Edwards v Santos Limited

Case [2010] FCA 34

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Edwards v Santos Limited [2010] FCA 34

Citation: Edwards v Santos Limited [2010] FCA 34
Parties: NOELENE MARGARET EDWARDS, CLANCY MCKELLAR, IONA DAWN SMITH, ERNEST (HOPE) EBSWORTH, ROSEMARY (ROSE) ANNE WILSON, MARGARET ANNE COLLINS, SHARLEEN LOUISE KNIGHT and ARCHIE ALFRED EBSWORTH v SANTOS LIMITED (ACN 007 550 923), STATE OF QUEENSLAND and DELHI PETROLEUM PTY LIMITED (ACN 007 854 686)
File number: QUD 86 of 2009
Judge: COLLIER J
Date of judgment: 4 February 2010
Catchwords:

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for order that leave to appeal application be heard by Full Court pursuant to O 52 r 2AA(a) Federal Court Rules – s 25(2) Federal Court Act 1976 (Cth) – consideration of principles relating to referral of leave to appeal application to Full Court – factors relevant to exercise of Court’s discretion which justify departure from prima facie position that application for leave to appeal be heard by single judge – whether the judgment relates to “minor interlocutory squabble” – whether prima facie hopeless case inappropriate for referral to Full Court to hear leave application – whether factors including cost, efficiency and public importance warrant referral of leave to appeal application to Full Court

Held: application for leave to appeal referred to a Full Court and, subject to any contrary direction of the Full Court, the application for leave to appeal be heard concurrently with, or alternatively, immediately before the appeal
Legislation: Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 25, s 31A
Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) Pt 2 Div 3 Subdiv 1, s 24ID
Petroleum Act 1923 (Qld)
Federal Court Rules O 52 r 2AA
Cases cited: Allphones Retail Pty Ltd v Weimann [2009] FCA 849 cited
Edwards v Santos Limited [2009] FCA 1532 cited
Harding v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (2008) 172 FCR 469 cited
Kowalski v MMAL Staff Superannuation Fund Pty Ltd (2009) 178 FCR 401 cited
Optiver Australia Pty Ltd v Tibra Trading Pty Ltd [2008] FCA 47 cited
The Decor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397 cited
The Lardil Peoples v Queensland (2001) 108 FCR 453 cited
TS Production LLC v Drew Pictures Pty Ltd [2008] FCA 1329 cited
Zegarac v Pitcher Partners [2009] FCA 1061 cited
Date of hearing: 29 January 2010
Place: Brisbane
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 16
Counsel for the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh and Eighth Applicants: Mr J McCarthy QC with Mr J Kildea
Counsel for the First and Third Respondents: Mr G Coveney
Solicitor for the First and Third Respondents: Blake Dawson
Counsel for the Second Respondent: Mr P Flanagan SC
Solicitor for the Second Respondent: Crown Law

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

QUD 86 of 2009
BETWEEN:

NOELENE MARGARET EDWARDS
First Applicant

CLANCY MCKELLAR
Second Applicant

IONA DAWN SMITH
Third Applicant

ERNEST (HOPE) EBSWORTH
Fourth Applicant

ROSEMARY (ROSE) ANNE WILSON
Fifth Applicant

MARGARET ANNE COLLINS
Sixth Applicant

SHARLEEN LOUISE KNIGHT
Seventh Applicant

ARCHIE ALFRED EBSWORTH

Continue reading Edwards v Santos Limited

Sign in free to access the full text

Details
AGLC
Edwards v Santos Limited [2010] FCA 34
Case
[2010] FCA 34
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Edwards v Santos Limited, the primary dispute concerned a matter that reached the Federal Court of Australia. The applicants sought leave to appeal against the decision of the primary judge, which had summarily dismissed their application under section 31A of the Federal Court Act 1976. This dismissal was predicated on the finding that the applicants' claims lacked reasonable prospects of success. The applicants argued that the decision had significant consequences for them, effectively ending their litigation, and that the primary judge had erred in applying certain legal principles.

The legal issues before the court primarily revolved around the interpretation and application of section 31A of the Federal Court Act, which allows for the summary dismissal of proceedings where there is no reasonable prospect of success. The applicants contended that the primary judge had misapplied the decision in The Lardil Peoples v Queensland (2001) 108 FCR 453 and that the case raised issues of public importance regarding the Native Title Act 1993. The applicants also argued that the litigation did not represent a minor interlocutory dispute but had significant consequences for them. The court had to determine whether the application for leave to appeal should be referred to the Full Court or heard by a single judge.

The court considered the arguments put forward by both sides. While it observed that the Full Court's reconsideration of section 31A was not immediately necessary, it acknowledged that there was potential merit in the applicants' submissions regarding the application of The Lardil Peoples decision. The court also noted that the consequences of the primary judge's decision were significant and that the case potentially raised issues of public importance. Given the complexity of the issues and the substantial arguments presented, the court concluded that the application for leave to appeal was not hopeless and that it was appropriate to refer the application to the Full Court for consideration.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

A number of these factors emerge from cases including Optiver Australia Pty Ltd v Tibra Trading Pty Ltd [2008] FCA 47, TS Production LLC [2008] FCA 1329, Zegarac v Pitcher Partners [2009] FCA 1061, Allphones Retail Pty Ltd [2009] FCA 849 and Harding v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (2008) 172 FCR 469.Consideration In light of the detailed and extensive consideration given by his Honour to the application before him it is not obvious to me at this stage of the proceedings that his Honour’s decision is attended by sufficient doubt to warrant it being reconsidered by the Full Court as explained in The Decor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397. However Mr McCarthey QC for the applicants submitted strongly that not only was his Honour in error, but that the application for leave to appeal should be referred to the Full Court because, in summary:·A conclusive interpretation of s 31A of the Federal Court Act by the Full Court is desirable in light of a range of views of the Court at first instance.·The litigation between the parties did not represent a “minor interlocutory squabble”. Rather, his Honour’s decision put an end to the litigation between the parties, and the applicants were prejudiced as a result.·His Honour was wrong in his application of the decision in The Lardil Peoples (2001) 108 FCR 453.·The case raises issues of public importance in relation to the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth). For the purposes of the application before me, Mr McCarthey’s submissions are, to varying degrees, helpful. Following the decision of the Full Court in Kowalski v MMAL Staff Superannuation Fund Pty Ltd (2009) 178 FCR 401 where the Full Court examined s 31A, the importance of the Full Court so soon thereafter revisiting the origins, meaning and effect of s 31A is not clear to me. Further, as I observed to Mr McCarthey QC during the proceedings, the mere fact that an order had been made pursuant to s 31A summarily dismissing a substantive application for want of reasonable prospects of success (and thus bringing an end to the litigation) does not in itself warrant automatic referral of an application for leave to appeal to the Full Court – else all applications for leave to appeal from decisions made pursuant to s 31A should properly be directed to the Full Court. Section 25 of the Federal Court Act and O 52 r 2AA clearly do not contemplate that outcome. However:·I consider that there is potentially some merit in Mr McCarthey’s extensive submissions concerning the application of the decision The Lardil Peoples v Queensland (2001) 108 FCR 453 in the context of the primary judgment;·I accept that these proceedings did not constitute a “minor interlocutory squabble”, but that his Honour’s orders resulted in important consequences for the parties; and·I accept that the case potentially raises issues of public importance. While Mr Flanagan SC for the second respondent pressed his submission that indeed his Honour’s findings were correct in their entirety, and that accordingly it was appropriate that any application for leave to appeal should be heard by a single Judge, the complexity of the issues in question in the substantive proceedings are such that Counsel’s written submissions in support of that single issue were themselves extensive. In my view, prima facie, the application for leave to appeal does not represent a hopeless case inappropriate for referral to the Full Court, and there appear to be issues which are quite properly suitable for consideration by the Full Court.