FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Young v Hughes Trueman Pty Ltd (No 3) [2018] FCA 531
Appeal from: Hughes Trueman Pty Ltd v Young [2017] FCCA 468 File number: NSD 556 of 2017 Judge: MARKOVIC J Date of judgment: 19 April 2018 Catchwords: BANKRUPTCY AND INSOLVENCY – where appellant appealed the whole of the primary judgment – whether primary judge erred in finding the creditor’s petition was not maintained for an improper purpose – whether appellant was denied procedural fairness in the primary judge’s conduct of the hearing – whether primary judge erred in his consideration and treatment of submissions made about the appellant’s applications for special leave to appeal to the High Court of Australia – whether primary judge erred in holding a proposed appeal was not genuine and arguable and that another judge gave adequate reasons – whether primary judge erred by denying the appellant an adjournment – whether primary judge erred in considering the appellant’s solvency – appeal dismissed. Legislation: Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) s 52
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 27
Cases cited: Attwells v Jackson Lalic Laywers Pty Ltd (2016) 259 CLR 1
Coulter v The Queen (1988) 164 CLR 350
Hussain v CSR Building Products Ltd (2016) 112 ACSR 507; [2016] FCA 392
Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) (1996) 189 CLR 51
Mount Bruce Mining Pty Ltd v Wright Prospecting Pty Ltd (2015) 256 CLR 104
Murdaca v Accounts Control Management Services Pty Ltd [2007] FCA 577
North Ganalanja Aboriginal Corporation v Queensland (1996) 185 CLR 595
Re New World Alliance Pty Ltd; Sycotex Pty Ltd v Baseler [1994] 51 FCR 425
Re Sinanovic’s Application (2001) 180 ALR 448; [2001] HCA 40
Smith Kline v French Laboratories (Australia) Limited (1991) 173 CLR 194
Date of hearing: 29 August 2017 Registry: New South Wales Division: General Division National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations Sub-area: General and Personal Insolvency Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 83 Counsel for the Appellant: Mr R Newell Solicitor for the Appellant: L C Muriniti & Associates Counsel for the Respondents: Mr S Gray Solicitor for the Respondents: Kennedys Law ORDERS
NSD 556 of 2017 BETWEEN: MARGO YOUNG
Appellant
AND: HUGHES TRUEMAN PTY LTD
First Respondent
STEPHEN JOHN PERRENS
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
MARKOVIC J
DATE OF ORDER:
19 APRIL 2018
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be dismissed.
2.The appellant pay the first respondent’s and second respondent’s costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
MARKOVIC J:
On 23 March 2017 a sequestration order was made against the estate of the appellant, Margo Young: see Hughes Trueman Pty Ltd v Young [2017] FCCA 468 (Primary Judgment). Mrs Young now appeals from that order. This proceeding first came before me on Mrs Young’s interlocutory application for an order pursuant to r 36.08 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) staying proceedings on the…
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- Case
- [2018] FCA 531
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The appeal centred on several key legal issues: whether the primary judge erred in finding that the creditor’s petition was not maintained for an improper purpose, whether procedural fairness was denied in the primary judge's conduct of the hearing, and whether the primary judge erred in his consideration and treatment of submissions regarding Mrs Young’s applications for special leave to appeal to the High Court. Additionally, the appeal questioned the primary judge’s decisions regarding the genuineness and arguability of proposed appeals, the denial of an adjournment, and the assessment of the appellant’s solvency.
The court examined each ground of appeal and concluded that Mrs Young had not substantiated any of her claims. The primary judge’s findings were upheld as there was no evidence to suggest that the respondents had an improper motive in filing the creditor’s petition. The court also found that the primary judge did not deny procedural fairness, and that his consideration of the proposed appeals and the denial of an adjournment were appropriate. Furthermore, the primary judge’s assessment of the appellant’s solvency was deemed to be within his discretion and was not found to be erroneous. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, and Mrs Young was ordered to pay the respondents' costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The appellant pay the first respondent’s and second respondent’s costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In her second further amended notice of appeal Mrs Young raises the following grounds:1.The learned primary judge erred in finding that there was no evidence that the Respondents were actuated by a collateral purpose or improper purpose in advancing the creditors petition.2.Further or in the alternative, the Applicant asserts an entitlement to adduce further evidence pursuant to section 27 Federal Court Act 1975 as to the collateral purpose of the Respondents in seeking a sequestration order.3.The primary judge erred in that he misapprehended the grounds of the Applicant's October 2016 application to the High Court for special leave in respect of the decision of Garling J. of 27 September 2013 and 1 May 2014.4.In the premises, the learned primary judge further erred in assessing the prospects of a further prospective High Court application for special leave so far as concerns the judgment of Garling J. dated 27 September 2013 and 1 May 2014 ("the Garling Orders").5.Further, the learned primary judge's erred in holding that the Appellant's further proposed special leave application in respect of the Garling Orders is not genuine and arguable thereby denying the Appellant an adjournment to and prepare and conduct her High Court Special leave application and in proceeding to make a sequestration order against her.6.The learned primary judge erred in that by reasons of the matters in (5) he thereby denied the Appellant natural justice.7.The learned primary judge erred in holding that:a.The Appellant's proposed appeal from the decision of Bromwich J is not genuine and arguable and thereby denying the Appellant an adjournment to prepare and conduct her High Court Special Leave application and in proceeding to make a sequestration order against her, and that;b.Bromwich J gave adequate reasons for his decision.8.The Applicant was denied procedural fairness in that the learned primary judge pre-empted or prevented a cross-examination of Michael Thornell on behalf of the Applicant which cross-examination was calculated to elicit evidence of the Respondent's collateral purpose in pressing an application for sequestration against the Applicant.9.The learned primary judge erred in deciding that the debts which are owing to the appellant's sister and to the appellant's solicitors, Leonardo Carlo Muriniti, were debts that were due and payable by the appellant notwithstanding that the evidence before the court was that neither the appellant's sister nor the appellant's solicitors were pressing for payment.10.Further or in the alternative, the primary judge’s discretion to dismiss or not dismiss the creditor’s petition miscarried in that he failed to have regard to the particulars actual circumstances of the lawyer’s debt and the sister’s debt.CONSIDERATIONGrounds 1, 2 and 8 It is convenient to consider these grounds together. By ground 1 Mrs Young alleges that the primary judge erred in finding that there was no evidence that the Respondents were actuated by a collateral or improper purpose in advancing the creditor’s petition and by ground 8 she alleges that she was denied procedural fairness because the primary judge either pre-empted or prevented a cross-examination of Michael Thornell, a solicitor in the employ of Kennedy’s (the solicitors for the Respondents) which was calculated to elicit evidence of the Respondents’ collateral purpose.