Harris v Carter - [2020] NSWSC 196

Supreme Court

New South Wales

Medium Neutral Citation: Harris v Carter [2020] NSWSC 196
Hearing dates: 12 December 2019
Date of orders: 12 December 2019
Decision date: 06 March 2020
Jurisdiction: Equity
Before: Hallen J
Decision:
The Court:

(1) Orders that the Summons be dismissed.
(2) Orders the Plaintiff to pay the Defendants’ costs up to 20 June 2019 calculated on the ordinary basis, and from 21 June 2019, to pay the Defendants’ costs calculated on the indemnity basis.
Catchwords:
SUCCESSION – Family provision – Claim by minor child for provision from the deceased’s estate under Succession Act 2006 (NSW), Ch 3 – The Defendants are the parents of the deceased and the executors to whom Probate was granted – Obligation or responsibility of a parent to a child – Relevance of "bare paternity" – Maintenance provision made in the deceased’s Will for the Plaintiff – Other significant provision received by the Plaintiff as a result of deceased’s membership of a superannuation fund and as a member of the Australian Defence Force – Whether provision made in the Will of the deceased is adequate and proper
COSTS – Indemnity costs – Offer of compromise –Where defendant obtains an order or judgment on the claim no less favourable than the terms of the offer – Where offer of compromise complies with UCPR – Whether Court should otherwise order – Whether Plaintiff’s tutor should be held personally liable to pay costs
Legislation Cited: Family Provision Act 1982 (NSW)
Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975 (UK) c 63
Legal Profession Uniform Law (NSW), s 181
Military Superannuation and Benefits Act 1991 (Cth)
Probate and Administration Act 1898 (NSW), s 86
Succession Act 2006 (NSW), ss 3, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 63, 72, 79, 84, 99, Ch 3
Trustee Act 1925 (NSW), ss 43, 44
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW), rr 20.26, 36.17, 42.1, 42.13, 42.13A, 42.14, 42.15A, 42.20
Cases Cited: Andrew v Andrew (2012) 81 NSWLR 656; [2012] NSWCA 308
Ashton v Pratt (No 2) [2015] NSWCA 134
Bates v Cooke (2015) 14 ASTLR 221; [2015] NSWCA 278
Bates v Cooke (No 2) [2014] NSWSC 1322
Bkassini v Sarkis [2017] NSWSC 1487
Boettcher v Driscoll (2014) 119 SASR 523; [2014] SASC 86
Borebor v Keane (2013) 11 ASTLR 96; [2013] VSC 35
Bosch v Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd [1938] AC 463
Bowditch v NSW Trustee and Guardian [2012] NSWSC 275
Bowyer v Wood (2007) 99 SASR 190; [2007] SASC 327
Burke v Burke (No 2) (2015) 13 ASTLR 313; [2015] NSWCA 195
Carey v Robson (No 2) [2009] NSWSC 1199
Chan v Chan (2016) 15 ASTLR 317; [2016] NSWCA 222
Chapple v Wilcox (2014) 87 NSWLR 646; [2014] NSWCA 392
de Angelis v de Angelis [2003] VSC 432
Devereaux-Warnes v Hall (No 3) (2007) 35 WAR 127; [2007] WASCA 235
Diver v Neal (2009) 2 ASTLR 89; [2009] NSWCA 54
Estate Hemmes; Cameron v Mead [2018] NSWSC 85
Farrell v Royal Kings Park Tennis Club (Inc) [2007] WASCA 173
Foley v Ellis [2008] NSWCA 288
Forsyth v Sinclair (No 2) (2010) 28 VR 635; [2010] VSCA 195
Goodman v Windeyer (1980) 144 CLR 490; [1980] HCA 31
Goodsell v Wellington [2011] NSWSC 1232
Gorton v Parks (1989) 17 NSWLR 1
Hamod v State of New South Wales (2002) 188 ALR 659; [2002] FCAFC 97; [2002] FCA 424
Harkness v Harkness (No 2) [2012] NSWSC 35
Heyward v Fisher (Court of Appeal (NSW), Kirby P, 26 April 1985, unrep)
Hunter v Hunter (1987) 8 NSWLR 573
Ilott v The Blue Cross [2018] AC 545; [2017] UKSC 17
Jodell v Woods [2017] NSWSC 143
Lado Causillas v NSW Trustee and Guardian [2015] NSWSC 1204
Leach v The Nominal Defendant (QBE Insurance (Australia) Ltd) (No 2) [2014] NSWCA 391
Litchfield v Smith [2010] VSC 466
McKenzie v Topp [2004] VSC 90
Meres v Meres (No 2) [2017] NSWSC 523
New South Wales Insurance Ministerial Corporation v Reeve (1993) 42 NSWLR 100
Nicholls v Hall (2007) 2 ASTLR 419; [2007] NSWCA 356
Pontifical Society for the Propagation of the Faith v Scales (1962) 107 CLR 9; [1962] HCA 19
R (on the application of M) v Slough Borough Council [2008] 1 WLR 1808; [2008] UKHL 52
Re Sherborne Estate; Vanvalen v Neaves; Gilroy v Neaves (No 2) (2005) 65 NSWLR 268; [2005] NSWSC 1003
Rogic v Samaan (No 2) [2018] NSWSC 1573
Sam Wardy v Gordon Salier; William Wardy v Gordon Salier; Hassiba Wardy v Estate of late Edmond Wadih Wardy developer and Ch 3 of the Succession Act 2006 [2014] NSWSC 473
Savic v Kim [2010] NSWSC 1401
Sgro v Thompson [2017] NSWCA 326
Singer v Berghouse (1993) 67 ALJR 708; [1993] HCA 35
Singer v Berghouse (1994) 181 CLR 201; [1994] HCA 40
Slack v Rogan; Palffy v Rogan (2013) 85 NSWLR 253; [2013] NSWSC 522
Steinmetz v Shannon (2019) 368 ALR 161; [2019] NSWCA 114
Stern v Sekers; Sekers v Sekers [2010] NSWSC 59
Stokes v McCourt (Costs) [2014] NSWSC 63
Stott v Cook (1960) 33 ALJR 447
Sung v Malaxos [2015] NSWSC 186
Verzar v Verzar [2012] NSWSC 1380
Vigolo v Bostin (2005) 221 CLR 191; [2005] HCA 11
Walker v Walker (Supreme Court (NSW), Young J, 17 May 1996, unrep)
White v Barron (1980) 144 CLR 431; [1980] HCA 14
Yakmor v Hamdoush (No 2) (2009) 76 NSWLR 148; [2009] NSWCA 284
Yee v Yee [2017] NSWCA 305
Texts Cited: G E Dal Pont, Law of Costs (3rd ed, 2013, LexisNexis)
Rosalind Atherton, “The Concept of Moral Duty in the Law of Family Provision — A Gloss or Critical Understanding?” (1999) 5(1) Australian Journal of Legal History 5
Category: Principal judgment
Parties: Lachlan Daniel Harris by his tutor Susan Usherwood (Plaintiff)
Robin Walter Carter (First Defendant)
Joan Mary Carter (Second Defendant)
Representation:
Counsel:
Mr L J Ellison SC (Plaintiff)
Mr C A Vindin (Defendants)
Solicitors:
Sautelle White Lawyers (Plaintiff)
Craig Milne & Company (Defendants)

File Number(s): 2019/81746

Judgment

Introduction

HIS HONOUR: Christopher John Carter (the deceased) died on 18 March 2018, aged 39 years. He was survived by his minor son, Lachlan Daniel Harris (the Plaintiff), who was born in April 2006, and by his parents, Robin Walter Carter and Joan Mary Carter (the Defendants).
These proceedings were commenced by Summons filed on 14 March 2019. The tutor of the Plaintiff is Susan Usherwood. She signed a Consent to Act as Tutor on 13 March 2019 in which her solicitor on the record certified that Ms Usherwood did “not have an interest in the proceedings adverse to the interests of” the Plaintiff. Her relationship, if any, to the Plaintiff, was not elucidated in any of her affidavits. All that she wrote was that she visited the Plaintiff and his mother, Lisa Jane Harris, “regularly”: Affidavit, Susan Usherwood, 18 October 2019 at par 21.
Ms Usherwood did not attend the hearing on behalf of the Plaintiff. No reason for her non-attendance was proffered, other than it being stated that she had not been required for cross-examination. Mr L J Ellison SC, who appeared for the Plaintiff, informed the Court that she could be contacted by telephone if that were necessary.
In the Summons, the Plaintiff sought a family provision order out of the estate of the deceased pursuant to Chapter 3 of the Succession Act 2006 (NSW) (the Act) and that his costs should be paid out of the estate. The Act applies in respect of the estate of a person who died on, or after, 1 March 2009. The Act replaces the Family Provision Act 1982 (NSW) (the former Act), which was repealed, effective from 1 March 2009. A family provision order is one for the maintenance, education, or advancement in life, of an eligible person.
As stated, the biological mother of the Plaintiff is Lisa Jane Harris. She commenced her own proceedings, in which she sought a family provision order, which proceedings were resolved, consensually, with final orders being made by this Court in June 2019. Pursuant to those orders, Ms Harris received a lump sum of $110,000, out of the estate of the deceased. No order for her costs was made, with the intention that she would pay her own costs of those proceedings. The Defendants’ costs of those proceedings, calculated on the indemnity basis, were ordered to be paid, or retained, as the case may be, out of the estate of the deceased.
In accordance with the usual practice in the Family Provision List, involving different proceedings in relation to the estate of the same deceased person, notice of the terms of the settlement of Ms Harris’ proceedings was given to the legal representatives of the Plaintiff in these proceedings. This course is followed, first, because any distribution in accordance with the Court’s orders in one proceedings will reduce the value of the estate of the deceased available at the time of the determination of the other proceedings; and, second, in order to avoid the recipient of the distribution made pursuant to the court order in one proceedings being joined as a defendant in the other proceedings, as the holder of property that may be designated as notional estate: s 79 of the Act.
The legal representatives of the Plaintiff in these proceedings consented to orders being made in settlement of Ms Harris’ proceedings. Thus, as will be shown, the value of the estate available, at the date of the hearing of the current proceedings, was reduced by satisfying the orders that were made in the proceedings commenced by Ms Harris.
Naturally, in her proceedings, the fact that Ms Harris is the mother of the Plaintiff in these proceedings was a relevant matter in determining whether the Court should make the family provision order that had been agreed to, in her favour. Adequate provision for her maintenance and advancement in life, also, would have been assessed by the parties, having regard to her obligation to support the Plaintiff in these proceedings.
Ms Harris was present in Court throughout the hearing of the proceedings, and as there were a number of affidavits made by her that were read, she was cross-examined.
Of the Defendants, only the second Defendant (the mother of the deceased) had sworn affidavits that were read in the proceedings and she was cross-examined, albeit briefly. However, both Defendants were in attendance in Court throughout the hearing.
Following completion of the evidence and the oral submissions, I informed the parties that I did not wish to delay them knowing the result of the proceedings, because of the long vacation, and that I would announce the Court’s decision following a short adjournment. Upon my return, I ordered that the Plaintiff’s Summons should be dismissed. I informed the parties that I would publish my reasons as soon as I was able. These are the reasons for dismissing the proceedings.
Subsequently, counsel for the Defendants, without objection, handed up an Offer of Compromise. I shall refer to this document later in these reasons and the consequences that flow from the offer made on their behalf to the Plaintiff, which offer was not accepted, or which lapsed through effluxion of time.
Before, and at, the hearing, Mr Ellison SC appeared for the Plaintiff and Mr C A Vindin appeared for the Defendants. The hearing was able to be completed within one day.
In this case, as will be read, the Plaintiff’s legal representatives, including senior counsel, conducted the Plaintiff’s case on the basis of a contingent costs agreement. I suspect that, unnecessarily, and unintentionally, this may have fuelled the expectations of those involved, on the part of the Plaintiff, thereby causing disappointment, and hardship, to the parties.

