Cultivaust Pty Limited v Grain Pool Pty Limited

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Cultivaust Pty Limited v Grain Pool Pty Limited [2005] FCAFC 223

CORRIGENDUM

CULTIVAUST PTY LIMITED v GRAIN POOL PTY LIMITED AND ORS

SAD135 OF 2004

FINN, EMMETT AND BENNETT JJ
28 OCTOBER 2005 (CORRIGENDUM DATED 3 NOVEMBER 2005)
ADELAIDE


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

SAD135 OF 2004

ON APPEAL FROM A SINGLE JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

CULTIVAUST PTY LIMITED (ACN 09 400 202)
APPELLANT

AND:

GRAIN POOL PTY LIMITED (ACN 089 394 883)
FIRST RESPONDENT

STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
SECOND RESPONDENT

ATTORNEY-GENERAL FOR THE STATE OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
THIRD RESPONDENT

STATE OF TASMANIA
FOURTH RESPONDENT

JUDGES:

FINN, EMMETT & BENNETT JJ

DATE:

28 OCTOBER 2005 (CORRIGENDUM DATED 3 NOVEMBER 2005)

PLACE:

ADELAIDE

CORRIGENDUM

  1. [56] of the judgment should read:

    “In dealing with s 14 of the Plant Breeder’s Act the primary judge considered the meaning of s 14(1)(b), which is in the same terms as s 15(b). The primary judge, in dealing with whether Tasmania had a ‘reasonable opportunity to exercise the grantee’s right in relation to Franklin barley produced or reproduced without its authorisation’, the primary judge characterised Tasmania’s ‘rights’ [sic] as ‘exclusive, but negative’ and said that the exercise of ‘those rights’ [sic] involved, if necessary, action under s 54 of the Plant Breeder’s Act. However, s 54 simply provides that that an action for an infringement of PBR in a plant variety may be begun in the Federal Court.”

  2. [57] of the judgment should read:

    “His Honour’s characterisation may involve a confusion of the concept of exercising the right that constitutes PBR with the concept of enforcing rights that arise under the Plant Breeder’s Act by reason of infringement of the right, conferred by the Plant Breeder’s Act, that constitutes PBR. That is to say, if s 14(1) be relevant, the primary judge may have misconstrued s 14(1)(b) in failing to distinguish between the grantee’s right under s 11 and the secondary rights that arise by reason of infringement of that right, as provided for in s 53(1). In the light of the conclusion reached above, it is unnecessary to resolve that question but it should not be thought that his Honour’s view of ss 14(1)(b) and 15(b) would necessarily be endorsed if the question arises in the future.”

I certify that the preceding two (2) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justices Finn, Emmett & Bennett.

Associate:

Dated:             3 November 2005

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Cultivaust Pty Limited v Grain Pool Pty Limited [2005] FCAFC 223

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY – Plant Variety Rights and Plant Breeder’s Rights [‘PBR’] – consideration of ss 11, 14, 15, 17, 18, 19 Plant Breeder’s Rights Act 1994 (Cth) – whether the word ‘enables’ in s 18(1)(b) has significance – relationship between ss 14 and 18 - s 18 constitutes a significant derogation from PBR of a plant variety where the…

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Details
Case
[2005] FCAFC 223
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appeal in Cultivaust Pty Limited v Grain Pool Pty Limited was brought before the court to address the infringement of Tasmania's Plant Breeder's Right (PBR) by Grain Pool Pty Limited through the offering for sale, sale, or exportation of Franklin barley, or the stocking of such barley for those purposes. The primary legal question centered on the interpretation and application of section 18 of the Plant Breeder’s Act, which was enacted in light of the 1991 International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants, although section 18 itself has no counterpart in the Convention. The appeal also involved a review of the primary judge's exercise of discretion in ordering Cultivaust and Tasmania to pay Western Australia's costs of the consolidated proceeding.

The court meticulously examined the scope and intent behind section 18, particularly its exception clauses, to determine if Grain Pool's activities constituted an infringement of PBR. The court considered the historical context and legislative intent behind section 18, including its predecessor, section 38 of the Plant Variety Act, which was intended to ensure that PBR did not unduly restrict traditional farming or home garden practices. The court's analysis included a detailed exploration of the explanatory memorandum accompanying the Bill for the Plant Variety Act, which emphasized that the legislation was not meant to restrict sales for food, fibre, fuel, etc. The court concluded that the primary judge's interpretation of section 18 and his exercise of discretion regarding costs were correct, and therefore, the appeal should be dismissed.

In its ruling, the court addressed the costs associated with the appeal, noting that Cultivaust, as the unsuccessful party, should pay Grain Pool Pty Limited's costs of the appeal. However, it was deemed appropriate that the costs of the appeal books should be borne equally by both parties. Cultivaust was also ordered to pay Western Australia's costs of the appeal, except for those related to the question of the primary judge's discretion regarding costs. The court decided not to make any orders regarding the costs of the Constitutional questions or the Attorney-General for South Australia or Tasmania.

The final orders of the court were as follows: the appeal was dismissed; Cultivaust was to pay the first respondent's costs of the appeal, except for those related to seven volumes of the appeal books; the first respondent was to pay half of Cultivaust's costs of preparing those seven volumes; Cultivaust was to pay the second respondent's costs of the appeal, except for the question of the primary judge's discretion regarding costs; and there would be no order as to the costs of the Constitutional questions or those of the third and fourth respondents.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal, except to the extent of any costs incurred in relation to seven volumes of the appeal books.

