Watts v Bendigo and Adelaide Bank Limited (No. 3) [2011] FCA 186
Citation:
Watts v Bendigo and Adelaide Bank Limited (No. 3) [2011] FCA 186
Appeal from:
Bendigo and Adelaide Bank Limited v Watts & Anor [2010] FMCA 623
Parties:
BHOJI WATTS and GAMBHIR WATTS v BENDIGO AND ADELAIDE BANK LIMITED (ACN 068 049 178)
File number(s):
NSD 1126 of 2010
Judge:
KATZMANN J
Date of judgment:
9 March 2011
Catchwords:
BANKRUPTCY – Sequestration order – creditor’s petition – whether act of bankruptcy within six months of petition – interpretation of order extending time for compliance with bankruptcy notice until “first return date” of notice of appeal – whether “first return date” was date of appeal index conference before registrar or later call-over before judge
BANKRUPTCY – Sequestration order – creditor’s petition – whether debtor able to pay debts within meaning of Bankruptcy Act 1996 (Cth) s 52(2)(a) – whether sequestration order ought not be made for “other sufficient cause” within meaning of s 52(2)(b)
BENDIGO AND ADELAIDE BANK LIMITED (ACN 068 049 178) Respondent
JUDGE:
KATZMANN J
DATE OF ORDER:
9 MARCH 2011
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be dismissed.
2.The appellants pay the respondent’s costs.
Note:Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules. The text of entered orders can…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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The Watts, Ghambir and Bhoji, appealed against a sequestration order made against their estates by a federal magistrate in the Federal Magistrates Court. The order was made on a creditor’s petition by the Bendigo and Adelaide Bank Limited. The Watts had been in debt to the bank for a long time, and the bank had been pursuing them through various proceedings. The federal magistrate found that the Watts had committed an act of bankruptcy within six months of the petition and that a sequestration order was appropriate. The Watts contested the order on several grounds, including the interpretation of an order extending the time for compliance with a bankruptcy notice and the meaning of “able to pay” and “other sufficient cause” in the Bankruptcy Act 1996 (Cth). The Full Court found that the federal magistrate did not err in his consideration of the evidence or in his conclusions. The Watts had not demonstrated any error of law or fact that would warrant interference with the order.
The Full Court held that the order extending the time for compliance with the bankruptcy notice was to be interpreted as extending it until the first return date of the notice of appeal, which was the date of the appeal index conference before the registrar and not the later call-over before the judge. The Full Court also held that the Watts were not able to pay their debts within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Act and that there was other sufficient cause for making a sequestration order, namely the fact that BMG, their company, was in liquidation and could not bring the proceeding without leave. The Full Court rejected the Watts’ argument that the federal magistrate gave “overwhelming significance” to the fact that BMG was in liquidation, when he merely referred to it as a relevant consideration. The Full Court also noted that the Watts had applied for leave to proceed with their claims against the bank after the sequestration order was made, which showed that they could not bring those proceedings without leave while BMG was in liquidation.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The appellants pay the respondent’s costs.
Note:
Background
Background to the litigation
The appellants, Ghambir and Bhoji Watts, are in debt to the respondent (“the bank”). Mr and Mrs Watts have been unwilling to discharge the debt and there is a long and unhappy history of litigation between them, their company, BMG Poseidon Corp Pty Ltd (“BMG”), and the bank. Ultimately, on 20 January 2010 the bank presented a creditor’s petition in the Federal Magistrate’s Court and, on 11 August 2010, in an ex tempore judgment, a federal magistrate made a sequestration order against their estates. This is an appeal from that order. Background facts The facts are summarised in the judgment of the federal magistrate. The summary is largely derived, as his Honour acknowledged, from the judgment of Foster J in BMG Poseidon Corp Pty Ltd v Adelaide Bank Ltd (No. 2) [2009] FCA 404, which was upheld by the Full Court in Watts v Adelaide Bank Limited [2009] FCAFC 169. It is convenient to reproduce the summary as none of the facts included in it is disputed. [5]In short, the Bank lent money to BMG Poseidon Corp Pty Ltd (“BMG”) under two loan agreements entered into in 2004. Mr and Mrs Watts were the principals and controllers of BMG at all relevant times, and gave guarantees for the obligations of BMG under the loan agreements. They also provided security over a residential house property at Lyons Road, Drummoyne, whose value never exceeded the amount of BMG’s indebtedness. [6]Default by BMG occurred in 2005, and a statutory demand was served in relation to the mortgaged property. The Bank obtained orders for possession of the property on 3 April 2006, and took possession of it on 1 November 2006. There were then exchanges between Mr and Mrs Watts and the Bank concerning realisation of the security, and a summary of their exchanges appears in the judgment of Foster J. Eventually, the Bank ended the efforts of Mr and Mrs Watts themselves to find a purchaser, and itself entered into a contract to sell the property on 2 April 2007 for $1,000,000, with a purchaser, Mr Campbell, with whom Mr and Mrs Watts had previously been negotiating. [7]The Bank also obtained a default monetary judgment against BMG and Mr and Mrs Watts on 3 April 2006, in the sum of $1,028,725.29. As a result of the Bank’s sale of the Drummoyne property, it realised a substantial part of that indebtedness, but a significant debt remained owing, and the Bank proceeded to take further