiving section. Mr Oelling gave evidence that he referred to the flow charts in his desk drawer from time to time, to remind himself of the procedure for doing a discrepancy note.

1. Mr Sloman and Mr Payne had different responsibilities, and their desks were in a different part of the receiving section from those already described. Mr Sloman was responsible for receiving air freight. Goods arriving at Mt. Isa by air were brought to the mine by trucks and unloaded onto pallets. Mr Sloman checked them with a picking slip and a goods received note. In the event of a discrepancy, he wrote a discrepancy advice. He would then prepare the item for despatch to the person who had ordered it, including re-wrapping if it had been necessary for him to unpack an item in order to check it. He then removed the goods to a despatch area, from which they were collected. Some items for storage he would take on a trolley to another storage area. Some items were direct charge, in which case the goods were passed on elsewhere in the line and the receiving documents for them were organised at their destination. Mr Payne had specific responsibility for checking fuel deliveries and was assisted from time to time by Mr Carlson. Fuel deliveries were made at various places on the mining lease, normally by piping fuel from mobile tankers into tanks. Mr Payne would assist the drivers of the mobile tankers in connecting the pipes and operating valves and switches. His responsibilities involved dipping tanks all over the mine site and recording the levels of the dips in a notebook, which he carried. When a tanker was unloaded, Mr Payne was required to check the quantity of fuel delivered and to deal with any associated paperwork. He was not involved in the ordering of fuel, but provided information to a purchasing officer for this purpose. If not occupied in relation to fuel deliveries, Mr Payne performed some of the ordinary work of a storeman/storewoman in the main warehouse receiving section.

2. On either side of the receiving section were stores known as the no. 1 warehouse and the no. 2 warehouse. They differed in terms of the size of the goods stored in each, the larger goods being in the no. 2 warehouse. In September 1988, the applicants John Joyce, James O'Donnell, Terrence Fegan, Harry Biondi, Mark Dowling, Henry Lowe and Wilfred Thun were employed in the no. 1 warehouse, and the applicants Kenneth Weal and Kimberley Williams were employed in the no. 2 warehouse. Mr Thun was one of the group of applicants for whom counsel did not appear at the trial.

3. In the no. 1 warehouse, Mr Fegan was the leading hand, with responsibility for the supervision of the other six storemen. Some of his time was therefore spent in observing what the others were doing and ensuring that they were carrying out their duties correctly. He also had specific duties to count picking slips after the night shift and investigate stock discrepancies, which involved physically counting stock in bins, or searching in the no. 2 warehouse for stock missing from the no. 1 warehouse. Mr Fegan also had responsibility for receiving deliveries of liquefied petroleum gas, with the accompanying paperwork.

4. The storemen in the no. 1 warehouse worked primarily with picking slips, locating and dealing with the items required by them, and acquitting the picking slips. A rotating position was that of desk storeman. The desk storeman did more acquitting, including the acquitting of picking slips handled by other storemen. The duties also included the issuing and checking of tool kits and of safety clothing. Records were kept, relating to safety clothing and tool kits. From these records it could be ascertained, for instance, whether a particular employee was entitled to a jacket at a particular time. The contents of a tool kit were checked against the records when it was returned, upon an employee leaving or being transferred.

5. The duties of Mr Biondi were divided between the no. 1 warehouse and the rubber safety store. The latter was so called because it was originally a rubber store, devoted to rubber goods, but later came to be used as the main store for safety equipment as well. The rubber goods were mainly tyres, but footwear was included as well. Mr Biondi spent most of his time in the no. 1 warehouse and approximately four hours per week, in periods of anything up to two hours, in the rubber safety store. He would supervise the unloading of rubber goods and see to their storage and issuing, as well as the storage and issuing of safety equipment. Records in the rubber safety store were kept manually, not by any computer system. Mr Biondi handled the stored items himself, except in the case of larger tyres, which required a forklift truck.

6. The chief difference between the no. 1 warehouse and the no. 2 warehouse seems to have been the size of the articles stored in them. The no. 2 warehouse was devoted to large items, many of them being electric motors. Most of the items in the no. 2 warehouse required movement by forklift truck, so that they were not actually moved by the storemen employed there. Once a storeman located an item which required moving, he would secure the services of a forklift driver and accompany the forklift driver to the place where the item was stored. Similarly, with respect to incoming goods, it was the storeman's task to locate the place where the goods were to be stored and then to secure a forklift driver to carry them there. The storeman would accompany the forklift driver in each case. The no. 2 warehouse also seems to have involved a higher level of stock checking than the no. 1 warehouse. It also responded frequently to urgent requisitions for equipment, as some of the items stored, particularly the electric motors, were important in maintaining production in the mine and safety.

