Pegg v Gumdale State School P&C Association

INDUSTRIAL COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:	Pegg v Gumdale State School P&C Association & Anor [2025] ICQ 024
PARTIES:	SHAUNESY ANDREA PEGG (Appellant) v GUMDALE STATE SCHOOL P&C ASSOCIATION (First Respondent) And STEVEN MADSEN (Second Respondent)
CASE NO:	C/2025/14
PROCEEDING:	Application in existing proceedings
DELIVERED ON:	14 November 2025
HEARING DATE:	14 November 2025
MEMBER: HEARD AT:	Merrell DP Brisbane
ORDER:	The Appellant's application in existing proceedings, to start her appeal within a longer period, is dismissed
CATCHWORDS:	INDUSTRIAL LAW – QUEENSLAND – APPEAL – APPEAL TO INDUSTRIAL COURT – OTHER MATTERS – Appellant was employed by the Respondent – on 5 December 2023, the Appellant resigned from the Respondent and then, on 8 December 2023, sought to rescind her resignation – the Respondent refused to allow the Appellant to rescind her resignation – on 2 January 2024, the Appellant filed an application seeking various remedies under ch 8, pt 1 of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 – by decision dated 13 December 2024, the Queensland Industrial Relations Commission, pursuant to s 541(b)(ii) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016, dismissed the Appellant's application because further proceedings were not necessary or desirable in the public interest because the Appellant's application was misconceived – by application to appeal filed on 29 July 2025, the Appellant appealed to the Industrial Court of Queensland against the decision of the Commission – the Appellant's appeal was started 207 days out of time – oral application made by the Appellant to the Court for the Court to allow her to start her appeal within a longer period – whether, pursuant to s 564(2) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 the Court should exercise its discretion and allow the Appellant to start her appeal against the decision of the Commission within a longer period – consideration of the relevant principles for the Court to exercise discretion to allow an appellant to start an appeal within a longer period, namely, the explanation for the delay and the prospects of success of the appeal – no acceptable explanation given by the Appellant for the very long delay in starting her application to appeal – the Appellant is also unable to demonstrate that her appeal has prospects of success – the justice of the case does not require the Court's indulgence to allow the Appellant to start her appeal within a longer period – Appellant's application to start her appeal within a longer period dismissed
LEGISLATION:	Industrial Relations Act 2016, s 282, s 429, s 530, s 541, s 557, s 563 and s 564 Industrial Relations (Tribunals) Rules 2011, r 43
CASES:	AB (a pseudonym) v Independent Broad-based Anti-corruption Commission [2024] HCA 10; (2024) 278 CLR 300 Drummond v Canberra Institute of Technology (No 3) [2022] FCAFC 169; (2022) 294 FCR 346 Minister for Immigration v WZARH [2015] HCA 40; (2015) 256 CLR 326 Oakey Coal Action Alliance Inc. v New Acland Coal Pty Ltd [2021] HCA 2; (2021) 272 CLR 33 Pegg v Gumdale State School P&C Association & Anor [2024] QIRC 295 Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth of Australia [2003] HCA 2; (2003) 211 CLR 476 Stratford North Pty Ltd v Workers' Compensation Regulator & Ors [2025] ICQ 004 Sun v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs [1997] FCA 1488; (1997) 81 FCR 71 Zamora v OCS Services Pty Ltd [2025] WASCA 117
COUNSEL:	The Appellant appeared on her own behalf
SOLICITORS:	Ms K. Richardson of Carter Newell Lawyers for the Respondents

Reasons for Decision

Introduction

Ms Shaunesy Andrea Pegg was employed by the Gumdale State School P&C Association ('the Association') in the position of Business Operations Manager. At all times material to the present application before the Court, Mr Steven Madsen was the President of the Association.
Ms Pegg commenced employment with the Association in March 2020.[1] By email sent to the Association on 5 December 2023, Ms Pegg informed the Association that she was resigning.[2] By further email to the Association sent on 8 December 2023, Ms Pegg sought to rescind her resignation in response to which the Association subsequently indicated that it had accepted her resignation and that it would not reinstate her.[3]
[1] Pegg v Gumdale State School P&C Association & Anor [2024] QIRC 295 ('the Primary Decision'), [3].
[2] Ibid [7].
[3] Ibid [8].
By application filed on 2 January 2024, Ms Pegg sought various remedies pursuant to ch 8, pt 1 ('General protections') of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 ('the IR Act').[4] The Association and Mr Madsen were the Respondents to that application filed by Ms Pegg ('Ms Pegg's general protections application').
[4] Ibid [1].
By decision dated 13 December 2024, the Industrial Commissioner to whom the matter was allocated for hearing and determination, pursuant to s 541(b)(ii) of the IR Act, dismissed Ms Pegg's general protections application because further proceedings by the Commission were not necessary or desirable in the public interest ('the Primary Decision').[5]
[5] Ibid [58].
By application to appeal to this Court filed on 29 July 2025, Ms Pegg appealed against the Primary Decision. Pursuant to the combined effect of s 564(1) and s 564(3)(b) of the IR Act, Ms Pegg had 21 days after the Primary Decision was given to start her appeal against the Primary Decision. That is, Ms Pegg should have started her appeal by 3 January 2025. As a consequence, Ms Pegg's application to appeal was started 207 days out of time.
