Re: MAHA HAFZA
And: DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF SOCIAL SECURITY (1985) 6 FCR 444
No. 454 of 1984
Social Security
(1985) ASSC para 92 - 052
COURT
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
Wilcox J.(1)
CATCHWORDS
Social Security - Child endowment (family allowance) - Provision that endowment cease if endowee ceases to have his usual place of residence in Australia unless absence temporary only - Meaning of "usual place of residence" - What constitutes "temporary" absence.
Social Services Act 1947 (now the Social Security Act) ss.96, 103(1)(d) and (e), 104;
Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 ss.44, 45.
Koitaki Para Rubber Estates Limited v The Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1941) 64 C.L.R. 241 at p.249, Commissioners of Inland Revenue v Lysaght (1928) A.C. 234, Keil v Keil (1947) V.R. 383, Levene v Inland Revenue Commissioners (1928) A.C. 217, Judd v Judd (1957) 75 W.N. (N.S.W.) 147, Norman v. Norman (1969) 16 F.L.R. 231 referred to.
Re Kehagias and Director-General of Social Security (1981) 3 A.L.N. N.151, Re Houchar and Director-General of Social Security (1984) 5 A.L.N. N.449 approved in part, disapproved in part.
Social Security - Child endowment - Cessation - Endowee ceasing to have usual place of residence in Australia - "Usual place of residence" - "Temporary absence" from residence - Relevant considerations - Intention to return - Effect of prolongation of absence - Social Services Act 1947 (Cth), (now the Social Security Act), s 103(1)(d) and (e).
HEADNOTE
Held: (1) The words "usual place of residence" in the former Social Services Act 1947, s 103(1)(d) rima facie limit benefits to endowees who, during any particular period, ordinarily eat, sleep and live in a place in Australia which is a narrower test than that of "residence" in Australia.
Koitaki Para Rubber Estates Ltd v. Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) (1941) 64 CLR 241 at 249; Commissioners of Inland Revenue v. Lysaght (1928) AC 234 at 248; Keil v. Keil (1947) VR 383; Levene v. Inland Revenue Commissioners AC 217 at 225; Judd v. Judd (1957) 75 WN (NSW) 147 at 149 and Norman v. (1928) Norman (No 3) (1969) 16 FLR 231 at 236, considered.
Re Kehagias and Director-General of Social Security (1981) 3 ALN N, 151 and Re Houchar and Director-General of Social Security (1984) 5 ALN N 449, disapproved.
(2) A "temporary" absence from Australia within s 103(1)(e) is an absence that will be relatively short and its duration will be either defined in advance or related to the fulfilment of a specific passing purpose and the intent of the absentee is of considerable importance.
Re Houchar and Director-General of Social Security (1984) 5 ALN N 449 at 452, approved.
(3) Where there is a prolongation of an initial temporary absence the extended period may continue to be temporary provided it is governed by the intention to fulfil a particular purpose and then return to Australia.
HEARING
1985, March 21; May 23. #DATE 23:5:1985
APPEAL
Appeal from the decision of the Administrative Appeals…
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- Case
- [1985] FCA 201
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the court was to determine the meaning of "usual place of residence" in the context of the Social Security Act and what constitutes a "temporary" absence. The court was tasked with interpreting these statutory terms to ascertain whether the appellant's move to Malaysia was temporary or permanent, and consequently, whether the child endowment payments should have ceased. This interpretation involved a careful analysis of the legislative language and relevant case law to establish the intended meaning and scope of the statutory provisions.
The Full Court of the Federal Court found that the appellant's move to Malaysia constituted a permanent change of residence rather than a temporary absence. The court reasoned that the appellant's actions, including the sale of her home and the establishment of a new residence in Malaysia, indicated a permanent relocation. The court also held that the term "temporary" in the context of the Social Security Act should be interpreted narrowly, requiring a clear and convincing demonstration that the absence would be of a limited duration. Given these findings, the court upheld the decision of the Director-General to cease the child endowment payments. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the costs of the appeal to the respondent.
Orders
Orders of the court
1.
The appeal be dismissed.
2.
The appellant pay the costs of the respondent of the appeal.
NOTE: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
Orders accordingly
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi