FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Addy v Commissioner of Taxation [2019] FCA 1768
File number: QUD 108 of 2018 Judge: LOGAN J Date of judgment: 30 October 2019 Catchwords: TAXATION – residency of taxpayer – where the applicant is a citizen of the United Kingdom – where the applicant came to Australia for a “working holiday” – where the applicant lived almost continuously in one house in Australia for nearly two years – definition of “resident” – whether the applicant was a resident of Australia as defined in s 6 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) – ordinary meaning of “resident” – meaning of “usual place of abode” exception where a person present in Australia for more than half a year – Income Tax Rates Act 1986 (Cth) s 18 - whether part-year residency periods applied to the applicant
INTERNATIONAL LAW – TAXATION – interpretation of double taxation agreements – where Australia entered into a double taxation agreement with the United Kingdom – where Art 25 of the Double Taxation Agreement provides that party States shall not tax nationals of the other State in a more burdensome way than their own nationals in the same circumstances – application of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Art 31 and Art 32 – construction of “in the same circumstances”
TAXATION – where Pt III of Sch 7 to the Income Tax Rates Act 1986 (Cth) provides that a “working holiday maker” is taxed at a certain rate – where s 3A of the Income Tax Rates Act 1986 (Cth) defines “working holiday maker” as a holder of a certain class of visa – where s 4 of the International Tax Agreements Act 1953 (Cth) provides that the Australia-UK Double Taxation Agreement has paramountcy over inconsistent provisions imposing Australian tax – where Art 25 of the Double Taxation Agreement provides that there should not be taxation discrimination on the basis of a taxpayer’s nationality – where the applicant was taxed as a working holiday maker – where the applicant was an Australian tax resident – whether the applicant has been taxed in a way which is more burdensome than Australian nationals in the same circumstances would have been taxed – whether any taxation discrimination was on the basis of nationality
Legislation: Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 37M
Income Tax Act 1986 (Cth) s 5
Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) ss 6, 175A
Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) Subdiv 768-R
Income Tax Rates Act 1986 (Cth) ss 3A, 18
International Tax Agreements Act 1953 (Cth) ss 3, 3AAA, 4, 5
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 29
Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth) s 14ZV, 14ZVC, 14ZZO
Taxation Boards of Review (Transfer of Jurisdiction) Act 1986 (Cth)
Cases cited: Alcan (NT) Alumina Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Territory Revenue (2009) 239 CLR 27
Aon Risk Services Australia Ltd v Australian National University (2009) 239 CLR 175
Bosanac v Commissioner of Taxation [2019] FCAFC 116
Bundesfinanzhof (Federal Fiscal Court)…
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- Case
- [2019] FCA 1768
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined the interpretation of the term "resident" under the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth), focusing on the "usual place of abode" exception for individuals present in Australia for more than half a year. The court also addressed the application of the Australia-UK Double Taxation Agreement, specifically Article 25, which stipulates that nationals of the contracting states should not be taxed more burdensomely than their own nationals in the same circumstances. The court had to interpret this provision in light of the International Tax Agreements Act 1953 (Cth) and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Additionally, the court considered whether the taxation of the applicant as a working holiday maker constituted discrimination based on nationality, as prohibited by Article 25.
The court found that the Double Taxation Agreement, given domestic effect by the International Tax Agreements Act 1953 (Cth), took precedence over the Australian tax laws to the extent of any inconsistency. The court applied settled principles of treaty interpretation, emphasizing the importance of the text, context, object, and purpose of the treaty provisions. The court held that the term "national" under Article 3(1)(l) of the Double Taxation Agreement meant different things in relation to the UK and Australia, and that the applicant was subject to UK law rather than Australian law for taxation purposes. The court determined that the tax rates applied to working holiday makers did not amount to a more burdensome taxation than that applied to Australian nationals in similar circumstances, thus no discrimination based on nationality had occurred.
The court allowed the appeal, set aside the respondent's objection decision, and ordered the respondent to make an amended assessment. The applicant's objection was allowed, and the matter was remitted to the respondent for the appropriate tax assessment, considering the applicant's residency status and the applicable tax rates. The court granted leave to apply for further directions regarding the basis of the amended assessment and made no order as to costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The leave provisionally granted to the applicant on 3 December 2018 to amend her grounds of objection in accordance with those specified in the document which became Exhibit 2 be confirmed.