7. Storage of very large items and those which are unlikely to be affected by the weather takes place in an area known as the yard. This area was described as about the size of two Australian rules football fields. Employed in it in September 1978 were Bevan Alexander, Ronald Norup, Barry Morrison, John McCullough and Mervyn Radecker. The Court also heard evidence from Fernando Perez, who was ordinarily employed in the yard but who absent in September 1988. Mr McCullough and Mr Radecker were among those applicants for whom counsel did not appear at the trial.

8. In the yard, one storeman is designated as a checker. His task is to check goods delivered to the yard against goods received notes when they have been unloaded. The unloading is performed by means of forklift trucks and labourers. Unloading often involves transferring items from the pallets on which they are delivered to pallets owned by Mount Isa Mines Limited. The checker spends approximately three hours each day checking goods which have been unloaded. The rest of his day is spent in an office in the yard raising the correct documents for goods which have been delivered. After he has performed his work, the goods become the responsibility of other storemen. The job of checker is normally performed by Mr Perez. In September 1988, he was absent and was being relieved by Mr Norup.

9. Evidence of the work of other storemen in the yard was given by Mr Alexander. According to him, storemen might assist with the transfer of goods from one pallet to another, when goods are delivered. They are then responsible for the location of the goods in their right places in the yard. This is generally done by forklift drivers. Because the yard is so large, each forklift vehicle is provided with a seat for the storeman in addition to that for the driver. Other than that, storemen in the yard handle the outward movement of goods, pursuant to picking slips, in much the same way as storemen elsewhere, although using forklifts for the actual transfer of the items.

10. A particular job within the yard is that of direct charge storeman, which was performed by Mr Morrison in September 1988. Direct charge items were those which Mount Isa Mines Limited did not hold in stock. They were delivered from outside the mining lease for specific purposes. Records relating to them were kept on the Mapper system, not the Mincom system. On the arrival of such goods, Mr Morrison would check them against the deliverer's manifest. Sometimes such items were checked by the checker storeman. The direct charge storeman would then deal with the transfer of items to where they were needed. If storage were necessary, the direct charge storeman would attend to this as well. Some of the items received were likely to be affected by the weather, in which case they were stored in the no. 4 warehouse. When items were moved, the direct charge storeman would accompany the forklift driver. Items that were required urgently were of particular concern to the direct charge storeman and he would see to their transfer to the appropriate destination. A particular responsibility of the direct charge storeman was the receipt and storage of explosives. He would attend to delivery, secure storage and records.

11. As its title suggests, the main workshop is devoted to the repair and maintenance of articles used elsewhere in the mine. It is a large workshop, with different sections under the control of ten or twelve foremen. Within it is the workshop store, an area approximately fifteen metres by five metres, surrounded by a wire fence. The store has shelves and bins containing parts and other items for use in the workshop. The main workshop store is not on the Mincom system but the documents used in the workshop are generated by computer. In September 1988, Douglas Hendricks, Robert Downie and Miroljub Mihajlovic were employed as storemen in the main workshop store. The duties of Mr Hendricks involved checking items delivered to the workshop against requisitions, and ensuring that the items were delivered to the correct part of the workshop. He delivered most of them himself, by means of a trolley. Various documents were also distributed to different parts of the workshop, including a shop floor schedule, a weekly report and a period report. Mr Hendricks was responsible for delivering some of these documents to the appropriate foremen. He described himself as a sort of postman. On occasions, it was necessary for him to leave the mining lease and go to town to buy items required in the workshop. He was also required to collect from the various parts of the workshop items on which work had been completed and take them to a despatch area. He was not involved in the actual despatch, which was done by a despatch foreman. Mr Hendricks was required to keep records of items received and despatched. Mr Downie and Mr Mihajlovic seem to have performed similar duties, but were also involved in the ordering of articles required in the workshop store.

12. The rock drill store is a secure area, adjacent to the top of the mine shaft for convenience. It does not store parts for rock drills, but rather nuts and bolts, fittings and consumable items of a general nature. In addition, many tools are stored in the rock drill store. Parts specially made for drilling machines are stored in the rock drill shop itself. In September 1988, Peter Maller, Robert Rennie, Ian Richardson and Raymond Graham were employed there under the classification of storemen. Mr Richardson was an applicant for whom counsel did not appear at the trial. Mr Maller's duties included the checking of stock and the ordering of parts, the storing and issuing of tools and the checking of them on their return, the handling of telephone enquiries as to the availability or suitability of items and the receipt and checking of items, including rock drill parts, which go straight into the rock drill shop. He kept records and handled tools and other items when receiving or issuing them.

