Pegg v Gumdale State School P&C Association

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INDUSTRIAL COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Pegg v Gumdale State School P&C Association & Anor [2025] ICQ 024

PARTIES:

SHAUNESY ANDREA PEGG

(Appellant)

v

GUMDALE STATE SCHOOL P&C ASSOCIATION

(First Respondent)

And

STEVEN MADSEN

(Second Respondent)

CASE NO:

C/2025/14

PROCEEDING:

Application in existing proceedings

DELIVERED ON:

14 November 2025

HEARING DATE:

14 November 2025

MEMBER:

HEARD AT:

Merrell DP

Brisbane

ORDER:

The Appellant's application in existing proceedings, to start her appeal within a longer period, is dismissed

CATCHWORDS:

INDUSTRIAL LAW – QUEENSLAND – APPEAL – APPEAL TO INDUSTRIAL COURT – OTHER MATTERS – Appellant was employed by the Respondent – on 5 December 2023, the Appellant resigned from the Respondent and then, on 8 December 2023, sought to rescind her resignation – the Respondent refused to allow the Appellant to rescind her resignation – on 2 January 2024, the Appellant filed an application seeking various remedies under ch 8, pt 1 of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 – by decision dated 13 December 2024, the Queensland Industrial Relations Commission, pursuant to s 541(b)(ii) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016, dismissed the Appellant's application because further proceedings were not necessary or desirable in the public interest because the Appellant's application was misconceived – by application to appeal filed on 29 July 2025, the Appellant appealed to the Industrial Court of Queensland against the decision of the Commission – the Appellant's appeal was started 207 days out of time – oral application made by the Appellant to the Court for the Court to allow her to start her appeal within a longer period – whether, pursuant to s 564(2) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 the Court should exercise its discretion and allow the Appellant to start her appeal against the decision of the Commission within a longer period –  consideration of the relevant principles for the Court to exercise discretion to allow an appellant to start an appeal within a longer period, namely, the explanation for the delay and the prospects of success of the appeal – no acceptable explanation given by the Appellant for the very long delay in starting her application to appeal – the Appellant is also unable to demonstrate that her appeal has prospects of success – the justice of the case does not require the Court's indulgence to allow the Appellant to start her appeal within a longer period – Appellant's application to start her appeal within a longer period dismissed

LEGISLATION:

Industrial Relations Act 2016, s 282, s 429, s 530, s 541, s 557, s 563 and s 564

Industrial Relations (Tribunals) Rules 2011, r 43

CASES:

AB (a pseudonym) v Independent Broad-based Anti-corruption Commission [2024] HCA 10; (2024) 278 CLR 300

Drummond v Canberra Institute of Technology (No 3) [2022] FCAFC 169; (2022) 294 FCR 346

Minister for Immigration v WZARH [2015] HCA 40; (2015) 256 CLR 326

Oakey Coal Action Alliance Inc. v New Acland Coal Pty Ltd [2021] HCA 2; (2021) 272 CLR 33

Pegg v…

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Details
Case
[2025] ICQ 24
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Pegg v Gumdale State School P&C Association, the appellant, Ms Pegg, sought to appeal a decision of the Queensland Industrial Relations Commission, which had dismissed her application for various remedies under the Industrial Relations Act 2016. The central issue before the Industrial Court of Queensland was whether it should exercise its discretion to allow Ms Pegg to commence her appeal within the extended period stipulated under s 564(2) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016, given that she had started her appeal 207 days out of time.

The court was required to consider the principles governing the exercise of such discretion, which includes evaluating the explanation for the delay and the prospects of success of the appeal. The appellant's explanation for the delay was found to be inadequate, as she did not provide a satisfactory reason for the significant delay in initiating her appeal. Furthermore, the court determined that Ms Pegg had not demonstrated that her appeal had a reasonable prospect of success. The court concluded that the justice of the case did not necessitate the indulgence of the Court to allow the appellant to start her appeal within a longer period.

Based on the above reasoning, the court dismissed the appellant's application to commence her appeal within the extended period. The decision underscored that the appellant had failed to provide an acceptable explanation for the delay and had not shown that her appeal had prospects of success. Consequently, the appellant's application to the Court to start her appeal within a longer period was dismissed.

Orders

Orders of the court

The Appellant's application in existing proceedings, to start her appeal within a longer period, is dismissed

