relation to grounds 1 and 2 has already been

covered by the dialogue yesterday. However, there
are some matters that have only been touched on
peripherally and, indeed, in answer to certain of
the questions put to me yesterday, particularly
those by Mr Justice Deane and Mr Justice McHugh,
there are some matters still remaining to which I
should go.
If I might take Your Honours in the outline to

page 2, the third paragraph commencing nowhere does
the Court of Criminal Appeal adeq~ately define the accused's act for causation, coi_ ;idence of intent

with act and to enable the evide e to define
intent, and the references there re to the passag~ from Sir Garfield Barwick's judgment in Ryan and to
the judgment of the majority in the Victorian Court
of Criminal Appeal in Demirian, and add to that
what appears in the outline at page 4 concerning
the discussion of causation and recklessness in the
light of causation, the New Zealand decision in
Ramsay, it can be seen, Your Honours, that the
propositions for which we contend, not only was
there an inadequate definition of the act for the
purposes of causation, coincidence of intent with
act, and to enable the evidence to define the
intent but, in addition, what was referred to was
the outcome of the series of acts or a body of
conduct without precise analysis.

McHUGH J:

Mr James, I was thinking about this case last

night. You have not put it this way, but it seemed
to me that your client could only be convicted of
murder if he had an intention to push her out the
window, and all the rest is manslaughter only.
Even if he had an intention to commit grievous
bodily harm on her in the bathroom and she fell out
the window, that could only constitute

manslaughter, could it not?

MR JAMES:

That is our submission, Your Honour.

I have not

put it as clearly obviously as I should have, but
it really came down, as indeed I put to
Justice Gaudron yesterday, to the proposition she
advanced yesterday at best for the Crown.
The practicality of the case meant that the

way in which it was left to the jury there may have
been a speculative verdict based on all the bases
thrown in.

McHUGH J: But leaving aside any question of speculative

verdict,…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Royall v The Queen

Details

AGLC: Royall v The Queen [1990] HCATrans 270
Case: [1990] HCATrans 270
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This case concerned an appeal to the High Court of Australia following a conviction for murder. The appellant, Royall, argued that the Court of Criminal Appeal had erred in its determination of the legal issues surrounding his conviction.

The central legal issues before the High Court were whether the trial judge had adequately directed the jury on the elements of murder, specifically concerning causation, the coincidence of intent with the act causing death, and the definition of the relevant act for the purposes of establishing intent. The appellant contended that the jury's verdict may have been speculative due to an insufficient analysis of the sequence of events and the required mental state.

The High Court considered the necessity for the "concomitants" – the subject and predicates of the offence – to coincide, as articulated in *Ryan*. The Court examined whether the jury had been properly instructed that the appellant must have intended to cause death or grievous bodily harm at the time of the act that led to the victim's death. The appellant's submission was that even if he had intended to inflict grievous bodily harm, and the victim died as a result of falling from a window during a struggle, this would only constitute manslaughter, not murder, unless the intention to push her out the window with the intent to cause death or grievous bodily harm was proven.

Orders