3. The first respondent pay one half of the appellant’s costs of the preparation of the seven volumes of the appeal books.

4. The appellant pay the second respondent’s costs of the appeal, on the basis of junior counsel in relation to the question of the exercise by the primary judge’s discretion as to costs.

5. There be no order as to costs of the Constitutional questions.

6. There be no order as to costs of the third respondent or fourth respondent.

Background

Background to the litigation

The appeal was concerned solely with the questions of whether, by offering for sale, selling, or exporting Franklin barley, or stocking Franklin barley for those purposes, the Grain Pool infringed Tasmania’s PBR and whether the primary judge erred in the exercise of his discretion in ordering Cultivaust and Tasmania to pay Western Australia’s costs of the consolidated proceeding. As to the first question, the appeal turns on the meaning and effect of s 18 of the Plant Breeder’s Act in the circumstances outlined above.BACKGROUND TO SECTION 18 Although Australia did not subscribe to the 1991 International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants until 1999, it enacted the Plant Breeder’s Act in light of that Convention. A copy of the English text is set out in the schedule to the Plant Breeder’s Act. By Article 30 of the Convention, each Contracting Party agreed to adopt all measures necessary for the implementation of the Convention. In particular, each Contracting Party was required to provide for appropriate legal remedies for the effective enforcement of PBR and it was understood that, on depositing its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession of, or to, the Convention, each Contracting Party was to be in a position, under its laws, to give effect to the provisions of the Convention. Chapter V of the Convention deals with ‘THE RIGHTS OF THE BREEDER’ and contains Articles 14 to 19 inclusive, the substance of which is enacted in the provisions of Part 2 in the Plant Breeder’s Act. Part 2 of the Plant Breeder’s Act, which is headed ‘Plant Breeder’s Right’, consists of ss 11 to 23 inclusive. Each of ss 11 to 23, apart from s 18, can be seen to be based on one or other of Articles 14 to 19 of the Convention. Curiously, s 18 has no counterpart in the Convention, but appears to have been enacted for a reason other than to give effect to the terms of the Convention. Interestingly, although irrelevantly for present purposes, s 18 was repealed by the Plant Breeder’s Right Amendment Act 2002 (Cth). Section 18 had a precursor in s 38 of the Plant Variety Act. Thus, s 38(1) relevantly provided as follows:‘Notwithstanding that plant variety rights subsist in respect of a plant variety, any person may:(a) …(b)sell plants of that variety for use as food or for another use that does not involve the growing of the plants or the production of plants of that variety;(c)sell reproductive material of plants of that variety for use as food or for another use that does not involve the production of plants of that variety; [Emphasis added]…’ The source of the exception constituted by s 38 is by no means clear. It may be that s 38 was introduced to pacify rural and other interests who would be concerned at the possibility that the grantee of PBR would be in a position to impose end point royalties in relation to food or food ingredients. The explanatory memorandum circulated in connection with the Bill for the Plant Variety Act contained an outline that relevantly said:‘The Plant Variety Rights Bill is based on the following principles:…·Nothing in this Bill will prevent the retention of seed of protected varieties for sowing of crops or sale for human and animal consumption. Protected varieties will also be freely available for research purposes and to plant breeders for use in breeding programmes (sic).’The body of the explanatory memorandum said as follows, in relation to clause 38, which became s 38 of the Plant Variety Act:‘Specifies purposes for which registered varieties may be grown or sold without infringing the rights. The Bill does not preclude the retention of plants or reproductive material for own use. Protected varieties may also be used for research or breeding purposes but not in the commercial production of hybrid varieties. The aim of this clause is to make clear that the legislation is not intending to restrict traditional farming or home garden practices whereby seed or other reproductive material is retained for production of a subsequent crop.’That comment is headed ‘Plant variety rights not to restrict sales for food, fibre, fuel, etc.’, although there is no mention of food, fibre or fuel in the body of s 38.

Decision

Reasons for decision

FINN, EMMETT AND BENNETT JJ
The needless inclusion of material in appeal books is a matter of growing concern in this Court. The present appeal demonstrates starkly how little of what has been included was necessary for the orderly disposition of the matters actually in issue. Neither Cultivaust nor Grain Pool Pty Limited is free from fault in permitting this state of affairs to occur. Cultivaust, as the unsuccessful party, should pay Grain Pool Pty Limited's costs. Nonetheless it is appropriate that the costs of the appeal books should be borne equally by Cultivaust and Grain Pool Pty Limited. CONCLUSION The appeal should be dismissed. Cultivaust should pay the costs of the appeal of Grain Pool Pty Ltd, except to the extent of any costs incurred in relation to seven volumes of the appeal books. Grain Pool Pty Limited should pay one half of Cultivaust’s costs of the preparation of those volumes. Cultivaust should pay Western Australia’s costs of the appeal, on the basis of junior counsel in relation to the question of the exercise by the primary judge’s discretion as to costs. There should be no order as to the costs of the Constitutional questions. There should be no order as to the costs of the Attorney-General for South Australia or of Tasmania.