Simonova v State of Queensland (costs)

Link copied
Case Copied 36 min read

QUEENSLAND CIVIL AND
ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL


CITATION:

Simonova v State of Queensland (costs) [2021] QCAT 45

PARTIES: MILKA SIMONOVA

(applicant)

v

STATE OF QUEENSLAND

(respondent)

APPLICATION NO/S:

ADL086-17

MATTER TYPE:

Anti-discrimination matters

DELIVERED ON:

5 February 2021

HEARING DATE:

2 October 2020

HEARD AT:

Brisbane

DECISION OF:

Member Traves

ORDERS:

The application for costs ‘thrown away’ filed by the respondent on 17 June 2020 is dismissed.

CATCHWORDS:

PROCEDURE – COSTS – GENERAL MATTERS – POWER TO AWARD COSTS GENERALLY – where applicant given leave to amend statement of contentions to withdraw claim of direct discrimination – where respondent claims costs relating to preparation of the defence of that part of the complaint – where applicant has impaired capacity for legal matters – where complaint made by Ms Krzeva, the applicant’s daughter/attorney, on her mother’s behalf – whether Ms Krzeva is a ‘party’ for the purposes of s 39 of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld) (‘QCAT Act’) – if not, whether Ms Krzeva is a ‘party’ for the purposes of s 102 of the QCAT Act – whether costs can be awarded against a non-party under s 102 of the QCAT Act – whether costs can be awarded against Ms Krzeva as ‘representative’ under s 103 of the QCAT Act – whether grounds to make costs order

Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld), s 134, s 166, Schedule 1

Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), s 39, s 43, s 48, s 100, s 102, s 103, Schedule 3

Donovan Hill Pty Ltd v McNab Constructions Australia Pty Ltd [2015] QCA 114

Fashion Warehouse Pty Ltd v Pola [1984] 1 QdR 251
Gillespie v Goodwin [2000] 1 QdR 517
Harris v Carter [2020] NSWSC 196
Kebaro Pty Ltd v Saunders [2003] FCAFC 5
Knight v FP Special Assets Limited (1992) 174 CLR 178
N (on behalf of her son) v State of Queensland (Acting through the Dept of Education and the Arts) [2007] QSC 208
Ralacom Pty Ltd v Body Corporate for Paradise Island Apartments (No 2) [2010] QCAT 412
Stokes v McCourt (Costs) [2014] NSWSC 63

Yakmor v Hamdoush (No 2) (2009) 76 NSWLR 148

APPEARANCES & REPRESENTATION:

Applicant:

S. Keim SC and M. Rawlings, K. Hillard of counsel, instructed by Anderson Fredericks Turner

Respondent:

C. Murdoch QC and D. Keane of counsel, instructed by Crown Law

REASONS FOR DECISION

  1. By its application dated 17 June 2020, the respondent applied for costs thrown away as a result of the proposed amendments to the applicant’s case and that the order to pay costs be made against the applicant’s daughter and duly appointed attorney, Ms Krzeva.[1]

    [1]Enduring power of attorney appointing Antoneta Krzeva as attorney for financial and personal/health matters dated 4 July 2011, effective immediately for financial matters and upon losing capacity for personal matters.

  2. Ms Krzeva is the person who made the complaint of discrimination, the subject of these proceedings, to the Queensland Human Rights Commission (‘QHRC’) on behalf of her mother. She was authorised to do…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Simonova v State of Queensland (costs) and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2021] QCAT 45
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Simonova v State of Queensland (costs) involved the issue of whether the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal (QCAT) had the authority to award costs against a non-party. The dispute centred on the interpretation of section 102 of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009, which allows the Tribunal to order a party to a proceeding to pay costs. The applicant argued that QCAT lacked the power to impose costs on Ms Krzeva, who was not a party to the proceeding but was acting as an agent for her mother, the principal.

