The State of Western Australia v Ciavalini [No 2] - [2025] WASC 164

JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
IN CRIMINAL

CITATION:   THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA -v- CIAVALINI [No 2] [2025] WASC 164
CORAM:   GETHING J
HEARD:   1 MAY 2025
DELIVERED          :   8 MAY 2025
FILE NO/S:   SO 11 of 2024
BETWEEN:   THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Applicant
AND
DANIEL CIAVALINI
Respondent

Catchwords:

Consideration of whether respondent is a high risk serious offender and appropriate order to be made if he is - Consideration of appropriate conditions and period of a supervision order, if made

Legislation:

Criminal Code (WA) s 338E, s 338E(1)(a)
High Risk Serious Offenders Act 2020 (WA) s 3, s 5, s 7, s 8, s 26, s 27, s 30, s 31, s 35, s 48, s 49, s 55, s 74
Sentence Administration Act 2003 (WA) s 30(2)
Sentencing Act 1995 (WA) s 33HA, s67A, s76A, s 84CA, s 124G

Result:

Supervision order made

Category: B

Representation:

Counsel:

Applicant	:	Ms T C Loo
Respondent	:	Ms L Boston

Solicitors:

Applicant	:	State Solicitor's Office (WA)
Respondent	:	Carlo Primerano & Associates

Case(s) referred to in decision(s):

Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) v GTR [2008] WASCA 187
Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) v Hart [2019] WASC 4
Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) v Lyddieth [2012] WASC 246
Garlett v The State of Western Australia [2022] HCA 30; (2022) 277 CLR 1
The State of Western Australia v AB [No 3] [2022] WASC 126
The State of Western Australia v ACJ [2021] WASC 219
The State of Western Australia v Colbung [No 2] [2023] WASC 197
The State of Western Australia v Hansen [No 2] [2025] WASC 4
The State of Western Australia v Paraha [2025] WASC 20
The State of Western Australia v Patrick [No 5] [2022] WASC 61
The State of Western Australia v Williams [No 2] [2024] WASC 215

GETHING J:

The State of Western Australia contends that the respondent, Daniel Ciavalini, is a high risk serious offender as defined in High Risk Serious Offenders Act 2020 (WA) (HRSO Act) s 7 for whom a restriction order should be made pursuant to HRSO Act s 48.
It is not in issue that at the time the State's application was made on 12 September 2024, the respondent was a 'serious offender under custodial sentence' in respect of whom the State may make an application for a restriction order.
On 25 October 2024 Forrester J heard the preliminary hearing and determined that there were reasonable grounds for believing that the court might find the respondent to be a high risk serious offender. Her Honour ordered that, upon the conclusion of his custodial sentence on 25 December 2024, he be detained until 2 January 2025, after which he was to be released from custody on an interim supervision order pending the determination of the State's application.
The State's application was heard by me on 1 May 2025. In summary, the State's position was that, while the court should find that the respondent is a high risk serious offender for whom a restriction order is appropriate, it was open to the court to make a supervision order in relation to him.
The respondent, through his counsel, accepted that he is a high risk serious offender. The respondent contended that a supervision order was appropriate in the circumstances and consistent with the objects of the HRSO Act.
At the conclusion of the hearing, I advised the parties that I had formed that view that, while I considered Mr Ciavalini to be a high risk serious offender, I was satisfied that a supervision order was appropriate, which I then made.
My reasons for coming to this conclusion follow.
In these reasons, I will consider the following:
·The evidence.
·The relevant legal principles.
·Is the respondent a high risk serious offender?
·If so, what form of order should be made to ensure the adequate protection of the community?

The Evidence

The State tendered a three volume Book of Materials:[1]
(a)volume one, containing material from the Department of Justice, filed 20 February 2025;
(b)volume two, containing the historical record of offending, filed 20 February 2025; and
(c)volume three, containing the reports pursuant to HRSO Act s 74, filed 4 April 2025.
[1] Which I will refer to as 'BOM##'.
The State's evidence at the hearing comprised the oral testimony of three witnesses:
(a)Professor Natalie Pyszora, who prepared the Psychiatric Report for the Court dated 5 March 2025;
(b)Dr Ben Bannister, who prepared the Psychological Report dated 20 March 2025; and
(c)Mr Beau Moulton, who prepared the Community Supervision Assessment dated 4 April 2025.
Each witness gave some additional oral evidence in chief, and was cross-examined.
Mr Ciavalini did not file any affidavit evidence, nor give or adduce evidence at the hearing.