13. Mr Rennie's duties were different. A more accurate description of his job would be that of runner. His primary concern was to deliver parts and other items to appropriate areas in the mine as they were required. Most of his time was spent outside the office of the rock drill store, although he was required to acquit paperwork in respect of items delivered by him and to keep records of everything he sent out.

14. The use of diesel powered equipment is of great importance in the operation of the mine. There is a diesel workshop on the surface for the maintenance and repair of such equipment. In addition, a substantial amount of such maintenance and repair is carried out underground. In the diesel workshop, there is a diesel workshop store, storing and supplying parts and tools to the workshop. In September 1988, Percy Saltmer was the storeman in that store. Underground was the diesel underground store, in which Miles Mason and Bradley Coleman were the storemen. That store also received, stored and issued items required for the maintenance and repair of diesel equipment.

15. Throughout the mining lease were various other stores, storing items required for specific purposes, and in which persons employed as storemen or storewomen were located. In September 1988, Brian Gerhardt was in the steel yard, Costas Cambetis was in the refrigeration store, Andrew O'Brien was in the copper smelter store, Patrick McAllister was in the instrument workshop store, Thomas Whelan was in the concentrator store, Ronald Shute was in the mines store, Eric Groundwater was in the power station store, Sylvia Lowe was in the trade training store, Kenneth Belton was in the X41 safety store and Gerassimos Exarhos was in the public relations store. In substance, the duties of these persons followed the general pattern described earlier in these reasons for judgment. Mr Exarhos did not appear at the trial.

16. Special mention needs to be made of Kenneth Edmunds. In September 1988, he was employed under the classification storeman in an area known as the salvage section. In a large external area, known as the salvage yard, there were stored items discarded from elsewhere in the mining lease. The purpose of the salvage section was the sale or reuse of these items. In the salvage yard was an office, in which were a foreman and Mr Edmunds. The salvage section was not on the Mincom system. Mr Edmunds spent most of his time in the office, dealing with documents concerning the receiving, storage and despatch of items in the salvage section. He was responsible for cash sales and sundry debtors. He would give instructions to a forklift operator, truck drivers and labourers as to the movement of items in the salvage yard, but does not seem to have been responsible himself for that movement. In other words, unlike storemen employed in the yard, he would not ordinarily ride on the forklift truck and attend to the movement of items.

17. Mr Amarena argued that, in determining whether the persons whose occupations have been described were eligible to be members of the Union, no weight at all should be given to the fact that all were classified as "storemen/storewomen". It is true that the title given to a classification cannot be conclusive as to the eligibility of a person to belong to a registered organisation. It is equally true, however, that the classification of a person's occupation has some relevance. No doubt, if each of the applicants had been classified as "clerk", Mr Amarena would have seen fit to place reliance on such a classification. It cannot be denied that the title of a person's job is one of the factors to be taken into account in an exercise such as the present, although it is clearly not determinative of the question of eligibility. A job title may mislead as to the nature of the job.

18. Those applicants who gave evidence tended to emphasise in their evidence the duties which they regarded as clerical. Most of them spoke of the skills which they had found it necessary to acquire in the operation of computer terminals and of the importance to the systems of stock control maintained by Mount Isa Mines Limited of the recording functions which they performed. They referred to the percentages of their working time spent in dealing with documents and with the computers and in some cases to increases in those percentages after the introduction of the Mincom system. In addition, each of the applicants who gave evidence committed himself or herself to the proposition that the keeping of records as to items handled was of primary importance, and that the handling of the goods themselves was only of secondary importance. Each was cross-examined as to the meaning of "primary" and "secondary" in this proposition, and various answers were given. Some said that the handling was secondary in point of time or in sequence. Others said that the handling of goods was secondary in importance to them in the performance of their tasks.

19. There can be no doubt that the amount of time which an employee spends doing a particular task can be a useful guide as to whether that task is all or part of the primary function of that employee. As illustrations given earlier indicate, however, merely to divide up a job in terms of time spent on different tasks is not necessarily to ascertain what is the primary function of that job. Nor is the question of primary function to be determined necessarily according to how an employee sees the functions, in terms of the order in which they are carried out, or of their relative importance in his or her daily activity. Ultimately, the primary function of an employee must be determined by looking at what he or she does in the context of the employer's organisation of work.

20. There can be little doubt that the primary function of most of the employees purged from membership of the Union was such as to render them ineligible to belong to the Union in September 1988. For the most part, they were employed to receive, store and issue items required by other employees of Mount Isa Mines Limited in the conduct of mining activities. Their activities in recording what was delivered to, stored in and despatched from the various stores were incidental to their major responsibility. If there had been no items in stores, there would have been no recording to do. It is crucial that, for the most part, the employees classified as "storemen/storewomen" themselves carried out the processes of receiving, storing and despatching; they were not employed to record the results of operations of those kinds carried out by others.