Ms Pegg did not make a separate application seeking the Court to exercise discretion to allow her appeal to be started within a longer period. However, at a mention on 21 August 2025, the Court, with the agreement of the Respondents, allowed Ms Pegg to make an oral application that the Court allow her appeal to be started within a longer period ('Ms Pegg's Court application').[6]
[6] T (21 August 2025), 1-4, ll 9-17.
By Directions Order issued by the Court on 21 August 2025, both parties were given the opportunity to file and serve written submissions and affidavit material in respect of Ms Pegg's Court application. On 22 September 2025, Ms Pegg filed written submissions. Ms Pegg filed no affidavit material. On 20 October 2025, the Respondents filed written submissions and an affidavit affirmed by Ms Katie Rebecca Richardson, solicitor with Carter Newell Lawyers ('Ms Richardson's affidavit').
Furthermore, while the Court indicated that Ms Pegg's Court application would be determined on the papers, the parties were given an opportunity to request a hearing of Ms Pegg's Court application. As part of her written submissions filed on 22 September 2025, Ms Pegg requested a hearing. That hearing took place today.
The question for the Court's determination is whether or not, pursuant to s 564(2) of the IR Act, the Court should exercise discretion and allow Ms Pegg to commence her appeal within a longer period, namely, on 29 July 2025.
For the reasons that follow, I will not exercise the Court's discretion to allow Ms Pegg to commence her appeal within that longer period.
Background
Ms Pegg's general protections application was not resolved by conciliation. It then came to a different Member of the Commission for hearing and determination. The Industrial Commissioner, into whose hands Ms Pegg's general protections application fell for that purpose, held a mention of the matter on 21 June 2024. In that mention, the Industrial Commissioner raised his preliminary concerns with the parties about Ms Pegg's disclosed cause of action.[7]
[7] The Primary Decision (n 1), [2].
On that same day, the Industrial Commissioner issued a Directions Order for the parties to file and serve written submissions addressing the issue of whether or not the Commission, pursuant to s 541(b)(ii) of the IR Act, should refrain from hearing Ms Pegg's general protections application because further proceedings by the Commission were not necessary or desirable in the public interest ('the s 541(b)(ii) issue').[8] In the mention on 21 June 2024, the Industrial Commissioner stated that he would decide the s 541(b)(ii) issue on the papers, but that if the parties wanted a hearing to address him, such a hearing would be held.[9]
[8] The affidavit of Ms Katie Rebecca Richardson filed on 20 October 2025 ('Ms Richardson's affidavit'), Exhibit KKR-1, pages 1-3 of 86.
[9] T (21 June 2024) 1-3, ll 34-35. Ms Pegg and the Respondents, in their written submissions to this Court, referred to comments made by the Industrial Commissioner in the mentions held before him. As a consequence, on 11 November 2025, I ordered that, pursuant to r 43 of the Industrial Relations (Tribunals) Rules 2011, the parties be provided with the transcripts of the three mentions before the Industrial Commissioner held on 21 June 2024, 9 August 2024 and 15 August 2024.
On 12 July 2024, Ms Pegg filed and served her written submissions.[10] On 30 July 2024, the Respondents filed and served their written submissions.[11] On 6 September 2024, Ms Pegg filed and served her written submissions in reply.[12]
[10] Ms Richardson's affidavit, exhibit KRR-2, pages 5 to 12 of 86.
[11] Ms Richardson's affidavit, exhibit KRR-3, pages 13 and 17 to 21 of 86.
[12] Ms Richardson's affidavit, exhibit KRR-5, pages 29 to 32 of 86.
The Primary Decision was released to the parties on 13 December 2024 by email from the Industrial Registry to the parties after it had been filed in the Industrial Registry.[13]
[13] Ms Richardson's affidavit, exhibit KRR-6, pages 33 to 54 of 86.
The factual background to Ms Pegg's application can be conveniently taken from the Primary Decision. The Industrial Commissioner relevantly stated:
[3]      The Applicant was employed by the First Respondent from March 2020 until early December 2023. The Applicant alleges that she was subject to persistent unreasonable conduct throughout her employment that made it difficult for her to perform her role. The Applicant further alleges that she exercised her workplace rights in and around April 2023 by seeking support on how she should do her work, support to address issues in her employment and support for her mental health.
[4]      On 29 November 2023, the Applicant commenced a period of sick leave citing alleged persistent unreasonable conduct as a reason. On that same day, the Applicant emailed Mr Phil Savill, Principal of Gumdale State School, raising her concerns about her role and her mental health and requesting an investigation against the executives of the  First Respondent. The Applicant, in a later email also on the same day, requested to meet with Mr Savill. Mr Savill noted the Applicant's concerns and recommended she refer to the grievance procedure under her relevant award, as well as contacting the relevant executives for guidance on how to raise her complaints. Mr Savill also requested a medical certificate from the Applicant and told her that he would not meet with her while she was on sick leave because that was the protocol of P&C Queensland and the Department of Education and because "the priority is for you to get well".
[5]      On 30 November 2023, the Applicant sent an email to the Second Respondent and the First Respondent's Vice President, Secretary and Treasurer, raising her concerns about her role clarity and requesting a meeting with the executives of the First Respondent.
[6]      The Applicant also alleges that during her personal leave the First Respondent made inquiries with staff who reported to the Applicant. The Applicant claims those staff contacted the Applicant. The Applicant says that "such conduct" undermined the Applicant and exacerbated her mental health condition.
[7]      On 5 December 2023, the Applicant sent an email to the First Respondent informing the First Respondent that she was resigning. The Applicant submits that she sent this email "[i]n a moment of feeling pressured, stressed, anxious and hopeless due to the [First Respondent's] continued repeated unreasonable conduct" and "during a moment of psychological distress and without consultation with any of [the Applicant's] immediate family or health practitioners".