Some formal uncontested matters

On 1 August 2018, this Court granted Probate of the deceased’s last Will, dated 5 March 2010, to both of the Defendants.
Section 57(1) of the Act provides that “eligible persons” may apply to the Court for a family provision order. As the child of the deceased, the Plaintiff is an eligible person within s 57(1)(c) of the Act.
The Plaintiff commenced the proceedings within the time prescribed by the Act (not later than 12 months after the date of the death of the deceased): s 58(2) of the Act.
As the deceased left a Will that dealt with all of his property, there is no scope for the operation of the intestacy rules, with the result that it is only necessary, hereafter, to refer to the Will of the deceased.
A family provision order may be made in relation to property that is not part of the deceased’s estate, but is designated as “notional estate” of the deceased by an order under Pt 3.3 of the Act: s 63(5). “Notional estate” of a deceased person is defined in s 3(1) of the Act to mean property designated by a notional estate order as notional estate of the deceased person. A person’s rights are extinguished to the extent that they are affected by a notional estate order: s 84 of the Act. In this case, there is no property that is sought to be designated as notional estate of the deceased.
The Defendants do not seek any commission, or percentage, for their pains and trouble as is just and reasonable, out of the estate of the deceased pursuant to s 86 of the Probate and Administration Act 1898 (NSW).
The only eligible persons in respect of the deceased are the Plaintiff and Ms Harris. Ms Harris has made a claim that has been dealt with and now the Plaintiff’s claim for a family provision order is being dealt with.
As will be read, the bulk of the deceased’s estate passes to the Defendants, neither of whom asserts that he, or she, respectively, is an eligible person within the meaning of that term in the Act.

Background Facts

It is next convenient to set out some background facts that are not the subject of any dispute between the parties. To the extent that any are in dispute, what follows should be regarded as the findings of the Court. These facts are necessary for the decision that was reached.
The deceased was born in December 1978.
Ms Harris was born in May 1979 and is currently 40 years of age.
Prior to his death, the deceased served, full time, in the Royal Australian Navy, often on active duty overseas. He was never married. Nor did he have any long-term de facto relationship. He did, however, in 2005, have a relationship with Ms Harris, who, as a result of the relationship, gave birth to the Plaintiff, who will be 14 years old in April 2020.
Ms Harris gave written evidence, in her proceedings, which evidence, with the leave of the Court, was read in these proceedings, that she knew the deceased “as a friend” for 1.5 years and that her de facto relationship with him was for about 8 months. She stated that she would stay with the deceased, at his home, two or three times per week. (There is some dispute about the nature and duration of the relationship, but that dispute does not need to be resolved for the purposes of these proceedings, as even on her case, the relationship between her and the deceased was a brief one. Following its termination, it appears that they had no further face to face contact.)
The deceased terminated the relationship shortly after Ms Harris informed him of her choice to carry her pregnancy to full-term and become a mother.
Following the termination of the relationship, Ms Harris moved out of Sydney and went to live on the far South Coast of New South Wales “to be closer to my mother so that I had support when the child was born”.
Ms Harris, subsequently, informed the deceased about the birth of the Plaintiff. There is evidence that in January 2009 she sent some photographs of the Plaintiff, under cover of an email written to him, and that she and the deceased had a telephone conversation, followed by an email sent by her to him, in November 2009. There was no written evidence of a response from the deceased. However, Ms Harris averred, in her affidavit dated 18 October 2019, at par 25, that, in relation to the January 2009 email:

“After the above email [the deceased] and I spoke on the phone and he said something to the effect of
‘Is being a part time father who travels really good enough for this boy’
[The deceased] then had to go off to sea with the Navy. On his return from deployment he said words to the effect:
‘I have given it some thought and decided to wait until my parents pass as I am already such a disappointment to them already’.”

Initially, the deceased did not voluntarily acknowledge the paternity of the Plaintiff. Apparently, pursuant to an order of the Family Court, in late 2007, parentage testing, being DNA typing, occurred, and, in December 2007, Genetic Technologies Corporation Pty Ltd, in a Parentage Testing Procedure Report, stated that the “Relative Chance of Paternity” (of the child) was 99.999999%.
As she was legally entitled to do, and because she was receiving Centrelink benefits, Ms Harris sought child support. She applied through the Child Support Agency (now jointly administered by the Department of Human Services and the Department of Social Services). As the deceased was required to, he did pay the assessed amount (about $9,955, per year), by way of child support for the Plaintiff. There is no suggestion that he did not comply with his financial obligations, in that regard, during his lifetime.
The deceased, however, never met, or otherwise had anything to do with, the Plaintiff. He maintained his decision to not have a relationship during the almost twelve years after the Plaintiff’s birth.
The Defendants are, of course, the biological grandparents of the Plaintiff. However, like the deceased, they, too, have decided to not meet, or have any relationship with, him. So far as is known, neither of them, currently, has any relationship with the Plaintiff. Ms Harris, through Facebook, attempted to contact, initially, the second Defendant, and, later, both Defendants. (I understand Facebook to be a social networking website and service that provides an electronic medium for the acquisition, and dissemination, of information. It is available to anyone who can access it. Facebook users can access the information on Facebook pages and can then contribute to the page by posting material on it. For someone to post on Facebook, he, she or it, must also have a Facebook account.)
Ms Harris gave evidence that she had been “blocked” by the second Defendant before making contact again through a new Facebook account. The second Defendant gave a different version of events regarding this issue, namely that she and her husband had chosen not to have a relationship with the Plaintiff since the deceased’s death “[i]n response to messages from Ms Harris on Facebook in which she said she wanted nothing whatsoever to do with us”. None of the Facebook entries were the subject of direct evidence.
(Nothing turns on the dispute of fact and no submissions about it were made. The relationship of the Defendants and Ms Harris is not relevant to the determination of the questions posed in the proceedings and do not arise as a result of the proceedings being dismissed.)
The second Defendant accepted, in cross-examination, that she and her husband, in the future, would be unlikely to initiate any relationship with the Plaintiff: Tcpt, 12 December 2019, p 47(39–41).
There is also conflicting evidence concerning the reasons why the deceased chose to not have contact with the Plaintiff. I do not think it is necessary to determine the reasons for him not doing so. It is clear, however, that the Plaintiff, himself, could not have been the cause of the deceased’s decision. As will be read, despite the absence of any actual relationship between them, and the fact that the deceased had never met the Plaintiff, the deceased could not escape his obligation, or responsibility, to make adequate and proper provision for the Plaintiff’s maintenance, education or advancement in life by severing all personal contact with him. Parental obligations and responsibilities are not distinguished according to acknowledgment or legitimacy.
The Plaintiff has lived with Ms Harris since his birth. They lived in Sydney together, but, subsequently, returned to live in Merimbula, on the far South Coast of New South Wales.
In her affidavit sworn on 18 October 2019, Ms Harris stated that she receives assistance from her mother, and from Mr Craig Newman, in caring for the Plaintiff when she has to work at nights. She states that she and Mr Newman “are not in an intimate relationship, just good friends who help each other out”.

No evidence was given by either Ms Harris’ mother or by Mr Newman.

The Will of the deceased

As stated, the deceased left a duly executed Will, made on 5 March 2010. Relevantly, Clause 3 of that Will provided:

“3. I DEVISE AND BEQUEATH the whole of my estate of whatever nature and wherever situate unto and to the use of my Trustee/s UPON TRUST as follows:
(a) That from my estate my Trustees are to pay an annual sum equivalent to the child support obligation as assessed for this [sic] support of my son LACHLAN HARRIS such sum being equal to the amount assessed as at the date of my death and to increase by CPI each year, such payments to continue until the child obtains the age of 18 years or leaves school whichever is the earlier and such sum to be paid annually in arrears.
(b) I give the whole of the residue of my estate both real and personal to my parents, ROBIN WALTER CARTER and JOAN MARY CARTER of … East Hills in the State of New South Wales.
…”

(Although there are no express words creating a charge to secure the payment of the annual sum, it seems to have been accepted by the Defendants that it is charged upon the capital of the residuary estate. They also appear to be prepared to set aside a sufficient sum, from the residuary estate, to ensure its payment.)
There is no dispute that the first payment of the “annual sum equivalent to the child support obligation” was made, by the Defendants, in March 2019. I shall return to the other benefits that the Plaintiff has received as a result of the death of the deceased. The matter should be approached upon the footing that the Plaintiff has received, or will receive, these benefits. They are particularly relevant to the determination of the questions before the Court.
It is clear that the deceased, in making his Will, gave some consideration to whether, and how, the Plaintiff should benefit from his estate. He made an absolute gift for the maintenance of the Plaintiff, which had the effect of carrying forward, after his death, an obligation to pay child support, adjusted for inflation, as set out in cl 3(a) of the Will. Whether he was aware of what benefits the Plaintiff would receive, otherwise, as a result of his death, is not established by the evidence.
The deceased left no written statement setting out the reasons why he made the Will in the terms that he did.

The nature and value of the deceased’s estate

On 6 November 2019, the Court directed the parties to provide to the Chambers of the Family Provision List Judge by 4:00 p.m. on Tuesday, 3 December 2019, in hard and soft copy, an agreed schedule that contained:

the assets and liabilities of the estate at the date of death;

the assets and liabilities of the estate at the date of hearing;

the estimated costs and expenses of any property that is to be sold or that has been sold;

the estimated costs of each party calculated on the ordinary, and on the indemnity, basis, inclusive of GST; and

any costs of any party that have been paid, and in relation to the Defendants, whether those costs have been paid out of the estate of the deceased.

Whilst a document was provided to the Court on 4 December 2019, it was headed “Defendants’ Proposed Agreed Statement of Assets & Liabilities”. However, at the commencement of the hearing, when the matter was raised with counsel, the Court was informed that the contents of the document had been agreed. Subsequently, the document was marked as Ex JS 1. What follows under this heading is taken, principally, from Ex JS 1.
At the date of death, the deceased’s estate was estimated to have a gross value of $1,455,477. It was said to consist of real estate in Bulimba, Queensland ($450,000) (the Bulimba property), an amount paid to the estate from the Military Superannuation & Benefits Scheme (had the whole of the amount been paid to the estate — $400,000), an amount held by the Mercer Super Trust (had the whole of the amount been paid to the estate — $568,718), monies in bank ($759) and a car ($36,000). (I have omitted and shall continue to omit a reference to cents. This will explain any apparent mathematical miscalculation.)
The only liabilities of the estate were said to be an amount secured, by mortgage registered on the Bulimba property (estimated to be about $420,000) and a credit card debt ($540). It follows, that the net value of the estate, as at the date of death, was estimated to be $1,034,937.
At the date of hearing, the gross amounts that had been received by the estate, totalled $584,591. The amounts received consisted of: the net proceeds of sale of the Bulimba property (after payment of the amount secured on that property — $46,076); part of the proceeds of the Military Super Death Benefits ($192,923); part of the proceeds of the Mercer Super Trust Benefits ($288,802) with the fund trustees determining that the other part should be paid to the Plaintiff (as to which see [65] below); monies in bank ($759); proceeds of sale of the car ($36,000); a refund of an amount paid to Navy Health ($136); and the net rent received from the Bulimba property ($19,893) prior to its sale. Only part of the proceeds of the Military Super Death Benefits was paid into the deceased’s estate, with the fund trustees determining that the other part should be paid to the Plaintiff: see Affidavit, Joan Mary Carter, 29 October 2019 at par 4 (as to which see [71] below).
The amounts paid out of the deceased’s estate, totalled $232,703 and included: interest and costs paid on the mortgage in respect of the Bulimba property ($30,947); legal fees and disbursements incurred on the sale of the Bulimba property ($1,172); commission incurred on the sale of the Bulimba property ($14,822); expenses incurred on the Bulimba property prior to it being sold ($12,403); funeral expenses ($6,700); a credit card debt ($540); an outstanding Telstra account ($25); costs and expenses regarding the deceased’s home ($5,769); legal fees and disbursements in the administration of the estate ($15,143); the amount of the provision made for Ms Harris pursuant to the orders of the Court ($110,000); the Defendants’ costs and disbursements of the proceedings commenced by Ms Harris ($25,863); and the amount paid to Ms Harris, for the Plaintiff, pursuant to the terms of the deceased’s Will ($9,316).
It follows that the value of the distributable estate, excluding the costs of these proceedings, at the date of hearing, was $351,888.
The future annual sums that would have to be paid pursuant to the terms of the deceased’s Will, for the Plaintiff if he continues his schooling until 18 years of age, were estimated to total $46,582, leaving a distributable estate (without deducting the costs of these proceedings), out of which any order for additional provision could be made, of $305,306.
(No reference was made in Ex JS 1 to the amount of approximately $76,000, being part of the Residual Death Benefit (as one part of the Military Superannuation & Benefits Scheme) that was paid to the Defendants on about 20 December 2018 and which was used by them to reduce the mortgage on their home. In the events that have happened, this is not relevant as it appears that it was not deducted from the gross value of the deceased’s estate set out in Ex JS1. Nor was it said to be the subject of designation as notional estate of the deceased.)
It will be necessary to return to the benefits that have been received by the Plaintiff later in these reasons.

