| [2017] FWCFB 3513 |
| FAIR WORK COMMISSION |
| DECISION |
Fair Work Act 2009
s.604—Appeal of decision
Northern SEQ Distributor-Retailer Authority
v
Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union
(C2017/731, C2017/758)
| JUSTICE ROSS, PRESIDENT dEPUTY PRESIDENT GOOLEY COMMISSIONER HUNT | MELBOURNE, 3 JULY 2017 |
Appeal against decision [2017] FWCA 454 of Commissioner Roe at Melbourne on 20 January 2017 in matter number AG2016/6710.
Introduction
This matter is an appeal by Northern SEQ Distributor – Retailor Authority trading as Unitywater (Unitywater) and the Australian Workers’ Union (the AWU) from a decision of Commissioner Roe (the Decision) in which the Commissioner, in accordance with s.201 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (the FW Act), noted that the Unity Water Industry Field/Outdoor Employees (Operations and Maintenance – Non-Trade) Enterprise Agreement No 1 (the Agreement) covered the Construction Forestry Mining and Energy Union (the CFMEU).
The decision at first instance
Commissioner Roe found, and it was not disputed on appeal, that the CFMEU had members employed by Unitywater.
Section 183 of the FW Act provides that an employee organisation that was a bargaining representative for the proposed agreement may give notice to the Fair Work Commission that it wants the enterprise agreement to cover it. It was not disputed that the CFMEU gave such a notice in accordance with the Act.
Section 176(3) of the FW Act provides that an employee organisation cannot be a bargaining representative for a member of that organisation unless ‘the organisation is entitled to represent the industrial interests of the member in relation to work that will be performed under the agreement’.
Commissioner Roe was required to determine whether the CFMEU was entitled to represent the industrial interests of two particular CFMEU members, namely Mr Grocott and Mr Carroll, in relation to work that will be performed under the Agreement.
In the proceedings before the Commissioner the parties agreed to rely upon the evidence, transcript and submissions in a related scope order application which had been before Commissioner Booth[1] and made specific submissions in relation to the CFMEU’s application to be covered by the Agreement. The scope applications before Commissioner Booth did not require a determination of the issue which arose for determination before Commissioner Roe and because of the manner in which the matter proceeded the Commissioner did not have the benefit of an evidentiary hearing directed at the issue in contention.
As a result of the manner in which the parties chose to put the case at first instance the evidence before the Commissioner was limited and the focus of that evidence was not upon the factual dispute that the Commissioner was required to resolve. We make no criticism of the Commissioner for acceding to the proposal put by the parties. We appreciate the desire of the parties to have the agreement approval application dealt with promptly, but it would have been preferable for a hearing of this application to have been conducted in a way that enabled the relevant factual disputes to be fully tested before the Commissioner.
The Commissioner determined…
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- Case
- [2017] FWCFB 3513
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court included whether the CFMEU was entitled to represent Mr Grocott's industrial interests under the agreement and the criteria set out in Section 176 of the Fair Work Act (FW Act) that must be satisfied for the CFMEU to act as a bargaining representative. The court also had to determine whether the Australian Workers' Union (AWU) had standing to appeal the Commissioner’s decision.
The court considered the evidence provided by Mr Grocott and Mr Craig Dearling, the Employee Relations Manager of Unitywater, and noted that the evidence was limited and focused on other aspects of the case. The court found that while the CFMEU was not entitled to represent Mr Carroll, it was entitled to represent Mr Grocott. The court reasoned that the primary purpose of Mr Grocott’s employment was not solely to operate an excavator, but his role involved performing various tasks, including operating different machinery. The court held that this broader scope of duties meant that the CFMEU could represent Mr Grocott's industrial interests under the agreement.
The court also addressed the issue of standing for the AWU to appeal the decision. It concluded that the AWU had sufficient interest to be considered a person aggrieved by the decision, as it was covered by the agreement and represented the industrial interests of some employees who would be covered by the agreement. The court granted permission for the AWU to appeal the decision, finding that it was in the public interest to reconsider the matter.
The court ultimately allowed the appeal, setting aside the Commissioner's decision and substituting a new decision that the CFMEU was entitled to represent Mr Grocott's industrial interests under the agreement. The court also dismissed the CFMEU’s appeal in relation to Mr Carroll.
Orders
Orders of the court
Full text does not contain this section.
Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Considerations Section 176 of the Act sets out the criteria that must be satisfied for the CFMEU to be a bargaining representative for Mr Grocott. In the present proceedings only point (4) is in contest. A person aggrieved by a decision of the Commission may appeal the decision with the permission of the Commission. The CFMEU submitted that the AWU did not have the requisite standing to appeal the Commissioner’s decision. It submitted that the decision to note that the CFMEU was covered by the Agreement has no consequences, legal or otherwise, for the AWU and the fact that the CFMEU gains the right to enforce the Agreement as a result of the Decision, does not diminish or otherwise impact on the AWU’s rights or interests. It further notes that even the rights conferred on the CFMEU are limited as it can only enforce the Agreement on behalf of a member if it is eligible to represent the member.[99] The AWU submitted that it was person aggrieved by the decision.[100] In support of its submissions it relied on the decision of the Full Bench in Traffic Technologies Traffic Management Division Pty Ltd[101] and the Director of the Fair Work Building Industry Inspectorate v CFMEU.[102] In particular it relied upon the following: We are satisfied that the AWU has a sufficient interest to be characterised as a person aggrieved by the Decision. The AWU is covered by the Agreement and represents the industrial interests of some of the employees who will be covered by the Agreement. While we acknowledge that no legal or other right of the AWU is diminished by the Decision we accept that but for the Decision the AWU would be the only union covered by the Agreement and to the extent that it has rights that derive from being covered by the Agreement those rights will now need to co-exist with the CFMEU’s rights. An appeal of a decision is not as of right and permission to appeal must first be obtained.[104] Subsection 604(2) of the FW Act requires the Commission to grant permission to appeal if satisfied that it is ‘in the public interest to do so’. The task of assessing whether the public interest test is met is a discretionary one involving a broad value judgment.[105] Other than the special case in s.604(2), the grounds for granting permission to appeal are not specified. Considerations which would usually justify the grant of permission to appeal include that the decision is attended with sufficient doubt to warrant its reconsideration or that substantial injustice may result if permission is refused.[106] All the parties accepted that the powers of a Full Bench on appeal are only exercisable where there is error on the part of the primary decision maker.[107] Unitywater and the AWU submitted that the determination of the primary purpose of Mr Grocott’s employment was a legal question involving questions of law and fact.[108] The CFMEU submitted that the question of whether Mr Grocott was an excavator operator was a question of fact. [109] For the purpose of determining the appeal we have proceeded on the basis that Unitywater and the AWU correctly characterise the question of the primary purpose of Mr Grocott’s employment as a legal question, or at least a mixed question of fact and law, and that: