Gumbinyarra v Teague [2003] NTSC 25
PARTIES:ERIC GUMBINYARRA
v
ALLAN JAMES TEAGUE
TITLE OF COURT: SUPREME COURT OF THE NORTHERN TERRITORY
JURISDICTION: SUPREME COURT OF THE NORTHERN TERRITORY EXERCISING TERRITORY JURISDICTION
FILE NO:JA93 of 2002 (20205643)
DELIVERED: 20 March 2003
HEARING DATES: 5 February 2003
JUDGMENT OF: MILDREN J
REPRESENTATION:
Counsel:
Appellant:S. Musk
Respondent: A. Elliott
Solicitors:
Appellant:North Australian Aboriginal Legal Aid Service
Respondent: Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions
:
Judgment category classification: B
Judgment ID Number:
Number of pages: 12
IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE NORTHERN TERRITORY
OF AUSTRALIA
AT DARWINGumbinyarra v Teague [2003] NTSC 25
No. JA93 of 2002 (20205643)
BETWEEN:
ERIC GUMBINYARRA
Appellant
AND:
ALLAN JAMES TEAGUE
Respondent
CORAM: MILDREN J
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(Delivered 20 March 2003)
This is an appeal against sentence pursuant to s 163 of the Justices Act. The appellant pleaded guilty to one count of criminal damage and to one count of trespass brought by complaint in the Court of Summary Jurisdiction. The facts alleged by the prosecutor were as follows:
On the evening of Monday 15 April 2002, the appellant went to the Gunbalanya Sports & Social Club and consumed Victoria bitter beer. The appellant left the club in a heavily intoxicated state and went home to Banyan Camp. Later, some time after midnight, he decided to walk to Clancy's Outstation, which is approximately four kilometres out of Gunbalanya. He was in an intoxicated state.
As the appellant was walking past the Gunbalanya Health Clinic, he approached the rear side door of the clinic and used a clenched left fist to smash the top plate glass window of the window, shattering the glass. The damage amounted to $319. The appellant smashed the glass, causing a large laceration to his left fist that bled profusely all over the door and floor. He then entered the health clinic. He walked through the hallway. A short time later he exited the clinic and left the area.
The next morning, the appellant attended he Gunalanya Police Station, participated in a taped record of interview and made full admissions to the offences. When asked why he smashed the glass door, he replied: "I was too drunk". When asked why he entered the clinic, he replied: "No reason". He was then charged and bailed.
The appellant was, at the time of sentencing, a 33 year old unemployed Aboriginal man, living on unemployment benefits. Nothing more is known about the appellant's personal circumstances other than that he has worked on a CDEP program previously and was on a waiting list to return to CDEP work. He had pleaded guilty and through his counsel offered to make restitution of the $319 to the clinic. He had 47 prior convictions, the last being for aggravated assault on 19 February 1997 when he was sentenced to a partly suspended sentence. His last previous conviction for criminal damage was on 8 June 1993 when he received 80 hours community service. The prior convictions included some multiple count convictions.…
Continue reading Gumbinyarra v Teague
Sign in free to access the full text
- AGLC
- Gumbinyarra v Teague [2003] NTSC 25
- Case
- [2003] NTSC 25
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The Court considered the grounds of appeal raised by the appellant. The Court found that the appellant could only succeed on the grounds of appeal if it was satisfied that some sentence other than the sentence actually imposed ought to have been imposed, even if the sentence actually imposed could not be said to be manifestly excessive so as to, in itself, demonstrate error. The Court found that the appellant had failed to show that the sentence imposed was manifestly excessive and that the Magistrate had not erred in his consideration of the gap in offending and the appellant's prior record.
The Court dismissed the appeal, finding that no substantial miscarriage of justice had occurred. The Court noted that while the sentence imposed may not have been ideal, it was not so excessive as to demonstrate error. The Court found that the Magistrate had given due consideration to the gap in offending and the appellant's prior record, and that there was no error in the Magistrate's approach.
The Court made no orders as to costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
Full text does not contain this section.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Full text does not contain this section.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
However, that does not necessarily mean that the appeal must be allowed. Section 177(2) of the Justices Act entitles this Court to dismiss the appeal, notwithstanding that it is of the opinion that the point raised might be decided in favour of the appellant if it considers that no substantial miscarriage of justice has actually occurred. This means, in a sentencing appeal, that this Court must be satisfied that some sentence other than the sentence actually imposed ought to have been imposed, even if the sentence actually imposed could not be said to be manifestly excessive so as to, in itself, demonstrate error.Ground 2 – Failure to give due consideration to the gap in offending. The learned Magistrate said that he had regard to the fact that the appellant had not committed offences for something in the order of eight years at all and for ten years in relation to similar offending. This ground of appeal therefore cannot succeed unless what is said is that the learned Magistrate, although he gave it some weight, failed to give it "due" weight. Ground 3 – Erred in placing undue weight on the appellant's prior record. The learned Magistrate said of the appellant's prior record:Sergeant Teague I think correctly points out that he's got an appalling record. Now that's not meaning that he should be sentenced according to what he has done in the past and has to be sentenced of course based on what he's done here. But it does indicate that he hasn't learnt from anything that's gone before and highlights I think a need for specific deterrence. Counsel for the appellant did not submit that this passage disclosed error. In Baumer v The Queen (1998) 166 CLR 51, the Court (Mason CJ, Wilson, Deane, Dawson and Gaudron JJ) said at 57:We have already referred to his Honour's observation that "the literally appalling record" of the applicant increased the seriousness of the offence. If this means no more than that such a record would make it difficult to view the circumstances of the offence or of the offender with any degree of leniency then, of course, such a remark would be understandable and unobjectionable. It would clearly be wrong if, because of the record, his Honour was intending to increase the sentence beyond what he considered to be an appropriate sentence for the instant offence. If that passage is applied to the observations made by the learned Magistrate in this case, it is clear that there is no error shown. Therefore, as with ground 2, the appellant can only succeed on this ground if, in the end result, this Court is of the view that the sentence actually imposed was manifestly excessive and that these grounds provide the explanation as to why that is so.Ground 4 – Manifestly excessive It is well established that in order to succeed on this ground the appellant must show not only that the sentence is excessive, but that it is manifestly so. In Cranssen v The King (1936) 55 CLR 509, the expression used by Dixon CJ, Evatt and McTiernan JJ was that the sentence imposed was "out of all proportion to any view of the seriousness of the offence which could reasonably be taken." Where the appellant relies upon statistical sentencing material, the appellant must show striking disparity before the Court will interfere: see R v Allinson (1987) 49 NTR 38 at 39 per Nader and Kearney JJ.