FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| HUGHES TRUEMAN PTY LTD & ANOR v YOUNG | [2017] FCCA 468 |
| Catchwords: BANKRUPTCY – Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) – creditors petition – application for adjournment of hearing of petition based on foreshadowed applications to High Court to reopen previous dismissal by High Court of special leave applications based on alleged failure of High Court to give proper and sufficient reasons for previous dismissals – High Court not bound to give reasons when dismissing special leave applications – application to reopen special leave applications doomed to fail and unmeritorious – no reason to adjourn hearing of creditors petition – debtor unable to pay debts and insolvent – sequestration order made. |
| Legislation: Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), ss.5, 52 Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) |
| Second Applicant: | MR STEPHEN JOHN PERRENS |
| Supporting Creditor: | MR IAN HEMMINGS SC |
| Respondent: | MS MARGO YOUNG |
| File Number: | SYG 1345 of 2016 |
| Judgment of: | Judge Dowdy |
| Hearing dates: | 9 December 2016 and 3 March 2017 |
| Date of Last Submission: | 13 March 2017 |
| Delivered at: | Sydney |
| Delivered on: | 23 March 2017 |
REPRESENTATION
| Counsel for the Applicants: | Mr S Gray of Counsel |
| Solicitors for the Applicants: | Kennedys |
| Solicitors for the Supporting Creditor: | Moray & Agnew |
| Counsel for the Respondent: | Mr R Newell (solicitor) |
| Solicitors for the Respondent: | L C Muritini & Associates |
THE ORDERS OF THE COURT ARE AS FOLLOWS:-
A sequestration order be made against the estate of Ms Margo Young.
The Applicant Creditors’ costs, including any reserved costs and the costs of the hearings before the Court on 14 October 2016, 9 December 2016 and 3 March 2017, be taxed and paid from the bankrupt estate of Ms Margo Young according to the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth).
A copy of this sequestration order be given to the Official…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read Hughes Trueman Pty Ltd v Young and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
Details
- Case
- [2017] FCCA 468
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
This decision concerns applications for special leave to appeal before Dowdy J. The applicant, Hughes Trueman Pty Ltd, sought special leave to appeal in relation to two separate decisions, Young v Hones and Young v King, and a further judgment by Bromwich J. The core of the dispute revolved around the applicant's perceived dissatisfaction with the reasons provided in these judgments and the prospects of success for special leave applications.
The legal issues before the court were whether the applications for special leave to appeal had merit and arguable grounds, and whether they could satisfy the stringent criteria for reopening a special leave hearing. Specifically, the court was required to consider the nature of special leave applications, the discretion involved in granting or refusing them, and the circumstances under which a prior decision on special leave could be revisited.
Dowdy J, applying established principles regarding special leave applications, noted that the High Court is not obliged to provide detailed reasons for its decisions on such matters. The court referenced statements from *Smith Kline & French Laboratories (Aust) Ltd v Commonwealth* and *Coulter v The Queen*, highlighting that special leave applications are a mechanism for filtering appellate work and involve a wide judicial discretion that can be exercised without extensive reasons. The judge found the proposed special leave applications in *Young v Hones* and *Young v King* to be wholly lacking in merit and without reasonable prospects of success, as they did not present genuine and arguable grounds. Furthermore, the judge determined that the proposed special leave application concerning Bromwich J's judgment, which was apparently criticised for a breach of the "duty to give reasons of a certain kind," was also doomed to failure, as the judgment was considered detailed and reasoned.
The court concluded that the applications for special leave to appeal were without merit and had no reasonable prospects of success.
The legal issues before the court were whether the applications for special leave to appeal had merit and arguable grounds, and whether they could satisfy the stringent criteria for reopening a special leave hearing. Specifically, the court was required to consider the nature of special leave applications, the discretion involved in granting or refusing them, and the circumstances under which a prior decision on special leave could be revisited.
Dowdy J, applying established principles regarding special leave applications, noted that the High Court is not obliged to provide detailed reasons for its decisions on such matters. The court referenced statements from *Smith Kline & French Laboratories (Aust) Ltd v Commonwealth* and *Coulter v The Queen*, highlighting that special leave applications are a mechanism for filtering appellate work and involve a wide judicial discretion that can be exercised without extensive reasons. The judge found the proposed special leave applications in *Young v Hones* and *Young v King* to be wholly lacking in merit and without reasonable prospects of success, as they did not present genuine and arguable grounds. Furthermore, the judge determined that the proposed special leave application concerning Bromwich J's judgment, which was apparently criticised for a breach of the "duty to give reasons of a certain kind," was also doomed to failure, as the judgment was considered detailed and reasoned.
The court concluded that the applications for special leave to appeal were without merit and had no reasonable prospects of success.
Orders
Orders of the court
Full text does not contain this section.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
The nature of a special leave application is such that the High Court is not obliged to give reasons for either refusing or allowing special leave. The following was said of special leave applications in Smith Kline & French Laboratories (Aust) Ltd v Commonwealth (1991) 173 CLR 194 at 217-218 by Mason CJ, Brennan, Deane, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ:-From time to time statements have been made which draw attention to the unusual character of an application for special leave to appeal. Such an application has special features which distinguish it from most other legal proceedings. It is a long-established procedure which enables an appellate court to control in some measure or filter the volume of work requiring its attention. Ordinarily, it results in a decision which is not accompanied by reasons, or particularly by detailed reasons … The procedure calls for a hearing, whether orally or on written materials, and a determination in the form of a curial order.(emphasis added and citation omitted.) To similar effect, Deane and Gaudron JJ in Coulter v The Queen (1988) 164 CLR 350 at 359-360 stated as follows:-On the other hand, the application for leave or special leave to appeal commonly possesses a number of special features which set it apart from at least some other judicial proceedings. First, it involves the exercise of an extremely wide judicial discretion. Secondly, and notwithstanding that refusal of the application ordinarily involves the final determination of the particular litigation, that wide discretion can commonly be exercised without the provision of detailed or, sometimes, any reasons. (emphasis added.) Accordingly, I consider that the foreshadowed special leave applications in relation to Young v Hones [2017] HCASL 27 and Young v King [2017] HCASL 28 are wholly lacking in merit and doomed to failure. They are not based on genuine and arguable grounds and have no reasonable prospects for success. They could not possibly satisfy the basis for the reopening of a special leave hearing or application which was stated by Kirby J in Re Sinanovic at 451 [7(4)] as follows:The only basis for ordering the reopening of a special leave hearing would, in my opinion, be where it is affirmatively shown that exceptional circumstances exist and new circumstances have arisen that require a reopening to prevent a serious miscarriage of justice because an error of fact or law has occurred in the earlier determination of the application, which error demands correction. Insofar as the debtor proposes a special leave application in relation to the judgment of Bromwich J, I consider that any such special leave application is also doomed to failure. Apparently, the criticism made of that judgment is the breach of the “duty to give reasons of a certain kind”. I am not sure what that really means but the simple fact of the matter is that his Honour’s judgment is, with respect, detailed and reasoned and I could not conceive of a successful argument that its content is inadequate or in some respect lacking.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Full text does not contain this section.