Background

Background to the litigation

For the reasons that follow, I will not exercise the Court's discretion to allow Ms Pegg to commence her appeal within that longer period. Background Ms Pegg's general protections application was not resolved by conciliation. It then came to a different Member of the Commission for hearing and determination. The Industrial Commissioner, into whose hands Ms Pegg's general protections application fell for that purpose, held a mention of the matter on 21 June 2024. In that mention, the Industrial Commissioner raised his preliminary concerns with the parties about Ms Pegg's disclosed cause of action.[7] [7] The Primary Decision (n 1), [2]. On that same day, the Industrial Commissioner issued a Directions Order for the parties to file and serve written submissions addressing the issue of whether or not the Commission, pursuant to s 541(b)(ii) of the IR Act, should refrain from hearing Ms Pegg's general protections application because further proceedings by the Commission were not necessary or desirable in the public interest ('the s 541(b)(ii) issue').[8] In the mention on 21 June 2024, the Industrial Commissioner stated that he would decide the s 541(b)(ii) issue on the papers, but that if the parties wanted a hearing to address him, such a hearing would be held.[9] [8] The affidavit of Ms Katie Rebecca Richardson filed on 20 October 2025 ('Ms Richardson's affidavit'), Exhibit KKR-1, pages 1-3 of 86.[9] T (21 June 2024) 1-3, ll 34-35. Ms Pegg and the Respondents, in their written submissions to this Court, referred to comments made by the Industrial Commissioner in the mentions held before him. As a consequence, on 11 November 2025, I ordered that, pursuant to r 43 of the Industrial Relations (Tribunals) Rules 2011, the parties be provided with the transcripts of the three mentions before the Industrial Commissioner held on 21 June 2024, 9 August 2024 and 15 August 2024. On 12 July 2024, Ms Pegg filed and served her written submissions.[10] On 30 July 2024, the Respondents filed and served their written submissions.[11] On 6 September 2024, Ms Pegg filed and served her written submissions in reply.[12] [10] Ms Richardson's affidavit, exhibit KRR-2, pages 5 to 12 of 86.[11] Ms Richardson's affidavit, exhibit KRR-3, pages 13 and 17 to 21 of 86.[12] Ms Richardson's affidavit, exhibit KRR-5, pages 29 to 32 of 86. The Primary Decision was released to the parties on 13 December 2024 by email from the Industrial Registry to the parties after it had been filed in the Industrial Registry.[13][13] Ms Richardson's affidavit, exhibit KRR-6, pages 33 to 54 of 86. The factual background to Ms Pegg's application can be conveniently taken from the Primary Decision. The Industrial Commissioner relevantly stated:[3] The Applicant was employed by the First Respondent from March 2020 until early December 2023. The Applicant alleges that she was subject to persistent unreasonable conduct throughout her employment that made it difficult for her to perform her role. The Applicant further alleges that she exercised her workplace rights in and around April 2023 by seeking support on how she should do her work, support to address issues in her employment and support for her mental health.[4] On 29 November 2023, the Applicant commenced a period of sick leave citing alleged persistent unreasonable conduct as a reason. On that same day, the Applicant emailed Mr Phil Savill, Principal of Gumdale State School, raising her concerns about her role and her mental health and requesting an investigation against the executives of the First Respondent. The Applicant, in a later email also on the same day, requested to meet with Mr Savill. Mr Savill noted the Applicant's concerns and recommended she refer to the grievance procedure under her relevant award, as well as contacting the relevant executives for guidance on how to raise her complaints. Mr Savill also requested a medical certificate from the Applicant and told her that he would not meet with her while she was on sick leave because that was the protocol of P&C Queensland and the Department of Education and because "the priority is for you to get well". [5] On 30 November 2023, the Applicant sent an email to the Second Respondent and the First Respondent's Vice President, Secretary and Treasurer, raising her concerns about her role clarity and requesting a meeting with the executives of the First Respondent. [6] The Applicant also alleges that during her personal leave the First Respondent made inquiries with staff who reported to the Applicant. The Applicant claims those staff contacted the Applicant. The Applicant says that "such conduct" undermined the Applicant and exacerbated her mental health condition.[7] On 5 December 2023, the Applicant sent an email to the First Respondent informing the First Respondent that she was resigning. The Applicant submits that she sent this email "[i]n a moment of feeling pressured, stressed, anxious and hopeless due to the [First Respondent's] continued repeated unreasonable conduct" and "during a moment of psychological distress and without consultation with any of [the Applicant's] immediate family or health practitioners". [8] By email sent on 8 December 2023 the Applicant sought to rescind her resignation on the asserted basis that she was not psychologically well when she emailed the resignation. Ms Abigail Chambers, an executive of the First Respondent, replied to the Applicant advising her that the First Respondent did not accept the Applicant's rescission of her resignation. Ms Chambers noted that the Second Respondent had formally acknowledged receipt of the Applicant's resignation on the afternoon of 5 December 2023, that the Applicant's statutory entitlements and outstanding reimbursements had been paid out and that the First Respondent had begun recruiting for the role the Applicant was in. Ms Chambers also noted that the Applicant had sent an email confirming her approval of, as I surmise, a farewell letter to her team on 6 December 2023 and that the Applicant had actively participated in the handover process. [9] The Applicant responded on 8 December 2023 to Ms Chamber's 8 December 2023 email reiterating the assertion that her resignation was not given with sound mind and that she would return on Monday "unless it has been determined your wish it (sic) to terminate my employment". Ms Chambers affirmed by email reply on 11 December 2023 the First Respondent's position in the email dated 8 December 2023 that it accepted the Applicant's resignation at the Applicant's request and would not reinstate the Applicant. [10] The Applicant responded to that email on 14 December 2023 expressing her dissatisfaction and requesting a meeting with the human resources personnel of the First Respondent. The Applicant also requested that her "work related property [be] returned to me, unless it has been determined your wish is to terminate my employment". The Applicant further noted that "[i]n reference to the hand over or active remarks, I have no reference and am not supportive of these comments". The Respondents replied to this email on 15 December 2023 noting that its position remained unchanged from that outlined in the emails sent to the Applicant on 11 December 2023.

Decision

Reasons for decision

For all these reasons, I conclude that Ms Pegg has not demonstrated that her application to appeal against the Primary Decision has prospects of success.Conclusion The justice of Ms Pegg's case does not require that the Court exercise its discretion, pursuant to s 564(2) of the IR Act, to allow her to start her appeal within a longer period. Ms Pegg has not provided an adequate explanation for the very long delay in starting her appeal and she has not demonstrated that her appeal has prospects of success. For these reasons, Ms Pegg's Court application will be dismissed. The Court makes the following order: