Inghams Enterprises Pty Limited v Belokoski

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WORKERS COMPENSATION COMMISSION
DETERMINATION OF APPEAL AGAINST A DECISION OF THE COMMISSION CONSTITUTED BY AN ARBITRATOR
CITATION: Inghams Enterprises Pty Limited v Belokoski [2017] NSWWCCPD 15
APPELLANT: Inghams Enterprises Pty Limited
RESPONDENT: Dejan Belokoski
INSURER: Self-insured
FILE NUMBER: A2-4346/15
ARBITRATOR: Ms Elizabeth Beilby
DATE OF ARBITRATOR’S DECISION: 10 October 2016
10 November 2016 (Amended Decision)
DATE OF APPEAL DECISION: 27 April 2017
SUBJECT MATTER OF DECISION: Apprehended bias; credit findings; adequacy of reasons; fact finding and the weight of medical evidence: application of Hancock v East Coast Timber Products Pty Limited [2011] NSWCA 11; 80 NSWLR 43; 8 DDCR 399 and associated authorities; ‘injury’ findings: application of Jaffarie v Quality Castings Pty Ltd [2014] NSWWCCPD 79
PRESIDENTIAL MEMBER: Deputy President Michael Snell
HEARING: On the papers
REPRESENTATION: Appellant: Leigh Virtue & Associates
Respondent: Carroll & O’Dea Lawyers
ORDERS MADE ON APPEAL:

1.       The Arbitrator’s determination dated 10 October 2016 (as amended) is confirmed.

INTRODUCTION

  1. This is a claim by Dejan Belokoski (the respondent) for lump sum compensation, and a general order for the payment of expenses pursuant to s 60 of the Workers Compensation Act 1987 (the 1987 Act), resulting from injury on 25 March 2009. Injury to the left upper extremity (shoulder) is not in issue. Inghams Enterprises Pty Limited (the appellant) disputes that the appellant suffered injury to his cervical spine in the incident, and disputes that there was a consequential condition of the right upper extremity.

  2. The appellant appeals from a decision of an Arbitrator, in which the respondent succeeded on the disputed issues. The appeal does not succeed, for reasons which follow.

BACKGROUND

  1. The respondent was employed by the appellant as a process worker from about 2001. He suffered injury on 25 March 2009 when lifting a 25 kilogram bag of marinade. His employment was terminated on 24 May 2012. He underwent C4/5 and C5/6 discectomy and fusion on 27 September 2012 (by Dr Hsu), and C3/4 decompression and fusion on 4 April 2014 (again by Dr Hsu). The respondent had periods when compensation was paid to him voluntarily, and periods when he worked selected duties with the appellant. The respondent disputed liability in a notice dated 7 June 2012, based upon medical evidence from Dr Stephen Potter, a rheumatologist it had qualified.

  2. There were earlier proceedings between the parties. Matter no 14404/12 was discontinued on 10 March 2014. Matter no 3389/14 was discontinued on 25 September 2014. There was agreement at that time, on a ‘without admission’ basis, that the appellant would pay weekly compensation from 7 June 2012 to 31 December 2012, at the rate of $550 per week. The current proceedings pleaded a weekly claim from 31 December 2012 on a continuing basis. The respondent ultimately did not pursue this pleaded weekly claim.

  3. The current proceedings were determined by Senior Arbitrator McDonald on
    23 December 2015, in the respondent’s favour. That decision was appealed. The President Keating DCJ, in a decision dated 7 June 2016 (Inghams Enterprises Pty Ltd v…

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Details
Case
[2017] NSWWCCPD 15
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Inghams Enterprises Pty Limited v Belokoski, the primary issue was whether the arbitrator had exhibited apprehended bias in their determinations. The dispute involved the interpretation and application of various legal principles, including the concept of apprehended bias, credit findings, adequacy of reasons, and the weight of medical evidence. The court was tasked with determining whether the arbitrator's determinations were illogical, irrational, or lacked a basis in findings or inferences of fact supported on logical grounds. The case was heard in the Supreme Court of New South Wales.

The legal issues the court had to address included whether the appellant's complaint of apprehended bias was substantiated and whether the arbitrator's factual determinations were made in a manner that was illogical, irrational, or lacked a proper basis. The court also had to consider whether the leave to make further submissions was restricted to the application of the case law, specifically Nicholls, and not to making further submissions regarding the alleged failure to exercise jurisdiction. The court needed to determine if the appellant's argument regarding apprehended bias was fallacious, as suggested by the respondent.

