INDUSTRIAL COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION: | Pegg v Gumdale State School P&C Association & Anor [2025] ICQ 024 |
PARTIES: | SHAUNESY ANDREA PEGG (Appellant) v GUMDALE STATE SCHOOL P&C ASSOCIATION (First Respondent) And STEVEN MADSEN (Second Respondent) |
CASE NO: | C/2025/14 |
PROCEEDING: | Application in existing proceedings |
DELIVERED ON: | 14 November 2025 |
HEARING DATE: | 14 November 2025 |
MEMBER: HEARD AT: | Merrell DP Brisbane |
ORDER: | The Appellant's application in existing proceedings, to start her appeal within a longer period, is dismissed |
CATCHWORDS: | INDUSTRIAL LAW – QUEENSLAND – APPEAL – APPEAL TO INDUSTRIAL COURT – OTHER MATTERS – Appellant was employed by the Respondent – on 5 December 2023, the Appellant resigned from the Respondent and then, on 8 December 2023, sought to rescind her resignation – the Respondent refused to allow the Appellant to rescind her resignation – on 2 January 2024, the Appellant filed an application seeking various remedies under ch 8, pt 1 of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 – by decision dated 13 December 2024, the Queensland Industrial Relations Commission, pursuant to s 541(b)(ii) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016, dismissed the Appellant's application because further proceedings were not necessary or desirable in the public interest because the Appellant's application was misconceived – by application to appeal filed on 29 July 2025, the Appellant appealed to the Industrial Court of Queensland against the decision of the Commission – the Appellant's appeal was started 207 days out of time – oral application made by the Appellant to the Court for the Court to allow her to start her appeal within a longer period – whether, pursuant to s 564(2) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 the Court should exercise its discretion and allow the Appellant to start her appeal against the decision of the Commission within a longer period – consideration of the relevant principles for the Court to exercise discretion to allow an appellant to start an appeal within a longer period, namely, the explanation for the delay and the prospects of success of the appeal – no acceptable explanation given by the Appellant for the very long delay in starting her application to appeal – the Appellant is also unable to demonstrate that her appeal has prospects of success – the justice of the case does not require the Court's indulgence to allow the Appellant to start her appeal within a longer period – Appellant's application to start her appeal within a longer period dismissed |
LEGISLATION: | Industrial Relations Act 2016, s 282, s 429, s 530, s 541, s 557, s 563 and s 564 Industrial Relations (Tribunals) Rules 2011, r 43 |
CASES: | AB (a pseudonym) v Independent Broad-based Anti-corruption Commission [2024] HCA 10; (2024) 278 CLR 300 Drummond v Canberra Institute of Technology (No 3) [2022] FCAFC 169; (2022) 294 FCR 346 Minister for Immigration v WZARH [2015] HCA 40; (2015) 256 CLR 326 Oakey Coal Action Alliance Inc. v New Acland Coal Pty Ltd [2021] HCA 2; (2021) 272 CLR 33 |
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- Case
- [2025] ICQ 24
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court was required to consider the principles governing the exercise of such discretion, which includes evaluating the explanation for the delay and the prospects of success of the appeal. The appellant's explanation for the delay was found to be inadequate, as she did not provide a satisfactory reason for the significant delay in initiating her appeal. Furthermore, the court determined that Ms Pegg had not demonstrated that her appeal had a reasonable prospect of success. The court concluded that the justice of the case did not necessitate the indulgence of the Court to allow the appellant to start her appeal within a longer period.
Based on the above reasoning, the court dismissed the appellant's application to commence her appeal within the extended period. The decision underscored that the appellant had failed to provide an acceptable explanation for the delay and had not shown that her appeal had prospects of success. Consequently, the appellant's application to the Court to start her appeal within a longer period was dismissed.
Orders
Orders of the court
The Appellant's application in existing proceedings, to start her appeal within a longer period, is dismissed
Background
Background to the litigation
Decision