The State of Western Australia v Hood - [2025] WASC 379

JURISDICTION     :   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
CITATION:   THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA -v- HOOD [2025] WASC 379
CORAM:   LEMONIS J
HEARD:   1 APRIL 2025
DELIVERED          :   12 SEPTEMBER 2025
FILE NO/S:   SO 10 of 2024
BETWEEN:   THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Applicant
AND
ALI HOOD
Respondent

Catchwords:

Application for a restriction order under the High Risk Serious Offenders Act 2020 (WA) - Consideration of whether respondent is a high risk serious offender and appropriate order to be made if he is

Legislation:

Criminal Code (WA)
High Risk Serious Offenders Act 2020 (WA)
Sentence Administration Act 2003 (WA)

Result:

Respondent declared a high risk serious offender
Continuing detention order made

Category: B

Representation:

Counsel:

Applicant	:	T Hollaway
Respondent	:	D J McKenzie

Solicitors:

Applicant	:	State Solicitor's Office
Respondent	:	Legal Aid (WA)

Case(s) referred to in decision(s):

Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) v GTR [2008] WASC 187
Garlett v Western Australia [2022] HCA 30
The State of Western Australia v ACJ [2021] WASC 219
The State of Western Australia v Jackson [2019] WASCA 118
The State of Western Australia v Paraha [2025] WASC 20
The State of Western Australia v Williams [No 2] [2024] WASC 215

LEMONIS J:

The State of Western Australia has applied under s 35(1) of the High Risk Serious Offenders Act 2020 (WA) (HRSO Act) for a restriction order to be made in respect of the respondent (Mr Hood).
A restriction order is either a continuing detention order or a supervision order. The effect of a continuing detention order is that an offender is detained in custody, even though they have served all of the terms of imprisonment to which they have been sentenced. A supervision order permits an offender to live in the community subject to a number of mandatory and discretionary conditions.
A precondition to the making of either order is that the court finds the offender is a 'high risk serious offender' as that term is defined in the HRSO Act.

Relevant history

Most recently, Mr Hood was serving a total effective sentence of imprisonment of 4 years and 8 months that expired on 10 November 2024. The total effective sentence was comprised of the following sentences:
1.On 19 February 2021, a judge of the District Court sentenced Mr Hood to a term of imprisonment of 4 years and 4 months in respect of the following four offences. Two offences of aggravated armed robbery contrary to s 392(c) and (d) of the Criminal Code (WA) (Code), and two offences of deprivation of liberty contrary to s 333 of the Code.
2.On 9 March 2021, another judge of the District Court sentenced Mr Hood to a further term of 4 months imprisonment for the offence of armed robbery, contrary to s 392(c) of the Code.
The offences I have described at [4] above are all serious offences as that term is defined in the HRSO Act and Mr Hood's term of imprisonment was therefore in respect of a 'serious offence'. Accordingly, Mr Hood was a serious offender under custodial sentence within the meaning of that phrase as defined in s 3 of the HRSO Act.
The State made its application on 27 August 2024. Section 35(1) permitted the State to do so as there was a possibility Mr Hood might be released from custody within the period of one year after the application was made.
The requisite preliminary hearing was heard by Forrester J on 27 September 2024. At that time, Mr Hood was still in custody serving the total 4 year and 8 month sentence. Her Honour was satisfied there were reasonable grounds for believing that the court might find Mr Hood is a high risk serious offender. Her Honour was also satisfied it was appropriate to make an interim detention order until further order. Mr Hood remains in custody pursuant to that interim order.

Relevant provisions of the HRSO Act

Section 48 sets out the court's power to make a restriction order. It provides:
(1)If the court hearing a restriction order application finds that the offender is a high risk serious offender, the court must -
(a)make a continuing detention order in relation to the offender; or
(b)except as provided in section 29, make a supervision order in relation to the offender.
(2)In deciding whether to make an order under subsection (1)(a) or (b), the paramount consideration is to be the need to ensure adequate protection of the community.
Pursuant to s 48, if the court finds the offender is a high risk serious offender the court must make a continuing detention order or a supervision order. The ability to make a supervision order is subject to s 29. Section 29 provides that the offender must satisfy the court on the balance of probabilities that they will substantially comply with the standard conditions of the order.
Section 7(1) defines the phrase 'high risk serious offender' as follows:
An offender is a high risk serious offender if the court dealing with an application under this Act finds that it is satisfied, by acceptable and cogent evidence and to a high degree of probability, that it is necessary to make a restriction order in relation to the offender to ensure adequate protection of the community against an unacceptable risk that the offender will commit a serious offence.
Section 5 defines the term 'serious offence'. It does so predominantly by reference to offences specified in sch 1 div 1, and sch 1 div 2 where the offence is committed in the circumstances indicated in div 2. For the purposes of this application, I have reviewed the offences listed in sch 1 and also had regard to the balance of what s 5 prescribes is a serious offence.
The phrase 'high degree of probability' connotes a standard that is more than the civil standard of balance of probabilities but less than the criminal standard of beyond reasonable doubt.[1] The State has the onus of satisfying the court to this standard that Mr Hood is a high risk serious offender.[2]
[1] Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) v GTR [2008] WASCA 187 [28].
[2] HRSO Act, s 7(2).
In considering whether I am satisfied that Mr Hood is a high risk serious offender, I must have regard to the matters that are set out at s 7(3)(a) to (j). Section 7(3)(j) is a 'catch all' provision, which in effect provides that I must have regard to 'any other relevant matter' in addition to those set out at s 7(3)(a) to (i).
Section 7(4) sets out what I must disregard in making the relevant assessment. Specifically, I must disregard the possibility that Mr Hood might temporarily be prevented from committing a serious offence by imprisonment or remand in custody, or the imposition of bail conditions.
In The State of Western Australia v Williams [No 2],[3] I analysed these provisions, in particular by reference to the joint judgment of Kiefel CJ, Keane and Steward JJ and the separate judgment of Edelman J in Garlett v The State of Western Australia.[4] Having regard to that analysis, as I explained in Williams, the appropriate way to proceed is as follows:[5]
Whether or not a risk that an offender will commit a 'serious offence' is 'unacceptable' is a question which requires the court's judgment as to the nature and extent of the possible harm. The assessment of the nature and extent of the possible harm directs attention to the possible serious offences that might be committed and the harm they may cause. It also directs attention to the likelihood that the offender might commit such offences (that is, the likelihood the risk might eventuate). The extent to which deterrent factors have operated to reduce risk in the past feeds into the assessment of current and future risk, as does the offender's historical and current response to rehabilitation. These are all factors that inform the assessment of whether the risk is 'unacceptable'. They are by no means exhaustive. I am reluctant to attempt to provide greater definition, bearing in mind the caution expressed by the High Court in M v M against 'striving for a greater degree of definition than the subject is capable of yielding'.
If the risk is found to be 'unacceptable', the nature and extent of that unacceptable risk then informs the assessment of whether a restriction order is necessary to ensure adequate protection of the community. And, as Kiefel CJ, Keane and Steward JJ explained, the assessment of whether the order is necessary requires recognition that an offender's entitlement to be at liberty is not lightly to be denied.
(footnote omitted)
[3] The State of Western Australia v Williams [No 2] [2024] WASC 215.
[4] Garlett v Western Australia [2022] HCA 30; Williams [22] ‑ [40].
[5] Williams [39] ‑ [40].
Further, the joint judgment in Garlett explained that:[6]
The inclusion of an offence, such as robbery, in Sch 1 to the HRSO Act reflects a legislative judgment as to the kinds of offences which may be such as to cause harm of a kind from which the community needs protection different from that provided by the criminal law.
(emphasis added)
[6] Garlett [80].
Edelman J In Garlett addressed the application of the HRSO Act to robberies. His Honour said:[7]
It is of paramount importance to these reasons to emphasise that, on its proper interpretation, the HRSO Act does not permit the imposition of continuing detention orders for any robbery. In its application to robberies, the HRSO Act permits restriction orders only for anticipated robberies with a sufficiently high degree of seriousness and a sufficiently high magnitude of harm to justify a restriction order that deprives a person of their liberty for an offence that they have not committed. Even then, the restriction order will only be a continuing detention order as a matter of last resort.
[7] Garlett [282].
In respect of the type of restriction order that ought to be made, the joint judgment in Garlett quoted with approval the following additional observations of Fiannaca J in The State of Western Australia v ACJ:[8]
The court should make the order that is least invasive of the respondent's right to liberty, while at the same time ensuring an adequate degree of protection of the community, having regard to the paramount consideration stipulated in s 48(2). As was decided in respect of s 17(2) of the [Dangerous Sexual Offenders] Act, that requirement does not exclude other considerations. Further, the use of the word 'adequate' indicates that a qualitative assessment is required. It cannot simply be assumed that the most assured preventative measure is detention and, therefore, the protection of the community will always favour such an order.
(footnotes omitted)
[8] Garlett [106]; The State of Western Australia v ACJ [2021] WASC 219 [32].

