FSR17 v Minister for Immigration

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

FSR17 & ORS v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR [2018] FCCA 2931
Catchwords:
MIGRATION – Protection (Class XA) Visa – where the Applicants applied for protection visas on the ground of fear of persecution in Papua New Guinea – s.424A – legal unreasonableness.

Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.36, 63, 65, 424A. 424AA, 474

Cases cited:
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS & Anor (2010) 240 CLR 611
SAAP v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2005) 228 CLR 294.
NATL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 112
SZMCD v Minister of Immigration and Citizenship (2009) 174 FCR 415
SZAGF v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 82 ALD 364
SZBYR v Minister of Immigration and Citizenship (2007) 96 ALD 1
DAO16 v Minister of Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 2
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZUXN [2016] FCA 216
CQG15 v Minister for Immigration Border Protection (2016) 253 FCR 496
CWR16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 859
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v SGLB (2004) 78 ALD 224
Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Applicant S20/2002 (2003) 73 ALD 1
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332
First Applicant: FSR17
Second Applicant:  FSS17
Third Applicant: FST17
Fourth Applicant FSU17
Fifth Applicant: FSV17
Sixth Applicant: FSW17
Seventh Applicant: FSX17
First Respondent: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
Second Respondent: ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
File Number: BRG 1278 of 2017
Judgment of: Judge Howard
Hearing date: 29 June 2018
Date of Last Submission: 29 June 2018
Delivered at: Brisbane
Delivered on: 18 October 2018

REPRESENTATION

Counsel for the Applicant: Mr Byrne
Solicitors for the Applicant: Nandan Vaityte
Counsel for the Respondents: Ms Hoiberg
Solicitors for the Respondents: Clayton Utz

ORDERS

  1. That by no later than 4:00pm on 19 October 2018,  the parties shall jointly consult with each other and forward to the Court by way of email to associate.judgehoward@federalcircuitcourt.gov.au a draft final order which appropriately reflects the Reasons for Judgment including in respect of costs.

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT
OF AUSTRALIA
AT BRISBANE

BRG 1278 of 2017

FSR17

First Applicant

FSS17

Second Applicant

FST17

Third Applicant

FSU17

Fourth Applicant

FSV17

Fifth Applicant

FSW17

Sixth Applicant

FSX17

Seventh Applicant

And

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Background

  1. There are seven Applicants in this application before the Federal Circuit Court of Australia.  The Applicants are all members of the same family.  Each of the Applicants is a citizen of Papua New Guinea (“PNG”).  On 4 November 2014 the Applicants applied for Protection (Class XA) Visas in Australia.  The First Applicant had arrived in Australia on 26 January 2013 to commence as a student at the James Cook University in Townsville, Queensland.  The Second Applicant is the wife of the First Applicant.  The remaining five Applicants are the adult children of the…

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Details
Case
[2018] FCCA 2931
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This case concerned an application for judicial review brought by the applicants against the Minister for Immigration. The dispute centred on the Administrative Appeals Tribunal's (AAT) decision to affirm the refusal of protection visas. The applicants contended that the AAT had made jurisdictional error by failing to comply with sections 424A and 424AA of the *Migration Act 1958* (Cth) and that its decision was legally unreasonable. The matter was heard by Howard J in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia.

The primary legal issues before the Court were whether the AAT had contravened sections 424A and 424AA of the *Migration Act* by failing to provide the applicants with clear particulars of information it relied upon, ensure their understanding of its relevance and consequences, and invite them to respond. Additionally, the Court was required to determine if the AAT's credibility findings against the First Applicant were irrational and illogical, rendering the decision legally unreasonable. This involved examining the AAT's treatment of the applicants' evidence and the independent evidence provided by Detective Chief Superintendent Damaru of the Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary.

Howard J considered the AAT's obligations under sections 424A and 424AA, referencing High Court authority that defined "information" in this context as evidentiary material or documentation, not merely doubts or inconsistencies. The Court noted that despite a verbal indication from the Tribunal member that information from PNG authorities would be provided, it was not disclosed to the applicants before the decision was made. The Court also examined the specific content of Detective Damaru's letter dated 9 October 2017, and the Minister's submission that this letter did not contain information adverse to the applicants requiring disclosure under section 424A. The Court found that the AAT's failure to provide the applicants with particulars of the information contained in Detective Damaru's letter, which was relied upon in affirming the decision, constituted a contravention of section 424A. This failure, coupled with the AAT's potentially irrational credibility findings, led the Court to conclude that the AAT had engaged in jurisdictional error.