[8]      By email sent on 8 December 2023 the Applicant sought to rescind her resignation on the asserted basis that she was not psychologically well when she emailed the resignation. Ms Abigail Chambers, an executive of the First Respondent, replied to the Applicant advising her that the First Respondent did not accept the Applicant's rescission of her resignation. Ms Chambers noted that the Second Respondent had formally acknowledged receipt of the Applicant's resignation on the afternoon of 5 December 2023, that the Applicant's statutory entitlements and outstanding reimbursements had been paid out and that the First Respondent had begun recruiting for the role the Applicant was in. Ms Chambers also noted that the Applicant had sent an email confirming her approval of, as I surmise, a farewell letter to her team on 6 December 2023 and that the Applicant had actively participated in the handover process.
[9]      The Applicant responded on 8 December 2023 to Ms Chamber's 8 December 2023 email reiterating the assertion that her resignation was not given with sound mind and that she would return on Monday "unless it has been determined your wish it (sic) to terminate my employment". Ms Chambers affirmed by email reply on 11 December 2023 the First Respondent's position in the email dated 8 December 2023 that it accepted the Applicant's resignation at the Applicant's request and would not reinstate the Applicant.
[10]     The Applicant responded to that email on 14 December 2023 expressing her dissatisfaction and requesting a meeting with the human resources personnel of the First Respondent. The Applicant also requested that her "work related property [be] returned to me, unless it has been determined your wish is to terminate my employment". The Applicant further noted that "[i]n reference to the hand over or active remarks, I have no reference and am not supportive of these comments". The Respondents replied to this email on 15 December 2023 noting that its position remained unchanged from that outlined in the emails sent to the Applicant on 11 December 2023.
In her general protections application, Ms Pegg alleged that:
·the Association's refusal to allow the rescission or retraction of her resignation, or its refusal to re-employ her, constituted adverse action taken by it against her and that Mr Madsen was an accessory to that conduct;[14]
·the adverse action taken against her was taken:
-     because she had made complaints and enquiries during her employment; and or in the alternative;
-     to prevent her from making further complaints in relation to her employment; and, or in the alternative;
-     because she had a disability, being a mental health condition and, or in the alternative, she had a prospective and, or in the alternative, imputed disability; and, or in the alternative,
-     the Association failed to have proper or any regard to the fact that she had a disability when she resigned and, in doing so, indirectly discriminated against her.[15]
[14] The Primary Decision (n 1), [11].
[15] Ibid [12].
In making the Primary Decision, the Industrial Commissioner identified two issues for determination. It is only the second of those issues that is relevant before this Court. That issue was whether or not the Industrial Commissioner should have exercised his discretion, pursuant to s 541(b)(ii) of the IR Act, to dismiss Ms Pegg's general protections application because further proceedings were not necessary or desirable in the public interest.[16]
[16] The Primary Decision (n 1), [13].
In respect of the s 541(b)(ii) issue, the Industrial Commissioner, having regard to the issues raised by the parties in their submissions to him, found that:
·Ms Pegg had in fact resigned on 5 December 2023 and that she could not unilaterally rescind her resignation;[17] and
·at the time the Association refused to rescind Ms Pegg's resignation and, or in the alternative, refused to re-employ her, she was not in a prospective employment relationship with the Association, the consequence of which was that no relevant adverse action could have been taken against her by the Association within the meaning of s 282(2) of the IR Act.[18]
[17] Ibid [44]-[50].
[18] Ibid [51]-[52]. Section 282(2) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 provides:
(2) Adverse action is taken by a prospective employer against a prospective employee if the prospective employer–
(a)refuses to employ the prospective employee; or
(b)discriminates against the prospective employee in the terms or conditions on which the prospective employer offers to employ the prospective employee.
The Industrial Commissioner then dealt with other arguments made by the parties. Again, it is convenient to set out the Industrial Commissioner's reasons:
[53] Some of the Respondents' other submissions should also be accepted. The Applicant's claims about an unfair dismissal are misguided and irrelevant. The Applicant's claims that false or damaging statements were made that constituted adverse action are too poorly particularised as to make out a cause of action. Likewise, the claim that the Respondents' lawyers engaged in adverse action after the resignation through its correspondence is misconceived and entirely without merit. No employment relationship of any kind existed between the Respondents' lawyers and the Applicant. Furthermore, the FW Act also plainly does not apply.
[54]     The Respondents' argument that the further proceedings are not necessary or desirable in the public interest because the Appellant fails to make out a cause of action is compelling. Such an argument strongly predisposes me to exercise the discretion to find that the matter should not be heard.
[55]     I am not so persuaded that the First Resident [sic] being a not-for-profit entity whose board is made of unpaid volunteers weighs heavily on the public interest test. When Dwyer IC referred to parties that should not have to endure lengthy and costly proceedings dealing with an irretrievably unmeritorious complaint, the focus was on the waste of public resources and cost to parties drawn into defending unmeritorious proceedings. The charitable status or moral character of one party in particular did not feature in Dwyer IC's analysis.
[56]     When weighing up the public interest, the primary focus is the lack of merit in the proceedings, not the nature of, or good corporate character of, a party to those proceedings. I accept the Applicant's submissions on this point. The public interest is not concerned with whether a party is staffed by volunteers or has the capacity to run a matter. It is therefore irrelevant to the public interest of hearing this matter that the First Respondent is a not-for-profit entity whose board is made of unpaid volunteers.