Supervision order

Section 27(1) provides that a supervision order in relation to an offender is an order that the offender, when not in custody, is to be subject to stated conditions that the court considers appropriate.
The nature, conditions and period of a supervision order are addressed by s 27 and s 30.
Section 27(2) provides that a supervision order has effect from a date, and for a period, stated in the order.
Section 30(2) sets out the standard conditions of a supervision order. As I have said, a prerequisite to the making of a supervision order is that the court is satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the offender will substantially comply with the standard conditions of it.[9] Broadly speaking, the conditions in s 30(2)(a) to (e) and (g) impose reporting and notification obligations on the offender and subject the offender to intensive supervision. The standard condition provided for by s 30(2)(f) is that the offender not commit a serious offence during the period of the order.
[9] HRSO Act, s 29(1).
Section 30(3) provides the court with a discretion to impose a condition that requires the offender not to make any public comments relating to a victim of a serious offence committed by the offender. Section 30(4) regulates the exercise of that discretion.
Section 30(5) provides that a supervision order may contain any other terms that the court thinks appropriate:
(a)to ensure adequate protection of the community; or
(b)for the rehabilitation, care or treatment of the offender; or
(c)to ensure adequate protection of victims of serious offences committed by the offender.
In relation to the question of whether an offender will substantially comply with the standard conditions imposed by s 30, the joint judgment in Garlett quoted with approval the following observations of Fiannaca J in The State of Western Australia v ACJ:[10]
The question of whether the respondent will substantially comply with the standard conditions of the supervision order requires consideration of all of the circumstances, both personal to him and external, which will affect him. External circumstances include the conditions of the supervision order, the available means to monitor, supervise and treat him, and any pro-social support available to him.
[10] Garlett [103]; The State of Western Australia v ACJ [2021] WASC 219 [416].
Thus, the assessment of whether the offender will substantially comply with the standard conditions takes account of the protective and supportive measures provided by the terms of the order.
In respect of the additional conditions that a court might impose over and above the standard conditions of a supervision order, Edelman J in Garlett observed:[11]
The requirement of appropriateness [in s 27(1)] imposes a duty on the Court to make only the additional supervision conditions required to ensure 'adequate' protection of the community, while imposing the minimum intrusion on an offender's liberty.
(footnotes omitted)
[11] Garlett [230]; see HRSO Act, s 30(5), which also requires that conditions are 'appropriate'.
Further, in my view, the type of additional conditions which might be imposed are relevant to assessing the following three matters. First, whether additional conditions, taken together with the standard conditions, can ensure adequate protection of the community in the relevant circumstances. Second, if that is the case, what additional conditions are required to ensure adequate protection of the community, while imposing the minimum intrusion on an offender's liberty. Third, whether the additional conditions, taken together with the standard conditions and all of the relevant circumstances, satisfy the court that the offender will substantially comply with the standard conditions.
I turn now to the specifics of the application.

The hearing

The State tendered two volumes of a Book of Materials which respectively became Exhibits 1 and 2 of the appeal. The State also tendered an affidavit of Detective Acting Sergeant David Coton sworn 24 September 2024 in respect of the accommodation options available to Mr Hood. Detective Acting Sergeant Coton's affidavit became Exhibit 5. The State also tendered a Post Sentence Supervision Order report (PSSO report) and a Post Sentence Supervision Order (PSSO) in respect of Mr Hood. They respectively became Exhibits 3 and 4.
The State called as witnesses at the hearing Dr Petch, a psychiatrist; Dr Bannister, a psychologist; and Ms Nicole Bennetts, Mr Hood's community corrections officer. Each had prepared reports for the hearing which were contained in the Book of Materials.
Mr Hood was present at the hearing. He did not give or adduce any evidence.