The relevant legal principles

The objects of the HRSO Act are to provide for the detention in custody or the supervision of high risk serious offenders to ensure adequate protection of the community and of victims of serious offences, and to provide for continuing control, care or treatment of high risk serious offenders.[2] The powers conferred by the HRSO Act are not to be exercised for the purpose of imposing additional punishment on the offender, but, rather, for the ultimate purpose of protecting the community.[3]
[2] HRSO Act s 8.
[3] Garlett v The State of Western Australia [2022] HCA 30; (2022) 277 CLR 1 [55] - [56] (Kiefel CJ, Keane and Steward JJ) (Garlett).
The State may make an application for a restriction order where the offender is a 'serious offender under custodial sentence' pursuant to HRSO Act s 35. This phrase is defined in HRSO Act s 3 to mean, relevantly, 'a person … who is under a custodial sentence for a serious offence…'. The term 'serious offence' is defined in HRSO Act s 5 to include the offences specified in sch 1 div 1. These offences relevantly include the offence under the Criminal Code (WA) (CC) s 338E of aggravated stalking.
The central question in the application is whether the offender is a 'high risk serious offender', which is defined in HRSO Act s 7(1):
An offender is a high risk serious offender if the court dealing with an application under this Act finds that it is satisfied, by acceptable and cogent evidence and to a high degree of probability, that it is necessary to make a restriction order in relation to the offender to ensure adequate protection of the community against an unacceptable risk that the offender will commit a serious offence.
The onus is on the State to satisfy the court that the offender is a high risk serious offender.[4]
[4] HRSO Act s 7(2).
There are two distinct evaluative steps in HRSO Act s 7(1):[5]
(1)an evaluation of whether there is an unacceptable risk that the respondent will commit a serious offence in the future, in the absence of any measure that would provide protection of the community against that risk; and
(2)if so, an evaluation of whether it is necessary to make a restriction order in relation to the respondent to ensure adequate protection of the community.
So expressed, the HRSO Act does not provide that a person who presents with a risk of committing a serious offence is necessarily a high risk serious offender.[6]
[5] The State of Western Australia v Hansen [No 2] [2025] WASC 4 [30], [50] (Fiannaca J) (Hansen [No 2]); The State of Western Australia v Paraha [2025] WASC 20 [10] - [11] (Lemonis J) (Paraha); The State of Western Australia v Williams [No 2] [2024] WASC 215 [39] - [41] (Lemonis J).
[6] Garlett [84]; Paraha [11] - [12].
The principles by which these evaluative judgments are to be made were discussed by the High Court in Garlett. From the decisions of the majority,[7] a number of principles may be discerned:
(1)HRSO Act s 7 contemplates a practical evaluation concerned with the circumstances of the particular offending and the particular offender;[8]
(2)in that evaluation, considerations of retribution and deterrence, central to sentencing by way of punishment under the common law, have no part to play;[9]
(3)the requirements that the risk be 'unacceptable' and that the restriction order be 'necessary' to ensure 'adequate' protection of the community direct attention to whether the identified risk to the community can be tolerated;[10]
(4)whether or not a risk that an offender will commit a serious offence is 'unacceptable' is a question which requires the court's judgment as to the nature and extent of the harm said to be in prospect;[11]
(5)the court must consider whether a restriction order is 'necessary' to ensure adequate protection of the community;[12]
(6)whether a restriction order is 'necessary' to protect against the identified risk requires recognition of what would otherwise be the offender's entitlement to be at liberty, an entitlement not lightly to be denied;[13] and
(7)the word 'adequate' indicates that a qualitative assessment is required.[14]
[7] Kiefel CJ, Keane and Steward JJ, with whom Gleeson J generally agreed; Edelman J.
[8] Garlett [84].
[9] Garlett [55].
[10] Garlett [226] (Edelman J).
[11] Garlett [73].
[12] Garlett [73].
[13] Garlett [73]; [226].
[14] Garlett [106], citing The State of Western Australia v ACJ [2021] WASC 219 [32] (Fiannaca J) (ACJ).
The word 'unacceptable' connotes a balancing exercise that will take into account the nature of the risk (the commission of a serious offence, with serious consequences for the victim), the likelihood of the risk being realised and the serious consequences for an offender if an order is made (either detention, without having committed an unpunished offence, or being required to undergo what might be an onerous supervision order).[15]
[15] Hansen [No 2] [35]; Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) v GTR [2008] WASCA 187[27] (Steytler P and Buss JA).
In considering whether the court is satisfied that the offender is a high risk serious offender for the purposes of HRSO Act s 7(1), s 7(3) provides that the court must have regard to a number of factors:
(a)any report prepared under section 74 for the hearing of the application and the extent to which the offender cooperated in the examination required by that section;
(b)any other medical, psychiatric, psychological, or other assessment relating to the offender;
(c)information indicating whether or not the offender has a propensity to commit serious offences in the future;
(d)whether or not there is any pattern of offending behaviour by the offender;
(e)any efforts by the offender to address the cause or causes of the offender's offending behaviour, including whether the offender has participated in any rehabilitation programme;
(f)whether or not the offender's participation in any rehabilitation programme has had a positive effect on the offender;
(g)the offender's antecedents and criminal record;
(h)the risk that, if the offender were not subject to a restriction order, the offender would commit a serious offence;
(i)the need to protect members of the community from that risk;
(j)any other relevant matter.
The effect of HRSO Act s 7(3)(j) is that the list of matters to be considered by the court is not limited by those otherwise delineated in the subsection.[16]
[16] The State of Western Australia v Colbung [No 2] [2023] WASC 197 [21] (McGrath J) (Colbung).
In considering whether it is satisfied as required by HRSO Act s 7(1), s 7(4) adds that the court must disregard the possibility that the offender might temporarily be prevented from committing a serious offence by imprisonment, remand in custody or the imposition of bail conditions.
If the court is satisfied that the offender is a high risk serious offender, the court 'must' then make either a continuing detention order or a supervision order; there is no discretion.[17] However, the discretion to choose between two types of order 'preserves the basic principle of justice that detention in the custody of the State should only be ordered as a matter of last resort'.[18]
[17] HRSO Act s 48(1); Garlett [30], [70], [229].
[18] Garlett [229].
In deciding which of these two orders to make, the 'paramount consideration is to be the need to ensure adequate protection of the community'.[19] That requirement does not exclude other considerations.[20] The 'curtailment of liberty must be no greater than is necessary adequately to protect the community from the demonstrated unacceptable risk of harm to the community'.[21]
[19] HRSO Act s 48(2).
[20] Garlett [106], citing ACJ [32].
[21] Garlett [55], also [85]; [106]; ACJ [32]; The State of Western Australia v Patrick [No 5] [2022] WASC 61 [56] (Derrick J).
A continuing detention order in relation to an offender is an order that the offender be detained in custody for an indefinite term for control, care, or treatment. It has effect in accordance with its terms from the time the order is made until rescinded by a further order of the court.[22]
[22] HRSO Act s 26.
A supervision order in relation to an offender is an order that the offender, when not in custody, is to be subject to stated conditions that the court considers appropriate, in accordance with HRSO Act s 30. It has effect in accordance with its terms from a date stated in the order and for a period stated in the order. The date from which a supervision order has effect must not be earlier than 21 days after the date the order is made unless the court is satisfied that the implementation of the order from an earlier date is practically feasible.[23]
[23] HRSO Act s 27.
A court cannot make a supervision order in relation to an offender unless it is satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that the offender will substantially comply with the standard conditions of the order as made. The onus of proving this is on the offender.[24] The phrase 'will substantially comply with' should be given its ordinary meaning, consistent with the purposes of the legislation and the general conditions of a supervision order, the overall object of which is to achieve the adequate protection of the community by appropriate management and mitigation of the unacceptable risk that the offender will commit a serious offence.[25]
[24] HRSO Act s 30.
[25] Colbung [31].
The question of what constitutes 'substantial compliance' and whether the offender will 'substantially comply' are matters of judgment.[26] They require consideration of all of the circumstances, both personal to the offender and external, which will affect them. External circumstances include the conditions of the supervision order, the available means to monitor, supervise and treat them, and any pro‑social support available to them.[27]
[26] Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) v Hart [2019] WASC 4 [52] (Fiannaca J).
[27] Garlett [103]; ACJ [416].

Factors set out in HRSO Act s 7

I now turn to the matters relevant to determining whether or not Mr Ciavalini is a high risk serious offender pursuant to HRSO Act s 7. I will do so by considering the evidence in the context of the factors under HRSO Act s 7(3). I have reordered those factors into a more logical sequence.