By way of conclusion, the Industrial Commissioner found:
[57] Overall, I am persuaded that the further proceedings are not necessary or desirable in the public interest. I am persuaded to do so principally by the fact that the Applicant has failed to make out a cause of action. This is, therefore, one of those relatively rare cases where, at first glance, and even after hearing from the Applicant on this concern, it is abundantly clear that the case is misconceived.
[58] I am mindful of the gravity of dismissing the case or refusing to hear it. That is something that should only be done in the clearest of cases. However, in this case, after considering the Applicant's submissions and all of the material before the Commission, I am of the view that this is such a case. On my assessment, the Applicant's case cannot possibly succeed. For those reasons, canvassed above from paragraphs [44] to [58] of these reasons, I find that this case is one that should not be heard because it would not be in the public interest to do so. I therefore order that the matter is not to be heard further and that it be dismissed.
The relevant principles and provisions of the Industrial Relations Act 2016

Section 564 of the IR Act relevantly provides:
Time limit for appeal
(1) An appeal against a decision to an industrial tribunal must be started, as required under the rules, within the appeal period.
(2) However, on an application made during or after the appeal period, the industrial tribunal may allow an appeal to be started within a longer period.
By virtue of s 563 of the IR Act, this Court is an industrial tribunal for the purposes of s 564 of the IR Act.
The relevant principles that guide the Court's unfettered discretion to allow an appellant to start an appeal within a longer period have been stated by this Court. In Stratford North Pty Ltd v Workers' Compensation Regulator & Ors,[19] Vice President O'Connor relevantly stated (citations omitted):
[19] [2025] ICQ 004.
[33]     In considering an extension of time in which to appeal, the approach of this Court was described by Hall P in the Neophytos Foundadjis v Collin Bailey [2007] ICQ 10 in the following way:
This Court has traditionally adhered to the view that s. 346 of the Industrial Relations Act 1999 represents a legislative assessment that in the ordinary category of cases, justice will best be served by adhering to a 21 day limitation period, though on occasion the limitation may defeat a perfectly good case and that the discretion to extend time should be exercised only where the applicant for an extension of time discharges a positive burden of demonstrating that the justice of the case requires the indulgence of a further period.
[34] Section 346 of the 1999 Act is reproduced as s 564 in the current Act. In applying those principles, this Court will not grant leave unless it is positively satisfied that it is proper to do so.
[35]     As was said in Chapman v State of Queensland:
In determining whether it is proper to grant the extension, it is appropriate to consider the merits of the substantive application … An extension of time will not be granted if the court considers the appeal to be plainly hopeless.
[36]     In order to be successful, an applicant must ordinarily discharge the burden in three ways: first, the applicant must demonstrate that the justice of the case requires the indulgence sought; secondly, the applicant must demonstrate that the case sought to be appealed has prospects of success; and thirdly there must be an explanation for the delay between the expiry of the time period and the time at which the application was filed.

Ms Pegg's ground of appeal

By her application to appeal filed on 29 July 2025, Ms Pegg stated that it was s 557 of the IR Act upon which she pursued her appeal. That section relevantly provides:
557 Appeal from commission
(1) The Minister or another person aggrieved by a decision of the commission may appeal against the decision to the court on the ground of–
(a) error of law; or
(b) excess, or want, of jurisdiction.
(2) Also, the Minister or another person aggrieved by a decision of the commission may appeal against the decision to the court, with the court's leave, on a ground other than–
(a) error of law; or
(b) excess, or want, of jurisdiction.
Ms Pegg articulates only one ground of appeal, namely, that she was denied procedural fairness. Such a ground of appeal contends the Primary Decision was affected by jurisdictional error which is an error of law.[20]
[20] Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth of Australia [2003] HCA 2; (2003) 211 CLR 476, [45] (Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ) and Zamora v OCS Services Pty Ltd [2025] WASCA 117, [46] (Vaughan and Archer JJA and Cobby J).
Other than that, Ms Pegg does not contend that any of the reasons given by the Industrial Commissioner are vitiated on the basis that they were wrong in law or that the Industrial Commissioner engaged in jurisdictional error. In particular, Ms Pegg does not contend that the material findings made by the Industrial Commissioner, namely, that it was not possible for Ms Pegg to unilaterally withdraw her resignation, and that she was not in a prospective employment relationship with the Association, were wrong in law.
Further, Ms Pegg does not contend that there were errors of fact in the reasons given by the Industrial Commissioner in respect of which, pursuant to s 557(2) of the IR Act, she would need to seek the leave of the Court to pursue.
Ms Pegg's submissions
Ms Pegg makes a number of written submissions in support of the Court exercising its discretion to allow her to start her appeal within a longer period.
In summary, Ms Pegg's submits:
·she did not provide her consent to the Industrial Commissioner hearing the s 541(b)(ii) matter on the papers;[21]
[21] The written submissions of Ms Shaunesy Pegg filed on 22 September 2025 ('Ms Pegg's submissions'), para. 3.
·the Primary Decision did not have a stamped date, did not have the Commission's official seal and was not signed by the Industrial Commissioner;[22]
[22] Ms Pegg's submissions, para. 4.
·the responses she received from the Association's Executives in the performance of her duties as Business Operations Manager were frequently '…rooted in opinion and bias' which '…induced stress and disruption' into her professional environment, and the tone and substance of the communications '…often felt hostile and unproductive, which directly impacted on my sense of psychological safety in the workplace;'[23]
[23] Ms Pegg's submissions, paras. 9-12.
