Young v Hughes Trueman Pty Ltd (No 3)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Young v Hughes Trueman Pty Ltd (No 3) [2018] FCA 531

Appeal from: Hughes Trueman Pty Ltd v Young [2017] FCCA 468
File number: NSD 556 of 2017
Judge: MARKOVIC J
Date of judgment: 19 April 2018
Catchwords: BANKRUPTCY AND INSOLVENCY – where appellant appealed the whole of the primary judgment – whether primary judge erred in finding the creditor’s petition was not maintained for an improper purpose – whether appellant was denied procedural fairness in the primary judge’s conduct of the hearing – whether primary judge erred in his consideration and treatment of submissions made about the appellant’s applications for special leave to appeal to the High Court of Australia – whether primary judge erred in holding a proposed appeal was not genuine and arguable and that another judge gave adequate reasons – whether primary judge erred by denying the appellant an adjournment – whether primary judge erred in considering the appellant’s solvency – appeal dismissed.
Legislation:

Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) s 52

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 27

Cases cited:

Attwells v Jackson Lalic Laywers Pty Ltd (2016) 259 CLR 1

Coulter v The Queen (1988) 164 CLR 350

Hussain v CSR Building Products Ltd (2016) 112 ACSR 507; [2016] FCA 392

Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) (1996) 189 CLR 51

Mount Bruce Mining Pty Ltd v Wright Prospecting Pty Ltd (2015) 256 CLR 104

Murdaca v Accounts Control Management Services Pty Ltd [2007] FCA 577

North Ganalanja Aboriginal Corporation v Queensland (1996) 185 CLR 595

Re New World Alliance Pty Ltd; Sycotex Pty Ltd v Baseler [1994] 51 FCR 425

Re Sinanovic’s Application (2001) 180 ALR 448; [2001] HCA 40

Smith Kline v French Laboratories (Australia) Limited (1991) 173 CLR 194

Wainohu v New South Wales (2011) 243 CLR 181

Date of hearing: 29 August 2017
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations
Sub-area: General and Personal Insolvency
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 83
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr R Newell
Solicitor for the Appellant: L C Muriniti & Associates
Counsel for the Respondents: Mr S Gray
Solicitor for the Respondents: Kennedys Law

ORDERS

NSD 556 of 2017
BETWEEN:

MARGO YOUNG

Appellant

AND:

HUGHES TRUEMAN PTY LTD

First Respondent

STEPHEN JOHN PERRENS

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

MARKOVIC J

DATE OF ORDER:

19 APRIL 2018

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

2.The appellant pay the first respondent’s and second respondent’s costs.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

MARKOVIC J:

  1. On 23 March 2017 a sequestration order was made against the estate of the appellant, Margo Young: see Hughes Trueman Pty Ltd v Young [2017] FCCA 468 (Primary Judgment). Mrs Young now appeals from that order. This proceeding first came before me on Mrs Young’s interlocutory application for an order pursuant to r 36.08 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) staying proceedings on the…

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Details
Case
[2018] FCA 531
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Young v Hughes Trueman Pty Ltd (No 3), the appellant, Mrs Young, sought to appeal against the entire primary judgment which found in favour of the respondents, Hughes Trueman Pty Ltd and others, in a creditor’s petition for sequestration. Mrs Young raised eleven grounds of appeal, arguing that the primary judge erred in several respects, including the assessment of the creditor’s petition, the consideration of her solvency, and the denial of procedural fairness. The primary judge found that the respondents’ petition was prima facie sufficient to warrant a sequestration order against Mrs Young’s estate, and that she had admitted to committing an act of bankruptcy.

The appeal centred on several key legal issues: whether the primary judge erred in finding that the creditor’s petition was not maintained for an improper purpose, whether procedural fairness was denied in the primary judge's conduct of the hearing, and whether the primary judge erred in his consideration and treatment of submissions regarding Mrs Young’s applications for special leave to appeal to the High Court. Additionally, the appeal questioned the primary judge’s decisions regarding the genuineness and arguability of proposed appeals, the denial of an adjournment, and the assessment of the appellant’s solvency.

