Draper v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Draper v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2006] FCAFC 157

BANKRUPTCY – joint mortgagors – where one mortgagor became bankrupt and other mortgagor continued to make mortgage repayments – where bankrupt mortgagor provided general financial support to other mortgagor whilst bankrupt – disclaimer – whether trustee in bankruptcy disclaimed interest in property – estoppel – where trustee in bankruptcy inactive with respect to real property for 16 years – whether trustee in bankruptcy estopped from asserting interest in property – after-acquired income – whether after-acquired income of bankrupt vests in trustee in bankruptcy – whether bankruptcy should be annulled pursuant to s 153B of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth).

EQUITY – express trusts – whether husband’s interest in real property held on trust for wife – whether clear intention to create express trust – whether requirements of s 29 of the Law of Property Act 1936 (SA) that creation of interest be evidenced in writing satisfied – whether Magistrate overlooked material evidence in finding no express trust – constructive trusts – circumstances in which constructive trust imposed – equitable accounting – relevant principles – trustees – claim for damages against trustee in respect of administration of estate.

EVIDENCE – negative inference drawn by magistrate following applicant’s failure to call witness – where witness co-operating with both parties.

PROCEDURE – appeal by jury – where party seeks appeal to be determined by jury – circumstances in which Court may order trial by jury. 

Held: material evidence overlooked by Magistrate in finding that no express trust arose – Magistrate failed to review material which might satisfy s 29 of the Law of Property Act 1936 (SA) – Magistrate erred in drawing negative inference against applicant on the basis of failure to call witness where witness available to both parties – question of whether bankrupt contributed to mortgage repayments is question of fact – no conduct on the part of trustee in bankruptcy capable of creating an estoppel – no disclaimer of interest in property by trustee in bankruptcy – bankrupt potentially entitled to an account in equity for payments made improving property or repaying mortgage after discharge of bankruptcy – trustee in bankruptcy entitled to proper rent on equitable accounting – no power for Court to direct that matter in its appellate jurisdiction be heard by jury – no basis for annulment of bankruptcy under s 153B of Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) – no basis for claim for damages against trustee in respect of administration of estate – appeal allowed in part – matter remitted for rehearing of claims in respect of proceeds of sale of property.

Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth)
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth)
Law of Property Act 1936 (SA)

Allesch v Maunz (2000) 203 CLR 172 referred to
Astrazeneca Pty Ltd v GlaxoSmithKline Australia Pty Ltd [2006] FCAFC 22 referred to
Austin v Keele (1987) 10 NSWLR 283 referred to
Barkworth v Young (1856) 26 LJ Ch 153 referred to
Bathurst City Council v…

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Details
Case
[2006] FCAFC 157
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Draper v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy concerns a dispute between Mrs Draper and the Official Trustee in Bankruptcy over the equitable interests in two properties, the MacDonald Park property and the Marleston property, following the bankruptcy of Mr Draper. The case was initially heard in the Federal Magistrates Court, where the Drapers' claims were dismissed. The primary issues for the court were whether there was an agreement that Mr Draper’s interest in the MacDonald Park property would be held for Mrs Draper's benefit, whether there was a constructive trust, and whether the trustee had made representations that would give rise to estoppel. The court also needed to decide if the bankruptcy should be annulled and if damages should be awarded against the trustee.

On appeal, the court examined the evidence and the trustee's conduct in administering Mr Draper's estate. The court found that the Federal Magistrate had made significant errors in his findings. These errors included the failure to consider key evidence provided by Mr Draper, such as his Statement of Affairs and interview, which suggested that Mr Draper held his interest in the MacDonald Park property for Mrs Draper's benefit. The court concluded that these errors warranted a re-hearing of the claims concerning the MacDonald Park property and its proceeds of sale. The appeal was allowed in part, and the orders of the Federal Magistrates Court were set aside. The case was remitted for a new trial in the Federal Magistrates Court, limited to the claims concerning the MacDonald Park property. The appeal was dismissed in all other respects, and the parties were directed to submit on the costs of the appeal and the original hearing.