The court examined whether Ms Krzeva could be considered a party to the proceeding under section 39 of the QCAT Act. This section lists the conditions under which a person can be deemed a party, including being the applicant, being subject to the applicant's decision-seeking, intervening in the proceeding, being joined as a party, or being specified as a party by an enabling Act. The court found that Ms Krzeva did not fit within any of these categories and was not a party for the purposes of the costs provisions. Furthermore, the court highlighted that section 102 specifically refers to 'a party', which contrasts with broader provisions like order 91 rule 1 of the Queensland Supreme Court Rules.

The court concluded that the Tribunal does not have the power to award costs against a non-party. This conclusion was based on the principle that only parties who have initiated or defended the proceedings should bear the risk of an adverse costs order. Since Ms Krzeva was not a party, imposing a costs liability upon her would be unjust as she had not chosen to participate in the proceedings and may lack a real interest in them. Consequently, the Tribunal's attempt to order costs against Ms Krzeva was deemed beyond its statutory authority.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Finally, the applicant submits that the Tribunal has no power, having regard to the plain words of s 102, to award costs against a non-party. Ms Krzeva does not become the complainant under s 134. She is the agent for her mother, who remains the principal. Further, there is no order appointing Ms Krzeva litigation guardian for her mother.Consideration The power to award costs is statutory.[13] It has been held that the nature and extent of the power to award cost must be determined by close consideration of the terms of the statute which created and prescribed the occasions and conditions for its exercise.[14] [13]Knight v FP Special Assets Limited (1992) 174 CLR 178, 193. [14]Tamawood Ltd v Paans [2005] 2 QdR 101, 110. Ordinarily, whatever the precise wording of the relevant power, costs will only be awarded against ‘a party’ strictly so called. The rationale for this is explained in GE Dal Pont’s, Law of Costs:There are clear reasons in justice for this, as the parties, by their involvement in the proceeding, have taken the risk of exposure to an adverse costs order. To impose a costs liability upon a non-party is potentially to expose such a person to a liability that in justice he or she should not have to bear, as he or she has not ordinarily chosen to initiate or defend the proceedings, and may lack any real interest in or connection with them.[15] [15]GE Dal Pont, Law of Costs (LexisNexis Butterworths, 3rd ed), 744. Section 102 provides the Tribunal may make an order requiring ‘a party to a proceeding’ pay all or a stated part of the costs of another party to the proceeding. The express reference to ‘a party’ is of note: by contrast, for example, order 91 rule 1 of the Queensland Supreme Court Rules, the provision considered by the High Court in Knight v FP Special Assets Limited,[16] provided relevantly and more broadly that ‘the costs of and incident to all proceedings in the court shall be in the discretion of the court or judge’. [16](1992) 174 CLR 178. An important preliminary issue therefore is the status of Ms Krzeva in these proceedings, in particular, whether she is a party to these proceedings or, at least, a party for the purposes of the costs provisions. Section 39 of the QCAT Act provides that a person is a party to a proceeding in the Tribunal’s original jurisdiction if the person is: (a) the applicant; or(b) a person in relation to whom a decision of the tribunal is sought by the applicant; or(c) intervening in the proceeding under section 41; or(d) joined as a party to the proceeding under section 42; or(e) someone else an enabling Act states is a party to the proceeding. In Donovan Hill Pty Ltd v McNab Constructions Australia Pty Ltd[17] the Queensland Court of Appeal held that s 39 was important in construing the meaning of the expression ‘party to a proceeding’ for the purposes of s 102,[18] in particular, in the context of determining whether a costs order could be made in favour of a person unsuccessfully joined to a proceeding under s 42. This was said to be the case because ‘s 42 does not specify the jurisdiction exercised in determining a joinder application nor that the proposed party is a “party to a proceeding” whether or not the joinder application succeeds’.[19] In my view, s 39, while important, does not purport to exclusively define those who might be considered a ‘party’ for the purposes of s 102. [17][2015] QCA 114.[18]Ibid [40], [62].[19]Ibid [40], (Gotterson JA).