Baumer v The Queen

Case [1988] HCATrans 278


IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Darwin No Dl of 1988

B e t w e e n -

JOHN PAUL BAUMER

Applicant

and

THE QUEEN

Respondent

Application for special leave

to appeal

MASON CJ

WILSON J

DEANE J
DAWSON J

GAUDRON J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

Baumer

AT CANBERRA ON FRIDAY, 18 NOVEMBER 1988, AT 2.31 PM

Copyright in the High Court of Australia

C2T 64/ 1 /SDL 18/11/88

MR M.L. ABBOTT, QC: If the Court pleases, I appear with my

learned frienq, MR C.R. McDONALD, for the applicant.

(instructed by the Australian Legal

Aid Office)

MR T. I. PAULING, QC; SolicitoF-General for the Northern
·Territory: If it.please the Court, I appear
with my learned friend, MR W.J. KARCZEWSKI, for
the respondent. (instructed by the Solicitor
for the Northern Territory)
MASON CJ:  Yes, Mr Abbott?

MR ABBOTT: If the Court pleases, this application is

two-fold: firstly, for an application for an

extension of time in which to apply for special

leave. That application is not opposed by the

respondent and I advance, in support of that

application, the affidavit of Mr Baumer filed

in these proceedings.

MASON CJ:  Yes, we have read .the affidavits in support

of that application.

MR ABBOTT:  In my submission, Mr Baumer has, at no stage - - -
MASON CJ:  You need not worry about extension of time,

Mr Abbott.

MR ABBOTT:  If the Court pleases. The :second application is

an application for special leave and, in our

submission, it involves a question of law which

is of public importance and of general application,

namely, what should be the approach of a sentencing

judge to the procedures set out in section 154

of the Code and, in particular, :subsection (4).

. Se·ction 154. .of .the. Code d:eals with all

dangerous acts and omissions. It is a section

which is in a Code which came into operation

at the beginning of 1984 and has been amended

once by Act No 9 of 1984. I refer the Court to section 154(4) and, as the outline of our
submission indicates, this is a section of wide
application which deals with a variety of dangerous
acts and omissions. I have said, in our application,
that a charge under this section is invariably
included as an alternative charge in indictments
charging murder and/or manslaughter; In fact,
that is incorrect. By operation of section 318
of the Code, it is always an alternative charge
that is open to the jury to return a verdict
upon.

It is also the section under which charges

are laid in cases of alleged dangerous driving

causing death or, in the case of this applicant,

grievous harm to a member of the community.

C2T64/2/SDL 2 18/11/88
Baumer

?he question that we seek to argue in

this application relates to the wording of

section 154(4) and, in essence, is this: does

the phrase "liable to further imprisonment for

four years" mean that after considering the appropriate

penalty under subsections (1), (2) or (3),…

Continue reading Baumer v The Queen

Sign in free to access the full text

Details
AGLC
Baumer v The Queen [1988] HCATrans 278
Case
[1988] HCATrans 278
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The applicant, Mr. Baumer, sought special leave to appeal to the High Court of Australia against a decision of a lower court. The respondent was The Queen. The core of the dispute concerned the proper interpretation and application of section 154(4) of the Northern Territory Criminal Code, which deals with dangerous acts and omissions.

The legal issue before the High Court was whether the phrase "liable to further imprisonment for four years" in section 154(4) of the Code required a sentencing judge to undertake a separate exercise of determining additional imprisonment due to the offender's intoxication, after considering the appropriate penalty under other subsections of section 154. Alternatively, the question was whether this phrase merely directed the judge to add four years to the statutory maximum penalty when intoxication was a factor.

The applicant argued that section 154(4) represented a deliberate and radical departure from previous law, as characterised by a former Chief Justice. The applicant contended that the wording implied a distinct sentencing step focused on the additional punishment for intoxication, rather than simply an adjustment to the overall statutory maximum. The applicant sought to demonstrate that the courts below had treated the provision as merely an arithmetical calculation of the maximum penalty, rather than a directive for a separate sentencing consideration.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.