The court's decision highlights the importance of thorough examination of evidence and the consequences of administrative errors by trustees in bankruptcy cases. The re-hearing order ensures that the claims concerning the MacDonald Park property are properly considered, taking into account the evidence that was overlooked in the initial proceedings. The costs orders provide a framework for the parties to address the financial implications of the appeal and the original hearing.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be allowed in part.

2. The orders made by the Federal Magistrates Court on 23 September 2005 and 14 October 2005 respectively be set aside.

3. There be a new trial in the Federal Magistrates Court, differently constituted, limited to the appellants’ claims concerning the property at Lot 202 Heaslip Road, MacDonald Park, or the application of its proceeds of sale, but not including their claims based on disclaimer or estoppel.

4. The appeal be otherwise dismissed.

5. Each party has leave to make written submissions as to the costs of the appeal and of the hearing before the Federal Magistrates Court in accordance with the following timetable:

(i) The appellants may file and serve written submissions on the costs orders (if any) which they seek within 10 days of the date hereof.

(ii) The respondents may file and serve written submissions in response within 17 days of the date hereof.

(iii) The appellants may file and serve written submissions in reply within 20 days of the date hereof.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The position taken by the trustee is not an obviously attractive one. Following Mr Draper’s bankruptcy, the trustee took no action to realise the half share of the MacDonald Park property for some 16 years. The trustee’s inactivity is consistent with the view of the trustee at material times, at least up to about 1996, that there was no equity in the property. During that time, Mrs Draper or the Drapers paid interest on the mortgage, paid off the mortgages, paid the recurrent outgoings and paid for the improvements to the property. The trustee made no approach to the principal (and in essence the only) creditor in Mr Draper’s bankrupt estate for funds to proceed with any action against them or in relation to the property. The trustee’s early suggestion that the value of the Drapers’ continued occupation of the property could offset those payments must be seen in the light of the property being declared unfit for habitation and the relevant local authority having declared that the property could not be leased for more than $30 per week.THE DECISION The Federal Magistrate at first instance dismissed the Drapers’ claims. His Honour found:(1)there was no agreement at or prior to the settlement of the MacDonald Park property that Mr Draper’s registered interest as a joint tenant would be held for the benefit of Mrs Draper, nor any circumstances giving rise to the constructive trust asserted by the Drapers;(2)Mrs Draper did not meet the outgoings in respect of the MacDonald Park property from her own resources, but Mr and Mrs Draper pooled their incomes and that the mortgage capital and interest payments, and their other living expenses, and any recurrent ongoings or expenditure for improvements of the property were met from their joint incomes, to which Mr Draper was the major contributor;(3)consequently, there was no factual basis for any form of equitable accounting as between the trustee and Mrs Draper in respect of the mortgage capital or interest payments or the contributions to the improvements;(4)there was no representation, either express or by implication or by omission, by the trustee upon which any estoppel could arise preventing the trustee from being entitled to participate in one half of the MacDonald Park property. His Honour also dismissed the claims that the bankruptcy of Mr Draper should be annulled, and that damages should be awarded against the trustee for the trustee’s administration of the bankrupt estate of Mr Draper, in particular concerning the Marleston property.THE NATURE OF THE APPEAL The appeal is by way of rehearing: see Branir Pty Ltd v Owston Nominees (No 2) Pty Ltd (2001) 117 FCR 424; Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Jia Legeng (2001) 205 CLR 507 at 533 [75] per Gleeson CJ and Gummow J, 547 [128] per Kirby J, 561 [176] per Hayne J and see too Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118 at 125-129 [22]-[31] per Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Kirby JJ. A re-hearing, as Kirby J explained in CSR Ltd v Della Maddalena (2006) 224 ALR 1 at [16] involves the following:‘The relevant “requirements” are that the appellate court is obliged to conduct a thorough examination of the record and a real rehearing. It is not confined to reconsideration of the record in order to correct errors of law, although that will certainly be encompassed in such an appeal. It is required to consider suggested errors of fact finding. Experience teaches that many errors of this kind arise at first instance, more perhaps than errors of law. Having conducted a re-hearing as so described, the appellate court is obliged to “give the judgment which in its opinion ought to have been given in the first instance”. This involves, where, as here, there is no jury, conducting a thorough review of the primary judge’s reasons and engaging in the tasks of “weighing conflicting evidence and drawing… inferences and conclusions”’.(footnotes omitted)That passage was adopted and followed by the Full Court in this Court in Astrazeneca Pty Ltd v GlaxoSmithKline Australia Pty Ltd [2006] FCAFC 22.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