21. There is no doubt that this general observation is more easily made with respect to some of the employees than others. In the case of Mr Rennie, for instance, it is easy. He was employed to carry parts from the rock drill store and elsewhere to wherever they were required. The person for the time being filling the position of desk storeman in the no. 1 warehouse was more obviously engaged in a recording function, in that he might be called upon to deal with documents relating to the tasks of others. That was a rotating position, however. When the activities of all the persons employed in the no. 1 warehouse are taken into account, it could not be said that any one had a primary recording function. Some point was made of the proposition that in places such as the yard and the no. 2 warehouse, the storemen did not handle the items stored, because they were too large. Nevertheless, those storemen had the responsibility for the movement of those items. Even though the movement itself might be effected by a forklift driver, or by labourers, the storeman was always present, ensuring that the appropriate item was moved to the appropriate place.

22. There were some exceptions to the general conclusion which I have reached. That is to say that a few of the employees whose occupations have been described did have as their primary function the recording of the activities of others. The most obvious of these was Mr Edmunds in the salvage section. Mr Edmunds spent the bulk of his time in an office, maintaining records of movements into and out of the salvage section, without himself being responsible to effect those movements. That responsibility seems to have been carried out by labourers and a forklift driver, under the supervision of a foreman. Although Mr. Edmunds did give some instructions to the labourers and the forklift driver, he does not appear to have been at such a supervisory level as to remove his occupation from the clerical area. Similarly, the occupation of checker in the yard, ordinarily carried out by Mr Perez, but carried out by Mr Norup in September 1988, was an occupation concerned primarily with recording. The checker was obliged to check and record what was brought into the yard but, unlike the other storemen in the yard, was not to store the items or to direct their storage. The only other relevant person whose primary function seems to have been a recording one was Mr. Payne, the fuel checker. It may be that the nature of the goods for which he was responsible rendered any major role in handling them impossible, but his function seems to have been the ascertainment, recording and communication of amounts of fuel that were stored on the mining lease, and amounts of fuel that were delivered to it.

1. It is therefore necessary to determine in respect of precisely which applicants an order should be made. A simple order, directing the respondents to treat as null and void the decision of 20th September 1988 would have the effect of making the membership of each of the persons purged on that day continuous up to the date of the making of the order, and beyond that date unless some further action were taken. All of those persons would have rights under the rules as members during that period. They would also have obligations, not the least of which would be the obligations to pay contributions periodically. It will be recalled that a number of applicants did not seek to appear at the trial to pursue their claims. They remained applicants. Mr Amarena submitted that I should not make any order in favour of those persons. I accept this submission, on the ground that it would be undesirable to place persons who have not sought actively to retain their membership of the Union in the position of being liable for arrears of contributions. The order made should relate only to those applicants who appeared at the trial and pressed their claims and who are entitled to set aside the decision to purge them. The applicants who did not pursue their claims at the trial are the applicants Williams, Liddell, McCullough, Radecker, Richardson, Garrett, Exarhos, Garrard, Smyth, Swift, Ryder and Thun.

2. There was evidence as to three of the applicants that they were not the subject of the resolution of 20th September 1988, but were purged from membership of the Union at later dates. Those applicants are Messrs. Calvert, Garrard and MacDonald. No order can be made in respect of them in the present proceeding.

3. Of the remaining applicants, seven did not do anything which might be taken as showing cause to the branch executive, in accordance with rule 11(f) of the branch rules. They are the applicants Perez, Fegan, Maller, Cambetis, Mason, Weal and Whelan. It will be noted that I have regarded Mr McAllister as having shown cause, by virtue of his telephone call to the branch office, which was reported to the branch executive. The branch executive was entitled to act as it did with respect to those who had not shown cause, and no objection can be taken under the rules to the fact that it did so, even if it might have been prompted by the information placed before it to conduct a full hearing in respect of all of the persons, not just those who did show cause. As I have found, Mr Perez was eligible to belong to the Union, so no decision could have been made properly with respect to him. He did not fall within the provisions of rule 11(a)(i) of the branch rules.

4. There are therefore some twenty-nine applicants in respect of whom the respondents will be ordered to treat as null and void the decision of 20th September 1988. They are the applicants Joyce, O'Donnell, Sloman, Perez, Norup, Oelling, Gerhardt, Downie, S.M. Lowe, Edmunds, Dowling, Groundwater, Graham, Coleman, Hendricks, Payne, H.J. Lowe, Generosa, Carlson, Saltmer, Biondi, Shute, Alexander, Belton, McAllister, Mihajlovic, O'Brien, Rennie and Morrison.