Mr Hood's personal circumstances

Mr Hood was born on 8 April 1988. He is now 37 years of age. Mr Hood was born in Victoria. As is often the case, there is an array of material before the court regarding Mr Hood's personal circumstances, and it is not necessarily consistent.
Doing the best I can from the material that is before me, I am satisfied of the following matters.
Mr Hood is an Indigenous man, who had a traumatic childhood. His father left the family home before Mr Hood was born and his mother died when he was only three years of age. At that point in time, he became a ward of the State together with his younger half‑sister. They were eventually adopted, but ultimately Mr Hood was returned to State care. The available records indicate that Mr Hood was placed in a total of 79 care or foster placements from the age of about 10 years, including in about eight or nine residential homes.[12]
[12] Book of Materials Vol 2, p 498, Dr Bannister's report par 9.
Mr Hood stopped attending school at about the age of eight and left school unable to read or write. Mr Hood told Dr Petch that he learnt to read at 26 or 27 but still could not spell.[13]
[13] Book of Materials Vol 2, p 425.
Mr Hood does not have any significant employment history.
Mr Hood started using solvents from the age of eight, which he did constantly until he was about 13 or 14. At around seven or eight years of age he started to smoke cannabis, which he did for about 20 years.[14]
[14] Book of Materials Vol 2, p 425.
From the age of 13, Mr Hood used heroin regularly. He also started using amphetamines and methamphetamine from about the age of 11. Mr Hood developed an addiction to both heroin and methamphetamine. Mr Hood's use of both substances resulted in him working for a number of drug dealers in Victoria.[15]
[15] Book of Materials Vol 2, pp 425 - 426.
Mr Hood has children, although it is not clear from the material how many children he has.[16]
[16] Book of Materials Vol 2, p 425, p 499 par 14 and Book of Materials Vol 1, p 371.
Mr Hood has a limited connection to Western Australia. He came to Western Australia in 2019 with his then partner. He committed the offences for which he received the term of imprisonment of 4 years and 4 months on 3 October 2019. He committed the offence for which he received the further term of imprisonment of 4 months on 27 October 2019.
Mr Hood has not disclosed a positive support system in Western Australia.[17]
[17] ts 32.
Mr Hood has previously been a member of an outlaw motorcycle gang (OMCG). Dr Petch in his report recorded that a treatment assessment report dated 14 June 2021 stated that Mr Hood had said he will continue to be a life‑long member of that club, while also saying he would like an anti‑criminal lifestyle which he could do with the club's assistance.[18] Mr Hood denies any ongoing association with the club, and there is no direct evidence which suggests otherwise.
[18] Book of Materials Vol 2, p 456.

Offending history

In summary, the circumstances of the offending for which Mr Hood received a term of imprisonment of 4 years and 4 months are as follows.
The offending occurred as part of one overall incident and arose out of an attempt to buy drugs. Mr Hood and his partner approached a vehicle which had two people in it. One of them invited Mr Hood and his partner to get into the car, and they got into the back seat. Mr Hood sat behind the person in the driver's seat and his partner sat behind the person in the front passenger seat. As the car started to drive away, Mr Hood produced a small knife and his partner punched the person in the front passenger seat several times to the head. The driver of the vehicle applied the brakes suddenly, released his seatbelt and jumped from the moving car. Mr Hood then moved into the driver's seat and told the remaining passenger that he was coming with them. Mr Hood struck the remaining passenger to the head. The remaining passenger made attempts to try to escape by jumping from the moving vehicle. The driver of the vehicle suffered a cut to his left cheek which was glued back together in hospital, and the other passenger suffered a swollen and bruised right eye. Mr Hood and his then partner stole items worth a total combined value of $235.
The sentencing judge described the incident as a terrifying attack for both victims, emphasising that the driver of the vehicle jumped from a moving car and the remaining passenger also sought to escape from the moving car, which her Honour said demonstrated how terrified each of them must have been.[19]
[19] Book of Materials Vol 1, pp 369 - 370.

