Director-General, Dept of Community Services v D and Ors

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CITATION: Director-General, Dept of Community Services v D & Ors [2007] NSWSC 762
HEARING DATE(S): 4-8 September, 22 September, 16 October and 16 November 2006
 
JUDGMENT DATE : 

13 July 2007
JURISDICTION: Equity Division
Adoptions List
JUDGMENT OF: Brereton J
DECISION: 1. Revoke previous consent dispense order. 2. Dismiss application for consent dispense order. 3. Dismiss application for adoption order. 4. Order pursuant to Adoption Act, s 92, that proposed adoptive parents have parental responsibility for, and custody and care of, child. 5. Order that child have contact with birth mother. 6. Reserve liberty to the parties to apply for further orders in respect of contact, including orders further defining contact. 7. Order that in exercise of their parental responsibility, applicants may change child’s surname to their own, provided that they retain her present surname as middle name.
CATCHWORDS: FAMILY LAW – Adoption – jurisdiction - whether court can make order allocating parental responsibility when court refuses to make adoption order - consent to adoption – grounds for revocation of a consent dispense order – grounds for making consent dispense order – whether serious cause for concern for welfare of child – trans-racial adoption – where child of African parentage securely attached to white proposed adoptive parents for nearly four years – where birth mother’s consent subsequently declared ineffective - undesirability of child being raised apart from natural mother family culture and ethnicity – undesirability of disrupting secure attachments – significance of birth mother’s parenting capacity – relevance of birth mother’s wishes – whether adoption in best interests of child – whether adoption clearly preferable to all other alternatives - contact – benefits of contact in reducing sense of abandonment and loss of mother and culture – change of name – where no adoption order but proposed adoptive parents to have parental responsibility - relevant considerations
LEGISLATION CITED: (CTH) Family Law Act 1975 ss 4, 60B, 60CC, 61C, 61DA, 64B, 69ZK
(CTH) Family Law Reform Act 1995
(CTH) Family Law Regulations 1984 reg 12D, Sch 5
(NSW) Adoption of Children Act 1965 ss 7, 8, 24, 32, 52, 67, 71, 84, 86, 90, 92, 101
(NSW) Children and Young Persons (Care and Protection) Act 1998 ss 90 151
(NSW) Commonwealth Powers (Family Law – Children) Act 1986
(NSW) Mental Health Act 1990
(UK) Children Act 1989
CASES CITED: ANR and SCR v LJW (Racine’s case) (1983) 36 RFL (2d) 1
Application of DoCS, Re C [2004] NSWSC 702
B & R (1995) 19 Fam LR 594
Beach & Stemmler (1979) FLC 90-692
Chapman & Palmer (1978) FLC 90-510; 4 Fam LR 462
D v Director-General, Department of Community Services [2005] NSWCA 474; 34 Fam LR 445
Department of Community Services v D [2004] NSWSC 1241
Ex parte West (1861) 1 Legge 1475
F v Langshaw (1983) 8 Fam LR 833
Flanagan & Handcock (2001) FLC 93-074
George & Radford (1976) FLC 90-060; 1 Fam LR 11,510
Goudge & Goudge (1984) 9 Fam LR 500; (1984) FLC 91-534
Hodak, Newman…
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Details
Case
[2007] NSWSC 762
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case involved the Director-General of the Department of Community Services as a party, with several other parties also involved in the dispute. The central issue was whether the court could make an order allocating parental responsibility in the context of an adoption application, despite refusing to make an adoption order. The court had to consider whether the consent to adoption could be revoked, the grounds for making a consent dispense order, and whether there was serious cause for concern for the welfare of the child. Additionally, the case raised questions about trans-racial adoption, the child's secure attachment to the proposed adoptive parents, the significance of the birth mother's parenting capacity, and the relevance of the birth mother's wishes. The court was also tasked with determining whether adoption was in the best interests of the child and whether it was clearly preferable to all other alternatives.

The legal issues before the court were complex and involved balancing various factors. The court had to weigh the child's secure attachment to the proposed adoptive parents against the potential benefits of the child being raised within their natural mother's family culture and ethnicity. It also had to consider the desirability of disrupting these secure attachments and the significance of the birth mother's parenting capacity. The court further had to evaluate the relevance of the birth mother's wishes and whether they should be a decisive factor in determining the child's best interests. Ultimately, the court had to decide whether adoption was in the best interests of the child and whether it was clearly preferable to all other alternatives. The court also had to consider the benefits of contact in reducing the child's sense of abandonment and loss of their mother and culture, as well as the implications of a change of name.

The court concluded that it had the jurisdiction to make an order allocating parental responsibility even if it refused to make an adoption order. The court found that there was serious cause for concern for the welfare of the child, particularly given the child's secure attachment to the proposed adoptive parents. The court acknowledged the undesirability of disrupting these attachments and the potential benefits of contact in reducing the child's sense of abandonment. However, the court also recognised the importance of the child being raised within their natural mother's family culture and ethnicity. The court found that adoption was not clearly preferable to all other alternatives, and it was not in the child's best interests to be raised apart from their natural mother's family culture and ethnicity. Consequently, the court refused to make an adoption order but granted the proposed adoptive parents parental responsibility. The court also ordered that the child's name should not be changed and that there should be regular contact between the child and their birth mother.

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