Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) v GTR

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JURISDICTION     :   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

TITLE OF COURT  :   THE COURT OF APPEAL (WA)

CITATION:   DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS (WA) -v- GTR [2008] WASCA 187

CORAM:   STEYTLER P

BUSS JA
MURRAY AJA

HEARD:   6 JUNE 2008

DELIVERED          :   8 SEPTEMBER 2008

FILE NO/S:   CACR 5 of 2008

BETWEEN:   DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS (WA)

Appellant

AND

GTR
Respondent

ON APPEAL FROM:

Jurisdiction              :  SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

Coram  :McKECHNIE J

Citation  :DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS (WA) -v- GTR [2007] WASC 318

File No  :MCS 17 of 2007

Catchwords:

Criminal law and procedure - Dangerous sexual offender application - Appeal against refusal to make continuing detention or supervision order - Relationship between the notions of 'a serious danger to the community' and 'unacceptable risk' - The meaning of 'unacceptable risk' - The meaning of 'to a high degree of probability' - If an offender is 'a serious danger to the community' a continuing detention order or a supervision order must be made - Admissibility of evidence of offending and convictions as a child - Admissibility and weight of expert psychiatric opinion - Evaluation of risk of commission of a serious sexual offence - The nature of the appeal

Legislation:

Dangerous Sexual Offenders Act 2006 (WA)
Interpretation Act 1984 (WA), s 19, s 56
Young Offenders Act 1994 (WA), s 189, s 190

Result:

Appeal dismissed

Category:    A

Representation:

Counsel:

Appellant:     Mr D Dempster

Respondent:     Mr L C Carter

Solicitors:

Appellant:     Director of Public Prosecutions (WA)

Respondent:     Aboriginal Legal Service (WA)

Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):

Addington v Texas 441 US 41 (1979)

Attorney‑General (Qld) v Francis [2006] QCA 324; [2007] 1 Qd R 396

Attorney‑General (Qld) v Hynds [2007] QSC 374

Coal and Allied Operations Pty Ltd v Australian Industrial Relations Commission [2000] HCA 47; (2000) 203 CLR 194

Cobiac v Liddy (1969) 119 CLR 257

Cornwall v Attorney‑General (NSW) [2007] NSWCA 374

Craig v Troy (1997) 16 WAR 96

Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) v GTR [2007] WASC 318

Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) v Mangolamara [2007] WASC 71; (2007) 169 A Crim R 379

Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) v Williams [2007] WASCA 206; (2007) 35 WAR 297

Fardon v Attorney‑General (Qld) [2004] HCA 46; (2004) 223 CLR 575

Goodwin v Phillips (1908) 7 CLR 1

Griffiths v The Queen (1977) 137 CLR 293

Keating v The State of Western Australia [2007] WASCA 98; (2007) 35 WAR 1

M v M (1988) 166 CLR 69

Maxwell v The Queen (1996) 184 CLR 501

Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority [1998] HCA 28; (1998) 194 CLR 355

Re Calder; Ex parte Cable Sands (WA) Pty Ltd (1998) 20 WAR 343

Samad v District Court of New South Wales [2002] HCA 24; (2002) 209 CLR 140

Smith v The Queen (1992) 7 WAR 527

The State of Western Australia v Latimer [2006] WASC 235

Tillman v Attorney‑General (NSW) [2007] NSWCA 327

Traegar v Pires de Albuquerque…

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Details
Case
[2008] WASCA 187
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) v GTR is an appeal against the refusal to make a continuing detention or supervision order for a dangerous sexual offender. The appellant, the Director of Public Prosecutions, argued that the primary judge erred in his determination that the respondent did not pose an unacceptable risk of reoffending. The appeal was heard in the Western Australian Supreme Court. The central legal issues revolved around the interpretation of the terms 'serious danger to the community' and 'unacceptable risk' as defined in the relevant legislation, as well as the admissibility and weight of certain evidence, including expert psychiatric opinions.