The Court ordered that the decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal be set aside.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

In the Applicant’s written outline of submissions filed 15 June 2018 Ground 6 is further particularised. In paragraphs 30, 31, 32 and 33 the Applicants state that:- “30. Ground 6 is concerned with the Tribunal’s treatment, on the basis of credibility concerns relating to the applicants, of the evidence of the applicants and Detective Damaru.31. As for the applicant’s evidence, the various inconsistencies referred to by the Tribunal in its decision are minor and are understandable in light of the passage of time between the events in questions and the provision of evidence in interviews and at the hearing. In addition, the primary concern raised by the Tribunal member at the hearing, in relation to inconsistencies, was evidence surrounding the incident or incidents involving a ‘black Mazda’ (referred to above). However, those concerns were squarely and properly addressed at the hearing, and differences in accounts were insignificant (and not enough reasonably to impugn the credit of any of the applicants: see SZVAP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1089; (2015) 233 FCR 451, at 21-23).32. Even more troubling is the Tribunal’s having dismissed (without proper explanation) the unequivocal evidence provided by Detective Damaru in his letter dated 9 October 2017 (after the hearing) that the First Applicant was in fact at risk of harm were he to return to PNG – apparently on the basis of the Tribunal’s credibility concerns about the applicants. There is no logical basis, however, for the Tribunal to have disregarded the probative independent evidence of Detective Damaru (a PNG official in direct correspondence with the Tribunal) on the basis of credit concerns that the Tribunal apparently had (without proper reason, in the applicants’ submission) in respect of evidence of the applicants. Again, there is no connection between Detective Damaru and the applicants, and he has independently informed the Tribunal that the First Applicant will be targeted and exposed to harm if he returns to PNG (see paragraph 16 above).33. That evidence of Detective Damaru cannot reasonably be disregarded, and causes the decision to become infected by legal unreasonableness, again, in the Li sense. The evidence plainly exposes as irrational the Tribunal’s conclusions at paragraph 151 of the decision (CB 30), upon which the Tribunal’s decision hinges, that: (a) ‘the applicant has either embellished or concocted claims’ about being threatened; and (b) there had been no such threats….” In considering this aspect of the Applicant’s submissions it is necessary for the Court to have close regard to the credibility findings made by the Tribunal. It will then be necessary to review the credibility findings and conclusions of the Tribunal in the light of the independent corroborative evidence of Detective Chief Superintendent Damaru – including in particular the letter from Damaru dated 9 October 2017 addressed to the Registrar of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal.