The court's reasoning was that the appellant's submissions concerning apprehended bias were unfounded, as they did not identify any conduct by the arbitrator that would give rise to a reasonable apprehension that she had prejudged the issue. The court emphasised that the test for apprehended bias is one of possibility, not probability, and requires an objective assessment of the connection between the facts and circumstances said to give rise to the apprehension. The court further explained that an allegation of apprehended bias does not permit consideration of whether the judge had in fact prejudged an issue. The court concluded that the appellant's submissions were misconceived and did not direct themselves to identifying anything done or said by the arbitrator that might lead to a reasonable apprehension that she might not bring an impartial and unprejudiced mind to the resolution of the questions she was required to decide.

The outcome of the case was that the arbitrator's determination, dated 10 October 2016, was confirmed. The court found that the appellant's complaints regarding apprehended bias and the weight of medical evidence were unfounded, and the arbitrator's determinations were not illogical, irrational, or lacking a proper basis. The court upheld the decision of the arbitrator, and the appellant's appeal was dismissed.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The Arbitrator’s determination dated 10 October 2016 (as amended) is confirmed.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The appellant, in its further written submissions at [7], submits that if “it is found that the concept of apprehended bias is not made out… another way of characterising the arbitrator’s failures as outlined in its submissions at paragraph 15(a) to (j) is ‘a failure to properly exercise jurisdiction’ [Ground 2(b)].” The appellant submits:“It is submitted that the arbitrator’s factual determinations (for example, at paragraph [49] of the decision), are ‘illogical, irrational, or lacking a basis in findings or inferences of fact supported on logical grounds’{SZOOR v Minister for Immigration (2012) 202 FCR 1 at [83]}.” The respondent submits that Nicholls illustrates why the appellant’s complaint of apprehended bias is unfounded. The appellant has not identified conduct by the Arbitrator, “which would give rise to the apprehension that she had prejudged the issue”. The appellant’s argument is “confined to the decision itself”. The respondent submits that the appellant’s argument as to apprehended bias is of the “fallacious” kind referred to in Nicholls at [67]. The respondent, referring to Nicholls at [73], submits: “…it is ‘impermissible’ to reason ‘backwards from what was decided at trial, and how it was decided, to the conclusion that it might reasonably be apprehended that the judge might have prejudged those issues’.” The respondent also submits that the leave to make further submissions was restricted to requiring submissions going to the application of Nicholls, not “to make further submissions regarding the alleged failure to exercise jurisdiction”. The appellant’s submissions in support of Ground No 2 are misconceived. The submissions do not direct themselves to identifying anything done or said by the Arbitrator, which might lead to a reasonable apprehension that she might not bring an impartial and unprejudiced mind to resolution of the question she was required to decide. In Ebner the plurality, dealing with the ‘apprehended bias principle’, at [7] said:“Deciding whether a judicial officer (or juror) might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of a question that has not been determined requires no prediction about how the judge or juror will in fact approach the matter. The question is one of possibility (real and not remote), not probability. Similarly, if the matter has already been decided, the test is one which requires no conclusion about what factors actually influenced the outcome. No attempt need be made to inquire into the actual thought processes of the judge or juror.” (emphasis in original) The High Court in Nicholls dealt with the extent to which, in dealing with an issue of apprehended bias on appeal, when a case has been decided, it is permissible to have regard to the reasons given by the judge. At [67] the plurality (excluding references) said:“As pointed out earlier in these reasons, an allegation of apprehended bias requires an objective assessment of the connection between the facts and circumstances said to give rise to the apprehension and the asserted conclusion that the judge might not bring an impartial mind to bear upon the issues that are to be decided. An allegation of apprehended bias does not direct attention to, or permit consideration of, whether the judge had in fact prejudged an issue. To ask whether the reasons for judgment delivered after trial of the action somehow confirm, enhance or diminish the existence of a reasonable apprehension of bias runs at least a serious risk of inverting the proper order of inquiry (by first assuming the existence of a reasonable apprehension). Inquiring whether there has been ‘the crystallisation of that apprehension in a demonstration of actual prejudgment’ impermissibly confuses the different inquiries that the two different allegations (actual bias and apprehended bias) require to be made. And, no less fundamentally, an inquiry of either kind moves perilously close to the fallacious argument that because one side lost the litigation the judge was biased, or the equally fallacious argument that making some appealable error, whether by not dealing with all of the losing side's arguments or otherwise, demonstrates prejudgment.”