The court was tasked with determining whether the primary judge erred in his assessment of the evidence and whether the respondent indeed posed an unacceptable risk of reoffending. The primary judge had concluded that while the respondent was a serious danger to the community, he did not pose an unacceptable risk due to his youth and the opportunities he had taken for rehabilitation. The court considered the expert psychiatric evidence and the reliability of the STATIC-99 risk prediction tool, which both experts acknowledged had significant limitations, particularly in cases where rehabilitation had been undertaken. The court found that the primary judge's assessment of the evidence was sound, and the respondent's youth and rehabilitation efforts were properly considered.

The Supreme Court found no error in the primary judge's decision and dismissed the appeal. The court agreed with the primary judge's evaluation of the evidence and the risk presented by the respondent, concluding that the primary judge's findings were not inconsistent with the statutory requirements. The court emphasised the importance of considering the respondent's youth and rehabilitation efforts in assessing the risk of reoffending. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, and the primary judge's decision to not make a continuing detention or supervision order was upheld.

Orders

Orders of the court

Appeal dismissed

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

There has, in this case, been no further evidence. Nor has there been any change in the law. This court may consequently exercise its appellate powers only if there was error on the part of the primary judge. That seems to us to be the effect of s 36(1) of the Act, having regard to what was said in Coal and Allied Operations. That this was the Parliament's intention appears to be reinforced by the fact that s 36(2) limits the court's power, when drawing inferences of fact, to drawing inferences that are 'not inconsistent with the findings of the court making the decision against which the appeal is made'. Subject to the observations we have made concerning the proper construction and application of the Act, we agree, generally, with Murray AJA's reasons for dismissing the appeal. Any differences in reasoning or emphasis between our reasons and Murray AJA's reasons do not, in the present case, affect the merits of any of the grounds of appeal or the outcome of the appeal. We wish to make some comments on the evidence concerning the effect, on risk, of the respondent's youth (particular (c) of the ground of appeal) and concerning his prognosis in the light of courses undertaken by him. Murray AJA has commented at some length on the evidence as regards the effect, on risk, of the respondent's youth. Both psychiatrists who gave evidence, Dr Tanney and Dr Brett, appear, in their reports, to have placed some reliance upon the STATIC‑99 risk prediction tool in suggesting that offending at a young age gives rise to an enhanced risk of re‑offending. However, each recognised, in the course of oral evidence, that there are significant shortcomings in that test. That is primarily because the text relies upon unchangeable historical factors. It is consequently susceptible to error in cases in which opportunities for rehabilitation have been availed of. In his evidence, Dr Tanney acknowledged that, subject to one minor exception, the respondent had taken advantage of opportunities for rehabilitation that had been offered to him. He was asked, in cross‑examination, about the 'significance of youth and childhood' to the prospect of rehabilitation. In the course of that questioning he was asked whether it was a matter that bore very much in the respondent's favour that he had done all that had been asked of him. He responded, 'Very much in his favour'. As the primary judge pointed out [70], Dr Tanney acknowledged that there is a great margin for error in dealing with the issue of youthful offending. In his report, Dr Tanney considered the personal circumstances of the respondent at some length, raising factors that had worked for and against him. He emphasised (page 25 of his report) the need for family support and the presence of a guiding male figure, seemingly recognising that the risk presented by the respondent's immaturity could be alleviated by these factors as he matures. The respondent has completed a number of courses. Some of these were completed while he was detained in Banksia Hill Detention Centre during 2003. His case planning officer's report dated 6 March 2003 concludes with the following summary:[GTR] continues to behave well and make the most of the education and sporting programmes at Banksia Hill. He has also completed group programmes in substance misuse, anger management and coping skills and done as much sex offender counselling as could be expected. He would benefit from any further counselling that can be provided in the community, but he certainly seems to have earned the opportunity for early release.