The respondent's antecedents - s 7(3)(g)

The respondent is currently 46 years old, just about to turn 47.
The respondent is the older brother to twin sisters, two years his junior. He grew up in Perth, having a largely happy upbringing within an extended family of Italian heritage. He had an especially close bond with his mother, which continues to the present. He did not report experiencing any abuse as a child.
Around when he was 30, the respondent's parents separated after 32 years of marriage due to his father having an affair. He reports feeling hurt, angry and disappointed about what happened, and has ceased contact with his father.
The respondent was a shy, quiet and socially isolated child. He experienced a global developmental delay leading him to struggle with learning difficulties and social deficits in the school environment. The respondent experienced bullying at school, though in his interviews tended to downplay this. Professor Pyszora observes that this bullying impacted the respondent's self-esteem and confidence in the long term, and appears to have left him with a degree of trauma.
The respondent left high school after year 10 at the age of 15. He commenced a mechanical apprenticeship under his father's tutelage. He was unable to complete this and, after a year, commenced a spray‑painting apprenticeship, which he completed. In this field, the respondent found stable employment for 6 - 7 years. He then moved into labouring and plastering, where he went into business with some previous colleagues for a few years. At age 30, the respondent set himself up as a contractor. Following the separation from his wife in 2016, aged 38, he has not had consistent work as he felt mentally and physically incapable of working. However, the most recent reports indicate that the respondent wants to work and is actively looking for work, though with a level of anxiety given that he has not worked since 2016. He is being assisted in this by Community Corrections Officers (CCOs). His mother has been a consistent source of financial support.
The respondent has been in five significant intimate relationships, all but one of which has been the subject of family and domestic violence offending. In this part of my reasons, I set out the social history. I weave in the offending history later in these reasons.
The respondent's first intimate relationship commenced around the age 17 with a partner of similar age. This relationship lasted around 18 months to two years. The respondent told Dr Banister that he did not perpetrate any abuse against this partner, though he did recall finding the end of the relationship hard and that he contacted her for a period after it ended.
The respondent's second significant intimate relationship was when he was around the age of 23 and was with a 21 year old whom he met through his sisters, whom I will refer to as 'VS'. This relationship lasted 14 months. Again, he denied that there was any violence in this relationship. Following their breakup, VS was protected by a VRO, which the respondent breached. VS was the victim of the respondents first stalking offence in June 2002. I set out the details of his offending at [73].
The respondent's third significant intimate relationship commenced when he was about 24. He has a son from this relationship who was born in 2007, so is now 18. A VRO was required for the protection of this ex-partner and their son.[28]
[28] BOM page 784.
The respondent's fourth significant intimate relationship was with his now ex-wife (whom I will refer to as TC), which commenced when he was around the age of 29. They had two children together, a girl in 2012 and a boy in 2014. They were together for around 9 years until February 2016. After the pair separated, TC was protected by a VRO, which the respondent breached.[29]
[29] BOM page 784.
The respondent's fifth significant intimate relationship commenced in October 2016 with a woman whom I will refer to as 'LD', LD was the victim of the respondent's most recent stalking offences. In January 2017 they lived together for about one month. In May 2017, while he was in prison, he found out she was pregnant and in February 2018 his youngest daughter was born. The respondent describes to Professor Pyszora the behaviour of LD during their relationship as being 'toxic'. He makes similar observations to Dr Bannister. I return to the offences which the respondent has committed against LD when I review his criminal record. On the materials before the court, the respondent accepts that this relationship is at an end and expresses no wish to contact her.
The respondent reports that he has paid for the services of sex workers frequently throughout his life. This was weekly from the ages of 19 ‑ 21 and through all of his relationships, however, less frequently by comparison.

The respondent is currently not in a relationship.
The respondent does not have any issues with gambling or illicit substance abuse, and reports that he only drinks alcohol occasionally.
Professor Pyszora reports that although the respondent does not fulfill the criteria for an intellectual development disorder, his verbal skills and learning abilities are impaired. Dr Bannister remakes similar observations. There is a suggestion in Dr Bannister's report that this may have been the result of either a car accident which his mother was involved in while pregnant or the challenging, extended and complicated labour which preceded his birth. The fact that the respondent has intellectual difficulties is also a recurring theme in the reports which are either before the court or summarised in reports before the court. For example, it has meant that the respondent is more suited to individual counselling than group counselling.
As to his mental health, when the respondent was assessed by Professor Pyszora in February 2025 she could not discern any objective evidence of current symptoms of a major mental illness. He denied experiencing any such symptoms at the time.
Professor Pyszora reports that during the period from 2008 to 2021, there were various contacts with the public mental health services as regards the respondent. Many of these appear to have been in a triage function to assist police in their response to calls for assistance due to the respondent's dysregulated and aggressive behaviour within his own home.
Professor Pyszora opined that the respondent fulfils the diagnostic criteria for a personality disorder as he has displayed an enduring pattern of inner experience and behaviour which deviated markedly from the expectations of his culture. More specifically:[30]
Mr Ciavalini fulfils criteria for a diagnosis of personality disorder as he has displayed an enduring pattern of inner experience and behaviour that deviates markedly from the expectations of his culture. This has manifested in disturbance of cognition, affectivity, impulsivity, and interpersonal functioning and has led to significant impairment in his social functioning since adolescence, and social and occupational functioning as an adult including serious offending (stalking) in the context of intimate relationship problems. Using a dimensional perspective on classification of personality disorder (rather than the traditional categorical classification which classifies different personality disorders into distinct categories) allows the full range of impairments in personality functioning and pathological personality traits to be described as part of overall personality disorder.
Longstanding traits to Mr Ciavalini's personality include avoidant traits (avoiding tasks which involve a lot of contact with others and avoiding involvement in new relationships due to fear of criticism or rejection unless he is certain that he will be liked, fear of being shamed or ridiculed, feeling inferior and inadequate compared to others, and reluctance to try new things because of fear of embarrassment), dependent traits (difficulty expressing disagreement with others because of fear of loss of support and approval, difficulty initiating projects on his own because of a lack of confidence, and wanting to seek a new relationship as a source of care and support when a current relationship ends), and depressive traits (feeling inadequate and worthless with low self-esteem, is self-deprecating, and prone to feeling guilty).
[30] BOM pages 808 - 809, pars [222] - [223].
As to his personality issues more generally, Professor Pyszora opines:[31]
Despite some ability to form friendships with males, Mr Ciavalini has had a longstanding difficulty in forming and maintaining intimate relationships, as well as severe emotional regulation difficulties and repeated attempts to contact ex partners when these relationships deteriorated and eventually terminated. He did not have the social skills and interpersonal skills to recognise and respond to relationship difficulties as they arose, and termination of the relationship was emotionally destabilising for him and generally led to periods of clinical depression. He would become frustrated and angry with himself, and during these periods exhibited emotional and behavioural dysregulation; often resulting in police attendance.
Mr Ciavalini has a dependant, avoidant, depressive and self-defeating personality structure, and he lacks the necessary skills to navigate relationships including the empathy to understand his partner's communications and needs. He has a long history of stalking behaviour towards all of his significant partners as well as the victim of the 2004 offence whom he never met. His stalking behaviour has involved repeated attempts to communicate with the victim by phone, text, or social media, or by appearing at the victim's home or workplace in an attempt to reconcile and/or see his children. He has demonstrated a clear propensity to commit the serious offence of stalking over a 20‑year period.
[31] BOM page 810, pars [229] - [230].
Professor Pyszora also opined that the respondent met the diagnostic criteria for a major depressive disorder, but that this was in full remission at the time of assessment. He has previously experienced episodes of depression predominant at the termination of a relationship, but also during periods of incarceration in prison. Though he has been on anti-depressant medication in the past, he is not currently.
Dr Bannister makes the following observations as to the connections between the respondent's childhood experiences, personality and current offending:[32]
Several predisposing factors are relevant to Mr Ciavalini. He was subject to potential trauma in utero and during birth, which may have impacted negatively on his brain function. In any event, he was found to have delayed development and verbal, social, learning and behaviour problems from a young age, which early intervention did not appear to improve. He has also described feelings of inferiority and resentment towards his siblings, and a sense that he was the 'black sheep' of the family, suggesting he felt he was different and inferior to others. This would have been possibly reinforced by his experiences of bullying in school, and would have likely set the scene for a longing to be accepted and approved of. However, his cognitive defects would have been expected to result in an increase in impulsive behaviour, poor consequential thinking and judgment, poor perspective taking, and difficulties with problem solving, effective communication, and poor emotional regulation. These issues may have served to alienate him further.
By the time Mr Ciavalini was of an age to engage in intimate relationships, he was likely already experiencing depressive symptoms, anxiety, poor self-esteem and low confidence. His personality structure had also begun to crystalise to be characterised by elements of dependency, passive-aggression, and self-defeating features. Mr Ciavalini acknowledged that he struggled to establish relationships and became quickly attached to women if they showed him the slightest sign of attention or interest. His offending was likely precipitated by the interplay of an urgency to connect with an intimate partner in order to seek attachment, acceptance and approval, but seated within a resentment borne out of entitlement. His anti-sociality would then have been perpetuated by his challenges in accepting rejection, underpinned by an impaired ability to take the perspective of others and think consequentially, difficulty in managing negative emotions, poor frustration tolerance and poor problem solving.