The offences were committed on 3 October 2019. The evidence before me is quite inconsistent as to when Mr Hood came to Western Australia. The sentencing judge found that Mr Hood had arrived in Western Australia in May 2019.[20] Dr Petch's report set out that Mr Hood said he had been in Western Australia for two weeks before committing the first of the offences.[21] Dr Bannister in his oral evidence said he thought Mr Hood had only been in Western Australia two days before committing the offences.[22] The treatment assessment report says that Mr Hood said he committed the offences two months after moving to Western Australia.[23]
[20] Book of Materials Vol 1, p 371.
[21] Book of Materials Vol 2, p 446.
[22] ts 70.
[23] Book of Materials Vol 1, p 405.
It is not possible for me to discern what the true position is. In any event, I proceed on the basis that Mr Hood was in Western Australia for a relatively short period before he committed those offences. Even if he did arrive in May 2019, that is only four to five months before the offences were committed.
The further offence for which Mr Hood received a sentence of 4 months, involved Mr Hood stealing three bottles of liquor from a liquor store. On departing the store, he was confronted by a security guard, at which point Mr Hood pretended to be armed with a weapon in order to dissuade the security guard from stopping him leave the store. As a consequence, the security guard walked away and Mr Hood left the store.
Mr Hood has committed a number of other offences in Victoria. In April 2005, Mr Hood committed two offences of attempted rape, two offences of false imprisonment, two offences of intentionally causing injury and one offence of theft.[24] At the time of the offending conduct, Mr Hood was 17 years of age. The circumstances of that offending are as follows.
[24] Book of Materials Vol 1, p 323.
Mr Hood and three others, with considerable pre‑planning, lured two young victims aged 15 and 16 to a place where they planned to assault the victims. This was by way of retribution for some perceived grievance. The sentencing judge said that Mr Hood and the others subjected the 'victims to a frightening, cruel and horrifying ordeal, subjecting them to all manner of threats, assaults and participation in most degrading acts and situations'.[25] The sentencing judge also remarked that Mr Hood had the greatest involvement, and his conduct included using a knife to threaten the genitals of the victims.[26]
[25] Book of Materials Vol 1, p 323.
[26] Book of Materials Vol 1, p 323.
The sentencing judge noted that Mr Hood had 134 convictions.[27] The sentencing judge imposed a total effective sentence of 3 years and 6 months.[28]
[27] Book of Materials Vol 1, p 325.
[28] Book of Materials Vol 1, p 330.
On 17 June 2012, Mr Hood committed an offence of recklessly causing serious injury. Mr Hood was visiting his then de facto partner's residence, and the victim was visiting his own de facto partner's residence, which was next door. A verbal dispute ensued between the parties. Initially, Mr Hood had a tomahawk with him, however, thankfully he put this to one side. Ultimately, Mr Hood hit the woman who lived next door and her partner went to her assistance. Mr Hood then struck the partner twice in the face with his fist. The victim was knocked unconscious and suffered a fractured orbital bone, a broken nose, lacerations and bruising to his head. The sentencing judge said that Mr Hood's punches were very forceful and damaging blows.[29] Mr Hood was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 2 years.[30]
[29] Book of Materials Vol 1, p 337.
[30] Book of Materials Vol 1, p 341.
Further, on 10 September 2016, Mr Hood committed an offence of armed robbery, which was committed while he was on bail. There were three co-offenders including Mr Hood. The context of the offending involved a dispute as to the quality of drugs that had been sold by the victim to Mr Hood.[31]
[31] Book of Materials Vol 1, p 346, par 5.
One of the other co‑offenders was armed with a machete. Mr Hood and the other co‑offenders confronted the victim and Mr Hood stole the victim's bum‑bag which contained his mobile phone. Mr Hood and another one of the co‑offenders punched the victim, who ran into a toilet cubicle, crawled out the window, slipped, fell some five to seven metres and was seriously injured.[32] Mr Hood was not sentenced for that injury. The sentencing judge assessed the armed robbery offence to be a low range, mid‑level example of such offending.[33] Mr Hood received a total sentence of 2 years and 6 months.[34]
[32] Book of Materials Vol 1, pp 346 - 347, pars 6 - 8.
[33] Book of Materials Vol 1, p 349, par 16.
[34] Book of Materials Vol 1, p 355, par 48.
The sentencing judge noted that Mr Hood had been assessed by a neuropsychologist in 2012 and that testing had confirmed Mr Hood was 'in the lowest 2% of the population on IQ quotient, and [Mr Hood suffered] from a acquired brain injury with impaired memory'.[35]
[35] Book of Materials Vol 1, p 349, par 17.
Mr Hood's criminal history also includes offences of threatening to kill, and assaulting, his then de facto partner, which occurred on 3 June 2012. Mr Hood received a total sentence of 5 months imprisonment. Further, on 2 July 2016, Mr Hood committed a number of offences against the same victim. At that point in time, a family violence interim order had been served on Mr Hood. Mr Hood assaulted the victim by punching and kicking her and throwing her around. Further, Mr Hood attempted to stab her with scissors.[36]
[36] Book of Materials Vol 1, pp 23 - 24.

The evidence

Dr Petch

Dr Petch's evidence was constituted by his written report and by oral evidence.

Dr Petch's report

In summary, Dr Petch was of the opinion that:[37]
There is evidence to suggest that Mr Hood has suffered from intellectual disability, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, and disinhibited social engagement disorder from early childhood. Thereafter he developed substance use disorder and anti‑social personality disorder and intermittent major depressive disorder. These disorders all seem to have been present during his childhood which was marked by physical, emotional and sexual abuse, instability, emotional deprivation and severe negligent.
[37] Book of Materials Vol 2, p 465.
Dr Petch expanded upon these matters in his report. Particular matters of significance are as follows.
Dr Petch said that he did not have a clear understanding of Mr Hood's impairments arising from the reported intellectual disability.[38] Dr Petch did, however, note that Mr Hood did not appear to have developed his understanding of his offending beyond very simplistic terms and that Mr Hood grappled with developing meaningful release plans.[39]
[38] Book of Materials Vol 2, p 467.
[39] Book of Materials Vol 2, p 467.
Dr Petch said that Mr Hood's substance misuse disorder is very severe and enduring and that Mr Hood's insight into the severity of the disorder is negligible.[40]
[40] Book of Materials Vol 2, p 473.
Dr Petch is of the opinion that:[41]
… without ongoing intervention, and without the control of the environment in the context of his interim detention order, monitoring and supervision, in my view the risk of relapse into further substance use is still significant. The risks of serious offending should he relapse are grave.
[41] Book of Materials Vol 2, p 474.
Dr Petch observed that there is a considerable degree of impulsivity in Mr Hood's actions and little consideration by him for the consequences of his actions on others. Dr Petch said that Mr Hood justified much of his violence by stating that it was mostly against drug dealers and associates.[42] In respect of future programs, Dr Petch said that the programs need to be delivered 'at a rate and a level with which he can engage and participate'.[43]
[42] Book of Materials Vol 2, p 475.
[43] Book of Materials Vol 2, p 475.
Dr Petch undertook a psychopathy assessment in respect of Mr Hood by reference to a psychopathy checklist. In respect of that checklist, Mr Hood scored 29, which is below the threshold of 30 for a diagnosis by Psychopathy Australia. Dr Petch said that Mr Hood 'is very close to that label being applied, which would impel a finding of high risk'.[44]
[44] Book of Materials Vol 2, p 488.
However, care needs to be taken as to the use that can be made of Dr Petch's observation. The assessment under the HSRO Act is directed to whether a person is at an unacceptable risk of committing serious offences, not a 'high risk' in a general sense. The fact that someone is close to a diagnosis of psychopathy does not necessarily mean they are at an unacceptable risk of committing serious offences. Further, Dr Petch also observed that the extent to which the checklist is valid for use in Victorian Aboriginal men is not known and therefore a degree of caution should be exercised when interpreting the scores for Mr Hood.[45]
[45] Book of Materials Vol 2, p 477.
Particular aspects of the checklist that are, however, important are as follows: [46]
(1)That Mr Hood failed to appreciate the seriousness and impact of his actions on many of his victims.
(2)When Mr Hood uses illegal substances, his actions can be callous and his treatment of others can be very violent with no consideration of the consequences.
[46] Book of Materials Vol 2, p 478.
Dr Petch also undertook an assessment of Mr Hood by reference to the 'HCR 20v3' clinical judgment tool which is used to assess the risk for violence. Dr Petch did, however, say that this test has not been specifically validated on males from an Aboriginal background.[47]
[47] Book of Materials Vol 2, p 480.
Dr Petch found that Mr Hood presented with a significant number of historical and clinical risk factors. The historical factors included amongst others, violence, other anti‑social behaviour, substance misuse, major mental disorder, violent attitudes and a lack of successful treatment or supervision response. The clinical factors included similar such matters, in particular, violent ideations or intent, the symptoms of major mental disorder and the lack of a successful treatment or supervision response.
Ultimately, Dr Petch was of the opinion that the risk that Mr Hood poses is being managed now only as a result of the interim detention order.[48] Dr Petch was of the opinion that if Mr Hood is in the community, irrespective of whether or not he was on a supervision order, the risk would no longer be adequately managed and Dr Petch said the risk to the community would seriously escalate.[49]
[48] Book of Materials Vol 2, p 488.
[49] Book of Materials Vol 2, p 488.
Of particular concern is Dr Petch's opinion that while Mr Hood is intoxicated, he does not appear to have any hesitation in using violence, which he later justifies.[50] Dr Petch identified two main issues which would increase Mr Hood's level of risk in the community: Mr Hood returning to drug use, and returning to gang membership.[51]
[50] Book of Materials Vol 2, p 489.
[51] Book of Materials Vol 2, p 489.
Dr Petch also was of the opinion that if Mr Hood is returned to the community without any supervision, his descent into more violent offending, some very serious, will likely follow at some stage.[52]
[52] Book of Materials Vol 2, p 490.
Ultimately, Dr Petch in his report was of the opinion that Mr Hood presents with a high level of risk to the community of further serious violent offending. Dr Petch said that Mr Hood's propensity to act in such a way is underpinned by his intellectual disability, his anti‑social personality disorder, the extent to which his personality approximates to psychopathy in combination with his substance use disorders.[53]
[53] Book of Materials Vol 2, p 491.
Dr Petch concluded his report by saying that, in his view, the imposition of a supervision order would carry significant risks of a further serious violent offence at some stage by Mr Hood and that any conditions that might be included in a supervision order would be unlikely to reduce these risks significantly.[54] Dr Petch said that if Mr Hood is to remain in custody, an evaluation should be undertaken to ensure the programs made available to him meet his needs, in particular, that he has the necessary cognitive capabilities to benefit from the programs. As Dr Petch noted, this may help reduce Mr Hood's future risk to more acceptable levels so a supervision order could then be reconsidered in due course.[55]