recovery measures against BMG and Mr and Mrs Watts. The indebtedness relied upon under the petition is $64,561.19, and additional liabilities may be owed to the Bank, including under costs orders. [8]A statutory demand was served on BMG on 27 August 2007, and bankruptcy notices were issued against Mr and Mrs Watts. A series of bankruptcy notices were set aside in circumstances which it is unnecessary to explore. The bankruptcy notice which is now relied upon was issued on 21 November 2008, and was served personally on Mr Watts on 5 December 2008 and on Mrs Watts on 26 November 2008. [9]BMG disputed the statutory demand by commencing proceedings in the Federal Court in its corporation’s jurisdiction on 11 September 2007. These proceedings were adjourned pending the outcome of litigation which was also commenced by Mr and Mrs Watts and BMG in the Supreme Court, seeking to set aside the default judgment. [10]The application to set aside the default judgment was dismissed by McCallum J on 12 February 2008 (see Adelaide Bank Limited v BMG Poseidon Corp Pty Limited [2008] NSWSC 68). An application for leave to appeal to the NSW Court of Appeal was refused on 6 August 2008. An application for special leave to appeal to the High Court, requiring an extension of time, was refused on 11 February 2009.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
The federal magistrate pointed out (and Mr and Mrs Watts did not argue to the contrary in this appeal) that it was common ground that the reference to an “unconditional sale” in November 2006 was wrong. The real estate agents did not report an unconditional sale of the property at that price. Rather, they reported the existence of negotiations for a possible sale at that price. Moreover, the statement that it was the bank that did not allow the matter to proceed to contract is wrong. This was a matter considered in the proceeding before Foster J: BMG Poseidon Corp Pty Ltd v Adelaide Bank Ltd (No. 2) [2009] FCA 404 [23]-[33]. The federal magistrate observed:[48] …[T]he evidence before Foster J showed that the prospective purchaser, Mr Campbell, never became willing to execute an agreement to purchase the property at that price, in circumstances which are set out in the judgment of Foster J from [23]-[33]. Counsel for the Bank also pointed out that there was a caveat on the title at the time of Mr and Mrs Watts’ negotiations with Mr Campbell, which it appears neither Mr Watts nor the Bank was able or willing to remove to allow the proposed contract to be attractive to Mr Campbell at that time. In the events recounted by Foster J, based on the same evidence as is before me now, Mr Campbell only became a willing purchaser when the Bank took over the negotiations, and reduced the price so as to effect a sale to him on 2 April 2007 for $1 million. [49]It is therefore difficult to see how the new valuation evidence materially advances the merits of Mr and Mrs Watts’ claims against the Bank for an alleged mortgagee sale at an undervalue, so as to make their prospects any better than the assessments made by Foster and Buchanan [scil.] JJ and the Full Court. [Emphasis added.] Mr and Mrs Watts did not argue that the conclusion the federal magistrate reached in [48] was wrong on the evidence before him or was not open to him. That evidence showed that:(e)there was a caveat on the property;(f)the solicitors for the prospective purchaser, Mr Campbell, required confirmation that, if contracts were exchanged, there would be no difficulty in discharging the mortgage with the bank and removing the caveat; and(g)BMG was not in a position to provide an unencumbered title. Accordingly, the sale price in the proposed contract was not the price at which a sale to Mr Campbell could be realised. On any view Mr Garder’s assumption that there had been an unconditional sale of the property for $1,075,000 was mistaken. Where an expert’s opinion is founded on an assumption which is not supported by the evidence, the opinion has no weight. In the circumstances, the federal magistrate’s conclusion was inescapable. Mr and Mrs Watts also complained that the federal magistrate “accorded overwhelming significance to the fact that BMG was placed into liquidation and that no application for leave to proceed by that company has been sought from the Supreme Court”. The submission wrongly characterises the federal magistrate’s reasons. His Honour did not accord “overwhelming significance” to those matters. He merely referred to them. The fact that BMG was in liquidation and could not bring the proceeding without leave was plainly not irrelevant (and Mr and Mrs Watts did not suggest it was). In this appeal Mr and Mrs Watts tendered evidence to show that on 27 September 2010 – after the sequestration order was made – they had filed an application for leave under s 471B of the Corporations Act. Section 471B provides:Stay of proceedings and suspension of enforcement processWhile a company is being wound up in insolvency or by the Court, or a provisional liquidator of a company is acting, a person cannot begin or proceed with:(a)a proceeding in a court against the company or in relation to property of the company; or(b)enforcement process in relation to such property;except with the leave of the Court and in accordance with such terms (if any) as the Court imposes.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Mr and Mrs Watts have not shown that the federal magistrate acted on a wrong principle, took into account irrelevant considerations, failed to take into account a relevant consideration, mistook the facts or reached an unreasonable or plainly unjust conclusion so as to give rise to the inference that he failed properly to exercise his discretion (see House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499 at 505). Consequently, this ground must also fail.Conclusion None of the three grounds is made out. The appeal must therefore be dismissed. There is no reason why costs should not follow the event.