The court examined each ground of appeal and concluded that Mrs Young had not substantiated any of her claims. The primary judge’s findings were upheld as there was no evidence to suggest that the respondents had an improper motive in filing the creditor’s petition. The court also found that the primary judge did not deny procedural fairness, and that his consideration of the proposed appeals and the denial of an adjournment were appropriate. Furthermore, the primary judge’s assessment of the appellant’s solvency was deemed to be within his discretion and was not found to be erroneous. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, and Mrs Young was ordered to pay the respondents' costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the first respondent’s and second respondent’s costs.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Mrs Young raises 11 grounds of appeal as set out in her second further amended notice of appeal. Having considered each of them, in my opinion, Mrs Young has failed to make out any of her grounds of appeal and the appeal should be dismissed. My reasons for reaching that conclusion follow. THE PRIMARY JUDGE’S DECISION The primary judge found that the evidence relied on by the Respondents was prima facie sufficient to prove their entitlement to a sequestration order against Mrs Young’s estate. His Honour also noted that Mrs Young admitted that she had committed an act of bankruptcy when she failed in her application to set aside the bankruptcy notice and that she made no submission that there were any defects in the Respondents’ evidence: Primary Judgment at [4]. The primary judge then turned to consider Mrs Young’s notice of opposition to the creditor’s petition (Notice of Opposition) which included 11 grounds. At [6] his Honour summarised those grounds into three categories as follows:a)An assertion at [1]-[9] that the debtor intended within a further 14 days to seek special leave to appeal to the High Court of Australia from the decision of Garling J of 1 May 2014 ordering the judgment debt in the sum of $110,000 in Young v Hones (No.3) which, with accrued interest, amounted to the sum of $128,838.63 and was the amount specified in the bankruptcy notice as due to the creditors. If the High Court were to grant special leave in the subsequent appeal, for which it was claimed there were strong prospects for success, the debt of $128,838.63 would be extinguished and the debtor would consequently be in a position to litigate a negligence claim against the creditors and others to judgment on the merits.b)At [10] there was an assertion of solvency in that the debtor was able to discharge all of her financial obligations as and when they fell due.c)At [11] there was an assertion that the bringing of the Creditors Petition was maintained for a purpose “other than the recovery of money or to secure legitimate protection for a body of creditors”. The primary judge set out the background facts and the events leading up to the hearing of the creditor’s petition. Relevantly his Honour noted at [17]-[25] that:(1)the creditor’s petition had first come before him for directions on 14 October 2016 at which time Mrs Young’s solicitor informed the Court that Mrs Young intended to file a second application for special leave to appeal to the High Court of Australia (High Court) from the decision of the New South Wales Court of Appeal (Court of Appeal) in Young v Hones [2014] NSWCA 337 (Young v Hones Appeal) which had dismissed an appeal from the judgment in Young v Hones (No 2) (Second SLA). It was the second application for special leave because Mrs Young had previously applied for and been refused special leave to appeal from Young v Hones Appeal by the High Court: see Young v Hones [2015] HCASL 73;(2)consistent with that proposal Mrs Young filed an application in a case which sought an adjournment of the creditor’s petition for 14 days to enable her to file the Second SLA and a further adjournment until the Second SLA had been determined by the High Court;(3)the creditor’s petition, the application to file the Notice of Opposition and the application in a case were set down for hearing on 9 December 2016. The hearing on that day was not concluded and was adjourned to 3 March 2017. In the interim the Second SLA was refused by the High Court: see Young v Hones [2017] HCASL 27; and(4)at the resumed hearing Mrs Young’s solicitor informed the primary judge that the High Court had dismissed the Second SLA and a further application for special leave to appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeal in Young v King [2016] NSWCA 282: see Young v King [2017] HCASL 28. He also informed the court that Mrs Young intended to bring further applications for special leave to appeal each of Young v Hones [2017] HCASL 27 and Young v King [2017] HCASL 28 on the basis that the High Court had breached the judicial obligation and duty to give adequate reasons in refusing special leave and to bring an application for special leave to appeal the decision in Hughes Trueman on the basis that there had been a breach of the judicial “duty to give reasons of a certain kind” in that decision.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In her second further amended notice of appeal Mrs Young raises the following grounds:1.The learned primary judge erred in finding that there was no evidence that the Respondents were actuated by a collateral purpose or improper purpose in advancing the creditors petition.2.Further or in the alternative, the Applicant asserts an entitlement to adduce further evidence pursuant to section 27 Federal Court Act 1975 as to the collateral purpose of the Respondents in seeking a sequestration order.3.The primary judge erred in that he misapprehended the grounds of the Applicant's October 2016 application to the High Court for special leave in respect of the decision of Garling J. of 27 September 2013 and 1 May 2014.4.In the premises, the learned primary judge further erred in assessing the prospects of a further prospective High Court application for special leave so far as concerns the judgment of Garling J. dated 27 September 2013 and 1 May 2014 ("the Garling Orders").5.Further, the learned primary judge's erred in holding that the Appellant's further proposed special leave application in respect of the Garling Orders is not genuine and arguable thereby denying the Appellant an adjournment to and prepare and conduct her High Court Special leave application and in proceeding to make a sequestration order against her.6.The learned primary judge erred in that by reasons of the matters in (5) he thereby denied the Appellant natural justice.7.The learned primary judge erred in holding that:a.The Appellant's proposed appeal from the decision of Bromwich J is not genuine and arguable and thereby denying the Appellant an adjournment to prepare and conduct her High Court Special Leave application and in proceeding to make a sequestration order against her, and that;b.Bromwich J gave adequate reasons for his decision.8.The Applicant was denied procedural fairness in that the learned primary judge pre-empted or prevented a cross-examination of Michael Thornell on behalf of the Applicant which cross-examination was calculated to elicit evidence of the Respondent's collateral purpose in pressing an application for sequestration against the Applicant.9.The learned primary judge erred in deciding that the debts which are owing to the appellant's sister and to the appellant's solicitors, Leonardo Carlo Muriniti, were debts that were due and payable by the appellant notwithstanding that the evidence before the court was that neither the appellant's sister nor the appellant's solicitors were pressing for payment.10.Further or in the alternative, the primary judge’s discretion to dismiss or not dismiss the creditor’s petition miscarried in that he failed to have regard to the particulars actual circumstances of the lawyer’s debt and the sister’s debt.CONSIDERATIONGrounds 1, 2 and 8 It is convenient to consider these grounds together. By ground 1 Mrs Young alleges that the primary judge erred in finding that there was no evidence that the Respondents were actuated by a collateral or improper purpose in advancing the creditor’s petition and by ground 8 she alleges that she was denied procedural fairness because the primary judge either pre-empted or prevented a cross-examination of Michael Thornell, a solicitor in the employ of Kennedy’s (the solicitors for the Respondents) which was calculated to elicit evidence of the Respondents’ collateral purpose.