·the Association's Executive team '…repeatedly engaged with employees on matters that fell outside the scope of their roles and responsibilities, such actions were inconsistent with the established grievance procedures and governance protocols further undermining organisational integrity such that she was '…unable to perform my role and manage the undue stress.';[24]
[24] Ms Pegg's submissions, para. 17.
·in addition to what was contained in her '…statement of claim', there was further email correspondence that confirms that the '…Executive team fostered a culture of hostility and disregard for policy' while she '…remained committed to maintaining professional standards, relying on resilience and optimism to continue operating successful business units under challenging circumstances.';[25]
[25] Ms Pegg's submissions, paras. 17-18.
·bias was shown on the part of the Industrial Commissioner in that when he inquired of Ms Pegg whether she consented to the Respondents receiving legal advice, upon her refusal '…he remarked, "This is a heavy burden for a volunteer to carry" and that she found the comment '…deeply troubling, as it afforded undue leniency to individuals who held statutory responsibilities as Approved Providers.';[26]
·in respect of the same alleged remark, as referred to immediately above,:
21.I was and still am deeply disappointed and disturbed that such a statement could be made without any apparent consideration for my position as the Applicant. This remark not only lacked empathy but also disregard of the context and the facts surrounding the matter. It placed undue blame on me, further compounding the emotional toll of this process. Such a declaration, especially from a figure of authority, undermines the principles of impartiality and fairness that should guide these proceedings. It also reinforces the perception that my concerns have not been given respect of the seriousness they deserve.
·the Association's Executive team's actions '…clearly indicate that my employment was terminated' in that despite her resignation and her formal recission of her resignation '…they proceeded to calculate and pay out my entitlements as per termination outlined in the employment contract' which demonstrates that the Association '…treated my resignation as final, without proper consultation, procedural fairness, or consideration of my health status' and their refusal to facilitate '…a handover or engage in a meeting with HR further supports the claim that my dismissal was unjust and improperly executed.';[27] and
·the Association's justification for accepting her resignation, being because they had already recruited, within a two-day period, a replacement, is a claim that is '… highly questionable' and which raises serious concerns about fairness and transparency in that 'Legally, they are obliged to provide comprehensive recruitment documentation to substantiate their decision not to reinstate.'[28]
[26] Ms Pegg's submissions, para. 20.
[27] Ms Pegg's submissions, para. 29.
[28] Ms Pegg's submissions, para. 30.
Ms Pegg then went on to make submissions:
·alleging digital misconduct and various regulatory breaches on the part of the Association and Mr Madsen;[29]
·about her present mental and physical health;[30]
·alleging breach of confidentiality by the Respondents about confidential employment matters;[31] and
·alleging the Association's Executive team demonstrated limited understanding of the relevant Code of Conduct, the Constitution and relevant legislation which '… compromised my ability to lead effectively.'[32]
The Respondents' submissions
[29] Ms Pegg's submissions, paras. 32-51.
[30] Ms Pegg's submissions, paras. 53-54.
[31] Ms Pegg's submissions, paras. 56-57.
[32] Ms Pegg's submissions, para. 59.
The Respondents made the following submissions:
·the Industrial Commissioner, at the mention on 21 June 2024, indicated to the parties that in respect of the s 541(b)(ii) matter, he would decide the matter on the papers unless one of the parties requested a hearing;[33]
[33] The written submissions of the Gumdale State School P&C Association and Mr Steven Madsen filed on 20 October 2025 ('the Respondents' submissions'), paras. 11-13.
·after the parties had filed their written submissions in respect of the s 541(b)(ii) matter, Ms Pegg did not, at any stage, request a hearing about that matter;[34]
[34] The Respondents' submissions, paras. 14-15.
·after the Industrial Commissioner released the Primary Decision:
-        on 19 December 2024, (after receiving an email from the Industrial Registry which advised that the Primary Decision had been amended as it had previously had an incorrect date in it) Ms Pegg emailed the Industrial Registry asking:
§if she was required to respond and, if so, requesting information about what forms would be recommended; and
§how the Commission would '…proceed from this application' and whether it was appropriate to assume that there would be a hearing date;[35]
-        on 20 December 2024, the Industrial Registry responded to Ms Pegg, on behalf of the Industrial Commissioner's chambers, advising that the Industrial Commissioner could not answer the questions as that may involve providing legal advice;[36]
-        on 10 January 2025, Ms Pegg emailed the Industrial Registry seeking clarification:
§'…with respect to the interlocutory application' and about certain provisions of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999; and
§about the fact that the Respondents had been legally represented when she did not consent to the Respondents having legal representation;[37] and
-        on 29 July 2025, Ms Pegg filed her application to appeal.[38]
[35] The Respondents' submissions, para. 20 and Ms Richardson's affidavit, exhibit KRR- 7, page 56 of 86.
[36] The Respondents' submissions, para. 20 and Ms Richardson's affidavit, exhibit KRR- 7, page 55 of 86.
[37] The Respondents' submissions, para. 21 and Ms Richardson's affidavit, exhibit KRR- 8, pages 57-58 of 86.
[38] The Respondents' submissions, para. 22.