The respondent's criminal record - s 7(3)(g)

[32] BOM page 841, pars [62] - [63].

In relation to HRSO Act s 7(3)(g), in Colbung McGrath J observed:[33]
While s 7(3)(g) of the HRSO Act provides that the Court must have regard to the offender's criminal record in deciding whether a person is a serious danger to the community, the mere fact that a person has committed previous offences does not necessarily mean that there is an unacceptable risk that the person would commit a serious offence in the future. The relevance of a prior criminal record would depend on the nature of the offences committed, the number of offences, and the period of time over which they occurred. However, past behaviour is often a good indicator of future conduct.
I agree with this observation.
[33] Colbung [23].
The respondent has also committed numerous offences that are not characterised as 'serious offences'. Offences of other types may be relevant in assessing the risk of serious offending being committed in the future because other offences may be connected to behaviour which has the real potential to lead to serious offending.[34]

Offences where LD was the complainant

[34] Colbung [8]; Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) v Lyddieth [2012] WASC 246 [10] (Hall J).

On 22 March 2023 the respondent was convicted of one offence of aggravating stalking pursuant to CC s 338E(1)(a). He was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 2 years. He was denied parole and served the entire term. This was the fifth serious offence for the purposes of the HRSO Act.
This offence related to events that occurred between 1 November and 25 December 2022, immediately upon his release from custody on 1 November 2022. At 11:14 am on 1 November 2022, he made his first communication with LD via Instagram. Over the coming weeks, the respondent sent LD 3,062 text messages and phoned her over 400 times. On 25 December 2022 alone, the respondent made over 350 calls and sent 113 messages to LD. Some of these messages contained explicit material or abusive content.
At the same hearing, the respondent was convicted of 55 breaches of a FVRO protecting LD. These charges related to the communication with LD set out in the preceding paragraph. It included emotionally abusive messages such as 'go kill yourself' and a video of a penis being fondled. The respondent was given a 15 month concurrent term of imprisonment for each breach.
At the hearing on 22 March 2023 he was also declared a serial family violence offender. I will address the significance of this later in my reasons.
On 19 November 2021, the respondent was convicted of one count of aggravated stalking pursuant to CC s 338E(1)(a). He was sentenced to a term of immediate imprisonment of 13 months. This was the fourth serious offence for the purposes of the HRSO Act. The facts were that on 1 October 2021, LD reported to police that the respondent had been calling her in breach of a FVRO. During a 24-hour period, the respondent had attempted to contact LD more than 450 times. Some of the texts were abusive and threatening.
At the same hearing, the respondent was convicted of one count of breaching the FVRO and given a concurrent term of imprisonment. Police seized his mobile phone and found in excess of 17,000 communications over the previous 239 days, using the WhatsApp messaging application.
On 30 June 2020, the respondent was convicted of one count of aggravated stalking pursuant to CC s 338E(1)(a). He was sentenced to a term of immediate imprisonment of 10 months. This was the third serious offence for the purposes of the HRSO Act. The facts were that on 18 February 2020, the respondent was served with a FVRO protecting LD, as well as her three children. Between 19 and 22 February 2020, the respondent called LD's mobile continuously, leaving messages threatening to harm himself and destroy property if she did not pick up. On 22 February 2020, while police were at LD's home, the respondent called her over 30 times. The next day, when the respondent was arrested, they found 511 outgoing calls to LD's phone, as well as other devices showing the respondent had sent abusive messages to LD prior to the service of the FVRO.
At the same hearing, the respondent was convicted of four counts of breaching the FVRO. For each count he was given a 2 month term of imprisonment, each to be served concurrently.
On 2 October 2019, the respondent was convicted to two counts of breaching an FVRO protecting LD's children. He went to LD's home and yelled at LD through the window. He was given a 2 month term of imprisonment to be served concurrently.
On 21 December 2018, the respondent was sentenced to a term of immediate imprisonment of seven months for three counts of breaching the FVRO protecting LD and her children. One breach involved entering their home and asking to see the children (including his daughter). Another breach involved being within 100 m of LD when she was at a shopping centre. This offending in turn breached a suspended term of imprisonment imposed on 2 May 2018, for which he was sentenced to concurrent terms of imprisonment.
The offences for which he was sentenced to a suspended term of imprisonment on 2 May 2018 were also breaches of the FVRO protecting LD's children. There were seven offences. The respondent was captured in security footage attending their home on multiple occasions. The offending also breached a suspended term of imprisonment imposed on 5 July 2017, though this was allowed to continue.
On 5 July 2017, the respondent was convicted of two counts of breaching a FVRO protecting LD. The breaches were going to her home and contacting her by telephone.
On 16 May 2017, the respondent was convicted of two offences involving LD. The circumstances were that in October 2016, the respondent began a relationship with LD. Approximately two months later, LD attempted to end the relationship. On 9 March 2017, the respondent followed her to a shopping centre and filmed her. When she questioned why he was doing this, he answered, '[b]ecause you're a selfish bitch'. That same day, the respondent followed LD to her home, and filmed himself approaching her, who was recorded repeatedly asking the respondent to stay away from her. The respondent returned to LD's home that evening, where he took a photo of her in her living room.
Less than two weeks later, on 21 March 2017, the respondent used his mobile phone to call LD 84 times. The next day, 22 March, he called her 120 times.
On the morning of 23 March 2017, the respondent showed up unannounced at a shopping centre, where he had a verbal argument with LD who again told him to leave her alone. Throughout that day he attended her house at least three times uninvited, and called her mobile phone 266 times.
On the last occasion, the respondent and LD engaged in a verbal argument and the respondent attempted to rip LD's clothes off. As a result, she suffered abrasions to the inside of her right arm and the front of her right shoulder. The respondent also threw a piece of a vacuum cleaner at the back of LD's neck. The respondent then left the premises and returned home, where he was arrested shortly afterwards.
The respondent was convicted of one count of aggravated stalking for which he received a term of imprisonment of one year, suspended for one year. This was the second serious offence for the purposes of the HRSO Act. He was also convicted of one count of aggravated common assault for which he was placed on an intensive supervision order for a year.
On 10 March 2017 the respondent was convicted of one count of criminal damage. He had had an argument with LD. While she was in her vehicle, he pulled her keys out of the ignition and threw them on to the street. He then leaned into the vehicle and broke off the indicator stalk.

