FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Cultivaust Pty Limited v Grain Pool Pty Limited [2005] FCAFC 223
CORRIGENDUM
CULTIVAUST PTY LIMITED v GRAIN POOL PTY LIMITED AND ORS
SAD135 OF 2004
FINN, EMMETT AND BENNETT JJ
28 OCTOBER 2005 (CORRIGENDUM DATED 3 NOVEMBER 2005)
ADELAIDE
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
SAD135 OF 2004
ON APPEAL FROM A SINGLE JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:
CULTIVAUST PTY LIMITED (ACN 09 400 202)
APPELLANTAND:
GRAIN POOL PTY LIMITED (ACN 089 394 883)
FIRST RESPONDENTSTATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
SECOND RESPONDENTATTORNEY-GENERAL FOR THE STATE OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
THIRD RESPONDENTSTATE OF TASMANIA
FOURTH RESPONDENT
JUDGES:
FINN, EMMETT & BENNETT JJ
DATE:
28 OCTOBER 2005 (CORRIGENDUM DATED 3 NOVEMBER 2005)
PLACE:
ADELAIDE
CORRIGENDUM
[56] of the judgment should read:
“In dealing with s 14 of the Plant Breeder’s Act the primary judge considered the meaning of s 14(1)(b), which is in the same terms as s 15(b). The primary judge, in dealing with whether Tasmania had a ‘reasonable opportunity to exercise the grantee’s right in relation to Franklin barley produced or reproduced without its authorisation’, the primary judge characterised Tasmania’s ‘rights’ [sic] as ‘exclusive, but negative’ and said that the exercise of ‘those rights’ [sic] involved, if necessary, action under s 54 of the Plant Breeder’s Act. However, s 54 simply provides that that an action for an infringement of PBR in a plant variety may be begun in the Federal Court.”
[57] of the judgment should read:
“His Honour’s characterisation may involve a confusion of the concept of exercising the right that constitutes PBR with the concept of enforcing rights that arise under the Plant Breeder’s Act by reason of infringement of the right, conferred by the Plant Breeder’s Act, that constitutes PBR. That is to say, if s 14(1) be relevant, the primary judge may have misconstrued s 14(1)(b) in failing to distinguish between the grantee’s right under s 11 and the secondary rights that arise by reason of infringement of that right, as provided for in s 53(1). In the light of the conclusion reached above, it is unnecessary to resolve that question but it should not be thought that his Honour’s view of ss 14(1)(b) and 15(b) would necessarily be endorsed if the question arises in the future.”
I certify that the preceding two (2) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justices Finn, Emmett & Bennett.
Associate:
Dated: 3 November 2005
FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Cultivaust Pty Limited v Grain Pool Pty Limited [2005] FCAFC 223
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY – Plant Variety Rights and Plant Breeder’s Rights [‘PBR’] – consideration of ss 11, 14, 15, 17, 18, 19 Plant Breeder’s Rights Act 1994 (Cth) – whether the word ‘enables’ in s 18(1)(b) has significance – relationship between ss 14 and 18 - s 18 constitutes a significant derogation from PBR of a plant variety where the…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read Cultivaust Pty Limited v Grain Pool Pty Limited and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2005] FCAFC 223
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court meticulously examined the scope and intent behind section 18, particularly its exception clauses, to determine if Grain Pool's activities constituted an infringement of PBR. The court considered the historical context and legislative intent behind section 18, including its predecessor, section 38 of the Plant Variety Act, which was intended to ensure that PBR did not unduly restrict traditional farming or home garden practices. The court's analysis included a detailed exploration of the explanatory memorandum accompanying the Bill for the Plant Variety Act, which emphasized that the legislation was not meant to restrict sales for food, fibre, fuel, etc. The court concluded that the primary judge's interpretation of section 18 and his exercise of discretion regarding costs were correct, and therefore, the appeal should be dismissed.
In its ruling, the court addressed the costs associated with the appeal, noting that Cultivaust, as the unsuccessful party, should pay Grain Pool Pty Limited's costs of the appeal. However, it was deemed appropriate that the costs of the appeal books should be borne equally by both parties. Cultivaust was also ordered to pay Western Australia's costs of the appeal, except for those related to the question of the primary judge's discretion regarding costs. The court decided not to make any orders regarding the costs of the Constitutional questions or the Attorney-General for South Australia or Tasmania.
The final orders of the court were as follows: the appeal was dismissed; Cultivaust was to pay the first respondent's costs of the appeal, except for those related to seven volumes of the appeal books; the first respondent was to pay half of Cultivaust's costs of preparing those seven volumes; Cultivaust was to pay the second respondent's costs of the appeal, except for the question of the primary judge's discretion regarding costs; and there would be no order as to the costs of the Constitutional questions or those of the third and fourth respondents.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal, except to the extent of any costs incurred in relation to seven volumes of the appeal books.
3. The first respondent pay one half of the appellant’s costs of the preparation of the seven volumes of the appeal books.
4. The appellant pay the second respondent’s costs of the appeal, on the basis of junior counsel in relation to the question of the exercise by the primary judge’s discretion as to costs.
5. There be no order as to costs of the Constitutional questions.
6. There be no order as to costs of the third respondent or fourth respondent.
Background
Background to the litigation
Decision