Harding v Commissioner of Taxation

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Harding v Commissioner of Taxation [2019] FCAFC 29

Appeal from: Harding v Commissioner of Taxation [2018] FCA 837
File number: QUD 442 of 2018
Judges: LOGAN, DAVIES AND STEWARD JJ
Date of judgment: 22 February 2019
Catchwords:

TAXATION – residency of taxpayer – permanent place of abode – where primary judge found that the taxpayer was a “resident or resident of Australia” as defined in s 6 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) – where primary judge found that rented accommodation for a temporary purpose did not constitute a “permanent place of abode” – whether “permanent place of abode” should be construed by reference to a specific permanent dwelling or a geographic location

TAXATION – ordinary meaning of “resides” – where primary judge found that the taxpayer’s absence from Australia and his intention not to return were sufficient to terminate his residency in Australia – whether the taxpayer was a resident of Australia

TAXATION – review by the Court – where taxation provision is conditioned by the Commissioner’s satisfaction – whether Court can go beyond identifying an error of law in the Commissioner’s state of satisfaction

Legislation:

Domicile Act 1982 (Cth) s 10

Income Tax Assessment Act 1922 (Cth)

Income Tax Assessment Act 1930 (Cth)

Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) s 6

Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth) s 14ZZ

Explanatory Notes, Income Tax Assessment Bill 1930 (Cth)

Cases cited:

Applegate v Commissioner of Taxation [1978] 1 NSWLR 126

Avon Downs Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (1949) 78 CLR 353

Commissioner of Taxation v Futuris Corporation Ltd (2008) 237 CLR 146

Commissioner of Taxation v Miller (1946) 73 CLR 93

Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Brown (1958) 100 CLR 32

Donaldson v M’Clure (1857) 20 D. 307

Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Applegate (1979)
38 FLR 1

Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Jenkins (1982)
59 FLR 467

Ferrier-Watson v McElrath (2000) 155 FLR 311

Giris Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (1969) 119 CLR 365

Hafza v Director-General of Social Security (1985)
6 FCR 444

Inland Revenue Commissioners v Lysaght [1928] AC 234

Kolotex Hosiery (Australia) Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (1975) 132 CLR 535

Levene v Inland Revenue Commissioners [1928] AC 217

MacCormick v Commissioner of Taxation (1984) 158 CLR 622

R v Braithwaite [1918] 2 KB 319

R v Bundy [1977] 1 WLR 914

R v Hammond (1852) 117 ER 1477

R v Webb [1896] 1 QB 487

Re Dempsey and Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2014) 98 ATR 698

Russell v Russell [1935] SASR 85

Terrassin v Terrassin (1968) 14 FLR 151

Winans v Attorney-General [1904] AC 287

W R Carpenter Holdings Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation [2006] FCA 1252; 63 ATR 577

Date of hearing: 21 November 2018
Registry: Queensland
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Taxation
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 65
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr S Couper QC with Mr M May
Solicitor for the Appellant: Cooper Grace Ward Lawyers
Counsel for the Respondent:
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Details
Case
[2019] FCAFC 29
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Harding v Commissioner of Taxation, the primary issue was whether the taxpayer, Mr Harding, was a resident of Australia for the purposes of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) during the 2011 income year. The dispute arose when the Commissioner of Taxation objected to Mr Harding's objection to an amended assessment, claiming he was a resident of Australia for the specified period. The case was brought before the Federal Court of Australia, where the original decision of the primary judge was reviewed. The primary judge had found that Mr Harding was a resident of Australia, despite his absence and intention not to return, and that his rented accommodation did not constitute a "permanent place of abode."

The legal issues the court had to address included the interpretation of the term "permanent place of abode" within the context of determining residency under the Income Tax Assessment Act. Additionally, the court had to consider whether Mr Harding's absence from Australia and his intention not to return were sufficient grounds to terminate his residency status. Another issue was the extent to which the court could review the Commissioner's satisfaction in satisfaction-based taxation provisions.