Offences involving TC

On 24 April 2016, the respondent was convicted of one count of breaching a police restraining order protecting TC. The breach was calling her. He was given a 6 month conditional release order.

Offences involving other people

On 1 September 2009 the respondent was convicted of one count of breaching a police restraining order and was fined $250. Police issued the order due to violent behaviour at his family home where his mother and grandmother were. Shortly after, police were called again when he returned to the family home.
On 19 January 2005, the respondent was convicted of one charge of improper use of a telecommunications service, for which he was given a 12 month community based order. The respondent sent an offensive message to the victim (whom he had never met). The victim informed the introduction agency through whom they were introduced that she no longer wished to meet the respondent. Between 19 September 2004 and 14 October 2004 the respondent sent 12 messages and called 5 times, including sexual messages and a threat to the victim with retaliation by the Mafia.

Offences involving VS

On 2 December 2002, the respondent was convicted of one count of stalking for which he was given a 12 month community based order. This was the first serious offence for the purposes of the HRSO Act. Between 9 and 17 June 2002, the respondent made numerous telephone calls and sent multiple text messages to VS, who had ended her relationship with the respondent on 15 May 2002. On one day alone, 14 June 2002, the respondent sent VS 42 text messages, some of which were threatening. In addition, he called VS's workplace, before attending in person and being asked to leave by management. The respondent was aware that VS was afraid of him and of him being potentially violent towards her.[35]
[35] Affidavit of Tse Chee Loo affirmed 12 September 2024, Annexure J.
At the same hearing, the respondent was convicted of one charge of breaching bail conditions, for which he received the same sentence.
On 25 June 2002, the respondent was convicted of one charge of breaching bail conditions for which he received a $500 fine.

Other relevant conduct

In addition to the respondent's convictions, there have been 15 Domestic Violence Incident Reports (DVIR) where the respondent was the confirmed offender. These are summarised in Professor Pyszora's report.[36]
[36] BOM, pages 786 - 789.
The pattern of behaviour which led to the convictions I have set out continued in prison.[37]
Mr Ciavalini was involved in 15 incidents between 24/03/2017 and 13/02/2025. The majority of these incidents related to him making excessive, abusive and threatening telephone calls to [LD]. On one occasion in 2018, he was required to be separated and monitored after one such call due to emotional distress. On another occasion, during a prison visit, he refused to give his child back to [LD] and the visit was terminated. Over the course of several months in November and December 2019, as well as in January 2020, he received losses of phone privileges of progressively longer periods, due to continuing to call [LD] frequently despite sanctions, culminating in a charge of insubordination/misconduct and regression to basic supervision. Other incidents related to him being bullied by other prisoners, and - on one occasion - being assaulted by another prisoner.

Whether or not there is a pattern of offending behaviour by the respondent - s 7(3)(d)

[37] BOM page 840, par [59].

A 'pattern', as it pertains to behaviour, is a recurrent way of acting by an individual or group towards a given object or in a given situation.[38]
[38] The State of Western Australia v AB [No 3] [2022] WASC 126 [128] (Strk J).
The clear pattern of offending apparent for the respondent's criminal record is a tendency to engage in stalking behaviour towards his then current or immediate past intimate partner. The stalking behaviour has included the following, all done when he was subject to restraining orders:
(a)multiple communications over social media or text;
(b)multiple communications or attempted communication by telephone;
(c)communications involving emotionally abusive or sexually explicit content;
(d)attending at the house of the protected person;
(e)repeatedly approaching the protected person in a public place; and
(f)on limited occasions, assault or property damage.

Efforts to address the cause or causes of offending behaviour, and their outcome - s 7(3)(e), (f)

