Hillpalm Pty Ltd v Heaven's Door Pty Ltd

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HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

McHUGH ACJ,
KIRBY, HAYNE, CALLINAN AND HEYDON JJ

HILLPALM PTY LIMITED  APPELLANT

AND

HEAVEN'S DOOR PTY LIMITED  RESPONDENT

Hillpalm Pty Ltd v Heaven's Door Pty Ltd

[2004] HCA 59

1 December 2004
S530/2003

ORDER

1.        Appeal allowed with costs.

2.Orders of the New South Wales Court of Appeal made on 3 October 2002 set aside and in their place order:

(i)       Appeal allowed with costs.

(ii)Paragraphs 1 to 5 of the orders of the New South Wales Land and Environment Court made on 7 June 2001 set aside and in their place order that the application is dismissed with costs.

On appeal from the Supreme Court of New South Wales

Representation:

D F Jackson QC with P R McGuire for the appellant (instructed by Bolster & Co)

T F Robertson SC with L M Byrne for the respondent (instructed by Woolf Associates)

Notice:  This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.

  1. McHUGH ACJ, HAYNE AND HEYDON JJ. The appellant is the registered proprietor of an estate in fee simple in the land described as Lot 529 in Deposited Plan 1003396 ("the appellant's land"). Its title is subject to some exceptions, encumbrances, interests and entries recorded in the Second Schedule to the Computer Folio Certificate issued under s 96D of the Real Property Act 1900 (NSW).

  2. The respondent is the registered proprietor of an estate in fee simple in land ("the respondent's land") which adjoins the appellant's land.  The respondent's land is described as Lot 1 in Deposited Plan 601049.

    The issue

  3. The respondent now has no registered easement of way over the appellant's land.  None is recorded as an exception, encumbrance or interest on the title to the appellant's land.  Can the respondent compel the appellant to grant it such an easement and compel the appellant to construct a track along that easement?  The respondent contends that there was a condition of the grant of approval of the subdivision recorded in Deposited Plan 601049 which it can now have the appellant fulfil by granting it a registered easement of way and constructing a track.  That contention should be rejected.

    How the issue arises

  4. In 1977, Winchcombe Carson Trustee Co (Canberra) Ltd ("Winchcombe Carson") owned the land of which both the appellant's land and the respondent's land formed part.  The land owned by Winchcombe Carson was used for banana growing.  Now it seems that the appellant's land, and the respondent's land, would be much more valuable if used for tourist developments.

  5. In November 1977, a firm of surveyors, John P Marendy & Associates ("the surveyors"), applied to the local Shire Council (the Tweed Shire Council) for permission to subdivide the land owned by Winchcombe Carson, the purpose of the subdivision being said to be "Rural (Bananas)".  It is convenient to refer to this subdivision as the "subdivision of the Winchcombe Carson land".

  6. That permission was given by the Council.  The resulting plan of subdivision…

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Details
Case
[2004] HCA 59
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia heard an appeal concerning a dispute over a proposed right of way between Hillpalm Pty Ltd (appellant) and Heaven's Door Pty Ltd (respondent). The core of the disagreement involved whether the appellant, as the registered proprietor of land, was obligated to grant a registered easement for a right of carriageway, which had been depicted on a proposed plan of subdivision but was not registered on the appellant's title. The respondent contended that the creation of this easement was a condition of the subdivision approval and that the appellant should be compelled to grant it.

The legal issues before the court were whether the Tweed Heads Shire Council's approval of the subdivision, which included a condition for a constructed right of carriageway, created a registrable easement that bound subsequent registered proprietors, notwithstanding the absence of such an easement on the title. Specifically, the court had to consider the effect of the *Real Property Act 1900* (NSW) and its provisions regarding indefeasibility of title in light of the council's consent and the *Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979* (NSW), particularly whether the Land and Environment Court had the power to order the creation of such an easement.

The High Court allowed the appeal, finding that the appellant, as a registered proprietor under the Torrens system, took its title free of any unregistered easement or obligation to create one. The court reasoned that the *Real Property Act 1900* (NSW) prioritises registered interests, and the proposed right of way, not being registered, did not bind the appellant. Furthermore, the court determined that the *Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979* (NSW), specifically section 123, did not empower the Land and Environment Court to order the creation of an easement in favour of a party who had not suffered a breach of the Act, and that the council's approval of the subdivision did not, in itself, create a registrable interest that could override the principles of indefeasibility of title.

Consequently, the High Court allowed the appeal with costs, setting aside the orders of the New South Wales Court of Appeal and the Land and Environment Court. The application by the respondent was dismissed with costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Appeal allowed with costs.

2. Orders of the New South Wales Court of Appeal made on 3 October 2002 set aside and in their place order:

(i) Appeal allowed with costs.

