Hii v Commissioner of Taxation

Link copied
Case Copied 70 min read

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Hii v Commissioner of Taxation [2020] FCA 1452  

File number(s): QUD 76 of 2020
Judgment of: GREENWOOD J
Date of judgment: 9 October 2020
Catchwords: HIGH COURT AND FEDERAL COURT – consideration of an application under s 37AR(2) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) for leave to institute a proceeding being an application for leave to appeal from orders of the primary judge, being a proposed proceeding the subject of an order made by the primary judge under s 37AO of that Act – consideration of whether the Court can be satisfied that the proposed proceeding is not a vexatious proceeding for the purposes of s 37AT(4) and s 37AS(2) of that Act – consideration of aspects of the application for leave to appeal
Legislation: Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), ss 24(1A), 31A, 37AM, 37AO, 37AR, 37AS, 37AT
Cases cited:

Agapis v Plumbers Licensing Board (No 2) [2014] FCA 1045

Alexander v Australian Community Pharmacy Authority [2010] FCA 189; (2010) 233 FCR 575

Batistatos v Roads and Traffic Authority (NSW) (2006) 226 CLR 256

Carlisle Homes Pty Ltd v Barrett Property Group Pty Ltd [2009] FCAFC 31

Commissioner of Taxation v Miller (1946) 73 CLR 93

Dimitrov v Supreme Court of Victoria (2017) 92 ALJR 12

Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Futuris Corporation Ltd (2008) 237 CLR 146

Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Hoffnung & Co Ltd (1928) 42 CLR 39

Fuller v Toms (2015) 234 FCR 535

Garrett v Commissioner of Taxation [2015] FCA 117; (2015) 147 ALR 342

Harding v Commissioner of Taxation (2019) 365 ALR 286; (2019) 269 FCR 311

Hii v Commissioner of Taxation (2015) 230 FCR 385

Hii v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [No 3] (2016) 238 FCR 304

Hii v The Commissioner of Taxation of the Commonwealth of Australia [2019] HCATrans 097

Hii v Commissioner of Taxation (No 2) [2020] FCA 345

Hunter v Chief Constable of West Midlands Police [1982] AC 529

HWY Rent Pty Ltd v HWY Rentals (in liq) (No 2) [2014] FCA 449

Port of Melbourne Authority v Anshun Pty Ltd (1980) 147 CLR 35

Ramsey v Skyring (1999) 164 ALR 378

Spencer v Commonwealth (2010) 241 CLR 118

Tomlinson v Ramsey Food Processing Pty Ltd (2015) 256 CLR 507

UBS AG v Tyne (2018) 265 CLR 77

Walton v Gardiner (1993) 177 CLR 378

Division: General Division
Registry: Queensland
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Number of paragraphs: 119
Date of last submission/s: 29 June 2020
Date of hearing: Determined on the papers
Counsel for the Applicant: Ms M Clay (Next Friend) appeared on behalf of the Applicant
Counsel for the Respondent: M Brennan QC and M Ballans
Solicitor for the Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor

ORDERS

QUD 76 of 2020
BETWEEN:

YII ANN HII

Applicant

AND:

THE COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA

Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

GREENWOOD J

DATE OF ORDER:

9 OCTOBER 2020

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application under…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Hii v Commissioner of Taxation and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2020] FCA 1452
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Hii v Commissioner of Taxation involved an application by the applicant, a Malaysian citizen, for leave to appeal against orders made by the primary judge. The applicant sought to challenge the Commissioner of Taxation's findings that he was an Australian resident for tax purposes and that his conduct amounted to tax evasion for certain financial years. The primary judge had already dismissed the applicant's application for leave to appeal, and the applicant now sought leave to institute a proceeding for leave to appeal from that decision.

The court was required to determine whether the proposed proceeding was vexatious and without reasonable ground. The key legal issues included whether the applicant had frequently instituted proceedings without reasonable cause and whether the proposed proceeding was an abuse of process. The court considered the overlap between the proceeding before the primary judge and the previous proceedings in the Federal Court and the High Court.

The court found that the applicant had frequently instituted proceedings without reasonable cause, given that the proceeding before the primary judge was the third attempt at judicial review, encompassing matters that could have been raised earlier. The court concluded that the proposed proceeding was an abuse of process and vexatious, as it was without reasonable ground. Consequently, the application for leave to institute the proposed proceeding was refused, and the application for leave to appeal was dismissed with costs.