The Costs of the Proceedings

Section 99(1) of the Act provides that the Court may order that the costs of proceedings under Chapter 3, in relation to the estate or notional estate of a deceased person (including costs in connection with mediation), be paid out of the estate, or notional estate, or both, in such manner as the Court thinks fit. The section confers a discretion in respect of costs that is no more confined than the general costs discretion.
Usually, in calculating the value of the deceased's estate available from which a family provision order may be made, the costs of the proceedings should be carefully considered.
In Foley v Ellis [2008] NSWCA 288, Basten JA wrote, at [10]:

“... To exclude from consideration the diminution in the estate and hence [the applicant’s] expectation of provision, flowing from legal expenses incurred in the proceedings, is arguably inconsistent with the statutory mandate to consider the applicant's position at the time the Court ‘is determining whether or not to make such an order’.”

Parties, however, should not assume, in all cases, that this type of litigation can be pursued, safe in the belief that all costs will be paid out of the estate: Carey v Robson (No 2) [2009] NSWSC 1199 at [21] (Palmer J); Forsyth v Sinclair (No 2) (2010) 28 VR 635 at 642 [27]; [2010] VSCA 195 at [27] (Neave and Redlich JJA, Habersberger AJA); Harkness v Harkness (No 2) [2012] NSWSC 35 at [18]. I have made this statement, many times, in the context of a claim for a family provision order, particularly in relation to estates with a relatively small value.
Ms C L Thomson, the solicitor with the “care, conduct and control of this matter on behalf of the Plaintiff”, gave evidence that the costs and disbursements, calculated on the ordinary basis, up to, and including, a one day hearing, of the Plaintiff, were estimated to be $74,501.
Ms Thomson disclosed, also, that the “Plaintiff’s Tutor has entered into a contingent cost agreement with her Solicitor”: Affidavit, Carmen Lee Thomson, 18 October 2019 at par 6. The only term of that contingent cost agreement disclosed in her affidavit was “[t]here is no uplift payable”. However, when the Court informed senior counsel for the Plaintiff that the terms of the contingent cost agreement were unclear (s 181 of the Legal Profession Uniform Law (NSW) states that such an agreement may provide that the payment of some, or all, of the legal costs is conditional on the successful outcome of the matter to which those costs relate), he confirmed, after obtaining instructions, that no costs or disbursements (including the fees of senior counsel) were payable to the Plaintiff’s legal representatives in the event that the proceedings were dismissed: Tcpt, 12 December 2019, p 8(29–42).
There is evidence that the Defendants’ costs, calculated on the indemnity basis, of the proceedings commenced by Ms Harris, and the costs of these proceedings are, in total, $41,934. However, it was accepted that, of this estimated amount, $25,863 had been paid out of the estate, leaving an amount of $16,071 to be paid in respect of the present proceedings.
It followed, in the event that the costs of the proceedings were ordered to be paid out of the estate of the deceased, that the net distributable estate, out of which any order for additional provision for the Plaintiff could be made, was $214,734.

Benefits received by the Plaintiff following, and as a result of, the death of the deceased

At the date of his death, the deceased was a member of Mercer Super Trust (Mercer Super). The second Defendant gave evidence that a benefit for the Plaintiff, to which he is entitled under the Mercer Super Fund, is $288,802. Ms Harris did not deny that the Plaintiff is entitled to this amount, which will be held in trust for him until he attains the age of 18 years. She wrote however, that the Plaintiff has not received this amount because the necessary documents relating to the trust on which that amount is to be held has not been provided.
The precise documents required to enable the amount to be paid are referred to in a letter dated 16 October 2019 from the solicitors for the Plaintiff to Ms Harris. Regrettably, however, a copy of the “correspondence from Mercer Superannuation dated 9 October 2019” is not annexed. There are references to “copies of the Deeds of Trust”, “the Beneficiary Trusts”, “Trustees Form” (none of which are annexed).
Senior counsel for the Plaintiff, in his written submissions, acknowledged that “[t]he benefit from Mercer Super Fund of $288,802, has not been, but will be, received by [Ms Harris] to the benefit of [the Plaintiff]”. He also said, in answer to questions from the Bench, that “… it is just expected that it will be paid to [Ms Harris] to be held on trust. I don’t have any of that material”: Tcpt, 12 December 2019, p 4(25–28).
In addition, the Commonwealth Superannuation Corporation, which administers the benefits payable, pursuant to the Military Superannuation and Benefits Act 1991 (Cth), to members of the Military Superannuation and Benefits Scheme (Military Super), determined that an amount of $115,953 was to be paid, by way of a fortnightly pension, to the Plaintiff.
On 3 January 2019, Ms Harris received a net payment of $5,163, as arrears of the fortnightly pension payments, for the benefit of the Plaintiff. On 17 January 2019, she began to receive $256 per fortnight as the “normal fortnightly amount” for the Plaintiff. From May 2019, following the provision of a tax return number for the Plaintiff, the fortnightly pension increased to $307. It then increased, in July 2019, to $309, which is the current amount, paid fortnightly, into the account jointly held in the names of Ms Harris and the Plaintiff.
The precise terms of the benefit being received, and for how long the payments were to be received, were not disclosed, precisely, in the evidence read on behalf of the Plaintiff. However, in a letter dated 12 December 2018, from the Australian Government, Commonwealth Superannuation Corporation, annexed to Ms Harris’ affidavit, affirmed on 12 April 2019, the following statement appears:

“Children are only eligible for benefit purposes if they are less than 18 years of age, or between 18 and 25 years of age and engaged in full time education.”

In addition, the Plaintiff has received the Death Benefit, which was payable by Military Super, in the amount of $144,808, which amount was paid into a bank account held in the joint names of the Plaintiff and Ms Harris in December 2018.
From the above, it follows that upon the amount of $288,802 being paid, there will have been received, as a result of the death of the deceased, for the benefit of the Plaintiff, capital amounts totalling $433,610. In addition, he will be entitled to receive an income totalling $17,350 per annum, comprising $8,034 (from the Military Superannuation and Benefits Scheme) and $9,316 (from the deceased’s estate), subject to adjustment for inflation. Of course, there should be some additional interest earned on the capital amounts, if they are properly invested.
(In regard to each of Mercer Super and Military Super, Ms Harris had made an application, on behalf of the Plaintiff, which had resulted in the amounts being paid for his benefit. The balance of the entitlements of the deceased, as a member of each fund was paid to the estate as set out above.)

The Defendants’ Offer of Compromise

At the commencement of the hearing, the Court inquired of counsel for the Defendants whether the issue of costs was able to be determined at the conclusion of the hearing. He indicated that it could not be, and that he would want to be heard on the issue should it arise. Senior counsel for the Plaintiff then informed the Court that there was no document on his side that was relevant to the issue of costs: Tcpt, 12 December 2019, p 9(12–36).
Following the Court determining that the Plaintiff’s proceedings were to be dismissed, there was handed up, without objection, a Notice of Offer of Compromise dated 20 June 2019, made on behalf of the Defendants. The offer made in the Offer of Compromise was that:

“… in addition to the provision for [the Plaintiff] in the will of the deceased dated 5 March, 2010, the Plaintiff receive an order for provision under the Succession Act in the sum of $30,000.00.”

Because the offer did not include an amount for costs, and was not expressed to be inclusive of costs, the Plaintiff, upon acceptance of the offer, would have been entitled to an order against the Defendants, for his costs in respect of the claim, assessed on the ordinary basis, up to the time when the offer was made: Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) (UCPR), r 42.13A.
Because the offer was not accepted, or lapsed through effluxion of time, and because the order dismissing the proceedings was less favourable to the Plaintiff than the terms of the offer, pursuant to UCPR r 42.15A, unless the Court ordered otherwise, the Defendants became entitled to an order, against the Plaintiff, for their costs in respect of the claim, assessed on the indemnity basis, and since the offer was made before the first day of the trial, as from the beginning of the day following the day on which the offer was made. They were otherwise entitled to their costs, calculated on the ordinary basis, up to that time: UCPR r 42.1.
I shall return to the submissions made, and the reasons for the costs order that was made.
(In the result, it is unnecessary to consider the reasonableness, or otherwise, of the quantum of the Plaintiff’s costs and the justification, if there was one, for briefing senior counsel, in relation to a gross distributable estate with a value of less than $400,000. Undoubtedly, more on this topic would have been written if the result of the proceedings had been otherwise.)

The competing positions of the parties

Senior counsel for the Plaintiff submitted, in writing, that the Plaintiff should receive the whole of the estate of the deceased, although he added, by way of fall-back position, that “[a]t most the parents as beneficiaries should receive a nominal capital sum to reflect the wishes (albeit not properly directed to discharge his principle [sic] obligation) that the parents receive some benefit”.
Senior counsel also submitted that the deceased could not escape his responsibility to make proper provision for the Plaintiff’s maintenance, education and advancement in life, simply by severing all personal contact with him. Although he did not specifically refer to it, the principle in Nicholls v Hall (2007) 2 ASTLR 419 at 427 [45]; [2007] NSWCA 356 at [45] (Mason P, Hodgson and McColl JJA) to which I shall later refer, appears to have been the foundation of that submission.
(Senior counsel also referred to what I had written in Jodell v Woods [2017] NSWSC 143 at [104], but it seems to me that what I wrote in that (and repeated in other cases) applies in relation to a claim for a family provision order made by an adult child, rather than a claim by a minor child of the deceased.)
The thrust of the submissions made by the Defendants was that the relationship of the Plaintiff and the deceased consisted of nothing more than “bare paternity”, that is to say, a biological relationship only. However, counsel for the Defendants, correctly in my view, conceded that such a relationship does not, necessarily, preclude a successful claim, but submitted that the provision made for the Plaintiff in the deceased’s Will, taken with the provision that he otherwise received, or will receive, as a result of the deceased’s death (as set out above), would result in the Court concluding that no additional provision ought to be made for the Plaintiff out of the estate of the deceased. In this way, the Court would consider not merely matters concerning the relationship between the Plaintiff and the deceased, but matters concerning other factors identified in s 60(2) of the Act, including the Plaintiff’s needs, the nature and extent of the deceased’s estate, and other legitimate claims on the deceased’s bounty. In other words, the Court would consider what was “adequate” and what was “proper” having regard to what might be characterised as the claim of the Plaintiff on the estate of the deceased.
By way of a fall-back position, counsel for the Defendants, submitted in writing:

“If the defendants be wrong on that point, then some further modest sum would be the upper limit of proper provision.

What sum “ought to be” ordered? There is, of course, no fixed guide as to how to quantify such a claim. One suggested method, in relation to a claim by a child under the age of 18, is to estimate the child’s needs to the age of 18, with an appropriate discount and add on an amount for contingencies. There is no evidence in this case of Lachlan’s individual needs as opposed to those of Lachlan and his mother as a family. This is not intended to be a criticism of the way the case is put, but it is difficult to see what further provision for Lachlan is needed. But the amount the estate has paid as provision to Ms Harris certainly comes to account and is a significant injection of funds to assist the family in the five years until Lachlan becomes an adult.” (citations omitted)

From the above, it can be seen that there was a chasm between the position of each of the parties and their submissions were starkly in contrast. However, ultimately, it seems to me, in this case, that the real question is as to the adequacy and propriety of the provision received by the Plaintiff pursuant to the Will of the deceased, taking into account the other payments received, or to be received, by him, as a result of the death of the deceased.