(ii) Paragraphs 1 to 5 of the orders of the New South Wales Land and Environment Court made on 7 June 2001 set aside and in their place order that the application is dismissed with costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

For the appellant, however, the issue at stake concerns a fundamental aspect of the system of land title by registration, regulated in this case by the Real Property Act 1900 (NSW) ("the RPA"). The appellant argued that the courts below had erred in failing to hold that, when it became the registered proprietor of the land, supposedly subject to an unfulfilled condition of development and subdivision consent for a right of carriageway in favour of the respondent, the appellant took its interest in the land free of an easement necessary for the right of carriageway to be effective, and free of any obligation to recognise or create such an easement. At the time the appellant acquired title to the subject land, the appellant's Certificate of Title to the land did not disclose the existence of any easement, actual or proposed. Reference to the proposed right of carriageway existed only in a deposited plan. It was not on the registered title. For the appellant, then, the appeal concerned the suggested precedence which the RPA took, both as a matter of legal principle, and in the factual circumstances of the case. The facts, legislation and issues The background facts: The way the dispute arose between the parties is stated in the reasons of McHugh ACJ, Hayne and Heydon JJ ("the joint reasons")[32]. The relevant circumstances include those giving rise to the subdivision of the once unified parcel of land owned by Winchcombe Carson Trustee Co (Canberra) Ltd ("Winchcombe Carson") near Tweed Heads in New South Wales; the condition of a constructed right of carriageway imposed on Winchcombe Carson by the Tweed Heads Shire Council ("the Council") as a requirement for subdivision consent; and the survival of that condition despite intervening changes to planning law[33]. All of these are explained in the joint reasons[34].[32]Joint reasons at [4]-[13]. See also reasons of Callinan J at [111]-[124].[33]Miscellaneous Acts (Planning) Repeal and Amendment Act 1979 (NSW), Sched 3, cl 7.[34]Joint reasons at [14]-[24], [36]-[39]. The applicable legislation: It is perhaps as well to spell out, in a little more detail, the two different statutory regimes of planning law that successively applied to the development and use of the subject land. When Winchcombe Carson initially proposed the subdivision of the then unified allotment, development approval belonged to the Council under Pt XIIA of the Local Government Act 1919 (NSW) ("LGA"). For the proposed separation of the land into two lots, subdivision approval was required under Pt XII of the LGA, specifically applicable in the late 1970s whenever a subdivision was proposed[35].[35]The equivalent provisions to Pt XIIA LGA are now found in Pt 4 EPAA. Those in Pt XII LGA are now found in Pt 4A EPAA. The applicable request for development consent to create a 45 hectare rural lot (Lot 1) specified a right of way access from the lot to Clothiers Creek Road. Approval was sought pursuant to the Interim Development Order No 2 - Shire of Tweed ("the IDO"), cl 11(1). The Council had no power to grant development consent to the application unless it provided for access from the proposed lot to a main road. Clause 11(1)(c) of the IDO imposed a development standard requiring frontage to a main road of not less than 400 metres[36], although that requirement was capable of waiver in cases involving "minor" departures from the specified standard[37]. However, not only was the provision of the right of way a legal requirement for the exercise of the Council's powers to grant development consent. It was essential from the point of view of the purchaser of the proposed rural lot, otherwise effectively cut off from access to the nearest road. It was necessary to protect the interests of the public (including service utilities), having legitimate purposes to gain access to Lot 1 of the proposed subdivision. [36]IDO, cl 11(1)(c): "... land shall not be sub-divided ... unless ... the frontage of any such allotment to a main road is not less than 400 metres".[37]IDO, cl 35.

Decision

Reasons for decision

ACJ, HAYNE AND HEYDON JJ KIRBY J (dissent)
For the reasons given earlier, however, the respondent has no such right. Section 123 of the EPAA does not provide that right to the respondent in this case, the appellant not being in actual or threatened breach of that Act. No other provision of that Act was identified as founding the right asserted. That being so, the respondent's claim to orders obliging the appellant to create an easement and construct a right of way must fail.Conclusions and Orders The appeal to this Court should be allowed with costs. The orders of the Court of Appeal made on 3 October 2002 should be set aside and in their place should be orders as follows:(a) Appeal allowed with costs.(b)Set aside pars 1 to 5 of the orders of the Land and Environment Court of New South Wales made on 7 June 2001 and, in their place, order that the application is dismissed with costs. This appeal[23] "presents an interesting question of real property law" argued closely on "both sides with reference both to principle and to decided cases"[24]. As I approach the ultimate question in the appeal, it concerns the right of a specialised superior court of record, under deliberately wide statutory powers, to order Hillpalm Pty Ltd ("the appellant"), at the suit of Heaven's Door Pty Ltd ("the respondent"), to create "the 10 metre right of carriageway, shown on DP 601049, by registration thereof on the title to [Hillpalm's] land"[25].[23]From the New South Wales Court of Appeal: Hillpalm Pty Ltd v Heaven's Door Pty Ltd (2002) 55 NSWLR 446.[24]Pratten v Warringah Shire Council (1969) 90 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 134 at 139 per Street J.[25]Terms of the order of the Land and Environment Court, entered 7 June 2001, par 2. See Heavens Door Pty Ltd v Hillpalm Pty Ltd (2001) 116 LGERA 138 at 157 [114]. The respondent (which succeeded before the primary judge[26] and unanimously in the New South Wales Court of Appeal[27]) suggests that, ultimately, what is at stake is the application of the very broad powers afforded to the Land and Environment Court by the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (NSW)[28] ("the EPAA") in circumstances where the merits were, and were found to be[29], in the respondent's favour. This, it was said, sustained the making of orders rendering them unassailable in this Court. This Court has said many times that the High Court will not normally disturb collateral findings of fact[30]. It will only do so when the findings are shown to be "clearly erroneous"[31]. Still less will it readily interfere with discretionary orders of a court, so long as those orders are made within power and without legal error. [26]Hillpalm (2001) 116 LGERA 138 per Sheahan J.[27]Hillpalm (2002) 55 NSWLR 446 per Meagher JA (Handley JA concurring; Hodgson JA agreeing with further reasons).[28]In particular, see ss 122, 123 and 124.[29]Hillpalm (2001) 116 LGERA 138 at 156 [102]-[104].[30]eg Graham Barclay Oysters Pty Ltd v Ryan (2002) 211 CLR 540 at 568-569 [51]-[54].[31]Barclay Oysters (2002) 211 CLR 540 at 568 [53].