The court's reasoning focused on the overlap and repetitive nature of the applicant's claims, which indicated a pattern of instituting proceedings without reasonable cause. The court determined that the proposed proceeding was an abuse of process and vexatious, leading to the dismissal of the application for leave to institute the proceeding and the application for leave to appeal. The court also ordered the applicant to pay the costs of the respondent.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application under s 37AR(2) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) for leave to institute a proceeding being an application by the applicant for leave to appeal from the orders of the Court made on 4 March 2020 is dismissed.

2. The application for leave to appeal from the orders of the Court made on 4 March 2020 is dismissed.

3. The applicant pay the costs of the respondent of and incidental to the application.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Accordingly, the first question to be determined in these proceedings is whether leave is to be granted to the applicant under s 37AT(3) in the application made under s 37AR(2) to institute the application for leave to appeal and in deciding that question, the Court must dismiss the application if the Court considers the proceeding is a vexatious proceeding and the Court may only grant leave if it is satisfied the proceeding is not a vexatious proceeding. As to these matters, see Fuller v Toms (2015) 234 FCR 535 at [18] per Besanko, Logan and McKerracher JJ. Some background facts The background to the application for leave to institute the application for leave to appeal (the “proceeding”) is extensively set out in the affidavit of the applicant’s McKenzie Friend, Registered Tax Agent and Accountant, Ms Clay, sworn on 17 March 2020, and attached exhibits (the “Clay affidavit”). These matters should be noted. The applicant is a Malaysian citizen. On 26 June 2012, following an audit of his income tax affairs, the Commissioner published written findings in the reasons for decision (the “Audit Decision”). Those findings included that, for each of the financial years ending 30 June 2001 to 30 June 2009, the applicant was an Australian resident for tax purposes and his conduct amounted to tax evasion for the years ending 30 June 2001 to 30 June 2004 and 30 June 2007 to 30 June 2009. The Commissioner found that the applicant was a “resident”, being a “person who resides in Australia” (Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) s 6(1)) applying a test which determines the meaning of resident according to “ordinary concepts”: Commissioner of Taxation v Miller (1946) 73 CLR 93 at 99. The Commissioner’s findings of fact included:(i) the applicant was granted a permanent residency visa on 20 March 1992;(ii)the applicant was granted a five year resident return visa on 27 February 1995, which allows current or former Australian permanent residents to re-enter Australia after travelling overseas and to maintain status as a permanent resident on return to Australia;(iii)the applicant was issued a Queensland Drivers Licence on 6 February 1996, and his most recent Queensland Drivers Licence had effective dates of 23 December 2005 to 30 January 2011, with a Queensland address listed by the applicant;(iv)the applicant applied on 6 September 2005 to alter his credit card limit with the National Australia Bank, listing the same Queensland address for his contact details;(v)the applicant and his wife purchased the property at that Queensland address on 2 April 2001 for $6.5 million and more than six gigabytes of documents pertaining to the applicant's business interests were found at that Queensland address and another property owned by companies controlled by the applicant; (vi)the applicant's immediate family, his wife and six children, resided in Australia as permanent residents of Australia, the applicant's extended family lived in Brisbane, and his brothers lived in Victoria;(vii)all of the applicant’s children undertook their schooling at Queensland schools, and several children attended the University of Queensland and Queensland University of Technology;(viii)the applicant held in his own name 15 separate Australian bank accounts between 2001 and 2009;(ix)the applicant stayed at seven different hotels between 2002 and 2007 on his visits to Malaysia, but there was no evidence of any hotel stays when he was in Brisbane;(x)as at 21 January 2009, the applicant had a number of vehicles registered to him or his wife in Australia for which insurance was obtained listing either him or his wife, or both, as the main driver, including a Lamborghini Murcielago, a Rolls Royce Phantom, a Ferrari Coupe, and a Bentley Continental;(xi)between 1 July 2000 and 30 June 2009, the applicant departed Australia 85 times, of which 84 departure cards were located on each of which the applicant indicated that he was an "Australian resident departing temporarily";(xii)the applicant spent between 65 and 189 days in Australia in each year from 2001 to 2009 compared with 6 to 125 in Malaysia for the years known;(xiii)the applicant was a director of seven Australian companies with registered offices in Queensland (in six of which the applicant held between 35% and 90% of the shares) during the relevant income years; and(xiv)the applicant wrote a letter dated 12 March 2009 to the Australian Department of Immigration which he signed on behalf of one of the companies in which he was a director, which included his statement that "My family currently resides permanently in Brisbane since our first landing in 1993 ... Due to the nature of my business I am forced to regularly travel overseas, because of other business interests".

