FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Drummond v Canberra Institute of Technology (No 3) [2022] FCAFC 169
Appeal from: Application for leave to appeal: Cockburn v Canberra Institute of Technology [2022] FedCFamC2G 646 File number: ACD 41 of 2022 Judgment of: RANGIAH, CHARLESWORTH AND BANKS‑SMITH JJ Date of judgment: 23 September 2022 Date of publication of reasons: 30 September 2022 Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE - appeal from orders - where primary judge adjourned trial part-heard and made order for appointment of litigation guardian - where terms of appointment included that appellant obliged to identify litigation guardian and notify Court within 28 days on risk that proceeding might be dismissed - where appellant was represented by direct brief counsel at trial - where appellant conducted certain tasks relating to the proceeding himself - whether primary judge erred in application of r 11.07(1)(b) of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) that provide for the appointment of a litigation guardian - where primary judge failed to consider appellant's capability to adequately instruct counsel for limited tasks required for completion of trial - appeal allowed in part
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - appeal from orders appointing litigation guardian - application for recusal based on actual and apprehended bias of primary judge - whether a reasonable person might apprehend bias - where allegation of actual bias not supported by any conduct - where a reasonable person would not have apprehended bias - where grounds alleging bias not made out - no basis for recusal of primary judge - where application in the alternative for transfer of matter from Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia to Federal Court of Australia rested on findings as to bias - application to transfer refused
Legislation: Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth)
Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) r 11
Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) Division 11.2
Federal Court Rules2011 (Cth) rr 9.61, 9.63, 9.66
Cases cited: Aon Risk Services Australia Limited v Australian National University [2009] HCA 27; (2009) 239 CLR 175
British American Tobacco Australia Services Ltd v Laurie [2011] HCA 2; (2011) 242 CLR 283
Burnett v Browne (No 2) [2021] FCA 373
Cavar v Greengate Management Services Pty Ltd [2016] FCA 961
Concrete Pty Limited v Parramatta Design & Developments Pty Ltd [2006] HCA 55; (2006) 229 CLR 577
Décor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397
Dennis v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2019] FCAFC 231; (2019) 272 FCR 343
Drummond v Canberra Institute of Technology [2019] FCCA 2612
Drummond v Canberra Institute of Technology [2020] FCAFC 131; (2020) 278 FCR 436
Drummond v Canberra Institute of Technology (No 2) [2021] FCCA 556
Drummond v Canberra Institute of Technology [2021] FCA 376
Drummond v Canberra Institute of Technology [2022] FCA 1030
Drummond v Canberra Institute of Technology (No 2) [2022] FCAFC 162
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- Case
- [2022] FCAFC 169
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court had to determine whether the primary judge erred in appointing a litigation guardian and whether there was sufficient evidence to support the recusal or transfer of the matter on the grounds of bias. The court examined the application of Rule 11.07(1)(b) of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021, which allows for the appointment of a litigation guardian, and considered whether the primary judge failed to assess Drummond's capability to instruct counsel for the limited tasks required to complete the trial.
The court found that the primary judge erred in the application of Rule 11.07(1)(b) as there was no evidence to support the necessity of a litigation guardian, given Drummond's representation by direct brief counsel at the trial and his ability to conduct certain tasks relating to the proceeding himself. The court held that the primary judge failed to consider Drummond's capability to adequately instruct counsel for the limited tasks required for the completion of the trial. As for the application for recusal and transfer of the matter, the court found that the grounds alleging bias were not made out, and there was no basis for the recusal of the primary judge or the transfer of the matter to the Federal Court of Australia.
As a result, the appeal was allowed in part. Orders 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, and 8 of the orders made on 4 August 2022 by the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) were set aside. The application for leave to appeal was allowed, and the appeal was allowed in part.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application for leave to appeal be allowed.
2. The appeal be allowed in part.
3. Orders 1, 2, 3, 4, 7 and 8 of the Orders of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) made on 4 August 2022 be set aside.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The primary judge concluded:[78]Given the history of the matter and the unfortunate but ongoing delays and non-compliance, and the history also of the Applicant's psychological collapse shortly before or during final hearings, whatever his assurance (or that given by his GP) of getting better and being able to cope in the future, there can be no guarantee at all that, if dates are able to be found, he will not collapse again, especially in the face of the range of the Respondent's witnesses, each of whom in Affidavits (albeit prepared and filed in 2017 in expectation of the first final hearing proceeding) categorically deny the various claims and contentions made by the Applicant in his voluminous material.…[80]His wish and desire to proceed with the litigation is patent. His basic ability to prosecute it, and to withstand the standard process of trial, contest and challenge to his claims, is the nub of the present conundrum … The various annexures to these reasons that list the delays, extensions of time, and ongoing non-compliance with directions, Orders and timetables, unfortunately makes plain the abject inability of the Applicant to conduct the litigation satisfactorily as prescribed in Rule 11.07.…[82]I need only record that the breadth of the Rules, for example, regarding who may be a litigation guardian, gives the Applicant here very wide scope to nominate and appoint, for example, a member of his family, or a friend. It does not need to be someone legally qualified. Any such person will doubtless be well acquainted with the litigation and who will likely be in regular touch with the Applicant anyway. As stated many times, the appointment of such a guardian is not a punishment; it is a protection and is intended to be of assistance. …[87]In my view, what is more objective [than Dr Wessell's letters] is the assessment of the Applicant in 2017 and 2018 of Dr Clark, where he spoke (as recorded above) of the Applicant's 'obsessional traits' and his focus upon, for example, his then current employers or managers being compliant with regulations and the like. From his conduct of the litigation since those assessments, the Applicant's obsessional traits plainly remain evident and dictate in many respects the conduct of the litigation. It would seem, based on Dr Clark's assessment, that the Applicant is not able to control them, thus there cannot be undue criticism ……[88]In my view, the brief history recorded here (and in earlier judgments) provides no confidence at all that the Applicant's well-meaning assurances will bear any lasting or appropriate fruit. His litigious conduct and compliance has been very poor throughout the litigation over 7 years. It remains very poor. His consistent and constant failure to adhere to any time-table or Order or direction of the Court is a complete litany of failure and broken promises. His regular inability to cope with the stress of the litigation, and the never-ending delays that have ensued, (a) have consistently been wrongly placed at the feet of the Respondent, and (b) with no responsibility taken by the Applicant for them.[89]The ongoing prejudice to the Respondent and its witnesses has never been addressed, or addressed satisfactorily, by the Applicant. Likewise, despite repeated attention being drawn to it, there has been not the slightest attention paid to the relentless demand upon Court resources as if they are almost exclusively and unquestioningly to be available to him. The flow-on effects to other litigants is immeasurable but of no interest or regard to the Applicant.Consideration - bias