FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Sayed v National Disability Insurance Agency [2023] FCA 1550
Appeal from: Application for leave to appeal: Sayed v National Disability Insurance Agency and Anor [2022] FCA 1494 File number(s): VID 761 of 2022 Judgment of: ANDERSON J Date of judgment: 7 December 2023 Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for leave to appeal from primary judge decision refusing access to audio recording of a case management hearing – where application made in connection with application for primary judge to recuse on the grounds of actual bias and apprehended bias – where recusal application dismissed and leave to appeal that decision dismissed – where all appellate challenges to recusal decision exhausted – where application for leave to appeal decision concerning access to audio recording is inutile – application dismissed. Legislation: Federal Court of Australia Act 1974 (Cth) s 25(2)(a)
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 2.32
Cases cited: Décor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397
Duncan v Secretary, Dept of Family and Community Services [2007] FCA 507
Edwards v Santos [2010] FCA 34
Paschke v Secretary, Department of Social Services [2023] FCAFC 143
Sayed v Justice Michael Hugh O’Bryan & Ors [2023] HCASL 170
Sayed v National Disability Insurance Agency [2023] HCASL 41
Sayed v National Disability Insurance Agency (No 2) [2022] FCA 1591
Sayed v National Disability Insurance Agency (No 3) [2022] FCA 1600
Division: General Division Registry: Victoria National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Number of paragraphs: 26 Date of hearing: 23 November 2023 Counsel for the Applicant: The Applicant appeared in person Counsel for the First Respondent Mr N Swan Solicitor for the First Respondent HWL Ebsworth Lawyers Counsel for the Second Respondent The Second Respondent did not appear ORDERS
VID 761 OF 2022 BETWEEN: MUHAMMAD SAYED
Applicant
AND: NATIONAL DISABILITY INSURANCE AGENCY
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
ANDERSON J
DATE OF ORDER:
7 DECEMBER 2023
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The Applicant’s application for leave to appeal and his application that the application for leave to appeal be referred to a Full Court be refused.
2.The Applicant pay the First Respondent’s costs of the appeal, to be fixed by way of an agreed lump sum or, in default of agreement, by way of a lump sum fixed by a Registrar.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
ANDERSON J
INTRODUCTION
The Applicant seeks leave to appeal from orders of O’Bryan J dated 12 December 2022: Sayed v National Disability Insurance Agency and Anor [2022] FCA 1494 (Sayed No 1). For the reasons given below, leave to appeal will be refused.
BACKGROUND
On 8 September 2022, the Applicant filed a Notice of Appeal from a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal). The first case management hearing in this proceeding was held by O’Bryan J on 4 November 2022.
Following that hearing, the Applicant…
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- Case
- [2023] FCA 1550
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court was required to determine whether the application for leave to appeal the primary judge's decision was inutile and whether the decision was attended with sufficient doubt to warrant reconsideration by the Full Court. The court considered that the grant of leave to appeal is discretionary, and that ordinarily both the presence of sufficient doubt and the risk of substantial injustice if leave were refused must be established. The court also noted that it is cautious in granting leave to appeal in matters of practice and procedure, and that the application may be dismissed if it is lacking in utility.
The court found that the application for leave to appeal had no utility. The applicant sought the audio recording of the case management hearing to support his application for the primary judge's recusal, but the recusal application had already been dismissed, and the appeal against that decision had been dismissed. The court found that there was no substantial injustice to the applicant if leave were refused, as all appellate challenges to the recusal decision had been exhausted. The court also found that the decision of O'Bryan J was not attended by sufficient doubt to warrant reconsideration by the Full Court.
The court dismissed the application for leave to appeal and ordered that the applicant pay the first respondent's costs of the appeal, to be fixed by way of an agreed lump sum or, in default of agreement, by way of a lump sum fixed by a Registrar. The orders were entered in accordance with Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The Applicant’s application for leave to appeal and his application that the application for leave to appeal be referred to a Full Court be refused.
2. The Applicant pay the First Respondent’s costs of the appeal, to be fixed by way of an agreed lump sum or, in default of agreement, by way of a lump sum fixed by a Registrar.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Full text does not contain this section.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The orders made by O’Bryan J on 12 December 2022 are interlocutory and relate to a matter of practice and procedure. While the grant of leave to appeal is discretionary, the factors considered are, first, whether, in all the circumstances the decision is attended with sufficient doubt to warrant it being reconsidered by the Full Court and, secondly, whether substantial injustice would result if leave were refused. Ordinarily, both limbs must be satisfied. The Court will also be cautious in granting leave to appeal in cases (such as the present) which deal with matters of practice and procedure: Paschke v Secretary, Department of Social Services [2023] FCAFC 143 at [5] (Anderson, McEvoy and Hespe JJ); Décor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397 at 398-9 (Sheppard, Burchett and Heerey JJ). The Court may refuse to grant leave to appeal where the application for leave to appeal is lacking in utility: see, eg, Duncan v Secretary, Dept of Family and Community Services [2007] FCA 507 at [32] (French J).CONSIDERATION OF APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL For the following reasons, the application for leave to appeal made by the Applicant has no utility and the decision of O’Bryan J in Sayed No 1 is not attended by sufficient doubt to warrant it being reconsidered by the Full Court. It follows that there would be no substantial injustice to the Applicant if leave were refused. The Applicant filed submissions on the application for leave to appeal on 30 October 2023 (AS). It is clear from those submissions that the Applicant sought the audio recording of the 4 November 2022 case management hearing for the purpose of his application that O’Bryan J recuse himself: AS [8]-[9]. The Applicant wished to rely on some aspect of the way in which O’Bryan J conducted that hearing that is not reflected in a written transcript. According to the Applicant, the transcript of the hearing would not represent “the true colour and tone of what transpired at the hearing”: AS [9] Importantly, the recusal application was heard by O’Bryan J and dismissed on 23 December 2022, and an application for leave to appeal was also dismissed by O’Bryan J on the same day. It is apparent from the transcript of the hearing of the recusal application that O’Bryan J raised with the Applicant whether he wished to proceed with his recusal application in circumstances where he had also filed an application for leave to appeal his Honour’s decision with respect to audio recording access in Sayed No 1. The transcript records that the following exchange occurred:HIS HONOUR: - - - Sayed’s interlocutory application which was filed on 25 November 2022, seeking an order that I recuse myself from further involvement in the proceeding. I’m aware, though – and I think it was yesterday – that Mr Sayed has filed an application for leave to appeal my ruling that an audio transcript – an audio – I beg your pardon – an audio recording of the case management hearing on 4 November 2022 not be produced and, instead, this hearing proceed on the way of a written transcript. Mr Sayed, I wanted to ask you first, in those circumstances, given that you filed an application for leave to appeal my judgment, do you wish to proceed with the recusal application this morning or do you wish to adjourn the recusal application?MR SAYED: Hello. Yes. Look, I have appealed the decision.HIS HONOUR: Yes……However, if your Honour wishes to proceed today with this hearing, I am not waiving any right. I will simply, on protest, proceed with the hearing. Sorry. So that – in short, a reply to your answer is, yes, I’m happy - - -HIS HONOUR: No.MR SAYED: - - - to get on with it.HIS HONOUR: Let’s proceed. Yes. No, that’s fine. Thank you…