I am required to consider any efforts by the respondent to address the cause or causes of his offending behaviour, including whether he has participated in any rehabilitation program. I am also required to consider whether the respondent's participation in any rehabilitation program has had a positive effect on him.
The chronology of offending set out at [52] to [75] shows that on repeated occasions, the respondent has community based dispositions. Mr Moulton observes that Departmental records indicate that the respondent has demonstrated a poor response to community based dispositions. He adds that though the respondent's compliance with substantial conditions of dispositions appears to have generally been acceptable, he has continued to commit offences despite the presence of such dispositions. Likewise, he was not able to successfully complete the two instances of parole which he was granted. He also breached a post sentence supervision order he was placed on in December 2020, again by reoffending.
As to more specific programs, over November and December 2017 the respondent attended five of the six scheduled sessions of the Families Without Fear program. The program notes indicated that the respondent did not really engage in the group sessions and did not make any treatment gains.
Between January and May 2021 the respondent engaged in the Connect and Respect program. He appears to have had difficulty engaging in the group based format, and did not make any treatment gains.
The respondent has been on an interim supervision order since the beginning of 2025. Mr Moulton reports that he has demonstrated relatively positive compliance with the supervision component. Again, his cognitive issues were recognised. However, over time, the respondent appears to have gradually become increasingly comfortable in supervision sessions with Mr Moulton and has gradually presented as more willing to discuss topics.
As already mentioned, the respondent has been engaging with a treating psychologist, Ms Julia Morrison. This engagement appears to be going well, though again his cognitive limitations are identified. There is a treatment options report prepared by Luke Carmichael dated 26 March 2025. Much of this report summarises the reports of Professor Pyszora and Dr Bannister. However, it does contain a more detailed update from Ms Morrison. The report reads:[39]
Ms Morrison advised that Mr Ciavalini is engaging well in individual psychological counselling and was becoming more open and proactive in sessions. She reported this to be a significant improvement on their previous contact in 2022. Ms Morrison advised that Mr Ciavalini has "significant limitations in relation to retaining and processing information commensurate with his learning difficulties/cognitive deficits." As such, Ms Morrison continues to make accommodations and slow the process down, while using recaps during and after each session. Further, they revise and slow the discussion from previous sessions at commencement of a new session and focus on main themes to assist Mr Ciavalini's comprehension and retention. Ms Morrison advised that Mr Ciavalini is now able to tell her when he doesn't understand something rather than pretend, which presents as a change from his earlier approach.
Ms Morrison advised that aside from the social and relationship domains, Mr Ciavalini has outstanding treatment needs in relation to his emotion management and decision making, which will be a focus of intervention in the future. She advised that she will continue to see him on a weekly basis and assess his progress every 12 sessions.
[39] BOM pages 770 - 771, pars [13] - [14].
In terms of compliance with the other conditions, it appears from Mr Moulton's report that the respondent has experienced a level of frustration with the limitations on his ability to access social media platforms. However, he has engaged with the CCOs in the process of obtaining exemptions and has abided by their rulings. He has, however, received two warnings for what I would describe as low level non-compliance in relation to internet use. Otherwise, there have been no issues of non-compliance. Inquiries by CCOs with LD indicate that there have been no instances of non-compliance with the victim related conditions of the interim order. The respondent has also been reporting as required to the WA Police HRSO team.

Report prepared under HRSO Act s 74 - s 7(3)(a)

I am required to consider any report prepared under HRSO Act s 74 for the hearing of the application and the extent to which the respondent cooperated in the examination required by that section. I have two such reports:
(1)Professor Pyszora, dated 5 March 2025; and
(2)Dr Bannister, dated 20 March 2025.
I have already referred to material from both reports in considering the respondent's antecedents and rehabilitation efforts. In this section, I focus on their risk assessments and opinions.

Professor Pyszora's report

Professor Pyszora assessed the respondent using a number of risk assessment tools. In my view, the primary utility of these assessment tools is identifying the factors which place the respondent at an increased risk of offending in the future in a like manner to his past offending.
Drawing all the assessments together, seven factors are identified which place the respondent at an increased risk of offending in the future.
The first is the duration and frequency of his offending. He has been convicted for 2 serious offences of stalking and 3 serious offences of aggravated stalking over a period of 20 years between 2002 and 2022. Overlaid this are 75 breaches of FVROs dating back to 2017, 15 DVIR's and numerous instances of other stalking type behaviour not the subject of police intervention (for example, repeated daily telephone calls from prison). All but the first of his intimate relationships have been marred by his actions of family domestic violence (FDV).
The second is the nature of the offending. In two incidents there was violence (assaulting using a vacuum cleaner and throwing a phone). On one occasion there was criminal damage to a car. He has engaged in repeated approach behaviours, appearing at a victim's property and entering it. There have been multiple explicit threats to harm. He has breached VROs on multiple occasions, having a long standing pattern of violating non-contact orders. He has a repeatedly engaged in multiple successive communications with his victims.
The third is that the respondent has a long history of problems with his intimate relationships. He struggles when intimate relationships end, with associated emotional dysregulation and stalking behaviours.
The fourth is that he has a personality disorder. His problematic personality traits are chronic and pervasive and provide the context for his vulnerability to engage in stalking behaviours. Further, his tendency to have low self-esteem and confidence meant that his intimate relationships were impacted by negative self-image and poor self-efficacy, creating further vulnerability for engaging in FDV behaviours and stalking.
The fifth is his attitude to his offending and victims. Professor Pyszora observes that he minimised the impact of his behaviours including the psychological harm his stalking victims would have experienced. He admitted that he has previously intended to cause psychological harm through threats of violence and/or threats of self‑harm. He has expressed feeling justified, or blamed the victim, when breaching FVROs. Having said that, it does appear that, with counselling, his insight into his behaviours and need for change is slowly increasing. Further, he has not recently expressed any thoughts or urges to harm others and there is no evidence that he has any intention to harm others.
The sixth is that the respondent has some outstanding treatment needs, summarised by Professor Pyszora as follows:[40]
Mr Ciavalini has outstanding treatment needs for difficulties with emotional management, lack of pro-social coping strategies, difficulties maintaining positive relationships, impulsivity, poor decision making, , (sic) lack of conflict resolution and assertive communication skills, lack of consequential thinking, residual pro-criminal (FDV) attitudes, lack of engagement with family and supports, engagement in work and recreation activities, limited victim empathy, lack of insight into his offending, and lack of a detailed relapse prevention plan. Having a network of family and friends will be important to reduce social isolation and vulnerability to his tendency to prioritise an intimate relationship over other interpersonal relationships with friends and family. Engagement in work and leisure activities will reduce his social isolation and reduce time available to ruminate over past or future relationships.
[40] BOM page 812, par [239].
The seventh is that he has a history of poor compliance with treatment programs and supervision, which I have outlined. Having said that, he is currently engaging well with his rehabilitation and supervision. As mentioned, he has not breached the current strict supervision requirements nor his FVRO protecting LD. He is engaging well with both Community Corrections staff and in private counselling.
On the other hand, there are six factors which are either not present, neutral or tend to reduce this risk that the respondent will offend in a like manner in the future.
The first is the respondent's mental health. Whilst in the past he has had issues with his mental health, in particular in the context of relationship breakdowns, his mental health is currently stable.
The second is that his lifestyle is stable. He has stable accommodation in a unit owned by his mother and close to her house. Prior to that, his behaviour in the last few months of his most recent term of imprisonment was also stable.
The third is that he has some good employment skills and is in the process of seeking employment.
The fourth is that he has some social support, primarily from his mother. However, he has no friends or other social supports. In the past he has developed friendships in the work environment, so if he gains work, there is some potential for this to give rise to some positive friendships.
The fifth is that he is motivated not to reoffend and to rebuild a relationship with his children.
Finally, he does not have a history of substance abuse or wider antisocial behaviour or access to or affinity with weapons.
Professor Pyszora concludes by opining that the respondent would present a high risk of committing a serious offence of stalking if not subject to a restriction order.