Dr Petch's oral evidence

[54] Book of Materials Vol 2, p 492.

[55] Book of Materials Vol 2, p 494.

Dr Petch expanded on Mr Hood's intellectual functioning in his oral evidence.
In evidence in chief, Dr Petch said that Mr Hood finds it very challenging to do some things intellectually. Particular examples that Dr Petch gave included problem solving, grasping what is going on around him, understanding what people are saying, and understanding the social nuances of his interactions with other people. Dr Petch said these matters are all challenging for Mr Hood and are therefore more tiring for him. As a consequence, Dr Petch is of the opinion that Mr Hood would find it more difficult to maintain mood stability and emotional neutrality.[56]
[56] ts 37.
Dr Petch recommended that future programs in which Mr Hood participates should be tailored to someone of his literacy and level of functioning. Dr Petch said that if one or two participants in a program have intellectual capacities that are not sufficient for the content of the program, then the program tends to 'go over their heads'
[58] ts 38.
In respect of the scenario where Mr Hood is only offered general rehabilitation programs, Dr Petch was asked whether there was any additional assistance that would help Mr Hood make gains from those programs. Dr Petch raised two potential options. First, Mr Hood attends the standard program but in between has the support of an individual therapist or psychologist to go through the program content with him. Second, a specific program is tailored for his intellectual capacity.[59]
[59] ts 38 - ts 39.
In Dr Petch's report, he spoke of the risks of very serious violence increasing exponentially if Mr Hood returned to drugs and returned to gang membership. The report did not identify what Dr Petch meant by 'very serious violence'. In Dr Petch's oral evidence I asked him what he meant by that phrase. I understood his answer to be that the phrase 'very serious violence' conveyed similar drug related violence to that which Mr Hood has committed previously.[60]
[60] ts 45 - ts 47.
Dr Petch suggested that a potential advantage of further neuropsychological testing of Mr Hood is that it may indicate that he satisfies the criteria for NDIS funding.[61]
[61] ts 48.
In cross-examination, Dr Petch said that the preferred type of accommodation for Mr Hood will be one that is supported by an agency.[62] Dr Petch explained that the principal reason for this was that Mr Hood has a fairly negligible history of living in stable accommodation 'when he has been on his own'.[63]
[62] ts 50.
[63] ts 50.
Dr Petch identified that a significant factor in structuring a drug relapse program is for Mr Hood to have an understanding of his drive to use drugs, the positive and negative impacts of drug use, and his wish to use or remain abstinent.[64] Dr Petch said that while Mr Hood has expressed a desire not to use drugs in the community, he has not demonstrated an understanding as to how he might achieve that.[65]
[64] ts 53.
[65] ts 53.
Dr Petch was taken to the conditions of both the PSSO and also a possible supervision order. He was of the opinion that even if the proposed conditions of the supervision order were strictly enforced, the risk of Mr Hood committing a serious offence would still be high. In this respect, Dr Petch was of the opinion that Mr Hood would find it very difficult to remain abstinent from substance misuse. Further, Dr Petch is of the opinion that Mr Hood would find it very stressful to live in the community and in those circumstances, the drive to use drugs is even stronger.[66] Dr Petch said that substance misuse is a very major risk factor for Mr Hood.[67]

Dr Bannister

[66] ts 58.

[67] ts 59.

Dr Bannister's evidence was also constituted by his written report and by oral evidence.