The situation in life of the Plaintiff

The Plaintiff lives with Ms Harris in a two-bedroom home in Tura Beach, a suburb of Merimbula, on the South Coast of New South Wales. It is rented accommodation.
As at 21 November 2019, the amount held in the joint account for the benefit of the Plaintiff was $157,258. It is into this account that the pension of $309 per fortnight is deposited. It was also into this account that the arrears of the pension ($5,163) to which the Plaintiff was entitled, were paid, as was the first payment of the annual sum made for the Plaintiff ($9,316) pursuant to the Will of the deceased.
The bank statements, a copy of which were annexed to the affidavit sworn 29 November 2019 by Ms Harris, reveal that at least some of the rent of $740 per fortnight (and a bond payment of $1,480), has been deducted from this account (although there are some deposits of $300 per fortnight, from Ms Harris, into that account).
The Plaintiff attends a local High School. His half-yearly report for semester 1 2019 reveals that he is a competent student with B, C and D grades. He is doing reasonably well according to Ms Harris: Tcpt, 12 December 2019, p 21(01–07).
On 16 October 2019, the Plaintiff’s doctor placed him on a mental health care plan. He was diagnosed with “mild depression, 6 weeks”. There is a reference made to the Plaintiff’s “difficulty social coping”.
In the report annexed to an affidavit from Ms Harris, his mental state examination revealed that the Plaintiff’s “[i]nsight” is “[g]ood and improving”. He has also been seeing a school counsellor who has confirmed that the Plaintiff is “okay” but needs to work on “coping strategies”. Ms Harris recognised that it is unlikely that the Plaintiff will suffer from depression in the long term. She has adopted strategies to help him cope: Tcpt, 12 December 2019, p 23(45) – p 24(33).
Ms Usherwood stated, in an affidavit sworn on 18 October 2019, that the Plaintiff “appears happy and healthy”. In her earlier affidavit of 11 April 2019, she described the Plaintiff as suffering from “pigeon chest” (a malformation of the chest characterized by a protrusion of the sternum and ribs) but that he “is of relative good health”. (There was no medical evidence to support the first assertion.)
Ms Harris stated that the Plaintiff has applied to go on a two-week overseas exchange student program in 2020, which is estimated to cost $6,900. The deposit for the excursion has been paid, presumably out of the fund held for his benefit.
Ms Harris described herself as a “casual disability support worker”. She is currently employed by the Disability Trust. Her fortnightly income varies, but the copy of two different payment advices, annexed to her affidavit sworn 18 October 2019, reveal a fortnightly net income of between about $1,160 and $1,220. However, her net annual income for the year ending 30 June 2019 was about $44,000.
In addition, it appears that Ms Harris receives about $290 per fortnight by way of Centrelink payments: Tcpt, 12 December 2019, p 42(28–39); Ex A. (There is a reference in Ex A to “Number of Children Assessed – 1”.)
Ms Harris stated that “[w]hilst the child support payments received from [the deceased] are important, they are not enough to cover [the Plaintiff’s] weekly expenses …”. This statement does not take into account that both parents have a primary duty to provide for their child and the child support assessment is based upon the income of both parents. In making the statement referred to, Ms Harris also did not refer to the pension payments received from the Military Super, or to the Centrelink benefits to which reference has been made.
Ms Harris set out her “average weekly expenses”, which total $1,340. Of this total amount, the direct expenses for the Plaintiff that were identified total about $126 per week. There are, of course, other expenses in respect of which the Plaintiff receives a benefit. There are also expenses included that relate specifically, and only, to Ms Harris.
There was cross-examination of Ms Harris on some of the expense estimates which did suggest that some of the expenses were temporary. In addition, in relation to the purchase of a saxophone, it had been paid for, but it was shown as an ongoing annual expense, as Ms Harris had divided the purchase price to reach a weekly amount: Tcpt, 12 December 2019, p 31(28–33). In the circumstances, I do not accept all of the expenses as reasonable estimates of the household expenses. However, they provide a guide as to the categories of expenditure being paid.
Ms Harris also acknowledged that she has withdrawn $6,500 for the purchase of a car, from the account held for the Plaintiff: Tcpt, 12 December 2019, p 33(36–40).
Ms Harris has various bank accounts of her own in which there were amounts totalling about $72,000: Tcpt, 12 December 2019, p 38(17–28). The bulk of this amount is probably what is left from the provision made for her out of the estate of the deceased.
Ms Harris gave evidence of suffering from some medical conditions. (Her evidence would have been taken into account in determining the provision that she received out of the estate of the deceased.)
(Without intending this to be a criticism, the parties made no reference to any published research as to the average costs of maintaining, and educating, a child by, for example, the Australian Institute of Family Studies or by the Social Policy Research Centre at the University of New South Wales. Of course, the Court is not concerned with averages, but with the claim by the applicant for a family provision order, and determining what it is adequate and proper in all of the circumstances of the case.)

The situation in life of the Defendants

Each of the Defendants did not, specifically, raise his, or her, financial resources and needs as at the date of the hearing. In an affidavit made on 29 April 2019, filed in opposition to the claim by Ms Harris, which was read, with the leave of the Court and without opposition or objection, in the current proceedings, the second Defendant disclosed that they then owned “a modest villa home … at East Hills, which has a value of $650,000”; an apartment, in Woolloomooloo, in which the deceased had lived ($750,000), which was subject to a mortgage ($240,000), which is tenanted and the rent from which almost covers mortgage repayments and other outgoings; household items and furniture; and a 2004 Holden Commodore. Each receives a pension of $510 per fortnight.
The second Defendant was asked, in cross-examination, some questions about what had previously been disclosed.
I have taken all of the second Defendant’s evidence on these matters into account, albeit that, in part, it refers to the position in April 2019 and not at the date of the hearing. The competing financial claim of the Defendants is of little weight in the circumstances of the case. Even if I ignored the evidence, because in an email dated 10 January 2019, the solicitor for the Defendants stated “there is no competing claim”, it would not have resulted in any other order being made in the proceedings.

The Legal Principles

I shall next discuss the statutory scheme and what I have described as general principles. I have discussed the general principles in many cases.
The long title to the Act, relevantly, states that it is an Act “… to ensure that adequate provision is made for the members of the family of a deceased person, and certain other persons, from the estate of the deceased person …”.
Section 59(1) of the Act confers jurisdiction on the Court to make a family provision order in relation to the estate of a deceased person if, relevantly in this case, the Court is satisfied as to matters, namely that:

the applicant, the person in whose favour the order may be made, is an eligible person; and

…

at the time when the Court is considering the application, adequate provision for the proper maintenance, education or advancement in life of the applicant has not been made by the Will of the deceased.

Only if satisfied of each of those matters, can the Court then make such order for provision out of the estate of the deceased person as the Court thinks ought to be made for the maintenance, education or advancement in life of the eligible person, having regard to the facts known to the Court at the time the order is made.
An order, unless the Court otherwise orders, takes effect as if the provision was made in a codicil to the will of the deceased person, if the deceased person made a will, or in a will of the deceased person, if the deceased person died intestate: s 72(1) of the Act.
Relevantly, other than by reference to the provision made by the Will of the deceased, s 59(1)(c) of the Act leaves undefined the norm by which the Court must determine whether the provision, if any, is inadequate for an applicant’s proper maintenance, education and advancement in life. The question would appear to be answered by a multi-faceted evaluation that takes the Court, to, amongst other things, the provision made for the applicant in the Will of the deceased, and, in this case, other entitlements which the applicant has received, or will receive, as a result of the death of the deceased person, on the one hand, and to the requirement for maintenance or advancement in life of the applicant on the other. No criteria are prescribed, in the Act, as to the circumstances that do, or do not, constitute inadequate provision for the proper maintenance or advancement in life of the applicant.
The question whether the deceased has made adequate provision for an applicant is a question of objective fact, the determination of which involves an evaluative judgment: Singer v Berghouse (1994) 181 CLR 201 at 210–211 (Mason CJ, Deane and McHugh JJ); [1994] HCA 40; White v Barron (1980) 144 CLR 431 at 434–435 (Barwick CJ, albeit in dissent in the result), 443 (Mason J); [1980] HCA 14.
“Provision” is not defined by the Act, but it was noted in Diver v Neal (2009) 2 ASTLR 89 at 97 [34]; [2009] NSWCA 54 at [34] (Basten JA, Allsop P and Ipp JA agreeing), that the term “covers the many forms of support and assistance which one individual can give to another. That support and assistance will vary over the course of the person’s lifetime”.
The word “adequate” connotes something different from the word “proper”. “Adequate” is concerned with the quantum, described by Rosalind Atherton in “The Concept of Moral Duty in the Law of Family Provision — A Gloss or Critical Understanding?” (1999) 5(1) Australian Journal of Legal History 5, 10, as reached upon “a purely economic and objective basis”, whereas “proper” prescribes the standard of the maintenance, education and advancement in life: Devereaux-Warnes v Hall (No 3) (2007) 35 WAR 127 at 145 [72], 145–146 [77]; [2007] WASCA 235 at [72], [77] (Buss JA, Pullin JA agreeing), which seems to invite more subjective criteria.
In Pontifical Society for the Propagation of the Faith v Scales (1962) 107 CLR 9; [1962] HCA 19, Dixon CJ, at 19, pointed out that the words “adequate” and “proper” are always relative and that what the testator regarded as “superior claims or preferable dispositions” is a relevant consideration:

“The ‘proper’ maintenance and support of a son claiming a statutory provision must be relative to his age, sex, condition and mode of life and situation generally. What is ‘adequate’ must be relative not only to his needs but to his own capacity and resources for meeting them. There is then a relation to be considered between these matters on the one hand, and on the other, the nature, extent and character of the estate and the other demands upon it, and also what the testator regarded as superior claims or preferable dispositions. The words ‘proper maintenance and support’, although they must be treated as elastic, cannot be pressed beyond their fair meaning.”

In Goodman v Windeyer (1980) 144 CLR 490; [1980] HCA 31, Gibbs J (as his Honour then was) (Stephen and Mason JJ agreeing) wrote, at 502:

“… the words ‘adequate’ and ‘proper’ are always relative. There are no fixed standards, and the court is left to form opinions upon the basis of its own general knowledge and experience of current social conditions and standards.” (citations omitted)

In Vigolo v Bostin (2005) 221 CLR 191 at 228 [114]; [2005] HCA 11 at [114], Callinan and Heydon JJ wrote:

“… the use of the word ‘proper’ … implies something beyond mere dollars and cents. Its use, it seems to us, invites consideration of all of the relevant surrounding circumstances and would entitle a court to have regard to a promise of the kind which was made here … The use of the word ‘proper’ means that attention may be given, in deciding whether adequate provision has been made, to such matters as what used to be called the ‘station in life’ of the parties and the expectations to which that has given rise, in other words reciprocal claims and duties based upon how the parties lived and might reasonably expect to have lived in the future.”

As Callinan and Heydon JJ also emphasised, at [115], the concept of maintenance, for family provision purposes, may imply continuity of a pre-existing state of affairs. At [122], their Honours added that the question of the adequacy of the provision made by the deceased “is not to be decided in a vacuum, or by looking simply to the question whether the applicant has enough upon which to survive or live comfortably”. The inquiry is not confined only to the material circumstances of the applicant. It is a broader concept, which requires consideration of matters necessary to guard against unforeseen contingencies. The whole of the context must be examined.
White J (as his Honour then was), in Slack v Rogan; Palffy v Rogan (2013) 85 NSWLR 253 at 283–284 [123]; [2013] NSWSC 522, wrote, at [123]:

“The question of what level of maintenance or advancement in life is ‘proper’ depends on all of the circumstances of the case including ‘the applicant’s financial position, the size and nature of the deceased’s estate, the totality of the relationship between the applicant and the deceased, and the relationship between the deceased and other persons who have legitimate claims upon his or her bounty’: Singer v Berghouse (1994) 181 CLR 201 at 210.”

In Ilott v The Blue Cross [2018] AC 545 at 564–565 [14]–[15]; [2017] UKSC 17, a claim by an estranged adult daughter under the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975 (UK) c 63, Lord Hughes JSC (Lord Neuberger PSC, Baroness Hale DPSC, Lord Kerr, Lord Clarke, Lord Wilson and Lord Sumption JJSC, agreeing), in defining “maintenance”, wrote, at [14]–[15]:

“The concept of maintenance is no doubt broad, but the distinction made by the differing paragraphs of section 1(2) shows that it cannot extend to any or every thing which it would be desirable for the claimant to have. It must import provision to meet the everyday expenses of living … The summary of Browne-Wilkinson J in In re Dennis, decd [1981] 2 All ER 140, 145–146 is helpful and has often been cited with approval:
‘… in my judgment the word ‘maintenance’ connotes only payments which, directly or indirectly, enable the applicant in the future to discharge the cost of his daily living at whatever standard of living is appropriate to him. The provision that is to be made is to meet recurring expenses, being expenses of living of an income nature. This does not mean that the provision need be by way of income payments. The provision can be by way of a lump sum, for example, to buy a house in which the applicant can be housed, thereby relieving him pro tanto of income expenditure. Nor am I suggesting that there may not be cases in which payment of existing debts may not be appropriate as a maintenance payment; for example, to pay the debts of an applicant in order to enable him to continue to carry on a profit-making business or profession may well be for his maintenance.’

