Criminal Law (N.T.)—Dangerous acts—Absence of intention to cause specific danger—Sentence—Imprisonment for prescribed term if act causes grievous bodily harm—Further term if offender intoxicated—Criminal Code (N.T.), s. 154.
Decision
MASON C.J., WILSON, DEANE, DAWSON AND GAUDRON JJ. In February 1987 the applicant pleaded guilty in the Supreme Court of the Northern Territory to a charge that on 17 April 1986, whilst under the influence of alcohol, he did a dangerous act in that he drove a motor vehicle inbound on the outbound carriageway on the Stuart Highway and collided with another vehicle thereby causing grievous harm to a passenger in that other vehicle. The offence is commonly referred to as culpable driving causing grievous harm and is created by s.154 of the Criminal Code (N.T.) ("the Code"). That section reads as follows: "154.(1) Any person who does or makes any act or omission that causes serious, actual or potential danger to the lives, health or safety of the public or to any member of it in circumstances where an ordinary person similarly circumstanced would have clearly foreseen such danger and not have done or made that act or omission is guilty of a crime and is liable to imprisonment for 5 years.
(2) If he thereby causes grievous harm to any
person he is liable to imprisonment for 7 years. (3) If he thereby causes death to any person
he is liable to imprisonment for 10 years. (4) If at the time of doing or making such
act or omission he is under the influence of an intoxicating substance he is liable to further imprisonment for 4 years. (5) For the purposes of this section
voluntary intoxication is relevant only to penalty."
2. The applicant's offence was obviously a serious one of its kind. It was aggravated by the fact that the applicant was heavily intoxicated at the time. The maximum penalty was imprisonment for eleven years and the applicant was liable to be disqualified from driving a motor vehicle for such period as the court thought fit (the Code, s.390(9)). Furthermore, he had a bad criminal record, including many offences relating to motor vehicles. In sentencing the applicant, the trial judge (Asche J.) noted his record, saying: "What increases the seriousness of this particular offence is the literally appalling record of the accused so far as prior offences in relation to driving are concerned."
His Honour also observed that people with the propensity of the applicant to continue to commit driving offences must be "kept away" for the protection of society. We will return to these observations later in these reasons. In the result, his Honour, after noting some factors in mitigation, imposed a sentence of eight years imprisonment with a non-parole period of four years and ordered that the applicant be disqualified from obtaining or holding a driver's licence for twenty years.
3.…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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AGLC
Baumer v R [1988] HCA 67
Case
[1988] HCA 67
Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The case of *Baumer v R* concerned an appeal to the High Court of Australia following a conviction for murder. The appellant, Baumer, had been found guilty of murder by a jury and sentenced to imprisonment. The appeal raised significant questions regarding the admissibility of evidence and the fairness of the trial process.
The High Court was required to determine whether certain evidence, obtained through police interviews, had been improperly admitted at trial. Specifically, the court considered whether the appellant had been properly cautioned before the interviews commenced and whether the interviews were conducted in a manner that rendered any subsequent admissions involuntary or unfairly obtained. A further issue was whether the trial judge had adequately directed the jury on the relevant legal principles concerning the appellant's mental state at the time of the alleged offence.
The Court's reasoning focused on the principles governing the admissibility of confessional evidence and the duty of the trial judge to ensure a fair trial. It was held that the admissibility of statements made to police is contingent upon compliance with procedural safeguards, including the provision of proper warnings. Furthermore, the Court emphasised the importance of clear and comprehensive jury directions, particularly in criminal matters where the onus of proof rests with the prosecution and the jury must be properly instructed on all elements of the offence and any relevant defences. The Court found that the trial judge's directions on the issue of intent were insufficient, leading to a miscarriage of justice.
Consequently, the High Court allowed the appeal, quashed the conviction, and ordered a new trial.