The Respondents, after setting out authorities that deal with the issue of the Court's discretion allowing an appellant a longer period of time to start an appeal,[39] then submitted:
·there was no merit in Ms Pegg's general protections application because, as found by the Industrial Commissioner, she failed to make out a cause of action;[40]
·Ms Pegg has not provided any proper application and supporting submissions in support of her being granted a longer period of time to start an appeal;[41]
·Ms Pegg has not provided the Court with any evidence that would cause departure from the Industrial Commissioner's finding;[42]
·Ms Pegg has not discharged the positive burden required to justify the indulgence of a longer period of time to start an appeal;[43] and
·Ms Pegg's submissions are devoid of any explanation for the delay in filing her appeal.[44]
[39] The Respondents' submissions, paras. 24-25.
[40] The Respondents' submissions, para. 26.
[41] The Respondents' submissions, para. 27.
[42] The Respondents' submissions, para. 28.
[43] The Respondents' submissions, para. 28.
[44] The Respondents' submissions, para. 29.
Despite being given the opportunity to do so, Ms Pegg did not file any submissions or affidavit material in reply to the submissions and affidavit material filed by the Respondents. During the hearing, Ms Pegg did not make any substantive submissions in reply to the written and oral submissions of the Respondents.
Should the Court exercise its discretion in favour of Ms Pegg?
In my view, the justice of Ms Pegg's case does not require the exercise of the discretion of the Court to allow her a longer period to start her appeal.
No adequate explanation of the delay
Ms Pegg does not give any adequate explanation for her delay of 207 days in starting her appeal.
The material filed by the Respondents demonstrates that Ms Pegg did make email contact with the Industrial Registry – following the release of the Primary Decision on 13 December 2024 – on 19 December 2024 and then on 10 January 2025. A summary of that contact is set out earlier in these reasons. On the face of the evidence, that contact was not for the purpose of seeking any procedural advice about appealing the Primary Decision.
Even making the assumption that such contact was about seeking such advice, Ms Pegg has not provided any explanation for the subsequent delay of over 6 months from 10 January 2025 until 29 July 2025, when she started her appeal.
No prospects of success
Similarly, Ms Pegg has not demonstrated that her appeal against the Primary Decision has prospects of success.
The only ground of appeal contained in Ms Pegg's application to appeal is that she was denied procedural fairness.
A court established by legislation, as is the case with the Commission,[45] means that any jurisdiction conferred on it is necessarily conditioned by the requirement that it observes procedural fairness in the exercise of that jurisdiction.[46] In respect of procedural fairness or natural justice, the concern of the law is to avoid practical injustice.[47]
[45] Industrial Relations Act 2016 s 429.
[46] Oakey Coal Action Alliance Inc. v New Acland Coal Pty Ltd [2021] HCA 2; (2021) 272 CLR 33, [47] (Kiefel CJ, Bell, Gageler and Keane JJ).
[47] Minister for Immigration v WZARH [2015] HCA 40; (2015) 256 CLR 326, [57] (Gageler and Gordon JJ).
In AB (a pseudonym) v Independent Broad-based Anti-corruption Commission,[48] Gageler CJ, Gordon, Edelman, Stewart, Gleeson, Jagot and Beech-Jones J relevantly stated (citations omitted):
25. In construing that phrase, it is important to begin by identifying some basic propositions about the applicable common law principles of natural justice where a person's interests are likely to be affected by an exercise of power. First, such a person "must be given an opportunity to deal with relevant matters adverse to [their] interests which the repository of the power proposes to take into account in deciding upon its exercise". Second, the person whose interests are likely to be affected does not have to be given an opportunity to comment on every adverse piece of information, irrespective of its credibility, relevance or significance. However, "in the ordinary case where no problem of confidentiality arises an opportunity should be given to deal with adverse information that is credible, relevant and significant to the decision to be made". At least in some contexts, the affected person must be given the opportunity to respond to such information obtained from third parties even if it was not expressly relied on, or proposed to be relied on, by the decision-maker.
26 The nature of a decision-maker's powers and their capacity to affect a person's rights and interests not only bears upon the existence and informs the content of any duty of procedural fairness, but also informs the proper construction of statutory provisions that create analogous rights and obligations in that "all statutes are construed …against a background of common law notions of justice and fairness".
[48] [2024] HCA 10; (2024) 278 CLR 300.
Not provided with an opportunity to object to the orders sought
As best as I can make out from Ms Pegg's application to appeal, she contends that she was denied procedural fairness because she was not served with an interlocutory application made by the Respondents and was not provided with an opportunity to object to the orders sought in such an application.
Having regard to paragraph [2] of the Primary Decision, the issue of Ms Pegg's general protections application not disclosing a cause of action was one raised by the Industrial Commissioner himself at the mention of Ms Pegg's general protections application on 21 June 2024. That is to say, the s 541(b)(ii) issue was not before the Commission as a consequence of any interlocutory application, or application in existing proceedings, filed by the Respondents. Having regard to Ms Pegg's submissions, it seems to me that Ms Pegg was under the misapprehension that the order made in the Primary Decision came about as a consequence of such an application made by the Respondents. However, as a matter of fact, that was clearly not the case. During the course of the hearing of Ms Pegg's Court application, I raised this issue with Ms Pegg and, after a discussion about that issue, she indicated that she understood that no such interlocutory application was made by the Respondents.
Other than that, having regard to the Primary Decision and on the evidence presently before the Court, Ms Pegg did make submissions to the Industrial Commissioner about the s 541(b)(ii) issue that the Industrial Commissioner raised in the mention on 21 June 2024.