However, it is necessary for the Drapers to demonstrate that the judgment under appeal is a consequence of some legal, factual or discretionary error: see SZDCJ v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 212 ALR 581; Allesch v Maunz (2000) 203 CLR 172 at 180 [23] per Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ. CONSIDERATION(a) The beneficial interest in the MacDonald Park property The Federal Magistrate found that there was no express or constructive trust in favour of Mrs Draper over Mr Draper’s interest in the MacDonald Park property for the following reasons:(1)the claim by Mr Draper that he appeared as a joint tenant only on the insistence of the first mortgagee, the lending institution, was not supported, except by a letter which ‘was one insisting only that he be a joint borrower’ and his presence on the title as a joint registered party was therefore ‘left unexplained’;(2)initially the contract for the purchase of the MacDonald Park property was in the name of Kebar Sporting Goods Pty Ltd, and no explanation was given as to why the contract was assigned to Mr and Mrs Draper;(3)no officer of the relevant lending institution was called to give evidence, and no reason advanced as to why such evidence was not called, so that his Honour drew an inference that the evidence of the relevant officer from the lending institution would not have assisted the Drapers (see Jones v Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298);(4)there was no reference to any such arrangement in any of the documents completed by Mr Draper at or about the time of his bankruptcy, and there was no reference to that arrangement in his affidavit filed on 9 March 2004 in support of his original application, but the first claim that such an arrangement existed was made in Mr Draper’s affidavit of 5 August 2004; and(5)Mrs Draper in her evidence was unable to provide any detail about the arrangement, including whether it related to the MacDonald Park property, or to it and the Marleston property, or only to the Marleston property. His Honour concluded: ‘Her evidence persuaded me beyond reasonable doubt when taken in conjunction with the matters referred to in paras 1-55 above [sic] that no such agreement existed.’ [This quote appears in [17] of the judgment. I take the reference to paras 1-55 above to be a reference to sub-pars (1)-(5) of [17] in which the quote appears, as the quoted section appears as (6) of [17]. A review of the material before the learned Magistrate, including that presented by the trustee, indicates that in significant respects his Honour’s reasons are plainly wrong. The evidentiary material produced by the trustee containing details of the administration of Mr Draper’s estate is sufficient by itself to demonstrate those errors. It is not necessary to refer to the Drapers’ evidence to make the point. Mr Draper provided a Statement of Affairs of 17 July 1989. He declared his estate to have assets of some $750 only, and liabilities of some $74,500. The two principal creditors were the ASA for $33,000, and Mrs Draper who was said to be a creditor for $40,000. The trustee appears to have accepted the debt of ASA, and not to have accepted the debt of Mrs Draper (although it is not clear that proofs of debt were called for). There were no other significant creditors. In a questionnaire of the same day, Mr Draper said that he was registered as a joint owner of the MacDonald Park property. In an interview with an officer of the trustee on the same day, 17 July 1989, Mr Draper said that he and his wife had recently become the registered joint owners of the MacDonald Park property, but that he did not have any interest in the property and his name was only put on the title at the insistence of the lending institution from whom Mrs Draper obtained the finance to purchase the property.