…
The level at which maintenance may be provided for is clearly flexible and falls to be assessed on the facts of each case. It is not limited to subsistence level. Nor, although maintenance is by definition the provision of income rather than capital, need it necessarily be provided for by way of periodical payments, for example under a trust … As Browne-Wilkinson J envisaged (obiter) in In re Dennis (above) there is no reason why the provision of housing should not be maintenance in some cases; families have for generations provided for the maintenance of relatives, and indeed for others such as former employees, by housing them …”

Whether the disposition of the deceased’s estate is not such as to make adequate provision for the proper maintenance, education or advancement in life of the applicant will always, as a practical matter, also involve an evaluation of the provision, if any, made for the applicant on the one hand, and the applicant’s “needs” that cannot be met from her, or his, own resources on the other: Hunter v Hunter (1987) 8 NSWLR 573 at 575 (Kirby P, Hope JA agreeing). This statement is not intended to suggest that an applicant’s “needs”, when compared with the provision made for him or her, should be the dominant consideration. The existence, or absence, of “needs” which an applicant cannot meet from his, or her, own resources will always be highly relevant, and quite often decisive, as the statutory formulation, and therefore, the issue in every case, is whether the disposition of the deceased’s estate was not such as to make adequate provision for her or his proper maintenance, education and advancement in life: Singer v Berghouse at 227 (Gaudron J, albeit in dissent in the result); Bkassini v Sarkis [2017] NSWSC 1487 at [296]–[297] (Robb J).
In Devereaux-Warnes v Hall (No 3), at [81]–[84], Buss JA (as his Honour then was) wrote:

“The term ‘need’ has been used to refer to the claimant's inability to satisfy his or her financial requirements from his or her own resources. See Singer per Gaudron J at 227.
‘Need’ has also been used in the context of a value judgment or conclusion, namely, that the claimant is ‘in need’ of maintenance, etc, because inadequate provision has been made for his or her proper maintenance, etc. See Gorton v Parks (1989) 17 NSWLR 1 per Bryson J at 10-11.
The determination of whether the disposition of the deceased's estate was not such as to make adequate provision for the proper maintenance, etc, of the claimant will always, as a practical matter, involve an evaluation of the provision, if any, made for the claimant on the one hand, and the claimant's ‘needs’ that cannot be met from his or her own resources on the other. See Hunter per Kirby P at 575.

Although the existence or absence of ‘needs’ which the claimant cannot meet from his or her own resources will always be highly relevant and, often, decisive, the statutory formulation, and therefore the issue in every case, is whether the disposition of the deceased's estate was not such as to make adequate provision for his or her proper maintenance, etc. See Singer per Gaudron J at 227. Compare Gorton per Bryson J at 6-11; Collicoat v McMillan [1999] 3 VR 803 per Ormiston J at 816 [38], 820 [47].”

However, as will be read, s 60 of the Act invites the Court to have regard to various matters, including, but not limited to, financial need: s 60(2)(d). If the Court does so, as will also be read, one of the purposes for which that is done is for determining “the nature of any [family provision] order”: s 60(1)(b) of the Act.
No doubt, this has prompted White J (as his Honour then was) to write, in Sam Wardy v Gordon Salier; William Wardy v Gordon Salier; Hassiba Wardy v Estate of late Edmond Wadih Wardy developer and Ch 3 of the Succession Act 2006 [2014] NSWSC 473, at [147], that “… the need a claimant must demonstrate is a need for ‘proper’ maintenance, education and advancement in life”, but that does not mean that “… adequate provision for proper maintenance and advancement in life implies no more than provision for the necessities of life, irrespective of the size of the estate and the effect, if any, of an order for provision on others …”. Respectfully, I agree.
Of course, “need” is a relative concept: de Angelis v de Angelis [2003] VSC 432 at [45] (Dodds-Streeton J). It is different from “want” and does not simply mean “demand” or “desire”. The latent difference between the words was stated by Lord Neuberger (the former President of the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom), in the House of Lords decision, R (on the application of M) v Slough Borough Council [2008] 1 WLR 1808 at 1825 [54]; [2008] UKHL 52 at [54]:

“‘Need’ is a more flexible word than it might first appear. ‘In need of’ plainly means more than merely ‘want’, but it falls far short of ‘cannot survive without’.”

In Boettcher v Driscoll (2014) 119 SASR 523 at 530 [41]; [2014] SASC 86 at [41], David J added:

“‘Need’ is not so synonymous with ‘want’ such that the two are interchangeable.”

Whilst it does not extend to any, or every, thing, that it would be desirable for the applicant to have, no narrow view of what is encompassed by the concept of “need” is should be adopted. In Gorton v Parks (1989) 17 NSWLR 1, Bryson J (as his Honour then was) commented at 8 that “[i]t does not seem possible to give a complete or exhaustive statement of the concept”.
Furthermore, the following observations of Basten JA (Simpson and Payne JJA agreeing) in Chan v Chan (2016) 15 ASTLR 317 at 324 [22]; [2016] NSWCA 222 at [22], should be borne in mind:

“However, it is important not to elide the distinction between needs and adequate provision; the former is but one indicator of the latter. The adequacy of provision is not to be determined by a calculation of financial needs. The background to any consideration of the appellant’s needs require[s] determination of the size of the estate and the claims of others on the beneficence of the testator.”

If the Court is satisfied, at the time when the Court is considering the application, that adequate provision for the proper maintenance, education or advancement in life of the applicant has not been made by the Will of the deceased, it determines whether to make an order for provision and what provision ought to be made.
Section 60 of the Act provides:

“(1) The Court may have regard to the matters set out in subsection (2) for the purpose of determining:
(a) whether the person in whose favour the order is sought to be made (the applicant) is an eligible person, and
(b) whether to make a family provision order and the nature of any such order.

(2) The following matters may be considered by the Court:
(a) any family or other relationship between the applicant and the deceased person, including the nature and duration of the relationship,
(b) the nature and extent of any obligations or responsibilities owed by the deceased person to the applicant, to any other person in respect of whom an application has been made for a family provision order or to any beneficiary of the deceased person’s estate,
(c) the nature and extent of the deceased person’s estate (including any property that is, or could be, designated as notional estate of the deceased person) and of any liabilities or charges to which the estate is subject, as in existence when the application is being considered,
(d) the financial resources (including earning capacity) and financial needs, both present and future, of the applicant, of any other person in respect of whom an application has been made for a family provision order or of any beneficiary of the deceased person’s estate,
(e) if the applicant is cohabiting with another person—the financial circumstances of the other person,
(f) any physical, intellectual or mental disability of the applicant, any other person in respect of whom an application has been made for a family provision order or any beneficiary of the deceased person’s estate that is in existence when the application is being considered or that may reasonably be anticipated,
(g) the age of the applicant when the application is being considered,
(h) any contribution (whether financial or otherwise) by the applicant to the acquisition, conservation and improvement of the estate of the deceased person or to the welfare of the deceased person or the deceased person’s family, whether made before or after the deceased person’s death, for which adequate consideration (not including any pension or other benefit) was not received, by the applicant,
(i) any provision made for the applicant by the deceased person, either during the deceased person’s lifetime or made from the deceased person’s estate,
(j) any evidence of the testamentary intentions of the deceased person, including evidence of statements made by the deceased person,
(k) whether the applicant was being maintained, either wholly or partly, by the deceased person before the deceased person’s death and, if the Court considers it relevant, the extent to which and the basis on which the deceased person did so,
(l) whether any other person is liable to support the applicant,
(m) the character and conduct of the applicant before and after the date of the death of the deceased person,
(n) the conduct of any other person before and after the date of the death of the deceased person,
(o) any relevant Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander customary law,
(p) any other matter the Court considers relevant, including matters in existence at the time of the deceased person’s death or at the time the application is being considered.”

It can be seen that s 60(2) enumerates 15 specific matters, described by Basten JA in Andrew v Andrew (2012) 81 NSWLR 656 at 665 [37]; [2012] NSWCA 308 at [37], as a “multifactorial list”, and by Lindsay J in Verzar v Verzar [2012] NSWSC 1380 at [123], as “a valuable prompt” to which the Court may have regard, together with “any other matter the Court considers relevant”, for the purpose of determining whether the applicant is an “eligible person”, whether a family provision order should be made, and if so, the nature of any such order.
In Chapple v Wilcox (2014) 87 NSWLR 646 at 649 [7]; [2014] NSWCA 392 at [7], Basten JA (Gleeson JA agreeing) wrote:

“Section 60 of the Succession Act spells out the matters which the court may have regard to in determining whether the claimant ‘is an eligible person’ and whether to make a family provision order: s 60(1). Most of the factors listed in s 60(2) will be irrelevant in relation to whether the applicant is an eligible person, a matter largely dependent upon the language of s 57. The matters set out must be available considerations in relation to both limbs of s 59(1) dealing with a family provision order, namely par (b) and par (c). Section 60 provides no assistance in relation to the different considerations which may arise in respect of each paragraph of s 59(1). The factors are also relevant to the determination of the ‘nature of any such order’, which presumably includes the discretionary element to be found in s 59(2): s 60(1)(b).”

The section does not prioritise the catalogue of matters that may be taken into account. No matter is more, or less, important than any other. The weight of each of the matters specified in the section, which may be taken into account, will depend upon the facts of the particular case. There is no mandatory command to take into account any of the matters enumerated. None of the matters listed are, necessarily, of decisive significance, and none differentiate, in their application, between classes of eligible person. Similarly, there is no distinction based on gender. The sub-section makes clear, since other matters may be taken into account, that the jurisdiction is not exclusively needs-based.
It can be seen that the sub-sections more readily accommodate objective facts rather than just the facts known to the deceased, and some of the sub-sections also accommodate events occurring after the death of the deceased.
The section does not say how the matters listed are to be used to determine the matters identified in s 60(1). Considering each of the relevant matters does not prescribe a particular result, and whilst there is likely to be a substantial overlap in the matters that the Court may take into account when determining the answers to what is posed in s 60(1), those matters are not identical.
A reference to some of the matters in s 60(2) not only permits, but requires, a comparison to be made between the respective positions of the applicant and any other eligible person, as well as of any beneficiary, whilst others do not. Importantly, also, many of the matters in sub-section (2), of themselves, are incapable of providing an answer to the questions posed in s 60(1).
Leaving aside the question of eligibility, the matters referred to in s 60(2) may be considered on what has been described as “the discretionary question”, namely whether to make an order and the nature of that order. Importantly, under s 60(2), attention is drawn to matters that may have existed at the deceased’s death, or subsequently.
The Court should, and does, give considerable weight to the deceased’s wishes in recognition of the better position in which he was placed. Of course, “[t]his is subject to the qualification that the Court’s determination under s 59(1)(c) and s 59(2) is to be made having regard to the circumstances at the time the court is considering the application, rather than at the time of the deceased’s death or will”: Slack v Rogan; Palffy v Rogan at [127] (White J).
Dixon CJ, in Pontifical Society for the Propagation of the Faith v Scales, at 19, commented upon the consideration that was to be given to the deceased’s wishes:

“The words ‘proper maintenance and support’, although they must be treated as elastic, cannot be pressed beyond their fair meaning. The Court is given not only a discretion as to the nature and amount of the provision it directs, but, what is even more important, a discretion as to making a provision at all. All authorities agree that it was never meant that the Court should re-write the will of a testator. Nor was it ever intended that the freedom of testamentary disposition should be so encroached upon that a testator's decisions expressed in his will have only a prima facie effect, the real dispositive power being vested in the Court.”

In Stott v Cook (1960) 33 ALJR 447 at 453–454, Taylor J, although dissenting in his determination of the case, observed that the Court did not have a mandate to re-work a Will according to its own notions of fairness. His Honour added:

“There is, in my opinion, no reason for thinking that justice is better served by the application of abstract principles of fairness than by acceptance of the judgment of a competent testator whose knowledge of the virtues and failings of the members of his family equips him for the responsibility of disposing of his estate in far better measure than can be afforded to a court by a few pages of affidavits sworn after his death and which only too frequently provide but an incomplete and shallow reflection of family relations and characteristics. All this is, of course, subject to the proviso that an order may be made if it appears that the testator has failed to discharge a duty to make provision for the maintenance, education or advancement of his widow or children. But it must appear, firstly, that such a duty existed and, secondly, that it has not been discharged.” (emphasis in original)

In Vigolo v Bostin, at [10], Gleeson CJ pointed out that the relevant legislation did not confer new rights of succession and did not create legal rights of inheritance. Rather, his Honour explained:

“It preserved freedom of testamentary disposition, but subjected that freedom to a new qualification. The statute gave courts a discretionary power to make orders which would have the legal effect of altering the provisions of wills.”

In Goodsell v Wellington [2011] NSWSC 1232 at [108], I also noted that:

“Freedom of testamentary disposition remains a prominent feature of the Australian legal system. Its significance is both practical and symbolic and should not be underestimated.”

The Act, however, must be applied according to its terms, and is not confined by notions of reluctance to interfere with freedom of testation. There is no predisposition for, or against, the making of orders for provision for an applicant, and each claim must be dealt with on its merits based on the evidence before the Court.
As was stated by Brereton JA (Simpson AJA agreeing) in Steinmetz v Shannon (2019) 368 ALR 161 at 181 [97]; [2019] NSWCA 114 at [97]:

“The statutory family provision jurisdiction is not to be exercised on the footing that it must be approached with great caution because of its intrusion on testamentary freedom. Rather, the statute is to be given full operation according to its terms, notwithstanding that it encroaches on testamentary freedom.”

Some Additional Principles

Accepting that no two cases will be exactly alike, there are some general principles that may be stated. Whilst most of these principles were stated in the context of the former Act, they are equally apt in a claim brought pursuant to the Act. Other judges, and I, have repeated them in many cases under the Act.
The Court’s discretion in making an order is not untrammelled, or to be exercised according to idiosyncratic notions of what is thought to be fair, or in such a way as to transgress, unnecessarily, upon the deceased’s freedom of testation: Pontifical Society for the Propagation of the Faith v Scales at 19 (Dixon CJ); McKenzie v Topp [2004] VSC 90 at [63] (Nettle J).
Bryson J noted in Gorton v Parks, at 6, that it is not appropriate to endeavour to achieve “an overall fair” division of the deceased’s estate. It is not part of the Court’s function to achieve some kind of equity between the various claimants.
As Pembroke J repeated in Sung v Malaxos [2015] NSWSC 186 at [5]:

“Fairness and equality are not touchstones for relief under the Succession Act.”

Of course, in considering the question, the nature and content of what is adequate provision for the proper maintenance, education and advancement in life of an applicant, is not fixed or static. Rather, it is a flexible concept, the measure of which should be adapted to conform with what is considered to be right and proper according to contemporary accepted community standards: Pontifical Society for the Propagation of the Faith v Scales at 19 (Dixon CJ); Walker v Walker (Supreme Court (NSW), Young J, 17 May 1996, unrep) at 30–31; Stern v Sekers; Sekers v Sekers [2010] NSWSC 59 at [269]–[274] (Ward J).
In all cases under the Act, what is adequate and proper provision is necessarily fact specific: Sgro v Thompson [2017] NSWCA 326 at [67] (White JA, McColl and Payne JJA agreeing).
The size of the estate is a consideration in determining an application for provision. However, its size does not justify the Court re-writing the deceased’s Will in accordance with its own ideas of justice and fairness: Bowyer v Wood (2007) 99 SASR 190 at 202–203 [41]; [2007] SASC 327 at [41] (Debelle J, Nyland and Anderson JJ agreeing); Borebor v Keane (2013) 11 ASTLR 96 at 110 [67]; [2013] VSC 35 at [67] (Hargrave J).
The role of the Court is not “to address wounded feelings or to salve the pain of disappointed expectations” that the applicant might feel: Heyward v Fisher (Court of Appeal (NSW), Kirby P, 26 April 1985, unrep).
In Foley v Ellis, at [88], Sackville AJA (Beazley and Basten JJA agreeing) noted that Singer v Berghouse:

“… strongly suggests that the court cannot consider the propriety and adequacy (or inadequacy) of any testamentary provision for an applicant in isolation from the resources and needs of other claimants on the deceased’s bounty. These claimants include other beneficiaries entitled to a share of the deceased’s estate, whether or not they themselves have made a claim under the Family Provision Act.”

In Bosch v Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd [1938] AC 463, Lord Romer (delivering the advice of the Privy Council) observed, at 483, that the exercise of the discretionary power given to the court “must always be one of great difficulty and delicacy” and “must always be one largely of guess-work, especially in a case … which is concerned with children of tender age of whose needs in the future nothing can be predicted with any certainty”.

Bare paternity

In Nicholls v Hall, the Court of Appeal of New South Wales dealt with a case involving bare paternity. At [43]–[48], the Court wrote:

“There are some statements in the cases that could be understood as meaning that, if there is nothing more than ‘bare paternity’ in factor (1), the relationship between the applicant and the deceased, then the applicant cannot succeed. In our opinion, such an understanding would be plainly wrong. Even if a deceased never even knew of the existence of a child, if that child had a strong case on the other factors (that is, needs, size of estate and lack of competing claims), a court could find that that child was left without adequate provision for proper maintenance.
Such a view is supported by what Holland J said in Kleinig v Neal (No 2) [1981] 2 NSWLR 532 at 540:
If it is a case of a parent and child, another circumstance is that the parent was responsible for bringing the child into the world and having done so assumed a duty to be concerned for the child’s welfare.

We should make it clear that, in this discussion of ‘bare paternity’, we are not intending to include a mere sperm donor: in terms of Holland J’s statement, it is the persons who make use of the sperm rather than the sperm donor who are responsible for bringing a child into the world.
Our view is also supported by what Bryson J said in Gorton v Parks (1989) 17 NSWLR 1 at 9–10, to the effect that ‘the bare fact of paternity’ is ‘of very great importance in morality’. We agree with Bryson J’s justification for departure from what Dixon CJ said on the matter in Pontifical Society for the Propagation of the Faith v Scales [1962] HCA 19; (1962) 107 CLR 9 at 18–20, as conforming to changing beliefs in the community about moral duties to children.
It is supported also by what Ipp JA (with whom Tobias JA and Basten JA agreed) said in Palmer v Dolman [2005] NSWCA 361 at [112], to the effect that where an applicant is a child, proof that the applicant is a person in need will often be sufficient to justify an order.
We accept there is a suggestion to the contrary in Hughes v Hughes (NSWCA 6 June 1989) where Meagher JA (with whom Hope JA and Samuels JA concurred) said this:
Her right arises not merely from the bare fact of parenthood, which of itself does not generate a right, but from the general circumstances of the case: namely, parenthood, the performance of normal filial duties in the ten years after she left school and in the two periods between her early trips and in her professed and continued willingness to be of whatever assistance to her father she could be.

We do not understand an applicant to have a ‘right’ in any clear sense, in any event. It is only if an applicant satisfies the Court that he or she has been left without adequate provision for proper maintenance, and satisfies the Court that provision ought to be made, that it then can be said, in a loose sense, that the applicant has a right to an order. However, that right must depend, not merely on matters concerning the relationship between an applicant and the deceased, but on matters concerning the other three elements that we referred to, namely the applicant’s needs, the nature and extent of the deceased’s estate, and other legitimate claims. We do not think the passage from Hughes v Hughes should be read as meaning that entitlement can never be established if the only factor that appears in the relationship aspect of the claim is the bare fact of parenthood.”

More recently, Robb J in Lado Causillas v NSW Trustee and Guardian [2015] NSWSC 1204 at [337], wrote that “[t]he parent’s responsibility for bringing the child into the world leads to the assumption of a duty to be concerned for the child’s welfare that may entitle the child to the making of a family provision order, even in an extreme case where the parent did not become aware of the birth of the child”.
His Honour added:

“The entitlement to an appropriate family provision order does not, however, flow from the mere fact of a parental relationship. All relevant circumstances must be taken into account …”

Yet, just because a child has been neglected during the joint lives of the parent and the child, the Court should not, necessarily, right the wrong thereby done, by granting an order for provision out of the parent’s estate without reference to the requirements of the Act. Provision should not be made merely for the purpose of holding a deceased person to account for what might be regarded as unacceptable behaviour during his, or her, lifetime (although, of course, a deceased person’s conduct may be considered in determining whether to make a family provision order and the nature of any such order). The focus of the Act is not to somehow punish the deceased, or to provide for reparations in order to right past wrongs, or to compensate the Plaintiff for the deceased's limitations as a parent.
As I wrote in Savic v Kim [2010] NSWSC 1401 at [82]:

“It is not the purpose of the Act to punish, or redress, past bad, or unfeeling parental behaviour, where that behaviour does not still impinge on the applicant’s present financial situation.”

This does not mean that the deceased’s conduct will be irrelevant to his, or her, duty to make provision for an applicant. Where that conduct has the effect of depriving an applicant for provision of opportunities in life, or otherwise, and there is some causal connection between it and the applicant’s need for provision, the court may take that into account in determining whether proper provision has been made: Litchfield v Smith [2010] VSC 466 at [57] (Hargrave J).

Qualifications on “Principles”

As long ago as 1980, in White v Barron, at 440, Stephen J wrote:

“[T]his jurisdiction is pre-eminently one in which the trial judge's exercise of discretion should not be unduly confined by judge-made rules of purportedly general application.”

As I have stated in many cases (see, for example, Bowditch v NSW Trustee and Guardian [2012] NSWSC 275 at [117]) I do not intend what I have described as “principles” or “general principles” to be elevated into rules of law, propositions of universal application, or rigid formulae. Nor do I wish to suggest that the jurisdiction should be unduly confined, or the discretion should be constrained, by statements of principle found in dicta in other decisions, or by preconceptions and predispositions. Decisions of the past do not, and cannot, put any fetters on the discretionary power, which is left largely unfettered. I do not intend what is provided as a guide to be turned into a tyrant.
It is necessary for the Court, in each case, after having had regard to the matters that the Act permits it to consider, to determine what is adequate and proper in all the circumstances of the particular case. In addition, in each case, a close consideration of the facts is necessary in order to determine whether the basis for a family provision order has been established. Cases must be resolved on a “case by case basis” as each involves different classes of applicant, different factual circumstances and different competing claims by others upon the estate of the deceased. Every case is different and must be decided on its own facts.
The importance of the qualifications to which I have referred have been stressed in Chapple v Wilcox, by Basten JA, at [18]–[20], and by Barrett JA, at [66]–[67]; in Burke v Burke (No 2) (2015) 13 ASTLR 313 at 329 [84]–[85]; [2015] NSWCA 195 at [84]–[85] (Ward JA, Meagher and Emmett JJA agreeing); in Yee v Yee [2017] NSWCA 305 at [172] (McColl JA, Gleeson and Simpson JJA agreeing); and recently, by White JA, in Steinmetz v Shannon, at [37]. They must be remembered.

Determination

What is written below should be read as a continuation of what has been written above. I have dealt with the matters in s 60(2) that are relevant and to which I have had regard.
This is a case that does not readily fit the paradigm of an estranged relationship between child and parent. There was never an opportunity for the Plaintiff to engage socially, or otherwise, with the deceased, an opportunity which, for reasons good or bad, the deceased did not permit.
I am satisfied that the deceased did have an obligation, or responsibility, to make provision for the Plaintiff, who was his only child. Whilst the deceased did abandon him emotionally and physically (for which the Plaintiff bears no responsibility), he did comply with his legal obligation to make a contribution to the Plaintiff’s maintenance. By the terms of his Will, he provided for the continuation of that contribution, on certain terms, until the Plaintiff attained the age of 18 years. In so doing, the deceased, himself, recognised an obligation to the Plaintiff.
However, even if the deceased did repudiate his obligation to the Plaintiff during their joint lifetimes, and as the Court has found, was subject to an obligation to provide for the Plaintiff on his death, I am satisfied that he did meet that obligation in the events that have occurred.
This is not a case where the Plaintiff has not received any provision, or provision only by way of financial support necessary for the maintenance of the Plaintiff. What the Plaintiff has received, as a result of the death of the deceased, even though not pursuant to the Will of the deceased, or out of his estate, is a matter, at the time the application is being considered, that the Court considers very relevant.
Had the Plaintiff received no provision by way of lump sum provision, I would have concluded that the deceased, at no stage, had given the Plaintiff any assistance (financial or otherwise) towards making his own way in life, having made only the compulsory child support payments, and also that the totality of the circumstances would compel a finding that the jurisdictional question should be answered in the Plaintiff’s favour. In such circumstances, consideration would have had to be given by the following views expressed by Lindsay J in Estate Hemmes; Cameron v Mead [2018] NSWSC 85 at [56]:

“The defendants’ contention that the Court should not be satisfied of the essential element of the plaintiff’s claim for which s 59(1)(c) of the Succession Act provides must be rejected. No provision was made for the plaintiff in the deceased’s will. Neither a person guided by wisdom and justice, nor a person guided by current community standards, could reasonably conclude that the deceased’s bare payment of child support payments, under compulsion of law, has left the plaintiff with adequate provision, etc, from the estate, or notional estate, of a father of the deceased’s affluence. The plaintiff is a young man, unaided by paternal support beyond child support payments, who certainly has the advantages of youth and potential, but accompanied by a lack of substantial wealth that commonly accompanies youth. The defendants’ primary case (that the plaintiff’s summons should be dismissed) must fail.”