I come to this conclusion because:
·in the Primary Decision at paragraphs [39] and [43], the Industrial Commissioner refers to the written submissions filed by Ms Pegg; and
·Ms Richardson's affidavit exhibits:
- the written submissions filed by Ms Pegg on 12 July 2024 in response to the Directions Order issued by the Industrial Commissioner on 21 June 2024;[49] and
- the written submissions, in reply to the Respondents filed written submissions, filed by Ms Pegg on 6 September 2024 pursuant to an amended Directions Order issued by the Industrial Commissioner on 15 August 2024.[50]
[49] Ms Richardson's affidavit, exhibit KRR-2, pages 5-12 of 86.
[50] Ms Richardson's affidavit, exhibit KRR-5, pages 29-32 of 86.
The only conclusion that can be reached is that Ms Pegg was given an opportunity to be heard by the Industrial Commissioner in relation to the s 541(b)(ii) issue.
Further to the above, on the material available to me, not only was Ms Pegg given an opportunity to be heard about the issue that was of concern to the Industrial Commissioner about Ms Pegg's general protections application, the Industrial Commissioner, during the mention on 21 June 2024, was clear in explaining to Ms Pegg why he held a concern about Ms Pegg's general protections application not disclosing a cause of action and why, in those circumstances, s 541(b)(ii) of the IR Act became relevant. The Industrial Commissioner was also very clear about the matters he wanted Ms Pegg to address in submissions to him about those issues.

In the mention on 21 June 2024, the Industrial Commissioner relevantly stated:
Okay. Coming to the reason I've listed it for mention, Ms Pegg, I've read your material. And before I even got to the respondent's material, I had a number of preliminary concerns. The first is that it's clear on your case that you resigned and then two or three days later sought to withdraw that. The issue I have is that there's no legal notion for a resignation needing to be accepted. It's not like the start of a contract where an offer is made which needs to be accepted before there's agreement. And once there's a termination which is – unilaterally, the party can terminate simply by – sometimes by conduct or by saying whatever amounts to a resignation or a termination or a dismissal, that's it.
So ending a contract only takes one person to do it. It doesn't require any acceptance by the other party. There's no obligation to rehire. That would be entering into a new contract. And so there's no legal doctrine whereby there's a contract or some sort of obligation that’s still on foot for the two or three days post-resignation, in the sense that once the resignation happens, it can't be undone. You can't unring a bell, so to speak.
So I'm struggling to see how it is that the adverse action claim is made out, because it's alleged that the employer's failure to accept – or the employer's acceptance of the resignation amounts to adverse action, when there's no legal doctrine supporting the notion of an acceptance of a resignation.
There is a process, when a Commissioner gets to the point I'm at, which brings the parties to a crossroads. It's – and I'll issue some directions that give you some clarity around it. You can have a look at the section of the Act. It's all available online. But section 541 of the Industrial Relations Act provides for a mechanism where the parties can address the Commissioner. I'm going to issue some directions and set down that the parties provide some submissions, no more than five pages. I'll give – Ms Pegg, I'll give you about a month to get that in. I'll set the 10th of July. If there's any issue with any of the timetabling, simply confer with each other, and if you can't agree, contact my chambers through the registry, and we'll have a – something like this and we'll sort it out.
But that purpose is to address the Commission as to why there's an arguable case and how it is that it's in the public interest or not in the public interest, depending on which side of the bar table you're at, and whether the Commission should refrain from hearing the matter, because a hearing's an obviously very involved process. It's witness evidence, cross-examination, findings of fact, rounds of submissions and arguments and then the – a preparation of a judgement, which is published.
And if at this early junction, it seems on a preliminary view, on the applicant's own materials, that there isn't a case in law, that's not to say there isn't – there aren't issues about whether you've been dealt with fairly or all of those other contested facts. This is purely about the legal argument underpinning the claim. That's what this process under 541 is about. It's about the Commission having a more detailed look with the benefit of arguments from the parties as to whether there's a case that's in the public interest to actually hear or – I think the word is "necessary". And if it seems there's no legal foundation to the case, then it seems unnecessary and not in the public interest to put everyone through a trial only to get to the end of it and say, "There's no case in law," if we can see it from the start.
So at this stage, that's a preliminary view, and it's only based on your initial material. So if I've missed something, that's what this process I'm proposing is all about. Then what – after you prepare that submission, it gets filed in the Commission registry and it gets served on the other side. They get normally a month or a couple of weeks to prepare a response. And then if needed, we'll give you a week or so after that to prepare a final response. And then I'll consider that. Normally, I'll decide that argument on the papers.
But if the parties want to have a hearing and want to be able to address me on something, they can.[51]
[51] T (21 June 2024), 1-2, l 24 to T 1-3, l 35.
The Industrial Commissioner then asked Ms Pegg if she had any questions about what he had just stated. The transcript records that Ms Pegg did not ask any questions.[52]
[52] T (21 June 2024), 1-3, l1 38-39.
The Industrial Commissioner was very clear about why he held a concern that Ms Pegg's general protections application may not have disclosed a cause of action and that, in those circumstances, why it was necessary to give consideration to whether the he should exercise discretion pursuant to s 541(b)(ii) of the IR Act to not hear that application because further proceedings were not necessary or desirable in the public interest.
It was on that basis that Ms Pegg made her principal written submissions, and her written submissions in reply, to the Industrial Commissioner. Having regard to the reasons given by the Industrial Commissioner for the Primary Decision, the Industrial Commissioner took into account the submissions made by Ms Pegg that were relevant to the s 541(b)(ii) issue.