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The applicant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that proceedings had been instituted by the applicant “frequently” and without reasonable cause: at [19]. The meaning of the term “frequently” is described earlier in these reasons at [49] and [50]. As mentioned earlier, proceedings may be instituted “frequently” even where the number is quite small. Here, in circumstances where the proceeding before the primary judge represented the applicant’s third attempt at judicial review, and encompassed matters raised in the High Court in seeking relief in reliance on s 75(v) of the Constitution and which could have been or were raised in the first s 39B proceeding before Collier J, the applicant, for the purposes of determining the present application under s 37AR(2) of the FCA Act is a person who is properly characterised as having “frequently” instituted proceedings without reasonable ground. Conclusion Having regard to all of these matters, I am not satisfied, for the purposes of s 37AT(4) of the FCA Act, that the proposed proceeding “is not a vexatious proceeding”. The proposed proceeding is an abuse of process and one without reasonable ground. The application for leave to institute this proposed proceeding is refused with costs and the application for leave to appeal is dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

On the question of whether the proceeding was without reasonable ground, the applicant also contended that the Commissioner’s reliance on the applicant’s omission of foreign sourced income in his non‑resident returns as a basis for the finding of evasion was legally unreasonable and ultra vires as it exceeded the limits of ss 6.5 and 6.10 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth). The applicant further contended in broad, all‑encompassing terms, that the primary judge erred in finding that there was no evidence to support a claim of bad faith or conscious maladministration because “the errors of law and other matters as referred to in all the grounds of the application cumulatively amount to evidence of the claim”. Consideration: abuse of process The overlap between the proceeding before the primary judge and the first two s 39B proceedings in the Federal Court and the High Court is central to determining whether the proceeding the applicant seeks to now initiate is an abuse of process and thus a vexatious proceeding having regard to the definition in s 37AM(1). In the original s 39B application commenced in the Federal Court on 26 November 2014 by amended originating application, the applicant sought relief which included declarations that the Commissioner’s notices of amended assessment were void. Although the amended originating application filed on 18 February 2015 is not exhibited to Ms Clay’s affidavit, Collier J’s reasons for judgment (which are exhibited to that affidavit) set out the 17 grounds of relief sought under s 39B in full: Hii v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2015) 230 FCR 385 at [19]. In the first s 39B proceeding before Collier J, the applicant by his amended originating application, sought: a declaration that notices of amended assessment issued to him for the years ending 30 June 2001 to 30 June 2009, as a result of the Commissioner’s audit decisions, were void and of no effect (Declaration No. 1); a declaration that notices of amended assessment issued as a result of the Commissioner’s determination of objections to assessments for the years ending 30 June 2001 to 30 June 2009, lodged under Part IVC of the Administration Act, were void and of no effect (Declaration No. 2). A declaration in similar terms to Declaration No. 2 was sought concerning a further amended assessment for the year ending 30 June 2004 (Declaration No. 2A). As to those claims, the applicant sought remedial orders in the form of the constitutional writs of certiorari, mandamus and prohibition in reliance on s 39B of the Judiciary Act. Other declarations were sought that the Commissioner had no power to make the amended assessments for the years ending 30 June 2001 to 30 June 2004, under the 1936 Act, until the Commissioner had formed a view that there had been an avoidance of tax due to fraud or evasion and that no such view had been formed (Declaration Nos. 3 and 4). Similar declarations were sought as to the amended assessments for the years ending 30 June 2007 to 30 June 2009 (Declaration Nos. 5 and 6). The applicant sought a further declaration that if the amended assessments are void and of no effect (having regard to the declarations sought), the shortfall penalty assessments for the years ending 30 June 2001 to 30 June 2009 are also void and of no effect.