That conclusion would have required additional provision, by way of a capital sum, to be made for the Plaintiff’s education and advancement in life.
However, that hypothetical situation does not arise in this case. Here, the Plaintiff has received, or will receive, as a result of the death of the deceased and of him being a member of two different superannuation funds prior to his death, amounts of capital in excess of $430,000. Those amounts together, are more than the value of the gross distributable estate out of which an order for additional provision could have been made.
Whether the Plaintiff, in that hypothetical situation, would have received any additional income by way of maintenance, is less clear, as it cannot be forgotten, as previously written, that, generally speaking, it is both parents who have the primary duty or responsibility to maintain their child or children and on the present evidence, the Plaintiff is receiving, and will continue to receive, a reasonable amount of income by way of financial support.
The Plaintiff has a current entitlement to an income of about $667 per fortnight until he attains the age of 18 years, and in relation to part of the income (about $309 per fortnight), it continues to the age of 25 years provided he engages in full-time education: Tcpt, 12 December 2019, p 67(01–27). Furthermore, properly invested, for example by way of term deposit, there would also be some income received on, at least part of, the lump sums that have been received for the Plaintiff’s benefit.
It cannot also be forgotten that under s 43(1) of the Trustee Act 1925 (NSW), where any property is held in trust for a person who is for the time being an infant for any interest whatsoever, whether vested or contingent, and whether absolute or liable to be divested, the trustee may, at the trustee's sole discretion, pay to the parent or guardian, if any, of the infant, or to the person with whom the infant is for the time being residing, or otherwise apply to the whole or any part of the income of the property, for or towards the maintenance, education or benefit of the infant.
Under s 44 of the Trustee Act, unless there is a contrary intention expressed in the trust instrument, the trustee has power to apply capital, up to one half of the beneficiary's share of the estate, for the advancement or benefit of such person or, where that person is an infant, for their maintenance, education, advancement or benefit: s 44(1). However, the power to apply capital for the maintenance or education of an infant shall not be exercised where the property, or the infant’s share thereof, exceeds $4,000: s 44(1A).
There is a substantial financial foundation established, as a result of the death of the deceased, for the Plaintiff, during the approximately 4 years remaining of childhood, and also thereafter. No specific “needs” were identified that could not be met from the funds that are, or will be, available, and I am unable, on the evidence, to find any such needs.
Although the deceased’s best opportunity to support the Plaintiff had passed by the end of the deceased’s life, I was not satisfied that adequate and proper provision for the Plaintiff’s maintenance, education and advancement in life had not been made by the deceased. It followed that the Plaintiff had not satisfied the Court of this necessary element with the result that his proceedings should be dismissed.
What has been described as the “jurisdictional question” was not answered in favour of the Plaintiff. It followed that it was unnecessary for the Court to decide what provision ought to be made out of the deceased’s estate for the Plaintiff.
I tested the conclusion reached by asking the hypothetical question whether, had all of the capital amounts that have been paid to the Plaintiff been paid to the estate, would the Plaintiff have received a family provision order out of the deceased’s estate that is greater than what he has actually received, and will receive, as a result of the death of the deceased? I concluded that the answer would be in the negative.
For all of these reasons, I ordered that the Plaintiff’s Summons should be dismissed.

The Costs of the Proceedings

Counsel for the Defendants handed up the Offer of Compromise (to which I have referred). I then, immediately, heard submissions on costs, following which the Plaintiff was ordered to pay the Defendants’ costs, up to 19 June 2019, calculated on the ordinary basis, and to pay the Defendants’ costs, calculated on the indemnity basis, of the proceedings, from 20 June 2019. In fact, ordinary costs should be paid up to 20 June 2019 (not 19 June 2019) and indemnity costs should be paid from 21 June 2019 (not 20 June 2019). That error will be rectified under the slip rule: UCPR, r 36.17.
I turn now to the reasons for the decision made on the costs of the proceedings.
UCPR r 20.26 refers to offers of compromise. There was no dispute that the Offer of Compromise served by the Defendants’ solicitors complied with UCPR r 20.26. There was also no dispute that the offer of compromise that had been made contained a genuine compromise at the time at which the offer was made. Nor did senior counsel for the Plaintiff dispute that the Offer of Compromise specified the period of time within which the offer was open for acceptance: UCPR, r 20.26(2)(f). Finally, it is clear that this offer, if accepted, upon the making of an order in accordance with it, was capable of bringing the proceedings to an end.
UCPR r 42.20(1) provides that if the Court makes an order for the dismissal of proceedings, then unless the Court otherwise orders, the Plaintiff must pay the Defendant’s costs of the proceedings to the extent to which the proceedings have been dismissed.
Part 42, Division 3 of the UCPR, relates to “proceedings in respect of which an offer of compromise (the offer) is made under rule 20.26 with respect to a plaintiff's claim (the claim)”: UCPR, r 42.13.
UCPR rule 42.15A relevantly provides:

(1) This rule applies if the offer is made by the defendant, but not accepted by the plaintiff, and the defendant obtains an order or judgment on the claim no less favourable to the defendant than the terms of the offer.
(2) Unless the court orders otherwise—
(a) the defendant is entitled to an order against the plaintiff for the defendant's costs in respect of the claim, to be assessed on the ordinary basis, up to the time from which the defendant becomes entitled to costs under paragraph (b), and
(b) the defendant is entitled to an order against the plaintiff for the defendant's costs in respect of the claim, assessed on an indemnity basis—
(i) if the offer was made before the first day of the trial, as from the beginning of the day following the day on which the offer was made, and
(ii) if the offer was made on or after the first day of the trial, as from 11 am on the day following the day on which the offer was made.

The effect of these rules, in this case, was that the Plaintiff must bear the Defendants’ costs of the proceedings for the family provision order, unless the Court otherwise orders. The Court can only order otherwise if there is a discretionary decision to depart from what the UCPR provide.
In circumstances where an offer of compromise has been made, but not accepted, and that party has obtained a judgment no less favourable than the terms of the offer, there is a clear onus on the recipient of the offer to persuade the Court that indemnity costs should not be ordered. Here, the Plaintiff was required to demonstrate the basis on which an order should be made denying the Defendants’ entitlement to indemnity costs.
In Chapple v Wilcox, at [27], Basten JA wrote:

“Whether or not an unsuccessful applicant should be allowed to litigate without expense to the estate will depend on a variety of circumstances. There is always a discretion in the court when making an order pursuant to s 98 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW). The discretion conferred on the court by that provision is subject to the rules of court (s 98(1)) and thus to r 42.1 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW), which provides that costs will follow the event unless it appears to the court that some other order should be made. That rule is not disapplied in relation to family provision orders. Nor should applicants for such orders have any expectation that, as a general rule, the discretion will be applied so as to exempt them from liability for costs incurred by an estate in the case of an unsuccessful application. In some cases applicants will already be beneficiaries of the estate and may thus have some incentive to ensure that the costs of litigation are kept within tight bounds. However, that is not always the case. Where an applicant is entirely unsuccessful, an order that he or she should pay the costs of the estate may well be the appropriate order.”

Kunc J in Bates v Cooke (No 2) [2014] NSWSC 1322 wrote, at [33]:

“Taking into account the language of r 42.15A, a party seeking to persuade the court to order otherwise must identify some feature or features of one or more of the proceedings, the claim, the offer (including, for example, when it was made) and the order or judgment obtained by the successful party which provide a rational basis for the court to displace what the rule specifies is the costs order to which ‘the defendant is entitled’.”

(An appeal from the substantive judgment of Kunc J was dismissed in Bates v Cooke (2015) 14 ASTLR 221; [2015] NSWCA 278. Other than one mention of the costs judgment in Sackville AJA’s judgment on appeal at [16], nothing was written by the Court of Appeal about the costs judgment.)
In Meres v Meres (No 2) [2017] NSWSC 523 at [43]–[44], I wrote:

“From the authorities, it appears the question for determination regarding the effect of what is said to be an Offer of Compromise involves a two-stage process. The first stage is to enquire whether the offer made is an ‘Offer of Compromise’ at all, within the meaning of the UCPR. This will depend, in part, on whether it satisfies the formal requirements laid down by UCPR rule 20.26. It also depends, in part, on whether the offer made is one that can truly be called a ‘compromise’.
If the court concludes that the offer which is made is an ‘Offer of Compromise’ within the meaning of the Rules, and that the offer made is one that can truly be called a compromise, then UCPR rule 42.15A(2) operates to establish a ‘default’ position, relevantly that, if the defendant obtains a judgment no less favourable than that which the defendant had offered to accept, then indemnity costs would follow. It is then that the second stage of the process arises, in that the court can ‘otherwise order’. The court will ‘otherwise order’ if it is persuaded that is appropriate, in the interests of justice, that the ‘default’ position ought not apply: Manly Council v Bryne (No 2) [2004] NSWCA 227, per Campbell JA, at [10]; Evans v Braddock (No 2) [2015] NSWSC 518, at [52].”

Senior counsel for the Plaintiff was unable to identify any feature, or features, which provide a rational basis for the Court to displace what the rule specifies is the costs order to which the Defendants are entitled. Indeed, he simply put that the tutor, “under advice, thought that it was not appropriate to accept [the offer] … She made a bad call …”: Tcpt, 12 December 2019, p 73(16–24).
There was no evidence given about the nature of the advice given to the tutor of the Plaintiff regarding the prospects of success of the proceedings. She had retained experienced legal practitioners, indeed, senior counsel, to act for her throughout the proceedings. Her legal representatives would have been unlikely to have advised her that there was little risk, and probably much to be gained, in making the claim because even if the claim failed, the Plaintiff would be very likely to get his costs out of the estate, or that the tutor would not be significantly out of pocket if a costs order was made if the Plaintiff was unsuccessful in obtaining an order for provision. Undoubtedly, they would also have advised the tutor of the possible consequences of refusing the Offer of Compromise.

In Leach v The Nominal Defendant (QBE Insurance (Australia) Ltd) (No 2) [2014] NSWCA 391, McColl JA (Gleeson JA and Sackville AJA agreeing) repeated an observation of Gleeson CJ (as his Honour then was) in New South Wales Insurance Ministerial Corporation v Reeve (1993) 42 NSWLR 100 at 102, in relation to an earlier version of UCPR r 42.14, that it is impossible exhaustively to state the circumstances in which the discretion to depart from the prima facie rule might be exercised, and then wrote, at [48]:

“The mere fact that it was reasonable for the litigant to take the view that he or she did in rejecting the offer is not enough to displace the rule ... However that does not mean that reasonableness of the rejection is an irrelevant consideration ...” (citations omitted)

Naturally, as stated earlier, I have considered that there were no significant competing financial claims by either of the Defendants. However, that is only one of the matters the Court would have had to consider in relation to the Plaintiff’s claim for a family provision order. At a hearing, the Court would not disregard the interests of each, as a beneficiary and a chosen object of testamentary bounty. I have remembered s 61 of the Act.
Having considered what the tutor of the Plaintiff knew, or ought to have known, about the amounts received, or to be received, and the income to which the Plaintiff was entitled, at the time the Offer of Compromise was served, I am not satisfied that it was reasonable for the tutor to have rejected the offer made in the Offer of Compromise, or have allowed it to lapse through effluxion of time. An additional lump sum of $30,000, when added to the capital sums which the Plaintiff had received, or would receive, would have increased the capital amount available for his maintenance, education, or advancement in life, to over $460,000. That he was, at the date of the likely hearing, not yet 14 years old, is a relevant consideration.
In addition, had the offer been accepted, he would have been entitled to costs, calculated on the ordinary basis, of the proceedings.
Furthermore, it is to be noted that there was no evidence of the tutor’s response to the offer, and, on the evidence before the Court, it would seem that she did not make any real attempt to compromise by making a written offer in an amount that could be considered to constitute a genuine attempt to resolve the proceedings. (The nature of any other negotiations, naturally, was not disclosed, even though the Court was informed that there had been some. It is likely that the Court is not privy to all that has gone on behind the scenes.)
As Kunc J wrote in Rogic v Samaan (No 2) [2018] NSWSC 1573 at [36]:

“It is now beyond argument that the parties’ obligations under s 56 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) ... include giving proper attention to the possibility of settling litigation.”