Dr Bannister's report

Dr Bannister also uses risk assessment tools. The risk factors identified in Dr Bannister's analysis largely mirror those identified by Professor Pyszora. However, there were two additional factors which his analysis identified.
The first is that the respondent has clearly demonstrated and acknowledged poor emotional control. More specifically:[41]
Emotional control: Some empirical support also indicates that violent offenders have poorer control over their anger than non-violent offenders, and that a mismanagement of negative affect can elevate their violence risk potential. Emotional control has previously been identified as a treatment need…, and continues to be. Mr Ciavalini's violence appears to be linked to an inability to cope with relationship conflict and/or breakdowns. Such behaviour has been noted to be linked to feelings of anger, rejection, shame, abandonment. For the current assessment, Mr Ciavalini acknowledged he was not good at controlling his emotions and had a 'a little bit' of a temper.
[41] BOM page 846, par [91].
The second is that the respondent has a clear tendency to be impulsive:[42]
Impulsivity: Offenders who tend to engage in impulsive verbal and physical behaviours, and fail to consider the long-term consequences of their behaviour present a higher risk for future violence. Impulsivity has previously been identified as a treatment need for Mr Ciavalini…, evidenced by several factors, including that his offending was persistent despite VRO's and community-based orders, he had some reported financial difficulty due to overspending his income, he demonstrated some lifestyle instability characterised by unemployment, living at home, lack of independence, and preoccupation with relationship issues. For the current assessment, Mr Ciavalini acknowledged that he could be impulsive.
[42] BOM page 848, par [101].
In addition, his analysis highlighted that a number of other risk factors were not present, in particular the respondent's age, the fact that he had no juvenile convictions, and has no criminal peers.
In summary Dr Bannister concludes that the respondent currently poses a high risk of committing a further serious offence if he is not either subject to a continuing detention order or a supervision order. More specifically:[43]
Potentially predisposed to cognitive impairment due to in utero and birth trauma, Mr Ciavalini was reported to have delayed development and robust verbal, social, learning and behaviour problems from a young age. He likely felt he was different and inferior to others and appears to have developed a longing to be accepted and approved of. However, his cognitive deficits would have been expected to result in an increase in impulsive behaviour, poor consequential thinking and judgment, poor perspective taking, and difficulties with problem solving, effective communication, and poor emotional regulation. These issues may have served to alienate him further. As he began to engage in intimate relationships, his personality structure had likely begun to crystalise to be characterised by elements of dependency, passive-aggression, and self-defeating features. Mr Ciavalini's offending was likely precipitated by the interplay of an urgency to connect with an intimate partner in order to seek attachment, acceptance and approval, but seated within a resentment borne out of entitlement. His anti-sociality would then have been perpetuated by his challenges in accepting rejection, underpinned by an impaired ability to take the perspective of others and think consequentially, difficulty in managing negative emotions, poor frustration tolerance and poor problem solving.

Other medical, psychiatric, psychological or other assessments - HRSO Act s 7(3)(b)

[43] BOM page 851, par [118].

The historical assessments of the respondent have been summarised and taken into account by Professor Pyszora and Dr Bannister. I have also referred to the treatment options report prepared by Luke Carmichael dated 26 March 2025.
There are no other relevant medical, psychiatric, psychological or other assessments in the materials which require separate consideration.

Propensity to commit serious offences in the future - s 7(3)(c)

I am required to consider information indicating whether or not the respondent has a propensity to commit serious offences in the future.
In Garlett, Edelman J relevantly observed that the 'offending upon which the Court can place any weight must be relevant to establishing a pattern of behaviour, or a propensity, sufficiently proximate in time, showing a likelihood that the offender will commit the specified serious offence'.[44]
[44] Garlett [222].
Professor Pyszora outlines a number of scenarios in which, in her opinion, the respondent is likely to engage in future offending:[45]
Mr Ciavalini is most likely to engage in further stalking characterised by repeated electronic communications via text, call, voicemail, and social media, including the possibility of creating third party accounts to circumvent any blocks placed by the victim. He may send photos of himself or the victim, including sexually explicit images or language. He is also likely to attempt physical contact by attending the victim's home and/or workplace. If he is not aware of their new address, he may follow them from known locations such as a workplace or childcare centre.
He is likely to make explicit or implicit threats of violence towards the victim and/or threats to harm himself to get a response from the victim. He may damage the victim's property or threaten to do so. He is unlikely to perpetrate physical violence. Any physical violence which does occur is likely to be reactive aggression in the context of face-to-face arguments with the victim and poor emotional control. It is unlikely to involve any weapons unless household items are readily to hand.
Stalking is likely to cause serious psychological harm to the victim, either through fear of potential physical attack, or through the social and traumatic impacts of hundreds of calls and messages on their daily functioning.
…
Mr Ciavalini is most likely to engage in further stalking in the context of the breakdown of an intimate relationship. He would repeatedly contact the victim in an attempt to reconcile. This may include behaviours such as threatening the victim into staying in the relationship for fear of what may occur if they terminated it. As long as Mr Ciavalini lacks the social skills, verbal skills, emotional regulation skills, conflict resolution skills and victim empathy/perspective taking to navigate intimate relationships, he remains vulnerable to re-engage in stalking behaviours and persisting in them.
[45] BOM page 823, pars [305] - [308].
Dr Bannister likewise outlines the scenario in which, in his opinion, the respondent is most likely to engage in future offending:[46]
The most likely risk scenario for Mr Ciavalini is that he breaches the conditions of a Community Supervision Order, in the context of either failing to fully comprehend or misinterpreting his Order obligations, possibly due to his cognitive deficits. The most serious risk scenario for Mr Ciavalini is if he becomes unable to maintain successful self-regulation and contacts the subjects of the lifetime Violence Restraining Order to engage in further stalking behaviours, or if such behaviour escalates to incorporate a physical attack.
[46] BOM page 850, par [112].
I agree with both opinions and find that the respondent has a clear propensity to commit serious offences, specifically stalking, in the future.

The risk that, if Mr Ciavalini were not subject to a restriction order, he would commit a serious offence - s 7(3)(h)

As mentioned, both Professor Pyszora and Dr Bannister are of the opinion that the respondent would present a high risk of committing a serious offence of stalking if not subject to either a detention order or a supervision order.
I agree. The risk factors which I have set out above lead me to conclude that if the respondent is not subject to a restriction order, he will commit a serious offence, namely stalking or FDV in relation to a former or future intimate partner.

The need to protect members of the community from the risk of offending by the respondent - s 7(3)(i)

Following from the conclusion in [119] in my view, there is a clear need to protect members of the community from the risk of offending by the respondent, in particular, his former and future intimate partners.

