FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Oswal v Burrup Fertilisers Pty Ltd (Receivers and Managers Appointed) [2011] FCA 536
Citation: Oswal v Burrup Fertilisers Pty Ltd (Receivers and Managers Appointed) [2011] FCA 536 Appeal from: Burrup Fertilisers Pty Ltd (Receivers and Managers Appointed) v Oswal [2011] FCA 424 Parties: PANKAJ OSWAL v BURRUP FERTILISERS PTY LTD (RECEIVERS AND MANAGERS APPOINTED) ACN 095 441 151
RADHIKA OSWAL AND COMICAL ALI MILITANT VEGETARIAN PTY LTD ACN 129 299 172 v BURRUP FERTILISERS PTY LTD (RECEIVERS AND MANAGERS APPOINTED) ACN 095 441 151
File numbers: WAD 142 of 2011
WAD 146 of 2011Judge: BARKER J Date of judgment: 17 May 2011 Corrigendum: 25 May 2011 Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – whether application for leave to appeal against the refusal of a stay application should be heard by single judge or Full Court Legislation: Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 25 Cases cited: Allphones Retail Pty Ltd ACN 008 168 090 v Weimann [2009] FCA 849
Burrup Fertilisers Pty Ltd (Receivers and Mangers Appointed) v Oswal [2011] FCA 424
Décor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397
Edwards v Santos Limited [2010] FCA 34
Henry v Henry (1996) 185 CLR 571
Optiver Australia Pty Ltd v Tibra Trading Pty Ltd [2008] FCA 47
Sterling Pharmaceuticals Pty Ltd v Boots Co (Aust) Pty Ltd (1992) 34 FCR 287
TS Production LLC v Drew Pictures Pty Ltd [2008] FCA 1329
Union Steamship Co of New Zealand Ltd v The Caradale (1937) 56 CLR 277Date of hearing: 17 May 2011 Place: Perth Division: GENERAL DIVISION Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 30 Counsel for Mr Oswal: Mr P Collinson SC Solicitor for Mr Oswal: Murcia Pestell Hillard Counsel for Mrs Oswal and Comical Ali Militant Vegetarian Pty Ltd: Ms KJ Williams Solicitor for Mrs Oswal and Comical Ali Militant Vegetarian Pty Ltd: Jones Day Counsel for the Respondent: Mr K de Kerloy Solicitor for the Respondent: Freehills
FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Oswal v Burrup Fertilisers Pty Ltd (Receivers and Managers Appointed) [2011] FCA 536
CORRIGENDUM
1.In para 3 of the Reasons for Judgment, at the end of the first sentence, remove the word “be” so it reads “to repay the sum of $19,972,665.30 to BFPL”.
2.In para 13 of the Reasons for Judgment, in the second sentence, the word “the” should read “three” so the amended sentence reads “of three judges of the Federal Court”.
I certify that the preceding two (2) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Corrigendum to the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Barker. Associate:
Dated: 25 May 2011
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
WAD 142 of 2011
ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN: PANKAJ OSWAL
AppellantAND: BURRUP FERTILISERS PTY LTD (RECEIVERS AND MANAGERS APPOINTED) ACN 095 441 151
Respondent
JUDGE:
BARKER J
DATE OF ORDER:
17 MAY 2011
WHERE MADE:
PERTH
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The notice of motion be referred to…
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- Case
- [2011] FCA 536
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court reasoned that the applicants had not shown that their cases were straightforward or clear-cut, and that there was some value in having the Full Court determine the application for leave to appeal. The court concluded that the potential consequences of a single judge determining the leave application, including the risk of significant costs and resources being expended, justified referring the application to the Full Court. The court made orders referring the notice of motion to the Full Court, directing the parties to be in a position to fully argue an appeal if the Full Court so decides, requiring the parties to comply with Practice Note No 1 as though leave to appeal had been granted, listing the matter for hearing in the Full Court as a matter of urgency, and reserving costs. The ratio of the decision was that an application for leave to appeal may be referred to the Full Court if there is some value, some benefit or advantage to be gained by having a Full Court determine the leave application.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The notice of motion be referred to a Full Court.