For these reasons, I cannot come to the conclusion that the Industrial Commissioner denied Ms Pegg procedural fairness. There was no practical injustice suffered by Ms Pegg in the proceeding before the Industrial Commissioner.
As referred to above, Ms Pegg, in her submissions to this Court, raises a number of other issues. Being generous to Ms Pegg, some of those issues may have some relevance to her one ground of appeal, being that she was denied procedural fairness. I deal with those matters below.
Otherwise none of the other submissions made by Ms Pegg have any relevance to her ground of appeal. As a consequence, they cannot have any bearing on an assessment of Ms Pegg's prospects of success in her appeal.
No consent to a hearing on the papers
Ms Pegg contends that she did not provide her consent to the Industrial Commissioner hearing the s 541(b)(ii) issue on the papers. This submission cannot be accepted.
As set out immediately above, the Industrial Commissioner, at the mention on 21 June 2024, expressly stated to the parties that if they wanted a hearing to address him, they could have a hearing. When asked if she had any questions about the process proposed by the Industrial Commissioner, the transcript records that Ms Pegg had no questions. Further, as the Respondents pointed out in their oral submissions to the Court, at the further mention on 15 August 2024, the Industrial Commissioner again indicated to Ms Pegg that if she wanted a hearing about the s 541(b)(ii) issue, then she should indicate that in her written submissions in reply and he would set the matter down for a hearing.[53]
[53] T (15 August 2024) 1-6, l 45 to T 1-7, l 2.
There is no evidence before the Court that Ms Pegg asked for a hearing before the Industrial Commissioner.
Alleged actual bias
Ms Pegg then contends that, as best as I understand her submissions, the Industrial Commissioner demonstrated actual bias when, in respect of the Respondents' application to be legally represented, he allegedly stated: 'This is a heavy burden for a volunteer to carry.' In fact, this is not what the Industrial Commissioner actually stated.
On 15 August 2024, in giving his reasons for giving leave to the Respondents, pursuant to s 530(1)(e)(ii) of the IR Act, to be represented by a lawyer, the Industrial Commissioner, after hearing submissions from the parties, relevantly stated:
COMMISSIONER: All right. Well, look, thank you, parties. As I say, I have considered this matter earlier, and again today. I've heard from the parties to ensure that there's nothing I've missed, but essentially this is an application by the respondent to be legally represented pursuant to section 529 of the Industrial Relations Act 2016. A party can only be represented by a lawyer in the proceedings, such as these, if it’s pursuant to section 530. Now, that section relevantly provides that leave may be granted only if it would enable the proceedings to be dealt with more effectively having regard to the complexity of the matter, or if it would be unfair not to allow legal representation because a party's unable to represent itself, or it would be unfair not to allow legal representation, having regard to fairness as between the parties.
In this case I note it is a general protections application. It has raised complex issues of law around determination of a contract, and perhaps unknowingly, it has also raised issues around termination of the employment relationship, as opposed to termination of the contract. Those are complicated issues, in my view. I also note that the matter is a general protections claim, and if the rebuttable presumption of wrongdoing is triggered, then it falls to the respondent to prove that its motivating reasons were not infected with any unlawful motives.
In my view, that's a heavy burden for a party to bear, and having regard to the submissions from the respondent today that all of the respondent's witnesses are volunteers, I consider it an even heavier burden for them to bear by themselves if they are not only to be their own witnesses, but also their own advocates in a proceeding where they carry the evidentiary burden of dislodging a presumption of wrongdoing.[54]
[54] T (15 August 2024) 1-3, l 35 to T 1-4, l 11. Emphasis added.
Actual bias exists where the decision-maker has prejudged the case against the applicant, or acted with such partisanship or hostility as to show that the decision-maker had a mind made up against the applicant and was not open to persuasion in favour of the applicant.[55]
[55] Drummond v Canberra Institute of Technology (No 3) [2022] FCAFC 169; (2022) 294 FCR 346, [46] (Rangiah, Charlesworth and Banks-Smith JJ) citing North J in Sun v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs [1997] FCA 1488; (1997) 81 FCR 71, 134.
The comment made by the Industrial Commissioner does not demonstrate actual bias. The comment was not made in the context of determining whether or not Ms Pegg, by her general protections application, had a cause of action or whether or not her general protections application should be heard because further proceedings were not necessary or desirable in the public interest.
The comment was made in the context of weighing up a relevant issue as to whether or not the Respondents should be given leave to be represented by a lawyer in the proceeding before the Industrial Commissioner. The comment did not attribute undue blame to her as Ms Pegg asserts in her submissions. Furthermore, the comment was one that was reasonable to make in determining the question of legal representation for the Association. This was because of the fact that the members of the Association were volunteers and that they would be representing themselves in the proceeding at the same time as being their own witnesses. As I understand it, there was no appeal against the Industrial Commissioner's decision to give leave to the Respondents to be represented by a lawyer.
For all these reasons, I conclude that Ms Pegg has not demonstrated that her application to appeal against the Primary Decision has prospects of success.
Conclusion
The justice of Ms Pegg's case does not require that the Court exercise its discretion, pursuant to s 564(2) of the IR Act, to allow her to start her appeal within a longer period.
Ms Pegg has not provided an adequate explanation for the very long delay in starting her appeal and she has not demonstrated that her appeal has prospects of success.
For these reasons, Ms Pegg's Court application will be dismissed.

Order

The Court makes the following order:

The Appellant's application in existing proceedings, to start her appeal within a longer period, is dismissed.

[2025] ICQ 24

14 November 2025