Other relevant matters - s 7(3)(j)

There is one further factor to consider which is the fact that on 22 March 2023 the respondent was declared a serial family violence offender. The issue raised is whether the consequences of this declaration mean that it is not necessary to impose any further restrictions.
The consequences of such declaration include:[47]
(a)a serial family violence offender is disqualified from holding a licence or permit for a firearm under the Firearms Act 1973 or an explosive under the Dangerous Goods Safety Act 2004;[48]
(b)a sentencing court must require electronic monitoring unless exceptional circumstances apply when making a pre-sentence order, community-based order, intensive supervision order or an order for conditional suspended imprisonment in relation to a family violence offence;[49]
(c)the Prisoners Review Board must consider imposing an electronic monitoring requirement when considering parole;[50] and
(d)an accused who is a serial family violence offender may not be granted bail unless there are exceptional reasons why the accused should not be held in custody.[51]
[47] Based on current Sentencing Act, as amended by the Family Violence Legislation Reform Act 2024.
[48] Sentencing Act s 124G(a).
[49] Sentencing Act s 33HA, s 67A, s 76A, s 84CA.
[50] Sentence Administration Act 2003 (WA) s 30(2).
[51] Bail Act 1982 (WA) sch 1 pt C.

In my view, these restrictions do not go far enough to protect the community from further offending by the respondent. For example, they do not address the risks associated with use of social media to communicate with potential intimate partners. They do not require the respondent to undertake the supervision and counselling required to address the treatment need which I have summarised at [96]. As noted by Professor Pyszora, the respondent 'will benefit from significant levels of structure until he is able to develop internal control over his serious offending'.

Is the respondent a high risk serious offender?

Based the evidence before the court which I have summarised so far in these reasons, I am satisfied, by acceptable and cogent evidence and to a high degree of probability, that there is an unacceptable risk that the respondent will commit a serious offence in the future, in the absence of any measure that would provide protection of the community against that risk. The risk is unacceptable because the high likelihood that the respondent will commit serious stalking or FDV offences against a past or future intimate partner, with the serious consequences to such a victim, strongly outweighs the respondent's entitlement to be at liberty. This is a risk that, in my view, the community cannot tolerate.
I am also satisfied on the same basis that it is necessary to make a restriction order in relation to the respondent to ensure adequate protection of the community.
So, I am satisfied that it is necessary to make a restriction order in relation to the respondent to ensure adequate protection of the community against an unacceptable risk that the offender will commit a serious offence. The State has thus satisfied the onus on it to satisfy the court that the respondent is a high risk serious offender. Again, I note that counsel for the respondent accepts that this is the case.

What form of order should be made to ensure the adequate protection of the community?

Having been satisfied that the respondent is a high risk serious offender, I must then make either a continuing detention order or a supervision order. I do, however, have a discretion as to which to impose.
Accepting that the paramount consideration is the need to ensure adequate protection of the community,[52] in my view, the appropriate order is a supervision order.
[52] HRSO Act s 48(2).
The respondent has been on a supervision order since 2 January 2025. As set out at [86], his breaches of the interim order have been minor. Whilst on the order he has not breached the FVRO protecting LD and their child. He is responding well to both supervision and psychological counselling. He is in stable accommodation and is looking for employment.
At the hearing, both Professor Pyszora and Dr Bannister expressed confidence in the ability of the respondent to substantially comply with the standard conditions of a supervision order. Mr Moulton said that he had no reason to suggest that the respondent would not comply with the standard conditions of the order.
For these reasons, the respondent has satisfied me, on the balance of probabilities, that he will substantially comply with the standard conditions of the order as made. These reasons also mean that the respondent is not in the position where, as a last resort, continuing detention should be ordered. Rather, the curtailment of respondent's liberty by way of a supervision order is both necessary and sufficient to protect the community from the demonstrated unacceptable risk of harm to the community. Again, I note that counsel for the respondent accepts that the imposition of a suspension order is appropriate.
Accordingly, at the hearing on 1 May 2025, I made a supervision order in respect of the respondent. Given that the respondent was already on an interim supervision order, I was satisfied that the implementation of the order from the date of the hearing was practically feasible.
The one issue that was the subject of both evidence and submissions at the hearing was the duration of the order.
Professor Pyszora was of the view that three years would be sufficient. However, she observed in her report:[53]
Victim safety planning will depend on monitoring of any new relationship which Mr Ciavalini engages in to detect and address any early warning signs of escalating risk. It will be important for him to develop relationship skills and navigate a new relationship while still benefitting from significant support and supervision, should a Supervision Order be made, as his skills to manage his risk of further stalking will only be tested in this context.
When giving evidence she reiterated this point, saying that ideally the respondent would still be on the supervision order when he did engage in a new intimate relationship. She added that there is a risk that if the respondent did not enter into an intimate relationship whilst the supervision order was in force, he would not have had enough preparation and would re-engage in stalking behaviour.
[53] BOM page 825, par [318].
In relation to duration, Dr Bannister in his report was of the view that five years would be the optimal duration:[54]
Mr Ciavalini is highly likely to take some time to consolidate and internalise the skills required to successfully self-manage his risk. It is my opinion that in the event that the Court chooses to impose a Community Supervision order, an Order of at least 5 years would provide an opportunity to determine to what degree he is able to do this.
He reiterated this opinion when giving evidence, though he did observe that ultimately the length of time the respondent required supervision was up to him. This is because it would depend on how quickly the respondent moved from being managed under supervision to self-managing his risks.
[54] BOM page 852, par [122].
Counsel for the State did not press for a particular duration.
Counsel for the respondent invited the court to impose a supervision order of three years duration. There is a risk that, at some point, the intrusiveness of the restrictions would start to become counterproductive to the respondent's rehabilitation. This would give the respondent light at the end of the tunnel of his restrictions. Counsel made the point that, if the State towards the end of the term was of the view that the risks warranted an extension, they could apply for one.[55]
[55] HRSO Act s 55(2)(b)(ii).
I agree that ideally the supervision order needs to be in place when the respondent commences, is in and, potentially, ends his next intimate relationship. This would be a time at which he would be at high risk of re-offending. So it would be a time at which he would benefit from the support of CCOs and his psychologist to manage the relationship differently. If this does not occur for some time, it may be that CCOs in the exercise of their discretion as to the implementation of the supervision order will remove some of the conditions. For example, pursuant to HRSO Act s 31(4), CCOs can suspend the electronic monitoring of an offender subject to a supervision order whilst subject to the supervision order. Alternatively, if the respondent forms the view that the level of oversight is becoming counter-productive to his rehabilitation, he can apply to the court to have the conditions varied.[56] The level of oversight could then potentially be increased at the point in time when the respondent indicated that he wanted to start dating. In navigating any future intimate relationship the respondent will have to break out of a 20‑year pattern of problematic behaviour. For both his benefit and the benefit of his future partner, he needs to have support to do so. In my assessment, five years is appropriate.
[56] HRSO Act s 49.

I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the Supreme Court of Western Australia.
OS
Associate to the Honourable Justice Gething
8 MAY 2025