Dr Bannister's report

Dr Bannister undertook a psychopathy assessment in respect of Mr Hood. On that assessment, Mr Hood had a total score of 28, which Dr Bannister said is below the generally accepted cut‑off in Australia of 30.[68] It is not clear from Dr Bannister's report whether that assessment is appropriate for Aboriginal men.
[68] Book of Materials Vol 2, pp 506 - 507, pars 48 and 50.
In any event, what is of concern is that Mr Hood scored highly in respect of the areas of lack of remorse and empathy, and lack of responsibility taking.[69]
[69] Book of Materials Vol 2, p 507, par 50.
Dr Bannister also assessed Mr Hood by reference to the Violence Risk Scale Second Edition (VRS-2). Mr Hood's total combined static and dynamic risk variable was 69 out of a possible 78. This apparently suggests that he will have a 46% to 67.6% chance of violently reoffending within three years and a 63% to 80% chance of violently offending within five years if not subject to an order.[70] In this case, I have not found these statistical results to be of much assistance. The VRS-2 does not assess the risk of Mr Hood committing a serious offence. Rather, it assesses the risk of him engaging in violent and general recidivism. The statistical assessment also does not appear to address the degree of violence that might be used. Further, as I set out below, in Dr Bannister's oral evidence, he explained that the definition of violence in the VRS-2 includes non-physical acts.
[70] Book of Materials Vol 2, pp 514 - 515, par 91.
It must be kept in mind that the definition of a high risk serious offender in the HRSO Act is not directed to the risk that a person may engage in any violence, irrespective of its degree. The violence in prospect must constitute a serious offence. It also must have a sufficiently high degree of seriousness and a sufficiently high magnitude of harm to justify an order being made that deprives a person of their liberty for an offence that they have not committed.[71]
[71] See by analogy the observations of Edelman J in Garlett at [282] in respect of anticipated robberies.
Dr Bannister, in his own assessment of Mr Hood, said that:[72]
Mr Hood recognised that he had problems, but had not yet demonstrated he had taken recent active and concrete steps to address them in a comprehensive way, either through a lack of capacity, motivation or opportunity. These included factors such as his violent lifestyle, criminal attitudes and peers, and impulsivity.
[72] Book of Materials Vol 2, p 515, par 93.
Dr Bannister identified the most serious risk scenario for Mr Hood is that he relapses back to using illicit drugs, further weakening his capacity for self‑management, leading to him committing a serious offence.[73]
[73] Book of Materials Vol 2, p 515, par 94.
In Dr Bannister's opinion, Mr Hood poses a high risk of violent and general offending if not subject to a restriction order.[74] Dr Bannister identified Mr Hood's outstanding treatment needs as including anti‑social attitudes and peers, work ethic, interpersonal aggression, emotional management, substance abuse, relationships, impulse control, and cognitive distortions.[75]
[74] Book of Materials Vol 2, p 516, par 99.
[75] Book of Materials Vol 2, p 516, par 101.
Dr Bannister said that if a continuing detention order is made, then Mr Hood may benefit from engaging in individual treatment with an experienced psychologist. Dr Bannister said that Mr Hood's ability to gain from such treatment is likely to be tempered by his hesitance to engage in remedial attempts, any intellectual or cognitive deficits and his discomfort in trusting others and being vulnerable. Dr Bannister said that these factors should be considered by the treating clinician allocated to Mr Hood.[76]
[76] Book of Materials Vol 2, p 517, par 102.

Dr Bannister was also of the opinion that Mr Hood may benefit from an updated neuropsychological assessment which would determine the nature and severity of any areas of intellectual/cognitive deficit.[77]

Dr Bannister's oral evidence

[77] Book of Materials Vol 2, p 518, par 106.

Dr Bannister explained in his oral evidence that the definition of violence in the VRS-2 incorporates significant psychological and physical harm to someone else.[78] Dr Bannister explained that the definition of violence would include conduct such as stalking.[79]
[78] ts 63.
[79] ts 63 - ts 64.
Dr Bannister said that when he stated in his report that Mr Hood was a high risk of violent reoffending, he meant that Mr Hood posed a high risk of committing another serious offence as defined by the HRSO Act. He also clarified that he meant another serious offence that involves violence.[80]
[80] ts 68 - ts 69.
Dr Bannister accepted there would be benefit in obtaining a further neuropsychological assessment of Mr Hood.
In cross-examination, Dr Bannister explained that while Mr Hood has expressed a desire to live a pro‑social life, he has never really done that. Dr Bannister said Mr Hood does not know what a pro‑social life looks like or what he needs to do to get there and invariably, he will need support.[81]
[81] ts 74 - ts 75.
In Dr Bannister's re‑examination, Dr Bannister said that he thinks Mr Hood should be allocated an individual counselling clinician who should start to work with him.[82] Dr Bannister said Mr Hood would be more successful living positively in the community if beforehand, he had practical supports in place, had treatment which started to address his criminogenic needs and had established a relationship with his counsellor. Dr Bannister said this would prepare him for release into the community.[83]
[82] ts 77 - ts 78.
[83] ts 78.
Dr Bannister said that he and the Community Offender Monitoring Unit attempted to obtain a copy of the previous neuropsychological report in respect of Mr Hood, but were unsuccessful.[84]

PSSO report and Treatment Options Report dated 28 February 2025

[84] ts 62. See also the evidence of Ms Bennetts at ts 80.

The PSSO report and Treatment Options Report (TOR) noted that Mr Hood was suitable for the Violence Offending Treatment Program and the Addiction Offending Pathways Program, however, had refused to participate in these programs.
The TOR report says that the programs independently take between three and ten months to complete, with additional time required to obtain program completion reports that inform future treatment needs.
During his interview for the PSSO report, Mr Hood said that he completed the Violence Offending Treatment Program in Victoria and the Prisoners Review Board did not grant him parole after he had done so. He said that he then decided not to do any programs and to serve his full sentence, as doing a program did not guarantee him being released on parole.[85]

Community Supervision Assessment Report dated 28 March 2025 (CSA report)

[85] PSSO Report p 3.

In the interview for the purpose of the CSA report, Mr Hood denied any ongoing association with any OMCG. He also said he did not have any family members or social supports in Western Australia beyond his ex‑brother-in-law, who he proposed to live with. The CSA report identified other accommodation options available for Mr Hood, however, these options are very much at the preliminary stage of investigation.
While in prison, Mr Hood has been subject to urinalysis on five occasions. In November 2024 he returned a positive result to buprenorphine, and otherwise has tested negative. [86]
[86] Book of Materials Vol 2, p 505, par 40.
Mr Hood has held the position of unit cook since 24 August 2023.[87]
[87] Book of Materials Vol 2, p 505, par 41.
The CSA report was prepared by Ms Bennetts. In her oral evidence, she said that obtaining a further neuropsychological report would be necessary for Mr Hood to obtain NDIS funding.[88]
[88] ts 81 - ts 82.