2. The appeal be allowed.
3. The respondent’s objection decision dated 26 February 2018 in respect of his amended assessment of the applicant dated 20 December 2017 for the income year ended 30 June 2017 be set aside.
4. In lieu thereof, it be ordered that the applicant’s objection to that amended assessment be allowed.
5. The matter be remitted to the respondent for the making of an amended assessment in accordance with the Court’s reasons for judgement and on the footing that, until 1 May 2017, the applicant was a “resident” as defined by s 6(1) of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) and that the rates of tax specified in Part III of Schedule 7 to the Income Tax Rates Act 1986 (Cth) did not apply to her income from 1 January 2017.
6. Liberty to apply for further directions in respect of the basis upon which the amended assessment is to be made.
7. No order as to costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Subject to a presently immaterial exception, a provision in an agreement thus given domestic force and effect prevails over a provision in an “Assessment Act” or a law imposing taxation, to the extent of any inconsistency. This paramountcy is the result of s 4 of the Agreements Act, which provides:Incorporation of Assessment Act (1)Subject to subsection (2), the Assessment Act is incorporated and shall be read as one with this Act. Note: An effect of this provision is that people who acquire information under this Act are subject to the confidentiality obligations and exceptions in Division 355 in Schedule 1 to the Taxation Administration Act 1953. (2)The provisions of this Act have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent with those provisions contained in the Assessment Act (other than Part IVA of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936) or in an Act imposing Australian tax.By s 3 of the Agreements Act, “Assessment Act” is defined to mean the 1936 Act or the 1997 Act. By Art 3(1)(l) of the Double Taxation Agreement, the term “national” is defined as follows:(l) the term “national” means:(i)in relation to the United Kingdom, any British citizen, or any British subject not possessing the citizenship of any other Commonwealth country or territory, provided that individual has the right of abode in the United Kingdom; and any company deriving its status as such from the law in force in the United Kingdom;(ii)in relation to Australia, an Australian citizen or an individual not possessing citizenship who has been granted permanent residency status; and any company deriving its status as such from the law in force in Australia;Ms Addy was, therefore, a “national” in relation to the UK but not a “national” in relation to Australia. Given her working holiday visas, she was also a “working holiday maker”, subject to income tax on her “working holiday taxable income” at the rates specified in Pt III of Sch 7 to the Rates Act, unless, in terms of Art 25(1) of the Double Taxation Agreement, as afforded paramountcy by the Agreements Act, those rates were “more burdensome” than the rate of tax to which a “national” (as defined) in the same circumstances would be subject. There is no Australian authority concerning the meaning and effect either of Art 25 of the Double Taxation Agreement or a similar provision in a double taxation agreement to which Australia and another country are parties, also given domestic force by the Agreements Act. The general approach to the interpretation of double taxation agreements incorporated into domestic law via the Agreements Act is settled. The relevant principles were summarised by the Full Court by reference to pertinent authority, notably including Thiel v Commissioner of Taxation (1990) 171 CLR 338 (Thiel), in McDermott Industries (Aust) Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (2005) 142 FCR 134 (McDermott Industries), at 143 [38]: The application of the Convention has been discussed by McHugh J in Applicant A v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1997) 190 CLR 225 and in Thiel v Commissioner of Taxation (1990) 171 CLR 338, the latter case being concerned with the interpretation of the double taxation agreement between Australia and Switzerland. The leading authority in this Court on interpretation of double taxation agreements is Lamesa. It is unnecessary here, to set out again what is there said. The following principles can be said to be applicable:•Regard should be had to the “four corners of the actual text”. The text must be given primacy in the interpretation process. The ordinary meaning of the words used are presumed to be “the authentic representation of the parties’ intentions”: Applicant A at 252-253.•The courts must, however, in addition to having regard to the text, have regard as well to the context, object and purpose of the treaty provisions. The approach to interpretation involves a holistic approach.•International agreements should be interpreted “liberally”.•Treaties often fail to demonstrate the precision of domestic legislation and should thus not be applied with “taut logical precision”.