2. Although it will be a matter for the Full Court to decide whether to hear the substance of an appeal at the same time as the application for leave to appeal the parties are to be in a position to fully argue an appeal if the Full Court so decides.
3. The parties are to comply with Practice Note No 1 as though leave to appeal had been granted.
4. The matter to be listed for hearing in the Full Court as a matter of urgency.
5. Costs be reserved.
Note:
1. The notice of motion be referred to a Full Court.
2. Although it will be a matter for the Full Court to decide whether to hear the substance of an appeal at the same time as the application for leave to appeal the parties are to be in a position to fully argue an appeal if the Full Court so decides.
3. The parties are to comply with Practice Note No 1 as though leave to appeal had been granted.
4. The matter to be listed for hearing in the Full Court as a matter of urgency.
5. Costs be reserved.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The applicants, Mr Oswal in WAD 142 of 2011 and Mrs Oswal and related company in WAD 146 of 2011, now seek a direction that their applications for leave to appeal be heard and determined by a Full Court. BFPL as the respondent in each of these applications opposes the application for such a direction. CONSIDERATION It might be said that s 25(2) of the FCA Act creates the expectation that an application for leave to appeal to the Court will be heard and determined by a single judge, unless some good reason is advanced to suggest that there is some value, some benefit or advantage to be gained by having a Full Court determine the leave application. As a matter of first principle, one might surmise that s 25(2) is designed to ensure that unless a Full Court is already apprised of a proceeding in which the application is made, a Full Court should not be troubled to deal with such an application unless the circumstances of the application warrant it. Such a principle would recognise that the judicial resources of the judges of the Federal Court should not be expended where one would do. It is otherwise clear that s 25(2) does not lay out any criteria by which a single judge might decide to direct that an application be heard and determined by a Full Court. There is, for example, no requirement such a direction only be given in relation to a “significant” or “exceptional” matter or the like. It may be expected that the circumstances of each case in which the question of a direction is raised will suggest whether there is some value, some benefit or advantage in making a direction that the Full Court hear and determine the application for leave to appeal. Where a single judge decides to make such a direction, one would ordinarily think that the single judge would have in mind that a Full Court would, in all likelihood, expect to hear argument on the proposed substantive appeal as a result of which the Full Court will decide whether or not leave to appeal should be given and, if so, then to dispose of the appeal substantively one way or the other at the same time. It therefore comes as no surprise to discover that the decisions of this Court, necessarily by judges at first instance, have suggested that clear cut cases for the grant, or refusal of leave to appeal will obviously be more readily, and speedily, dealt with by a single judge than by requiring the attention of a Full Court: Optiver Australia Pty Ltd v Tibra Trading Pty Ltd [2008] FCA 47 at [8] (Optiver), Buchanan J; but that where the case for the grant or refusal of leave is more evenly balanced, considerations of a different kind are raised: Optiver at [9]; and that it may not be necessary to express any firm view about the strength of contentions advanced by an applicant where a case is evenly balanced: Optiver at [18]; or that a direction that the application be determined by a Full Court should not be made in a case which can be characterised as a minor interlocutory squabble over discovery or the like: TS Production LLC v Drew Pictures Pty Ltd [2008] FCA 1329 (TS Production) at [7] per Heerey J; but that that there may be cases where the presence or absence of either substantial injustice or sufficient doubt is so clear and obvious that the application should be disposed of on that ground alone: TS Production at [11]; or that the case is one, identifiable through experience, where it is not really practicable to separate out the leave issue of whether the decision below is attended with sufficient doubt from the substantive merits: TS Production at [13]; or that the application to appeal is “hopeless”: Allphones Retail Pty Ltd ACN 008 168 090 v Weimann [2009] FCA 849 (Allphones) at [13], McKerracher J; and where the decision has serious implications for the parties or one of them if the decision to be appealed against is allowed to stand: Allphones at [22]; or where the application for leave to appeal is not straight forward, suggesting that on efficiency and cost consideration grounds the direction to the Full Court should be made: Edwards v Santos Limited [2010] FCA 34 at [10], per Collier J.