The court, in its reasoning, clarified that when exercising original jurisdiction in taxation appeals, it has a broader scope than merely reviewing for jurisdictional error. The court highlighted that it could make a final determination on whether the Commissioner should have been satisfied, based on all the evidence presented. The court found that the primary judge had erred in adopting a narrow interpretation of "permanent place of abode," which should not be limited to a specific dwelling but could refer to a geographic location. The court also noted that Mr Harding's absence and intention not to return were significant factors in determining his residency status. Consequently, the court allowed the appeal and set aside the original decision, ordering that Mr Harding's objection be upheld and that a further amended assessment be issued reflecting his non-residency status for the 2011 income year.

The court further directed that the parties file agreed orders concerning costs or, if they could not agree, submit written arguments on the issue of costs, not exceeding three pages each, within seven days of the order. Pending the resolution of the cost issue, the court reserved costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be allowed.

2. The orders made on 8 June 2018 be set aside.

3. In lieu thereof, it be ordered that:

(a) the appellant’s appeal against the respondent’s objection decision dated 28 June 2017 in respect of the year of income ended 30 June 2011 be allowed.

(b) in lieu of that objection decision, the appellant’s objection against the Amended Assessment which issued on 11 December 2015 be allowed.

(c) the matter be remitted to the respondent for the issuing of a further amended assessment on the footing that the appellant was not, in that income year, a resident of Australia.

4. As to costs, within 7 days of this order, the parties file agreed orders as to costs or, failing agreement, their respective submissions of not more than 3 pages concerning the issue of costs. Pending the filing of such agreed orders or, as the case may be, submissions, costs are reserved.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

I have had the privilege of reading in draft the reasons for judgment of Davies and Steward JJ (joint judgment). I agree with the orders which their Honours propose in relation to the disposition of the appeal, including in that regard the respondent Commissioner of Taxation’s notice of contention. Subject to what follows, I also agree with their reasons for proposing those orders. I gratefully adopt the accounts of the facts found in the joint judgment and also the abbreviations there employed. When this Court exercises the original jurisdiction conferred on it by s 14ZZ of the Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth) to hear and determine an “appeal” against a taxation objection decision, it exercises a jurisdiction which, necessarily, is more extensive than determining on judicial review whether the objection decision is attended with jurisdictional error. The qualification, “necessarily”, flows from the basal constitutional proposition that a right of recourse to an exercise of the judicial power of the Commonwealth so as to contest whether the criteria giving rise to an alleged taxation liability are met is one feature which, at the Federal level, distinguishes a valid law with respect to taxation from an invalid arbitrary exaction: Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Brown (1958) 100 CLR 32 at 40; Giris Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (1969) 119 CLR 365 at 378-379; MacCormick v Commissioner of Taxation (1984) 158 CLR 622; Commissioner of Taxation v Futuris Corporation Ltd (2008) 237 CLR 146 at [9] – [10]. This feature, necessary for the constitutional validity of a law with respect to taxation is not expressly referred to in Kolotex Hosiery (Australia) Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (1975) 132 CLR 535, where Gibbs J discussed a taxation liability criterion which was conditioned by the Commissioner’s satisfaction. However, in my respectful view, this feature explains why, as Gibbs J allowed at 568, once error on the part of the Commissioner in being satisfied (or not satisfied) of the kind identified by Dixon J in Avon Downs Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (1949) 78 CLR 353, at 360 has been established, “it is right for the court to reach its final conclusion as to whether or not the Commissioner ought to be satisfied by reference to all the material before the Court”. The court’s so doing prevents arbitrary exaction by the Commissioner, who is an officer of the Executive. A like view of the role of the court on a taxation appeal in relation to a satisfaction based liability criterion is evident in the judgment of Stephen J in that case, at 576. One of the several further or alternative criteria by which a person may, by definition, be a “resident” or a “resident of Australia” is if that person is someone, “whose domicile is in Australia, unless the Commissioner is satisfied that the person’s permanent place of abode is outside Australia”: para (a)(i) of the definition in s 6 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth). The qualification found in this criterion is, as explained in the joint judgment, an exemplar of a satisfaction based criterion. That it has this quality and that the Commissioner evidently adopted a too narrow conception of “permanent place of abode” means that, quite apart from the way in which the parties chose to conduct the determination of this issue in the original jurisdiction, it was always open to the learned primary judge to decide for himself, on the evidence before him, whether the Commissioner should have been satisfied that Mr Harding’s permanent place of abode was outside Australia during the 2011 income year.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established