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: ACJ, HAYNE AND HEYDON JJ,

The Court in Hillpalm Pty Ltd v Heaven's Door Pty Ltd addressed several intricate issues relating to the creation and enforcement of easements, the powers of the Land and Environment Court, and the interplay between different statutory regimes. The appellant, Hillpalm Pty Ltd, argued that it was not required to create an easement of right of way across its property, which was purportedly a condition of the subdivision approval granted by the Tweed Heads Shire Council. The Court had to determine whether the creation of an easement was indeed a condition of the subdivision approval and whether the Council's consent created a right in rem enforceable by the respondent, Heaven's Door Pty Ltd.

The Court first examined whether the creation of an easement was a condition of the grant of approval of the subdivision. The Court held that the condition imposed by the Council was not effectively communicated to Hillpalm at the time of the grant of subdivision approval, and therefore, Hillpalm did not assume the land subject to such a condition. The Court relied on the fact that the easement was not registered under the Real Property Act 1900 (NSW) at the time Hillpalm acquired the property. This interpretation aligns with the principle that a registered proprietor takes free from unregistered interests, unless there are exceptional circumstances that would override this rule.

Next, the Court considered whether Hillpalm was required to grant a registered easement of right of way. The Court concluded that the easement was not registered at the time of Hillpalm's acquisition, and thus, Hillpalm did not acquire the land subject to such an unregistered easement. This finding was based on the statutory protection afforded by the Real Property Act 1900 (NSW), which generally shields registered proprietors from unregistered interests.

The Court also addressed whether the Council's consent to the subdivision created a right in rem enforceable by the respondent. The Court found that the Council's consent did not create a right in rem that could be enforced against Hillpalm. This conclusion was supported by the principle that a consent to subdivision does not, by itself, create a binding obligation enforceable in rem unless expressly stated in the consent or registered.

Furthermore, the Court examined whether such a right would be consistent with section 42(1) of the Real Property Act 1900 (NSW). The Court held that the Council's consent did not create an enforceable right in rem and thus did not conflict with section 42(1) of the Real Property Act, which pertains to the effect of registered dealings on unregistered interests.

The Court also deliberated on whether the creation of a right of way was a "condition" of a "development consent" under section 76A(1) of the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (NSW) ("EPAA"). The Court found that the condition was not sufficiently communicated to Hillpalm, and thus, the creation of the right of way was not a condition of the development consent. Moreover, the Court held that the purchase and occupation of the land did not amount to a breach of section 76A(1) of the EPAA because it did not constitute "carrying out development" within the meaning of the Act.

In addition, the Court assessed whether section 123 of the EPAA empowers the Court to make orders to remedy or restrain a breach of the EPAA against a party who had not committed any breach. The Court concluded that such orders could not be made against Hillpalm, as it was not in breach of the EPAA.

Lastly, the Court addressed whether the Land and Environment Court had the power to order Hillpalm to create a registered easement of right of way. The Court held that the Land and Environment Court could not make such an order as it would require the creation of a right that Hillpalm was not bound to recognize under the Real Property Act 1900 (NSW).

In summary, the ratio decidendi of this case is that the creation of an easement as a condition of subdivision approval does not bind a subsequent purchaser if the easement was not registered at the time of purchase. Additionally, the Court's wide powers under the EPAA do not extend to compelling a party to create an unregistered easement when such an easement does not bind the party under the Real Property Act 1900 (NSW). The Court's decision emphasizes the importance of the principles of the Torrens system and the limitations on the enforcement of unregistered interests against registered proprietors.