Decision

Reasons for decision

A-CJ AND KIEFEL J
On the authority of NATL (supra) the Tribunal is not required to provide evidence to the Applicants. All that is required is, “clear particulars of any information that the Tribunal considers would be the reason, or a part of the reason, for affirming the decision that is under review.” However, I do note what the High Court had to say about the word “information” in section 424A of the Act. In the joint decision of Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Kirby, Callinan, Heydon, and Crennan JJ in SZBYR v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2007) 96 ALD 1 at paragraph 18 the High Court stated, inter-alia:-“18…However broadly ‘information’ be defined, its meaning in this context is related to the existence of evidentiary material or documentation, not the existence of doubts, inconsistencies or the absence of evidence…."The High Court was focusing on a particular issue – however, the reference to “information” is a reference to the use of that word in the context of section 424A. Of particular note is the fact that the High Court made specific reference to “evidentiary material” and “documentation”. The member of the Tribunal in this case told the Applicants at the Hearing on 22 August 2017 that he would provide to the Applicants the information – or the response – from the relevant authorities in PNG to the Tribunal’s request for further information in the light of the August 2017 letter from Detective Damaru. Notwithstanding the verbal indication from the Tribunal Member that the information would be provided to the Applicants – the Tribunal did not provide the information to the Applicants. Certainly not before the decision was made. In SZMCD v Minister of Immigration and Citizenship (2009) 174 FCR 415 at paragraph 71 the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia (Moore, Tracey and Foster JJ) stated:- “71. The policy and purpose reflected in s 424A is that the Tribunal should be compelled:(a) To put the visa applicant on fair notice in writing of critical matters of concern to the Tribunal;(b) To ensure that the visa applicant understands the significance of those matters to the decision under review; and(c) To give the applicant a reasonable opportunity to comment on or to respond to those matters of concern.” I note paragraph 14 of the First Respondent’s written submission. Paragraph 14 of the written submission states:- “14. When regard is had to the content of the October Damaru Letter, it did not contain information that was required to be put to the Applicants under s 424A:(a) in relation to Damaru's advice that the threats against the First Applicant and his family were not formally reported to police, the Tribunal had raised with the First Applicant at the hearing its concern that Detective Chief Superintendent Damaru's risk assessment was based upon specific threats, which appeared not to have been the case, and that Damaru was only speculating that the threats were related to the Paraka issue;(b) Damaru's statement that when the trials are conducted and witnesses appear to give evidence, they will be exposed and most likely be subjected to threats, intimidation and physical harm, was information in the Applicants' favour and not information adverse to them (that is, it could not have been part of the reason for affirming the decision under review);(c) Damaru's statement that the security of all witnesses, including the First Applicant and his family, could not be guaranteed was also information in the Applicants' favour, and repeated his earlier advice of 27 February 2015, which the Applicants had provided to the Minister's delegate (CB 227-228);(d) the First Applicant had given evidence during the Tribunal hearing that the current Solicitor-General could testify in the First Applicant's absence. That information was not required under s 424A(3)(b) to be put to the Applicants; and(e) Damaru's advice that the First Applicant would be targeted because he was the one who exposed the matter, was information in the Applicants' favour and could not have been part of the reason for affirming the decision under review.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: A-CJ AND KIEFEL J

At the Hearing of the matter in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia in Brisbane on Friday 29 June 2018 the Applicants were represented by Mr Byrne of Counsel. The application proceeded in relation to two grounds only. Those two grounds are grounds 4 and 6 of the amended application filed 29 March 2018. Grounds 4 and 6 states as follows:- “4.…The Second Respondent fell into jurisdictional error, in making the decision, by contravening ss 424A and/or 424AA of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Act).Particulars:(i) At the hearing on 22 August 2017, the only information identified by the Second Respondent for the purposes of ss 424A or 424AA was information given by the Third and Seventh Applicants during the hearing indicating that they never specifically faced threats or harm and the Second Respondent’s concern that this was inconsistent with a statement provided by Detective Matthew Damaru of the Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary in 2015; (ii) After the hearing on 22 August 2017:A. the Second Respondent sent a letter dated 5 September 2017 (Request Letter) to Detective Matthew Damaru of the Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary requesting further information in relation to matters the subject of the Applicants' application for Protection visas;B. Detective Damaru sent a letter dated 9 October 2017 (Response Letter) to the Second Respondent providing information in response to the requests in the Second Respondent’s letter dated 5 September 2017;(iii) In making its decision dated 27 November 2017 to affirm the decision under review, the Second Respondent relied upon information other than the information referred to in (i) above, including, without limitation, information in the Request Letter and/or Response Letter:(iv) The information referred to in (iii) above was the reason or part of the reason, for the Second Respondent' s decision to affirm the decision under review;(v) In contravention of ss 424A and/or 424AA of the Act, the Second Respondent failed to:A. give the Applicants clear particulars of that information;B. ensure that, as far as reasonably practicable, the Applicants understood why that information was relevant to the review, and the consequences of the information being relied upon in affirming the decision under review; andC. invite the Applicants to comment on or respond to that information;…6. The decision of the Second Respondent was legally unreasonable and infected by jurisdictional error because the Second Respondent's credibility findings against the First Applicant, and the reasoning leading to those findings, were irrational and illogical.Particulars:(i) The Second Respondent found that there were inconsistencies in evidence, where there were no such inconsistencies;(ii) Alternatively, if there were any inconsistences, they were objectively minor and provided no proper basis to reject evidence and claims of the Applicants….” The First Applicant was employed in PNG by the Department of Justice and Attorney General’s Department between 2006 and 2014. From September 2009 until February 2013 the First Applicant was the Solicitor-General of Papua New Guinea.