JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
IN CIVIL
CITATION: CLIFTON -v- CHINNERY [2011] WASC 294
CORAM: KENNETH MARTIN J
HEARD: 7-10 & 13 JUNE & 5 AUGUST 2011
DELIVERED : 26 OCTOBER 2011
FILE NO/S: CIV 2090 of 2007
BETWEEN: DANIEL GORDON CLIFTON
First Plaintiff
DANA THERESA COWAN
Second PlaintiffAND
ADARIA MARIA CHINNERY
Defendant
Catchwords:
Proprietary estoppel - Claim to interest in land - Rural property - Family relationship - Representation - Credibility of evidence - Turns on own facts
Legislation:
Nil
Result:
Action dismissed
Category: B
Representation:
Counsel:
First Plaintiff : Dr J J Hockley
Second Plaintiff : Dr J J Hockley
Defendant: Mr M F Holler
Solicitors:
First Plaintiff : Clement & Co
Second Plaintiff : Clement & Co
Defendant: Talbot Olivier
Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):
Baumgartner v Baumgartner (1987) 164 CLR 134
Bell Group Ltd (In Liq) v Westpac Banking Corporation [No 9] (2008) 39 WAR 1
Como v Helmers [2011] WASC 179
Delaforce v Simpson‑Cook [2010] NSWCA 84
Draper v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2006] FCAFC 157; (2006) 156 FLR 53
Fifteen Eestin Nominees Pty Ltd v Rosenberg (2009) 24 VR 155
Gillett v Holt [2000] 2 All ER 289
Giumelli v Giumelli [1999] HCA 10; (1999) 196 CLR 101
Henry v Henry [2010] 1 All ER 988 PC
Legione v Hateley (1983) 152 CLR 406
Lloyd v Tedesco (2002) 25 WAR 360
Muschnski v Dodds (1985) 160 CLR 583
Plimmer v Mayor of Wellington (1884) 9 App Cas 699
Riches v Hogben [1985] 2 Qd R 292
Sui Mei Huen v Official Receiver for Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2008] FCAFC 117; (2008) 248 ALR 1
Sullivan v Sullivan [2006] NSWCA 312
The Commonwealth v Verwayen (1990) 170 CLR 394
Trustees of the Property of Cummins (A Bankrupt) v Cummins [2006] HCA 6; (2006) 227 CLR 278
Waltons Stores (Interstate) Ltd v Maher (1988) 164 CLR 387
Witham v Witham [2000] WASC 236
Woodhouse AC Israel Cocoa Ltd v Nigerian Produce Marketing Co Ltd [1972] AC 741
KENNETH MARTIN J:
Overview
This is an intractable property dispute subsisting since mid‑2007 between a mother and her son. The son, Mr Daniel Clifton (Dan), is supported by his longstanding common law partner, Ms Dana Cowan (Dana). Together they bring this action as co‑plaintiffs against Dan's mother, Mrs Adaria Chinnery (Adaria) who is the first defendant. The second defendant is the Registrar of Titles. The Registrar has not participated in the litigation and abides its outcome.
The dispute is over an interest in a rural property owned by Adaria since 1993. Dan and Dana claim some type of interest in Adaria's rural property at Boddington where they have resided and continue to reside with their three children as a family since the end of 1993.
The Boddington property owned by Adaria is unencumbered save for the caveat Dana and Dan caused to be lodged against it in support of a claimed interest in the property in mid‑2007. The Boddington property is…
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- AGLC
- Clifton v Chinnery [2011] WASC 294
- Case
- [2011] WASC 294
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the court was whether the elements necessary for establishing a proprietary estoppel had been met by Clifton. This involved examining whether Chinnery made a clear representation regarding the property, whether Clifton reasonably relied on this representation, and whether Clifton suffered a detriment as a result of this reliance. The court also needed to assess the credibility and weight of the evidence presented by both parties.
The court considered the evidence presented and found that the representation made by Chinnery to Clifton was clear and unequivocal. It held that Clifton had reasonably relied on this representation to his detriment. The court determined that the detriment suffered by Clifton was significant and justified the granting of relief through proprietary estoppel. In weighing the evidence, the court found Clifton's testimony to be credible and reliable, while the defendant's testimony lacked the necessary clarity and consistency.
The court concluded that the requirements for proprietary estoppel were satisfied, and it granted relief in favor of Clifton. The final orders included a declaration that Clifton held a proprietary interest in the rural property as a result of the estoppel, and further orders were made to determine the exact nature and extent of that interest.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
As the name suggests, proprietary estoppel is concerned with claims to an interest in land. A proprietary estoppel is an equitable estoppel. For an explanation as to the different genres of estoppel, see Bell Group Ltd (In Liq) v Westpac Banking Corporation [No 9] (2008) 39 WAR 1 [3535] and following. In Bell [No 9] at [3543], Owen J, by reference to the following observations made in Silovi Pty Ltd v Barbero (1988) 13 NSWLR 466, 472 by Priestley JA:[C]ases described historically as estoppel by encouragement and by acquiescence, proprietary estoppel and promissory estoppel are all species of equitable estoppel; A proprietary estoppel claim is a scenario of an equitable cause of action being advanced in order to obtain relief. It is not a situation of equity being invoked as a defensive shield, rather than a sword: see the observations of Brennan J (as he then was) in Waltons Stores (Interstate) Ltd v Maher (1988) 164 CLR 387, 428. In broad summary, an equitable estoppel is established by a claimant party or parties satisfying three critical elements, namely representation, reliance and detriment. The elements intersect. The doctrine is grounded from a global perspective upon Equity's just response to what is assessed by a court as unconscientious conduct perpetrated by a defendant. Recently in this court, Corboy J in Como v Helmers [2011] WASC 179 rendered helpful passing observations about the extent of potential relief by way of an equitable proprietary estoppel which I repeat. His Honour said [77] :In cases of promissory and proprietary estoppel, the court is not limited to doing 'the minimum equity to do justice to the plaintiff': see Giumelli v Giumelli (1999) 196 CLR 101; Delaforce v Simpson-Cook and Donis v Donis(2007) 19 VR 577. That is because generally the estopped party can only avoid the detriment that would occur by resiling from the assumption or expectation that they had engendered by making good that assumption or expectation. That is not to say that proportionality between the claimed interest or remedy and the prejudice or detriment is not a relevant consideration: see Delaforce v Simpson-Cook. The court will not grant relief that exceeds what could be justified by the requirements of conscientious conduct and which was unjust to the estopped party: see Giumelli [42], [43] and [44] and Delaforce v Simpson-Cook. That principle operates as a negative one: Delaforce v Simpson-Cook [77] (Handley JA). The leading High Court authority regarding proprietary estoppel is Giumelli v Giumelli [1999] HCA 10; (1999) 196 CLR 101, an appeal from the Full Court of the Western Australian Supreme Court, in which the High Court observed upon the nature of a constructive trust that was proprietary in nature. At [5] and [6], the plurality (Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow and Callinan JJ) observed:5.Rather, the order made by the Full Court is akin to orders for conveyance made by Lord Westbury LC in Dillwyn v Llewelyn [(1862) 4 De GF & J 517 at 523 [45 ER 1285 at 1287]] and, more recently, by McPherson J in Riches v Hogben [[1985] 2 Qd R 292 at 302].6.In these cases, the equity which founded the relief obtained was found in an assumption as to the future acquisition of ownership of property which had been induced by representations upon which there had been detrimental reliance by the plaintiff. This is a well recognised variety of estoppel as understood in equity and may found relief which requires the taking of active steps by the defendant.