Mandatory Factors

Section 7(3)(a)

Section 7(3)(a) requires that I have regard to the reports prepared under s 74 and the extent to which Mr Hood cooperated in the examinations required for the preparation of those reports. The relevant reports are those of Dr Petch and Dr Bannister. I have addressed their reports and their oral evidence at [59] to [99] above. It is not suggested that Mr Hood did not cooperate in the examinations.

Section 7(3)(b)

Section 7(3)(b) requires that I have regard to any additional assessments. These comprise the PSSO report, the TOR and the CSA report.
I have addressed these reports at [100] to [106] above.

Sections 7(3)(c) and (d)

It is useful to address s 7(3)(c) and (d) together. Section 7(3)(c) requires that I have regard to information indicating whether or not Mr Hood has a propensity to commit serious offences in the future. Section 7(3)(d) requires that I have regard to whether there is any pattern of offending behaviour by Mr Hood.
For present purposes, I am satisfied that the word 'propensity' encapsulates the person having an inclination or disposition to behave in a particular way.[89]
[89] See for example The State of Western Australia v Jackson [2019] WASCA 118 [20].
The requisite assessment is directed to whether a person has a propensity to commit serious offences in the future. This assessment thus encapsulates, at least, an assessment of whether the person has a current propensity and then endeavouring to predict the extent to which that propensity may change over time. Also, the propensity is directed to the commission of serious offences, as opposed to offences generally.
In my view, Mr Hood has a propensity to commit serious offences of the following type, which is likely to continue unless Mr Hood makes significant rehabilitative gains:
1.while under the influence of drugs, to commit physical assaults, while armed with an offensive weapon; and
2.while under the influence of drugs, to steal, while armed or pretending to be armed with an offensive weapon.
He also has a pattern of offending in the manner I have described at [113] above.

Sections 7(3)(e) and (f)

It is useful to address s 7(3)(e) and (f) together.
Section 7(3)(e) requires that I have regard to any efforts made by Mr Hood to address the cause or causes of his offending behaviour, including whether he has participated in any rehabilitation program. Section 7(3)(f) requires that I have regard to whether Mr Hood's participation in any rehabilitation program has had a positive effect.

Self‑evidently, prior attempts at rehabilitation have not resulted in entrenched gains for Mr Hood. It is not clear what programs Mr Hood undertook in Victoria. However, given Mr Hood's subsequent offending in Western Australia, any such programs do not appear to have resulted in material rehabilitative gains. Of particular significance is that Mr Hood has not been able to develop and implement a reliable plan that prevents him relapsing into drug use.

Section 7(3)(g)

Section 7(3)(g) requires that I have regard to Mr Hood's antecedents (his personal background) and criminal record.
I have addressed these matters at [33] to [57] above.

Section 7(3)(h)

Section 7(3)(h) requires that I have regard to the risk that if Mr Hood were not subject to a restriction order, he would commit a serious offence.

The particular matters of importance in making this assessment are the extensive nature of Mr Hood's offending, his lack of insight into his behaviour, his lack of any substantive gains in rehabilitation, his propensity to commit serious offences in the future, and the pattern of his offending behaviour. Having regard to these matters, I am satisfied that if Mr Hood were not subject to a restriction order, there is a significant risk he would commit a serious offence of the type I have described at [113] above.

Section 7(3)(i)

Section 7(3)(i) requires that I have regard to the need to protect members of the community from the risk that I have identified at [113] and [121].
To date, the serious offences that Mr Hood has committed exposed members of the community to the risk of significant harm, predominantly because of his use of weapons. Thankfully, so far, no significant physical harm has been caused. However, the use of weapons in drug-fuelled offending carries with it a material risk of significant harm being caused, including harm that reaches (at least) the level of grievous bodily harm. The nature and extent of the prospective harm is therefore significant. There is an obvious need to protect the community from the risk of him committing such offences, especially serious offences that involve the use of weapons.

Section 7(3)(j)

Section 7(3)(j) requires that I have regard to any other relevant matter.
The Prisoners Review Board has imposed a PSSO in respect of Mr Hood. It is for two years. It provides that, amongst other matters, Mr Hood undertake counselling in the community.[90] Second, it is a condition of the PSSO that Mr Hood attend random urinalysis as directed.
[90] Additional requirements, PSSO page 3, condition 2.
The PSSO remains in place notwithstanding the making of the interim detention order. Section 74J(3) of the Sentence Administration Act 2023 (WA) provides that if an offender becomes a 'serious offender under restriction' during the period of the PSSO, then the PSSO is cancelled. A 'serious offender under restriction' is a person who is subject to a continuing detention order, a supervision order or an interim supervision order.[91] Therefore, the making of the interim detention order does not result in the cancellation of the PSSO.
[91] Section 74A of the Sentence Administration Act 2003 (WA)states that ‘serious offender under restriction’ has the meaning given in s 3 of the HRSO Act. That definition does not include an offender subject to an interim detention order. The Prisoner’s Review Board may cancel a PSSO before it starts (s 74J) and may amend a PSSO at any time before it ends (s 74(I)(1)).
Mr McKenzie submitted that the PSSO provided adequate protection of the community, such that it is not necessary to make a restriction order in respect of Mr Hood. I address this submission below.

