Supreme Court
New South Wales
Medium Neutral Citation: Hammond v DPP [2013] NSWSC 888 Hearing dates: 16 November 2012 Decision date: 01 July 2013 Jurisdiction: Common Law - Criminal Before: Latham J Decision: Amended summons dismissed
Catchwords: APPEAL - conviction appeal - appeal from Local Court to Supreme Court - error of law - whether magistrate erred in making a finding of guilt on a date other than the nominated hearing date - statutory construction of ss 190, 196 Criminal Procedure Act 1986 - meaning of "first return date" - no denial of procedural fairness where notice of court attendance date given - amended summons dismissed Legislation Cited: Criminal Procedure Act 1986
Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Commonwealth)Cases Cited: Coco v R [1994] 179 CLR 427
DPP v Yeo [2008] NSWSC 953
House v The King [1936] HCA 40 ; 55 CLR 499
Huddart, Parker & Co Pty Ltd v Moorehead [1909] HCA 36 ; (1909) 8 CLR 330
R v Alexandroaia [1995] NSWCCA (7 July 1995)
Watts v Bendigo and Adelaide Bank Ltd (No. 3) [2011] FCA 186Category: Principal judgment Parties: Jeremy Hammond - Plaintiff
DPP - DefendantRepresentation: Counsel
PM Winch SC - Plaintiff
J Girdham SC - Defendant
Solicitors
Aboriginal Legal Service (NSW/ACT) Ltd - Plaintiff
Solicitor for Public Prosecutions - Defendant
File Number(s): 2012/00203187-1
Judgment
The plaintiff was convicted on 29 February 2012 by a magistrate at Dubbo Local Court, in his absence, of breaching an apprehended violence order (AVO). The Director of Public Prosecutions has taken over the conduct of the proceedings as the defendant.
By way of an amended summons filed on 17 September 2012, the plaintiff seeks orders allowing the appeal, setting aside the conviction and remitting the matter to Dubbo Local Court for rehearing.
The alleged error of law concerns the construction of s 196 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (the Act) and whether the magistrate was entitled to convict the plaintiff on a date that was not the nominated hearing date.
The Criminal Procedure Act 1986
Division 3 of Part 2 of Chapter 4 of the Act is headed "Hearings". Part 2 deals with trial procedures in lower courts of summary jurisdiction.
Section 190 provides :-
1) On the first return date for a court attendance notice in any summary proceedings, or at such later time as the court determines, the court must set the date, time and place for hearing and determining the matter.
(2) The court must notify the accused person of the date, time and place, if the accused person is not present.
(3) However, if the accused person is not present at the first return date and has not lodged a written plea of not guilty in accordance with section 182, the court may proceed to hear the matter on that day at its discretion.
Sections 192 to 195 provide for the hearing of a matter on the day set down for the hearing, where both the prosecutor and the accused person are…
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- Case
- [2013] NSWSC 888
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issue before the Supreme Court was the interpretation of sections 190 and 196 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986, specifically the meaning of the term "first return date". The appellant contended that the magistrate's decision to hear and determine the case on a date other than the nominated hearing date constituted a failure to comply with these statutory provisions. The Director of Public Prosecutions, on the other hand, argued that there was no procedural irregularity as the appellant had been given notice of the court attendance date, which was not disputed. The Supreme Court was tasked with determining whether the magistrate's actions constituted an error of law that warranted a conviction appeal.
In examining the statutory provisions and the circumstances of the case, the Supreme Court found that the term "first return date" did not strictly limit the magistrate's discretion to hear and determine the case on a date other than the nominated hearing date, provided the appellant had been given adequate notice. The court held that the appellant had not been denied procedural fairness as he had been notified of the actual court attendance date, which was not in dispute. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the conviction, ruling that there had been no error of law in the magistrate's proceedings.
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