FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Optiver Australia Pty Ltd v Tibra Trading Pty Ltd [2008] FCA 47
APPEAL – application for leave to appeal – whether the grant or refusal of leave to appeal is an exercise of appellate jurisdiction – Order 52 rule 2AA – distinction between a clear-cut case for the grant or refusal of leave and an evenly balanced case – significance of no right of appeal from grant or refusal of leave or confusion about whether such a right exists.
PRELIMINARY DISCOVERY – refusal to grant – whether a matter of practice or procedure – whether effectively final in nature.
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 25(2)
Federal Court Rules O 15A r 6(b), O 52 r 2AA, O 52 r 6Applicant S1815 [2007] HCA Trans 613
Bahonko v Sterjov [2007] FCA 1717
C7 Pty Ltd v Foxtel Management Pty Ltd [2001] FCA 1864Dart v Norwich Union Life Australia Ltd [2005] FCA 327
Electricity Retail Corporation v Griffin Energy Pty Ltd [2006] FCA 1810
Hooper v Kirella Pty Ltd (1999) 96 FCR 1
Johnson Tiles Pty Ltd v Esso Australia Pty Ltd (2000) 104 FCR 564
Kristoffersen v Department of Employment, Workplace Relations and Small Business [2002] FCAFC 269Malouf v Malouf (1999) 86 FCR 134
Optiver Australia Pty Ltd v Tibra Trading Pty Ltd [2007] FCA 1348
Optiver Australia Pty Ltd v Tibra Trading Pty Ltd [2007] FCA 1560
Optiver Australia Pty Ltd v Tibra Trading Pty Ltd [2007] FCA 2065
Qanta Software International Pty Ltd v Computer Management Services Pty Ltd (2000) 175 ALR 536Sharman License Holdings Ltd v Universal Music Pty Ltd [2005] FCA 505
Tait v Harris [2003] FCA 416
Thomas Borthwick and Sons (Pacific Holdings) Ltd v Trade Practices Commission (1988) 18 FCR 424United Mexican States v Cabal (2001) 209 CLR 165
Visy Industries Holdings Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2007) 161 FCR 122
Wati v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1997) 78 FCR 543
Hamod v New South Wales (2002) 188 ALR 659
OPTIVER AUSTRALIA PTY LTD v TIBRA TRADING PTY LTD, TIBRA CAPITAL PTY LTD, TIBRA CAPITAL MANAGEMENT PTY LTD, TIBRA INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PTY LTD, DINESH BHANDARI, GLENN WILLIAMSON, TIMOTHY BERRY, ANDREW KING AND KINSEY COTTON
NSD 84 OF 2008
BUCHANAN J
1 FEBRUARY 2008
SYDNEY
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
NSD 84 OF 2008
BETWEEN:
OPTIVER AUSTRALIA PTY LTD
ApplicantAND:
TIBRA TRADING PTY LTD
First RespondentTIBRA CAPITAL PTY LTD
Second RespondentTIBRA CAPITAL MANAGEMENT PTY LTD
Third RespondentTIBRA INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PTY LTD
Fourth RespondentDINESH BHANDARI
Fifth RespondentGLENN WILLIAMSON
Sixth RespondentTIMOTHY BERRY
Seventh RespondentANDREW KING
Eighth RespondentKINSEY COTTON
Ninth Respondent
JUDGE:
BUCHANAN J
DATE OF ORDER:
1 FEBRUARY 2008
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY
THE COURT DIRECTS THAT:
1.The notice of motion be referred to a Full Court.
2.Although it will be a matter for the Full Court to decide whether to hear the substance of an appeal…
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- Case
- [2008] FCA 47
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) permitted an application for leave to appeal to be heard and determined by a single judge or by a Full Court. Historically a party seeking to appeal an interlocutory decision had a practical right to elect whether its application for leave to appeal was dealt with by a single judge or by a Full Court. However, this right had been extinguished by Order 52 rule 2AA of the Federal Court Rules. Prima facie applications for leave to appeal should be dealt with by a single judge. However, it was appropriate to refer an application for leave to appeal to a Full Court if it was not a clear-cut case for the grant or refusal of leave and if there was a risk of confusion about whether a right of appeal against a refusal to grant leave existed. The decision of Tamberlin J in the present case was not a clear-cut case for the grant or refusal of leave to appeal. It was also not clear whether the respondents would suffer undue prejudice if preliminary discovery were granted. There was some substance in the suggestion that the decision had effectively final consequences. For those reasons, it was appropriate to refer the application for leave to appeal to a Full Court. It was not necessary to decide whether the application for leave to appeal should be heard at the same time as the substantive appeal. It was also not necessary to expedite the matter.
Background
Background to the litigation
The case began with an application for preliminary discovery by Optiver, which was dismissed by Tamberlin J. This decision was appealed by Optiver, seeking leave to appeal the dismissal of the preliminary discovery application. The application for leave to appeal was heard by Buchanan J, who decided to refer the matter to a Full Court for determination.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the grant or refusal of leave to appeal is an exercise of appellate jurisdiction under Order 52 rule 2AA of the Federal Court Rules.
2. What distinguishes a clear-cut case for the grant or refusal of leave to appeal from an evenly balanced case.
3. The significance of the lack of a right of appeal from the grant or refusal of leave to appeal or the confusion about whether such a right exists.
4. Whether the refusal of preliminary discovery is a matter of practice or procedure or if it effectively has final consequences.
Held
1. The notice of motion seeking leave to appeal is referred to a Full Court.
2. The Full Court will decide whether to hear the application for leave to appeal and the substantive appeal at the same time.
3. The parties must comply with Practice Note No 1 as though leave to appeal had been granted.
4. No special need for expedition is found.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Court considered whether the grant or refusal of leave to appeal is an exercise of appellate jurisdiction under Order 52 rule 2AA of the Federal Court Rules. The Court observed that under s 25(2) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976, an application for leave to appeal may be heard and determined by a single judge or by a Full Court. Historically, parties could elect for their application to be heard by a Full Court, but this was overruled by Kristoffersen v Department of Employment, Workplace Relations and Small Business [2002] FCAFC 269 and affirmed by Order 52 rule 2AA, which directs that applications must be heard by a single judge unless a judge directs otherwise. The Court also considered the distinction between a clear-cut case for the grant or refusal of leave to appeal and an evenly balanced case. It was noted that clear-cut cases should be dealt with by a single judge, while more evenly balanced cases should be referred to a Full Court. The significance of the lack of a right of appeal from the grant or refusal of leave to appeal, or the confusion about whether such a right exists, was also considered. The Court concluded that this uncertainty favors referring the application to a Full Court in cases that are not reasonably clear. Finally, the Court addressed whether the refusal of preliminary discovery is a matter of practice or procedure or if it effectively has final consequences. The Court found that although the refusal of preliminary discovery concerns practice and procedure, it can have final consequences in certain cases. Given these considerations, the Court decided to refer the application for leave to appeal to a Full Court.