Disposition

In my view, there is acceptable and cogent evidence that demonstrates there is a significant risk that Mr Hood will engage in drug‑fuelled violence using weapons, including in scenarios where Mr Hood attempts to steal property from the victims. Such conduct, if carried out, constitutes offences of robbery with violence under s 392 of the Code which is a serious offence under the HRSO Act. Further, the use of weapons in drug‑fuelled violence carries with it a significant risk that serious harm will be caused. The presence of weapons carries with it a significant risk that the harm caused will elevate to (at least) the degree of grievous bodily harm, which would constitute an offence under s 297 of the Code.
In coming to this view, I am satisfied that there is a significant risk that Mr Hood will relapse into substance abuse. As to Mr Hood's previous OMCG affiliations, on the evidence before me there is no suggestion that he has any such connections in Western Australia. That of course is not determinative, however it does seem to potentially reduce the risk of him affiliating with such organisations if released into the community in Western Australia.
A particular concern I have is that Mr Hood does not appear to have any substantive degree of insight into the cause of his drug use, nor does he have any substantive relapse plan in place. Given that Mr Hood has, tragically, been using drugs since he was a young boy, he needs to develop a substantive relapse plan before the court could be satisfied that his risk of relapsing to drug use is tolerable.
The principal submission made on Mr Hood's behalf is that the PSSO will provide adequate protection to the community and thus he does not present with an unacceptable risk and/or it is not necessary to make a restriction order. That submission has two key aspects. First, it is a condition of the PSSO that Mr Hood undertake counselling in the community.[92] Second, it is a condition of the PSSO that Mr Hood attend random urinalysis as directed.[93]
[92] Additional requirements, PSSO page 3, condition 2.
[93] Additional requirements, PSSO page 3, condition 4.
Mr Hood does not appear to have made substantial gains in his rehabilitation. There is limited information before me as to what programs Mr Hood undertook in Victoria. However, not long after Mr Hood left Victoria and arrived in Western Australia, Mr Hood committed serious offences in Western Australia and reverted to drug use. Accordingly, whatever programs he may have done in Victoria, they did not prevent that behaviour.
Mr Hood has a diagnosis of a substance use disorder, involving the use of alcohol and amphetamines. His use of illicit substances is a significant aspect of his offending behaviour. On the information before me, except for one incident when Mr Hood tested positive for buprenorphine in November 2024, Mr Hood has abstained from substance use while in prison. That is a positive factor in Mr Hood's favour. However, if he were released into the community, there are presently no protective factors in place that would sufficiently reduce the risk of him reverting to substance use.
The effect of what is proposed by Mr Hood's counsel is that Mr Hood would undertake counselling in the community without having first achieved substantial rehabilitative gains and without having developed a realistic drug relapse plan. An approach whereby the substantive aspect of Mr Hood's rehabilitation is undertaken in the community is fraught with risk. Also, a requirement that Mr Hood submit to random urinalysis in the community does not necessarily mean that any relapse to drug use would be detected before he commits any serious offences. Further, if Mr Hood does relapse to drug use, there is a greater risk he will gravitate towards negative influences, including an OMCG, because his drug use would necessarily result in him associating with people who are committing criminal offences.
As I said during the hearing, it seems to me that Mr Hood is at the stage of aspirational, rather than demonstrated, rehabilitation. That aspiration is important. However, Mr Hood needs to demonstrate material gains in rehabilitation, in particular regarding his drug use, before his risk of being released into the community is tolerable.
As to accommodation, it is predominantly relevant to risk assessment. The overall nature of the available accommodation may reduce the risk of reoffending, it may increase the risk of reoffending, or it may be neutral. Accommodation also has features that may not necessarily point in the same direction regarding risk, for example location, type, other occupants, cost and available support services.[94]
[94] The State of Western Australia v Paraha [2025] WASC 20 [57].
Mr Hood's counsel said that a potential benefit of the accommodation proposed here is that Mr Hood knows the person who lives there. The proposed accommodation is occupied by a person who has committed offences relating to illicit drugs, being armed or pretending to be armed in way that may cause fear, and obstructing public officers. I do not have any information as to whether the occupant has achieved substantive rehabilitation. In the absence of that information, the proposed accommodation is, at best, neutral. Further, I cannot be satisfied on the information before me that the accommodation provides any positive support structures for Mr Hood.
I appreciate that a particular difficulty for Mr Hood is that he is quite isolated in Western Australia. His connection to Western Australia is very limited and he does not have immediate family support in Western Australia. This reinforces the need for Mr Hood to be provided with assistance to obtain supported accommodation in Western Australia. However, Mr Hood's isolation does not necessarily reduce his risk of committing serious offences.
Finally in respect of the PSSO, it is due to expire on 9 November 2026. It is very unlikely that Mr Hood will have achieved sufficient gains in rehabilitation by then such that he could live unsupervised in the community without there being an unacceptable risk to the community of him committing serious offences.
For these reasons, I am satisfied to the requisite standard that is necessary to make a restriction order in relation to Mr Hood to ensure adequate protection of the community against an unacceptable risk that he will commit a serious offence. Thus, I am satisfied he is a high risk serious offender within the meaning of s 7(1) of the HRSO Act.
Accordingly, pursuant to s 48(1) of the HRSO Act, I must either make a continuing detention order or make a supervision order.
In that respect, I should make the order that is least invasive of Mr Hood's right to liberty while at the same time, ensuring an adequate degree of protection of the community, having regard to the paramount consideration of the need to ensure adequate protection of the community proscribed by s 48(2).
I am satisfied that a supervision order does not provide adequate protection of the community. In this respect, I have had regard to Mr Hood's offending, the absence of any substantive rehabilitation, Mr Hood's lack of insight into his offending behaviour, that he does not have a demonstrated substance relapse plan, and the proposed accommodation. Furthermore, for the same reasons, I am not satisfied on the balance of probabilities that Mr Hood would substantially comply with the condition not to commit a serious offence during the period of the order. Accordingly, a supervision order is not appropriate.
The appropriate order to make is a continuing detention order.

Recommendations

In light of the evidence of Dr Petch and Dr Bannister, it is apparent Mr Hood would benefit from a more focused approach to his rehabilitation. This ensures he would have the best prospect of being released into the community on the first review of the continuing detention order.
I have observed a recurring theme on applications under the HRSO Act that offenders are being offered rehabilitation programs which are not suited to their intellectual capacity, understanding of the English language and/or cultural background. That theme is of much concern. Not only will those offenders struggle to achieve material gains in their rehabilitation, they also are likely to become frustrated in their attempts to complete the programs and discouraged from continuing. It must be kept in mind that one of the objects of the HRSO Act is to provide for the care or treatment of high risk serious offenders.[95] It is very difficult to see how that object is met if offenders are offered programs that are not suitable for them.
[95] HRSO Act, s 8.
In light of the observations I have made at [80], [106], [138], [145] and [146], I recommend the following things occur:
1.A further neuropsychological report should be obtained in respect of Mr Hood. If that report suggests that he has a level of intellectual disability that meets the criteria for NDIS funding, he should be provided with support to apply for that funding.
2.The programs made available to Mr Hood should be tailored to his level of intellectual capacity and his level of education. This may require either individual counselling, or that Mr Hood participate in a combination of group counselling, and individual sessions that take place in tandem with the group counselling. These individual sessions would assist him to comprehend the group counselling and integrate gains from it.
3.Mr Hood should be assisted to apply for accommodation provided by support agencies.

Conclusion

For these reasons, I will make a continuing detention order.

I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the Supreme Court of Western Australia.

SP
Associate to the Hon Justice Lemonis
12 SEPTEMBER 2025

[57] ts 38.