The offer contained in the Offer of Compromise, in this case, was clearly intended to avoid the continuation of the litigation. Whilst the amount of the offer was not substantial, it was not a walk-away offer, that is one “where the offeror expresses its willingness to settle on the ground that each party bears its own costs”: Leach v The Nominal Defendant (QBE Insurance (Australia) Ltd) (No 2) at [50] (McColl JA), quoting G E Dal Pont, Law of Costs (3rd ed, 2013, LexisNexis) at [13.9]. The offer made did not call for the Plaintiff to capitulate. He would have received additional provision out of the estate of the deceased and his costs, calculated on the ordinary basis. The offer, albeit of a relatively modest lump sum in satisfaction of his claim, demonstrated a sufficient element of compromise.
I have also remembered what Gray J (Carr and Goldberg JJ agreeing) wrote in Hamod v State of New South Wales (2002) 188 ALR 659 at 665 [20]; [2002] FCAFC 97; [2002] FCA 424 at [20]:

“Indemnity costs are not designed to punish a party for persisting with a case that turns out to fail. They are not awarded as a means of deterring litigants from putting forward arguments that might be attended by uncertainty. Rather, they serve the purpose of compensating a party fully for costs incurred, as a normal costs order could not be expected to do, when the Court takes the view that it was unreasonable for the party against whom the order is made to have subjected the innocent party to the expenditure of costs.”

As has been written many times, offers made to settle proceedings, particularly in family provision matters, are designed to encourage parties to compromise their claims and reduce the impact of legal costs on the value of the estate particularly in claims where the estate is quite small and could be significantly reduced by legal costs. In addition, the power of the Court to make orders for costs is designed to compensate a successful party for the expense in resisting (or bringing) a claim, but it also has an effect of deterring a party from resisting (or bringing) a claim unsuccessfully. It is an incentive to resolve disputes and serves a public, as well as a private, interest.
Naturally, I also considered that the Plaintiff’s claim was one for a family provision order and what had been written by Gaudron J in Singer v Berghouse (1993) 67 ALJR 708 at 709; [1993] HCA 35 at [6] (albeit in the context of a security for costs application). I also remembered that proceedings for a family provision order involve elements of judgment and discretion beyond those at work in most inter partes litigation: Re Sherborne Estate; Vanvalen v Neaves; Gilroy v Neaves (No 2) (2005) 65 NSWLR 268 at 278–279 [56]–[58], 279 [62]–[64]; [2005] NSWSC 1003 at [56]–[58], [62]–[64] (Palmer J). This leads to claims for a family provision order, in some ways, raising issues with respect to costs that differ from those in other litigation and there being more flexibility where there has been an unsuccessful claim.
My overall impression of the evidence, and also the terms of the Defendants’ Offer of Compromise, led me to the view that there was not enough to displace the rule relating to costs. Ensuring that justice was done in the proceedings, required that the costs consequences of the action brought on behalf of the Plaintiff should not be visited upon the Defendants by reduction in the quantum of the estate to which they are entitled.
Ms Usherwood, even though strictly, not a “party”, as the Plaintiff’s tutor, is, nonetheless, to be regarded as a party for the purpose of making costs orders: Stokes v McCourt (Costs) [2014] NSWSC 63 at [7] (McDougall J); Yakmor v Hamdoush (No 2) (2009) 76 NSWLR 148 at 156–157 [44]–[45]; [2009] NSWCA 284 at [44]–[45] (Giles JA, Ipp and Tobias JJA agreeing). At [23], Giles JA referred, with approval, to a statement made by Buss JA in Farrell v Royal Kings Park Tennis Club (Inc) [2007] WASCA 173 at [17], that:

“… it is well-established that if an action brought by a plaintiff under a disability is dismissed, and the defendant is awarded costs, the next friend of the plaintiff is personally liable to the defendant for the costs.”

Thus, Ms Usherwood will be personally liable to pay the costs. The Defendants, if they desire to do so, may enforce the costs order directly against her since the Plaintiff is a person under a legal incapacity: Yakmor v Hamdoush (No 2) at [24]–[25], [44]–[45].
Naturally, I considered that it might be thought to be unfair for Ms Usherwood to be liable for costs as she did not stand to personally benefit from the proceedings and only consented to act as tutor because the Plaintiff was under a legal incapacity. But that could be said for nearly every tutor. As was pointed out by Bathurst CJ (McColl and Meagher JJA agreeing) in Ashton v Pratt (No 2) [2015] NSWCA 134 at [18]:

“… responsibility for costs is one, but not the only, purpose of appointing a tutor and even if an opposite party has a benefit of orders against both the persons under the incapacity and the tutor, it is for the benefit of that party to be free from the complications of recovery from the incapable person: Yakmor at [21], [30].”

When the potential costs implications if the Plaintiff were unsuccessful was raised at the beginning of the hearing, senior counsel for the Plaintiff informed the Court that Ms Usherwood was aware that “she will be personally liable for any order for costs that is made against the plaintiff in bringing these proceedings”: Tcpt, 12 December 2019, p 8(38–42).
In the circumstances, the Court ordered:

Orders that the Summons be dismissed.

Orders the Plaintiff to pay the Defendants’ costs up to 20 June 2019 calculated on the ordinary basis, and from 21 June 2019, to pay the Defendants’ costs calculated on the indemnity basis.

**********

Decision last updated: 06 March 2020

Medium Neutral Citation:	Harris v Carter [2020] NSWSC 196
Hearing dates:	12 December 2019
Date of orders:	12 December 2019
Decision date:	06 March 2020
Jurisdiction:	Equity
Before:	Hallen J
Decision:	The Court: (1) Orders that the Summons be dismissed. (2) Orders the Plaintiff to pay the Defendants’ costs up to 20 June 2019 calculated on the ordinary basis, and from 21 June 2019, to pay the Defendants’ costs calculated on the indemnity basis.
Catchwords:	SUCCESSION – Family provision – Claim by minor child for provision from the deceased’s estate under Succession Act 2006 (NSW), Ch 3 – The Defendants are the parents of the deceased and the executors to whom Probate was granted – Obligation or responsibility of a parent to a child – Relevance of "bare paternity" – Maintenance provision made in the deceased’s Will for the Plaintiff – Other significant provision received by the Plaintiff as a result of deceased’s membership of a superannuation fund and as a member of the Australian Defence Force – Whether provision made in the Will of the deceased is adequate and proper COSTS – Indemnity costs – Offer of compromise –Where defendant obtains an order or judgment on the claim no less favourable than the terms of the offer – Where offer of compromise complies with UCPR – Whether Court should otherwise order – Whether Plaintiff’s tutor should be held personally liable to pay costs
Legislation Cited:	Family Provision Act 1982 (NSW) Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975 (UK) c 63 Legal Profession Uniform Law (NSW), s 181 Military Superannuation and Benefits Act 1991 (Cth) Probate and Administration Act 1898 (NSW), s 86 Succession Act 2006 (NSW), ss 3, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 63, 72, 79, 84, 99, Ch 3 Trustee Act 1925 (NSW), ss 43, 44 Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW), rr 20.26, 36.17, 42.1, 42.13, 42.13A, 42.14, 42.15A, 42.20
Cases Cited:	Andrew v Andrew (2012) 81 NSWLR 656; [2012] NSWCA 308 Ashton v Pratt (No 2) [2015] NSWCA 134 Bates v Cooke (2015) 14 ASTLR 221; [2015] NSWCA 278 Bates v Cooke (No 2) [2014] NSWSC 1322 Bkassini v Sarkis [2017] NSWSC 1487 Boettcher v Driscoll (2014) 119 SASR 523; [2014] SASC 86 Borebor v Keane (2013) 11 ASTLR 96; [2013] VSC 35 Bosch v Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd [1938] AC 463 Bowditch v NSW Trustee and Guardian [2012] NSWSC 275 Bowyer v Wood (2007) 99 SASR 190; [2007] SASC 327 Burke v Burke (No 2) (2015) 13 ASTLR 313; [2015] NSWCA 195 Carey v Robson (No 2) [2009] NSWSC 1199 Chan v Chan (2016) 15 ASTLR 317; [2016] NSWCA 222 Chapple v Wilcox (2014) 87 NSWLR 646; [2014] NSWCA 392 de Angelis v de Angelis [2003] VSC 432 Devereaux-Warnes v Hall (No 3) (2007) 35 WAR 127; [2007] WASCA 235 Diver v Neal (2009) 2 ASTLR 89; [2009] NSWCA 54 Estate Hemmes; Cameron v Mead [2018] NSWSC 85 Farrell v Royal Kings Park Tennis Club (Inc) [2007] WASCA 173 Foley v Ellis [2008] NSWCA 288 Forsyth v Sinclair (No 2) (2010) 28 VR 635; [2010] VSCA 195 Goodman v Windeyer (1980) 144 CLR 490; [1980] HCA 31 Goodsell v Wellington [2011] NSWSC 1232 Gorton v Parks (1989) 17 NSWLR 1 Hamod v State of New South Wales (2002) 188 ALR 659; [2002] FCAFC 97; [2002] FCA 424 Harkness v Harkness (No 2) [2012] NSWSC 35 Heyward v Fisher (Court of Appeal (NSW), Kirby P, 26 April 1985, unrep) Hunter v Hunter (1987) 8 NSWLR 573 Ilott v The Blue Cross [2018] AC 545; [2017] UKSC 17 Jodell v Woods [2017] NSWSC 143 Lado Causillas v NSW Trustee and Guardian [2015] NSWSC 1204 Leach v The Nominal Defendant (QBE Insurance (Australia) Ltd) (No 2) [2014] NSWCA 391 Litchfield v Smith [2010] VSC 466 McKenzie v Topp [2004] VSC 90 Meres v Meres (No 2) [2017] NSWSC 523 New South Wales Insurance Ministerial Corporation v Reeve (1993) 42 NSWLR 100 Nicholls v Hall (2007) 2 ASTLR 419; [2007] NSWCA 356 Pontifical Society for the Propagation of the Faith v Scales (1962) 107 CLR 9; [1962] HCA 19 R (on the application of M) v Slough Borough Council [2008] 1 WLR 1808; [2008] UKHL 52 Re Sherborne Estate; Vanvalen v Neaves; Gilroy v Neaves (No 2) (2005) 65 NSWLR 268; [2005] NSWSC 1003 Rogic v Samaan (No 2) [2018] NSWSC 1573 Sam Wardy v Gordon Salier; William Wardy v Gordon Salier; Hassiba Wardy v Estate of late Edmond Wadih Wardy developer and Ch 3 of the Succession Act 2006 [2014] NSWSC 473 Savic v Kim [2010] NSWSC 1401 Sgro v Thompson [2017] NSWCA 326 Singer v Berghouse (1993) 67 ALJR 708; [1993] HCA 35 Singer v Berghouse (1994) 181 CLR 201; [1994] HCA 40 Slack v Rogan; Palffy v Rogan (2013) 85 NSWLR 253; [2013] NSWSC 522 Steinmetz v Shannon (2019) 368 ALR 161; [2019] NSWCA 114 Stern v Sekers; Sekers v Sekers [2010] NSWSC 59 Stokes v McCourt (Costs) [2014] NSWSC 63 Stott v Cook (1960) 33 ALJR 447 Sung v Malaxos [2015] NSWSC 186 Verzar v Verzar [2012] NSWSC 1380 Vigolo v Bostin (2005) 221 CLR 191; [2005] HCA 11 Walker v Walker (Supreme Court (NSW), Young J, 17 May 1996, unrep) White v Barron (1980) 144 CLR 431; [1980] HCA 14 Yakmor v Hamdoush (No 2) (2009) 76 NSWLR 148; [2009] NSWCA 284 Yee v Yee [2017] NSWCA 305
Texts Cited:	G E Dal Pont, Law of Costs (3rd ed, 2013, LexisNexis) Rosalind Atherton, “The Concept of Moral Duty in the Law of Family Provision — A Gloss or Critical Understanding?” (1999) 5(1) Australian Journal of Legal History 5
Category:	Principal judgment
Parties:	Lachlan Daniel Harris by his tutor Susan Usherwood (Plaintiff) Robin Walter Carter (First Defendant) Joan Mary Carter (Second Defendant)
Representation:	Counsel: Mr L J Ellison SC (Plaintiff) Mr C A Vindin (Defendants) Solicitors: Sautelle White Lawyers (Plaintiff) Craig Milne & Company (Defendants)
File Number(s):	2019/81746